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This thesis takes issue with Emily Miller Budick’s assertion that Holocaust fiction no longer 
needs “to establish its legitimacy against the charge that a fictional text is either inadequate, 
inappropriate or even endangering to the task of representing the Nazi genocide of the 
Second World War” (2015, p. 1). It argues instead that modern Holocaust fiction – texts 
written between the year 2000 and the present – demonstrates a particularly reductive and 
depthless approach to the subject, which is typified by a growing obsession with the suffering 
body. This stems, I contend, from a specifically Auschwitz-oriented understanding of the 
Shoah which has gradually been solidified in both commemorative culture and fictional 
recreations of the event over the last half-century. 
    The works utilised span from 1961 to 2018. While the pre-21st century texts are used to 
establish problematic trends in Holocaust writing, those written from the year 2000 forward 
are assessed according to Berel Lang’s standard of silence. In contrast to Budick’s position, 
the thesis argues that a text must be “more probative, more incisive” or “more revealing” 
(Lang, 2000, p. 18) than silence in order to have societal value. Many modern texts, it argues, 
do not meet these criteria.  
     Though the thesis utilises the work of several theorists, two particular figures have shaped 
the central argument: Alison Landsberg and Gillian Rose. Landsberg’s theory of “prosthetic 
memory” is used to explore the notion that modern fiction has become overly reliant on 
recreations of bodily suffering as a means of post-memorial connection with the past. Rose’s 
theory of Holocaust Piety is then used to outline the condition modern Holocaust fiction 
should aspire to. While pious texts are designed to keep the Holocaust ineffable, by 
maintaining psychological distance from the victims and perpetrators, impious texts are 
intended to demystify the Holocaust. For the Holocaust to have continued meaning in the 
present, I argue, we must come to a more psychologically and culturally particular (or 
impious) understanding of the victims of the Shoah. We cannot understand them only as 
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It has been many years since Holocaust fiction has had to establish its legitimacy against the 
charge that a fictional text is either inadequate, inappropriate or even endangering to the task 
of representing the Nazi genocide of the Second World War. (Budick, 2015, p. 1)   
 
In the opening of her study The Subject of Holocaust Fiction, Emily Miller Budick suggests 
that Holocaust fiction – a body of texts previously described by Sue Vice as inherently 
“scandalous” and liable to inspire “repulsion and acclaim in equal measure” (2000, p. 1) –  
no longer needs to justify its own capacity to represent the horrors of the Nazi genocide. By 
making this claim, Budick is asserting that the position of restraint favoured by critics such 
as Berel Lang is now a thing of the past. Lang’s core position is that historical writing is 
simply “more adequate”, “more compelling” and indeed “more valuable” (2003, p. 140) as 
a means of representing the subject. Chief among his concerns, as Bernard Harrison notes, 
is the notion that the author will fundamentally warp historical fact in his attempt to reframe 
it into a narrative. In short, Holocaust fiction runs the inherent risk of incorrectly interpreting 
and foundationally misrepresenting the truth of the Holocaust. Holocaust fiction, therefore, 
has the potential to put forward and then perpetuate a misreading and misrepresentation of 
the Holocaust past, one which will potentially alter our collective cultural memory of the 
atrocity. As Harrison puts it: “On the one hand, [the writer’s] choices will exhibit a bias 
determined by his personality and outlook, which will work to interpose that persona and 
point of view between the reader and the unvarnished facts of the Holocaust” (2006, p. 81). 
The inbuilt limitations of the author – from their personal prejudices to their partial readings 
of the historical raw data – will likely influence their presentation of the subject. While the 
phrase “unvarnished facts” may be considered problematic, Holocaust texts undoubtedly 
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require a historical foundation on which to construct their narrative.2 As Vice has noted, 
“intertextuality is likely to be the central element in Holocaust fiction” (2000, p. 161). By 
this she means that Holocaust fiction is explicitly reliant on “anterior sources” (p. 161) – 
largely survivor texts and assorted historical documents – in order to provide a foundation 
of authenticity for the piece of work in question. However, this thesis argues, our current 
post-memorial distance from the Holocaust is beginning to profoundly affect the relative 
value of modern-day Holocaust fiction.3 Returning to Budick’s quotation, it argues that 
many modern Holocaust texts – particularly those attempting to depict the reality of life 
within the camp system – are inadequate, inappropriate and even endangering to the task of 
representing the Nazi genocide. 
    This thesis explores the gradual conceptual narrowing of the Holocaust, as the historical 
Holocaust has been re-shaped into an explicitly Auschwitz-centric vision of the atrocity. As 
Irving Howe notes, the death camp now represents “what must be considered the essential 
Holocaust” (1988, p. 189). As Tim Cole implies, this broader vision of the death camp has 
devolved into one defining location: “More than any other place, ‘Auschwitz’ has come to 
symbolise everything about the ‘Holocaust’. ‘Auschwitz’ is to the ‘Holocaust’ what 
‘Graceland’ is to ‘Elvis’” (1999, pp. 98-99). Auschwitz, therefore, has become the focal 
point of modern Holocaust memory. It is the defining element of the Shoah which modern 
 
2 Hayden White, for instance, would argue that historical raw data must be narrativized in order for it to 
have meaning. Facts cannot stand on their own but must be framed within a narrative in order for them to 
have significance. As White puts it: “For example, no historical event is intrinsically tragic; it can only be 
conceived as such from a particular point of view or from within the context of a structured set of events of 
which it is an element enjoying a privileged place (1978, p. 84).  
Moreover, as Peter Weiss’s The Investigation (1965) illustrates, it is essentially impossible to reproduce the 
“raw data” (Rosenfeld, 1988, p. 158) of the Shoah without narrativizing or biasing the presentation to a 
certain extent. As Tammis Thomas suggests, Weiss’s text is slanted towards a particularly “Marxist reading 
of the facts” (2010, p. 558), which depicts Auschwitz as an “extreme form of capitalism” (p. 558) and its 
natural consequence. 
3 As the ‘Textual Choices and Rationale’ portion of this Introduction illustrates, the dissertation utilises both 
pre-21st century texts and 21st century (or “modern”) Holocaust fiction. While the pre-21st century material 
is used to establish trends in Holocaust writing, the 21st century material is judged for its potentially 
problematic qualities.     
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texts pivot around, given their regard for it as the conceptual centre of the atrocity. This 
“exceptionalist” (Mintz, 2001, p. 38) view of the Holocaust – which emphasises the “horror 
of the Holocaust” (p. 78) and which regards Auschwitz as “a metonymy for the Holocaust 
as a whole” (p. 62) – has profoundly influenced the core truths reproduced in Holocaust 
fiction. As this thesis contends, however, our post-memorial understanding of Auschwitz 
has become increasingly partial. To borrow a phrase from Alan Mintz, we have “an urgent 
need to imagine the Holocaust, while at the same time we have a poverty of images” (p. 
147). Modern fiction, this thesis argues, frequently struggles to connect with both the 
physical and experiential reality of the Auschwitz space. Given our post-memorial distance 
from the events of the Shoah, we lack the capacity to reproduce the inner-reality of the 
Auschwitz camp – the space as it was experienced by the internees themselves.4 As 
Holocaust fiction relies on a foundation of historical fact in order to produce an authentic 
narrative – one which represents certain core truths regarding the atrocity – flawed and 
partial historical foundations commonly lead to problematic and unrepresentative Holocaust 
texts. Modern Holocaust fiction, this thesis contends, often struggles to covey the truth of 
the Holocaust, instead conveying only its own inability to engage with the Holocaust past. 
Frustrated with the unreachable distance of the Holocaust dead, along with the experiential 
reality of life in Auschwitz, modern fiction has come to focus increasingly on representations 
of the suffering body.    
    Our collective memory of the Holocaust, as asserted by both Mintz and Sophia Marshman, 
“has been shaped more by popular representation than by testimony” (Marshman, 2005, p. 
1).5 Both authors focus predominantly on film in their work; yet they do note that “works of 
 
4 As Chapter Three argues, we lack the visual resources to reproduce the reality of life and death in 
Auschwitz. A cultural overreliance and handful of assorted images and films and led to a partial 
reproduction of the Auschwitz site, one which is broadly unrepresentative of its historical reality.  
5 Sophia Marshman has also published under the name Sophia Wood.  
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popular culture” (Mintz, 2001, p. 83) in general have impacted our cultural conception of 
the Holocaust. Fiction, according to Marshman, has effectively edged the survivor to “the 
margins of Holocaust representation” (2005, p. 4), given its general accessibility and its 
immediate cross-cultural appeal. This is deeply problematic, this thesis contends, as in place 
of the humanity of the survivor – or the Holocaust dead, who have been portrayed with 
fraternal depth in survivor and ghetto writing – modern fiction instead presents the victims 
of the Holocaust as empty, inhabitable shells.6 As this thesis suggests, modern Holocaust 
fiction is concerned explicitly with facilitating a bodily connection to the Holocaust.7 Unable 
to connect with the Holocaust dead and incapable of fathoming the experiences of survivors, 
modern Holocaust fiction often resorts to creating moments of bodily connection to 
Holocaust suffering – scenes of trauma which the viewer/reader may engage with on a 
physical level, which invite the sense of having experienced something of the Holocaust – 
not its experiential reality, certainly, but a sympathetic sense of physical unease or 
discomfort.  
    What is at stake here, therefore, is not simply our understanding of the Shoah itself – 
which is gradually narrowing due to our overreliance on Holocaust media – but also our 
moral regard for the Holocaust in general. The increased popularity of certain films depicting 
the Holocaust – Sophia Wood cites, for instance, Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List and 
Roberto Benigni’s Life is Beautiful specifically – is illustrative of “a continuing (if not 
growing) desire to ‘gaze’ at the Holocaust” (Wood, 2012, p. 22). Proof of this impulse to 
gaze upon the horrors of the Holocaust is evident, I contend, at certain memorial sites. Cole, 
for instance, discusses the “peep show” (1999, p. 156) quality attached to the display of 
 
6 Chapter Four of this dissertation, for instance, describes the fashion in which modern fiction portrays 
Anne Frank – focusing particularly on her departicularisation and our enduring focus on her body.  
7 This assertion is supported with reference to the work of Alison Landsberg, as is outlined in the 
‘Methodology’ section.  
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Holocaust horrors found in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM). He 
describes visitors peering over a low wall at a screen displaying assorted depictions of 
Holocaust suffering. Visitors, he notes, are almost uniformly “transfixed by the horror show 
on offer” (p. 155). Culturally, therefore, a predisposition already exists to luxuriate in the 
horrors of the Shoah – an impulse which the USHMM has arguably exacerbated given the 
illicit frisson of wrongness which they have attached to the act of looking with their exhibit. 
Modern Holocaust fiction, this study asserts, intensifies this pre-existing impulse. As modern 
texts demonstrate their inability to engage with the victims of the Holocaust on a human or, 
to borrow a term from Gillian Rose, “impious” level, they instead resort to scenes of 
gratuitous bodily suffering in order to generate a sense of connection to the Holocaust past.8 
Holocaust fiction, therefore, runs the risk of further dehumanising the Holocaust dead by 
transforming them into suffering bodies, stripped of all human particularity. Moreover, this 
emphasis on human suffering and gratuity only serves to exacerbate our pre-existing 
voyeurism. To continue Wood’s argument, this desire is “growing” in proportion with our 
fictional reproductions of the Holocaust. If this impulse is not curbed, the human specificity 
of the Holocaust dead and the reality of the survivors’ suffering will be forever eclipsed by 
these base fictional representations of bodies in pain. 
    This thesis consequently argues against Budick’s assertion about the merits of Holocaust 
fiction and, instead, contends that it is an inadequate and often inappropriate means of 
engaging with the Holocaust past. Borrowing from Berel Lang, it asserts that valuable texts 
must in some sense be “more probative, more incisive” and indeed “more revealing” (2000, 
p. 18) than silence. They must, in short, contribute to our cultural conception of the 
Holocaust by either illustrating certain foundational truths, examining certain wartime 
 
8 Rose’s concept of Holocaust Piety is essential to this study and is covered in more detail in the 
‘Methodology’ section.   
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behaviours or, just as crucially, revealing flaws in our current cultural conception of the 
Shoah. Texts which complicate our understanding of the event or cater to voyeuristic 
impulses – by graphically recreating scenes of suffering or edging ever closer to the 
representation of death in the gas chamber – will then be measured against Lang’s 
established standard of silence. Rather than accepting Budick’s position that Holocaust 
fiction no longer needs to justify its own existence, this thesis asserts that many modern 
works of Holocaust fiction only serve to complicate our understanding of the event. It then 




From a methodological standpoint, this thesis relies on the work of seven theorists: Eva 
Hoffman, Marianne Hirsch, Dana Wardi, Gillian Rose, Gary Weissman, Alison Landsberg 
and Berel Lang. While Rose, Weissman and Landsberg are used to discuss the shift away 
from character depth and towards the suffering body, Hoffman’s work is used to outline the 
role of the second generation in shaping Holocaust fiction. Specifically, the thesis borrows 
the concept of the “hinge generation” from Hoffman:  
The second generation after every calamity is the hinge generation, in which the meanings of 
awful events can remain arrested and fixed at the point of trauma; or in which they can be 
transformed into new sets of relations with the world, a new understanding. (2005, p. 103) 
Hoffman, therefore, emphasises the role of the second generation in shaping Holocaust 
memory. She conceives of it as a potentially positive one, as the second generation may 
move past the inarticulable trauma of their parents in order to reframe our broader 
understanding of the events. This thesis, however, takes the opposite stance. It argues that 
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the second generation have indeed played a central role in shaping Holocaust memory, by 
communicating only the message of failed transmission and thereby affirming that survivor 
parents can communicate nothing of their experiences to their child. As Giorgio Agamben 
asserts, the experiential reality of the Holocaust is fundamentally inarticulable and so all 
nonwitnesses must concede to the entirely constructed nature of their Holocaust knowledge.9 
This section of the discussion is also supported with references to Marianne Hirsch and Dana 
Wardi. While Hirsch is used to introduce the concept of “post-memory”, Wardi provides 
additional psychological information regarding the second generation. They may feel a 
profound emotional attachment to the Shoah, but their understanding of it is almost entirely 
reliant on post-memorial media. All present-day representations must therefore rely on the 
elements articulated in survivor testimony and other assorted post-memorial resources to 
provide their historical foundation. 
    Having established the failure of transmission from parent to child, the thesis considers 
the impact of this experiential distance from the Shoah on Holocaust fiction. The works of 
Rose, Weissman and Landsberg are used to illustrate this conceptual shift in Holocaust 
writing. 
 
9 Focusing specifically on the plight of the Muslim or “der Muselmann” (Agamben, 2012, p. 41), Agamben 
identifies this subgroup of prisoners as non-humans who “obstinately appear as human” (p. 82). For 
Agamben, the “complete witness” is not the exterminated – as Levi would have it – but rather “he whose 
humanity has been wholly destroyed” (p. 82). The Muselmann, for Agamben, represents the purest 
embodiment of dehumanisation, the point at which the human body has sunk into apathy, speechlessness 
and consuming hunger.  
If the central horror of the camps lies in absolute negation of self – the transformation of the prisoner into 
an unthinking and unprincipled walking corpse – then the Muselmann embodies the core of the atrocity, a 
core which remains beyond the limits of language. As Agamben notes, the witness can only hope to “bear 
witness for the Muselmann” and thereby “bring to speech an impossibility of speech” (p. 164).   In asserting 
this, Agamben is affirming that the reality of Auschwitz remains unsayable and that we must societally 
concede to the impossibility of speaking. Though his text ends with testimony from surviving Muselmänner, 
the core of their experiences – their loss of self – remains inarticulable. 




    Rose’s work is openly critical of texts which fall under the umbrella of what she terms 
“Holocaust Piety” (1996, p. 41). Using Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List as her test case, 
Rose argues that traditionally pious texts are committed to a doctrine of “ineffability” (p. 
43). Rather than presenting properly fleshed-out characters whose behaviours are 
understandable to the viewer, Spielberg instead keeps the viewer at an emotional distance 
from his characters. Schindler is not a man with understandable motivations, but rather he is 
a “ludicrous saviour on a charger” (p. 45). Thomas Keneally, by contrast, makes the violence 
of the Holocaust fathomable. By presenting the brutality of the Jewish police, Rose claims, 
Keneally is able to illustrate the corrupting influence of life under Nazi oppression as his 
characters have been caught up in the “contagion of violence” (p. 45). Keneally, therefore, 
is not simply presenting them as depthless embodiments of good or evil. Valuable Holocaust 
fiction, this thesis contends, therefore requires some attempt to approach its characters’ 
psychology – to construct them as individuals with depth and to explore their underlying 
thinking. Benn E. Williams has previously stated, for instance, that fiction is uniquely suited 
to unpacking the psychology of wartime collaborators and internees, saying: “a serious 
writer’s histoire often elucidates a gray zone, explores greater psychological depths, or 
simply furnishes the better literary punch to the stomach than an historian’s belabored prose” 
(2009, p. 126). Fiction, according to this logic, should have the capacity to bring the reader 
into impious proximity with a given character. It should be able to elucidate their underlying 
motivations, and yet modern-day Holocaust fiction commonly fails in the attempt. Holocaust 
Impiety, this thesis argues, represents a practical impossibility at the present time.  
    It is here that the theories of Alison Landsberg and Gary Weissman become significant, 
as – having established the impossibility of connecting with the experiential reality of 
Holocaust suffering – Weissman and Landsberg both illustrate the lengths to which post-
memorial nonwitnesses must go in order to connect to the Holocaust in other ways.  
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    Weissman’s work revolves around what he terms “fantasies of witnessing” (2004, p. 4) 
Specifically, his work is concerned with the attempts of “nonwitnesses” (p. 20) – those who 
did not directly live through the atrocity and so only have contact with it through mass media 
and commemorative sources – to connect with the event. As his work highlights, this 
experiential gap cannot be bridged. Nonwitnesses may wish to reconnect with the 
experiential reality of the Shoah, but – as is illustrated in Chapter Two – the traumatic reality 
of Holocaust suffering is non-transmissible. Unable to access the experiential reality of the 
events, therefore, nonwitnesses instead seek to experience “something” (p. 5) of the atrocity. 
Unable to approach the Holocaust dead as people, or to fully engage with the reality of in-
camp suffering, nonwitnesses instead latch on to particular visions of suffering.10  
    This emphasis on bodily suffering as a means of engaging with the Holocaust past then 
finds a parallel in Alison Landsberg’s theory of “prosthetic memory”. Landsberg argues that 
cinematic representations of Holocaust suffering have allowed nonwitnesses to touch 
elements of the Shoah. As she puts it, cinema has the capacity to “suture” viewers “into pasts 
they have not lived” (2004, p. 14). It “offers spectators from diverse backgrounds and 
ancestries a shared archive of experience” (p. 14). In short, Landsberg believes that cinema 
allows latter-day viewers to incorporate the experiences of racially distinct groups, those to 
which they clearly do not belong, into their worldview. We may not have experienced the 
Shoah, but we can prosthetically experience Jewish suffering by watching Schindler’s List 
and thereby incorporating the Jewish experience into our worldview.11 These memories are 
described as being “prosthetic” as they are temporarily worn and are, ultimately, removable. 
We are only momentarily inhabiting the suffering of Schindler’s Jews; we are not fully 
 
10 Weissman’s work is discussed in detail in Chapter Four 
11 Landsberg does view prosthetic memory as a potentially positive force. Thanks to the advent of cinema, 
she contends, memories can now be acquired by anyone “regardless of skin colour, ethnic background or 
biology” (p. 2). This capacity to take on memories to which we do not have a generic or biological right, 
Landsberg asserts, should act as a “powerful corrective to identity politics” (p. 21).   
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experiencing their reality. As Landsberg herself highlights, however, the prosthetic 
connection latter-day viewers are forming though watching Schindler’s List is based 
explicitly on suffering. She highlights certain scenes of violence that force viewers into a 
feeling of shared anxiety with the persecuted – from the infamous shower scene to the death 
of the hinge maker.12 Once again, therefore, our post-memorial connection with the past is 
founded specifically upon scenes of suffering bodies. 
    Finally, having established both the near impossibility of Holocaust Impiety and the 
inherently depthless nature of post-memorial fictional recreations of the concentration camp 
space, the thesis returns to Lang’s standard of silence. It asserts that several texts under 
consideration are “inadequate, inappropriate” and “even endangering” to the task of 
representing the Nazi genocide. While it does not suggest, as Lang has, that the “most 
valuable” writings about the Nazi genocide “appear in the forms of historical discourse” 
(2003, p. 123), it does assert that Holocaust fiction – now more so than ever – must establish 
its legitimacy. Along with the standard of silence, therefore, the one concern of Lang’s which 
proves central to this thesis is the role of the author. As Lang puts it: “In one sense, the fact 
of writing reflects a moral judgement, through its implied claim that writing will usefully 
add something to what the subject otherwise, unwritten, would fail to disclose to itself” (p. 
124). A piece of fiction has value for Lang, therefore, if it helps to illustrate certain core 
truths regarding the Holocaust – truths which, otherwise, would not have been forthcoming, 
based on the facts alone. The act of writing, Lang argues, reflects an element of presumption 
on the part of the author – an implied assertion that their narrativization will serve to 
highlight or demystify certain parts of the Shoah. In actual fact, however – this thesis asserts 
– present-day authors achieve only the opposite. Their texts are not reflective of Holocaust 
 
12 These sequences, and their importance to Landsberg’s work, are further discussed in Chapter Four. 
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truth, they are instead only illustrative of the author’s own latent desire to prosthetically 
connect with the Shoah through elaborate recreations of human suffering.  
 
Critical Field 
Many critics have attempted to address the fictionalisation of the Holocaust, and its inherent 
(un)representability. Taking as their starting point Elie Wiesel’s firm anti-representational 
stance, they discuss the inherently problematic nature of fictionally recreating the Holocaust 
– arguing that a series of moral and stylistic limitations have previously applied to fictional 
approaches.13 Writing in 1988, Terrence Des Pres outlined a series of conditions which were 
attached to the subject.  
1. The Holocaust shall be represented in its totality as a unique event, as a special case and 
kingdom of its own, above or below or apart from history.  
2. Representations of the Holocaust shall be as accurate and faithful as possible to the facts 
and conditions of the event, without change or manipulation for any reason – artistic reasons 
included.  
3. The Holocaust shall be approached as a solemn or even a sacred event, with a seriousness 
admitting no response that might obscure its enormity or dishonour its dead.” (1988, p. 217) 
Given his frequent use of the word “shall” and his overt references to the sacral dignity of 
the Holocaust, these three established rules must be read as semi-sacred prohibitions. 
Considering the placement of this list within an essay concerning ‘Holocaust Laughter’, 
however, it must also be asserted that Des Pres is not reproducing it sincerely. Instead, he is 
mocking the moral inflexibility which attends the fictional representation of the Holocaust. 
 
13 In A Beggar in Jerusalem one of Wiesel’s characters notes that words “destroy what they aim to describe, 




This attitude, his essay suggests, shapes the vast majority of representation. As he puts it, 
these rules are “not tyrannical”, and yet they are “fundamental and widely shared” (p. 217), 
having seeped into the public consciousness. The pre-21st century model, therefore, was 
defined broadly by representational restraint. However, Des Pres is careful to emphasise that 
this situation is likely to change, noting specifically that these rules apply “at present” (p. 
206). 
    Alvin Rosenfeld, in keeping with the previous list, adopts a singularly conservative model 
of representation. While he does advocate for representation, arguing that to surrender to 
silence is “tantamount to granting Hitler one more posthumous victory” (1988, p. 14), he is 
also conscious of the enormity of Auschwitz and its potential to overwhelm the literary 
imagination. He is particularly concerned with what he terms the “post-Auschwitz 
imagination” (p. 65) and the inability of fiction to represent the nature of Auschwitz. As he 
puts it: “In the absence of firsthand documentation, how, in other words, can fiction – the 
imaginative reproductions or transformations of experience – begin to register meaningfully 
‘a world that had no reality or meaning’?” (p. 66). In a fashion similar to Agamben’s, 
therefore, Rosenfeld feels that – once removed from the particular reality of Auschwitz and 
placed back into the civilised world – even the survivor could not recapture a sense of the 
camp’s chaos and cruelty. By conceiving of Auschwitz as an unfathomable other world, both 
Rosenfeld and Agamben therefore place the reality of the Holocaust beyond the writer of 
fiction.  
    This then helps to contextualise Sue Vice’s references to the intertextuality which seems 
to define the vast majority of Holocaust fiction. Vice stresses the attached level of scrutiny 
which seems to attend most works of Holocaust fiction. She notes that Holocaust texts are 
commonly judged by the dual standards of “authenticity and accuracy” (2000, p. 162), with 
most complaints regarding their worth arising from a presumption that they have 
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misrepresented the experiential or factual truth of the event. It is for this reason that 
nonwitness authors have developed an overreliance on survivor texts and other assorted 
anterior sources. Implicit in this argument, once more, is the presumption that the 
experiential reality of the sufferer remains beyond the reach of those who did not experience 
the Shoah first-hand.14  
    By contrast, Lawrence Langer suggests that one particular nonwitness may have been able 
to imagine herself into the experiential reality of the Shoah – to have connected with its 
horrors. Utilizing Stephen Spender’s analysis of the poetry of Nelly Sachs – a “Jew who 
escaped from Germany to Sweden in 1940” – Langer argues that Sachs’s poetry is the “lived 
material” (1977, p. 24) of Holocaust suffering. While not depicting the reality of Holocaust 
suffering, it is implied to speak from a place of knowledge. Langer believes Sachs possesses 
the unique capacity to imagine herself into the Holocaust world, thereby writing from inside 
the catastrophe and taking on the suffering of the dead for herself. Her poetry seems to speak 
to having effectively imagined real trauma. However, he does not believe that she possesses 
the capacity to represent the horror of Auschwitz as he believes no one may ever “portray 
completely” the “quivering flesh” (p. 7) of its reality. Despite his slight concession, this is 
still a bold assertion which this thesis strives to argue against. Nonwitnesses, it contends, do 
not possess the capacity to experientially inhabit the Auschwitz world.  
    Modern criticism, however – of which Budick’s work is an example – does not regard 
Holocaust fiction from a position of representational restraint. Gavriel Rosenfeld even 
asserts that, in the present moment, “there are no longer any limits – cognitive, moral or 
aesthetic – to representing the Holocaust” (2015, p. 27). This assertion is then functionally 
 
14 It is important to note that Vice draws a sharp distinction between charges of historical accuracy and the 
representation of broader truths regarding the nature of the Holocaust. As she puts it: “isolating features 
such as historical inaccuracy to condemn a Holocaust fiction is not enough; historical inaccuracy, of itself, 
tells us very little about a text or how effective its representation is of the Holocaust” (2000, p. 167).  
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reinforced by Matthew Boswell’s work regarding Holocaust Impiety. Boswell’s study 
begins with the foundational assertion that Holocaust fiction does possess the innate capacity 
to approach the victims of the Holocaust impiously. He believes that nonwitnesses can “look 
the Holocaust in the eye”, despite its perceived “ineffability” (2012, p. 15). This is due, he 
contends, to the gradual demystification of the Holocaust through the use of anterior 
sources.15 As this thesis argues, however, these sources have not provided a solid foundation 
upon which to build our cultural conception of the Holocaust. Instead, our flawed conception 
of the Auschwitz camp is complicating our relationship to the Holocaust past. In place of 
impiety we have instead developed a mania for replication – a desire to fictionally depict the 
horrors of the Holocaust.  
    Beyond the authors listed both here and in the Methodology portion of this introduction, 
this thesis has been particularly influenced by five critics: Emily Miller Budick, Tim Cole, 
Erin McGlothlin, Robert Eaglestone and Alan Mintz. 
    This thesis sets out to oppose Emily Miller Budick’s core assertion that Holocaust fiction 
no longer needs to defend itself from claims that it is “inadequate, inappropriate or even 
endangering to the task of representing the Nazi genocide” (2015, p. 1). It should be noted, 
however, that Budick does take a similar stance to modern society’s broader cultural 
“overinvestment in the subject of the Holocaust” (p. 14). Budick highlights the potentially 
dubious impulses which often draw modern readers and viewers to fictional recreations of 
the Holocaust. She focuses particularly on the “moderately distasteful” (p. 42) interest which 
society seems to take in the suffering of the survivor. Our excessive emphasis on their 
“shame, humiliation” and, ultimately, their “psychological distress” (p. 43) is symptomatic 
 
15 Boswell discusses “detail after detail” emerging in “testimony, archival footage and historical studies”. 
These, he contends, allow modern creators to “take the imaginative leap” (2012, p. 15) of collaborators and 
those within the grey zone. His text, for instance, includes representations of the Sonderkommando, as is 
discussed in Chapter Four.  
17 
 
of our more dubious impulses, she contends. We are not “listening” (p. 42) in a fashion 
which would reveal the hidden depths of their trauma – the unspeakable truth of their 
suffering (p. 42). Instead, we seek out these stories only to indulge our latent voyeurism.  
    Budick, I contend, does not go far enough in her assertions regarding this kind of 
Holocaust voyeurism. Our desire has clearly surpassed a foundational fascination with the 
suffering of the survivor. It has instead become explicitly bodily and often, as Chapters Two 
and Four outline, overtly sexual. 
    Tim Cole’s work, meanwhile, influences several of the foundational presumptions which 
underpin this project. Specifically, his writing is used to argue for the gradual simplification 
and calcification of Holocaust memory. As he puts it: “Rather than memory being alive and 
fluid, it becomes dead, fixed, and forgotten” (1999, p. 5). Cole specifically deconstructs our 
particularly Auschwitz-oriented conception of the Holocaust, stating that Auschwitz – more 
than any other site – has “come to symbolise everything about the Holocaust” (pp. 97-98). 
This is particularly problematic, he implies, as our cultural conception of Auschwitz has also 
been profoundly shaped by popular media. At the end of the 20th century, thanks to its 
representation in popular media, Cole contends that Auschwitz “has become so much more 
than simply a place, it is ‘a place of the mind, an abstraction, a haunted idea’” (p. 106). Cole, 
therefore, argues that the historical Holocaust has been transformed into a mythic cultural 
construction which is unrepresentative of historical fact. Fictional and commemorative 
representations of the Shoah, he argues, have only served to obscure the foundational reality 
of the Holocaust – complicating our relationship to, and understanding of, the past.16 
    Erin McGlothlin’s writings concerning second-generation fiction also have relevance to 
this thesis. McGlothlin, using Anne Karpf as her conceptual foundation, stresses the 
 
16 Cole’s work, and his view of the “mythic Holocaust”, is discussed in Chapter One.  
18 
 
explicitly physical nature of second-generation children’s Holocaust inheritance. She 
describes the profound lack of knowledge at the centre of their relation to the Shoah. They 
have no conception of the experiential reality of the Holocaust and yet their bodies still come 
to display “the symptoms of a trauma” they have “never experienced” (2006, p. 9). 
Borrowing from the work of Nadine Fresco she describes survivors as having transmitted 
“only the wound to their children, to whom memory had been refused and who grew up in 
the compact void of the unspeakable” (p. 8). For McGlothlin, there is no content to the 
second generation’s Holocaust inheritance. This purely physical form of transmission, in 
which the second generation come to inherit the physical symptoms of an unlived 
catastrophe, has profound relevance to my reading of two key texts: Thane Rosenbaum’s 
collection of short stories Elijah Visible and Shalom Auslander’s Hope: A Tragedy.17 
    This thesis draws a distinction between historical facts and certain broader truths 
regarding the nature of the Holocaust. This distinction, though he employs different terms, 
does feature in Robert Eaglestone’s The Broken Voice: Reading Post-Holocaust Literature. 
Eaglestone does not distinguish between facts and broader essential truths, but rather 
between “truth” and “meaning”. As he puts it: “Meaning and truth are not opposed to each 
other, but in the study of history, while meaning without truth is empty, truth without 
meaning is hollow” (2017, p. 3). He then expands on this position by referring to Bernard 
Williams’s contention that with “history . . . every statement . . . can be true and it can still 
tell the wrong story” (p. 3). This idea is very much in keeping with Hayden White’s position 
regarding the relative worth of Holocaust fiction. Facts alone, as has been previously 
established, have no inherent meaning. They require a historian’s particular framing in order 
for them to possess meaning. Eaglestone’s chosen terms, therefore, represent a certain level 
 
17 While this dissertation does agree with McGlothlin’s foundational assertions, it takes issue with her 
reading of certain elements regarding Elijah Visible. 
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of argumentative caution. He is not willing to refer to concrete truths, as “truth” remains a 
foundationally tricky proposition.  
    Historical texts cannot provide a faultless factual accounting of the past, therefore, but 
rather they are a lens through which meaning is tentatively developed. As Williams’s 
quotation implied, only the raw data of a given event may be deemed true. All historical and 
fictional texts following thereafter, therefore – this thesis argues – aim to assert tentative 
overarching truths regarding the nature of the Holocaust. While Eaglestone would never 
endorse the usage of this term, his study does involve several examples of these overarching 
interpretations of Holocaust fact.18 Eaglestone, it may be argued, does possess a series of 
core presumptions regarding the nature of the Holocaust – from the mindset of the 
perpetrator to the relative social impact of the “public secret” (p. 9) of mass genocide. 
Valuable fiction in his view – it is important to note that he does describe Jonathan Littell’s 
The Kindly Ones as “the most significant work of Holocaust fiction in recent years” (p. 54) 
thanks to its presentation of Aue as a “rootless and shallow” (p. 59) killer – should represent 
a set of foundational presumptions regarding the Holocaust. These may be taken as 
serviceable overarching truths, asserted in accordance with certain prevalent theories – 
Eaglestone, for instance, places extreme value on the thinking of Hannah Arendt. This thesis, 
 
18 Eaglestone, for instance, uses Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go to discuss how the public secret of mass 
genocide “lets the atrocity happen” (2017, p. 20) by binding the population “together in complicity” (p. 26). 
Fiction, he then goes on to note, provides a medium through which to examine the likely impact of this 
public secret on the interpersonal dynamics of the complicit populace – stating that it would likely “deform 
social relationships” (p. 19). As such, Eaglestone is positing a likely truth regarding the nature of the 
Holocaust. 
Similarly, Eaglestone also discusses fiction which depicts the psychological reality of Nazi violence. Using 
Hannah Arendt’s conception of banal evil, he looks for texts which frame the SS as “incomprehensible, 
boring, evasive, and rootless characters” (p. 40). This vision of the SS, perfectly aligning with both Arendt 
and Robert Lifton, represents another core truth about the Holocaust which Eaglestone is keen to endorse. 
Their acts of violence, he claims, should be framed as possessing neither “depth nor any demonic 
dimension” (p. 38). Despite Eaglestone’s claims to the contrary, therefore, there is something almost Berel 
Lang-ian in his assumptions regarding the nature of the Holocaust and the ideas to which fictional 
representations should conform in order to authentically portray the nature of the event.  
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therefore, adopts the same stance – that Holocaust fiction must accord with certain 
foundational truths, otherwise it will prove inadequate to the representation of the Shoah.  
    This thesis diverges from Eaglestone’s writing, however, in its analysis of texts directly 
concerned with the representation of the Holocaust. In his search for Holocaust meaning, 
Eaglestone frequently analyses texts that are either entirely unrelated to or only peripherally 
concerned with the Holocaust.19 While he does reference Fateless (1975) by Imre Kertész 
in the earlier chapters of his text, only his final chapter explicitly addresses Holocaust-centric 
works – focusing exclusively on Holocaust kitsch. While he does assert that The Boy in the 
Striped Pyjamas (2006), and by association other kitsch texts, could “begin to solidify a very 
dubious understanding of the Holocaust” (pp. 155-156), this represents a comparatively 
narrow view of problematic Holocaust fiction. These misrepresentations, this thesis 
contends, exist outside of the confines of Holocaust kitsch.20 While I may share Eaglestone’s 
definition of valuable Holocaust fiction, therefore, I also believe fictional recreations of 
Holocaust suffering to be almost uniformly problematic.  
    Finally, the work of Alan Mintz also impacts the conclusion of this thesis. 
“Exceptionalist” writing and commemoration, he argues, takes a particularly concentration 
camp and extermination-oriented view of the Holocaust. Constructivists, meanwhile, focus 
more on writing related to the ghettos and the particular humanity of the inhabitants 
contained within. Focusing specifically on the value of ghetto diaries, he notes that – in stark 
 
19 Chapter One of Broken Voices features a Holocaust-informed reading of Never Let Me Go (2005), a text 
with no specific relation to the Holocaust. Chapter Four, meanwhile, presents a “newly inflected reading” 
(Eaglestone, 2017, p. 7) of Joseph Conrad’s The Heart of Darkness (1899).  
20 Eaglestone conceives of kitsch texts as perpetuating a kind of Gillian Rose-inspired moral simplicity. He 
particularly highlights issues regarding the Hell sculpture by the Chapman brothers: “The ‘ conclusive’ 
punishment enacted in Hell implies, then, not only a finished punishment, but in the same gesture a 
finished chapter, an end, a disassociation between the past events and the present” (p. 149). For 
Eaglestone, therefore, kitsch texts block off our capacity for personal reflection. The Holocaust is not taken 
as an event which may influence the present and our own potential fascistic tendencies are not examined. 
Eaglestone, therefore, seems to presume that a certain level of impiety must be present in valuable 
Holocaust fiction.  
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contrast to most survivor texts – they provided an unmediated glimpse into the interpersonal 
dynamics that existed under these extreme circumstances: “There is a pronounced tendency 
in survivor testimony… to play down the feelings of accusation and betrayal that were 
strongly felt at the time” (2001, p. 67). Mintz contends, therefore, that survivor writing 
provides a mediated version of the Holocaust past, one which consciously censors or elides 
certain more unpleasant aspects. As ghetto diaries are not “recollections and reconstructions 
written at different removes from the war” (p. 64) they provide a comparatively unvarnished 
view of these interpersonal dynamics. In these ghetto diaries “collaborators are named” and 
“the behaviour of Jews towards other Jews is unflinchingly described” (p. 66). Ghetto 
writing, therefore, approaches the murdered Jewish population with both impiety and a level 
of fraternal familiarity. The ghetto inhabitants are not abstract figures, but rather players 
within a community who can be named and understood. Ghetto writing, in short, humanises 
the murdered rather than transforming them into untouchable abstractions.  
    Ghetto writing, Mintz also argues, serves as a missing component from our post-memorial 
conception of the Holocaust. There are two principal reasons for this. Firstly, as Mintz notes, 
“shockingly little” (p. 69) ghetto writing is available to the English reader and, perhaps more 
significantly, engaging with ghetto writing represents a significantly trickier proposition 
than reading a standard survivor text:  
The problem, I suspect, lies in the embarrassment of particularity embodied by these 
documents. The ghetto writers describe lives that are enmeshed in the very particular culture 
and politics of their times, and to know these lives requires acquiring some familiarity with 
this tangled knot of time and place and belief. (p. 70)     
In a world where the Holocaust has been departicularised and universalised, the ghetto text 
is a comparatively daunting document. We are not inclined to engage with texts which 
include an excess of particularising detail – specifically when concerned with matters of 
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culture or religion. As such, even were they to be translated and made publicly available, 
they will never supplant more easily processible texts by middle-class, acculturated Jewish 
figures. This, my thesis contends, has profoundly impacted our broader cultural conception 
of the Holocaust. Holocaust fiction must find a way to reconnect with the writing of the 
ghetto in order to impiously approach the Holocaust dead. At present, no one living seems 
to possess this capacity. It seems to have died with the survivor-authors and those who lived 
in close proximity to the events of the Holocaust.21 
 
Textual Choices and Rationale 
The fictional texts included in this thesis can be grouped into two broad categories: “modern” 
and “pre-21st century”. The pre-21st century texts included are, broadly speaking, being used 
to demonstrate problematic trends in Holocaust fiction. All of the modern texts featured, by 
contrast, are eventually measured against Lang’s established standard of silence.  
    Beginning with the pre-21st century texts, the thesis includes The Book of Questions 
(1963) by Edmond Jabès, Eve’s Tattoo (1991) by Emily Prager, The Emigrants (1992) by 
W.G. Sebald, Jerzy Kosinski’s The Painted Bird (1965), John le Carré’s Call for the Dead 
(1961), Thane Rosenbaum’s Elijah Visible (1996), The Search Warrant (1997) by Patrick 
Modiano, Götz and Meyer (1998) by David Albahari, Art Spiegelman’s Maus (1991) and 
Ida Fink’s A Scrap of Time (1987).22 Three films are also included under this category: 
Robert M. Young’s Triumph of the Spirit (1989), Lars von Trier’s Europa (1991) and 
Schindler’s List (1993) by Steven Spielberg.   
 
21 Chapter Four of this dissertation suggests that Ida Fink possesses the fictional capacity to Impiously 
connect the Holocaust dead. Though it does not feature in this study, Jiří Weil’s Mendelssohn Is On the Roof 
can also be said to provide an Impious representation of life within the ghetto. It may have been written 
after the fact, but it possesses the emotional frankness and accusatory power of a ghetto diary.  
22 Listed in order of their inclusion within the dissertation, along with the original publication dates. 
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    These texts come from a range of cultural contexts and time periods. As the thesis aims to 
address general trends established in Holocaust fiction – from the replication of certain 
defining images to the perceived intangibility and unreachability of the Holocaust dead – it 
does feature texts written between 1961 and 1998. Similarly, as the focus is on generalised 
trends and not specific cultural responses to the Holocaust, both European and American 
authors are featured.   
    The more contemporary texts which feature are as follows: Steve Stern’s The North of 
God (2008), W.G. Sebald’s Austerlitz (2001), Shalom Auslander’s Hope: A Tragedy (2012), 
Pascal Croci’s Auschwitz (2000), The Tattooist of Auschwitz (2018) by Heather Morris and 
The Kindly Ones (2006) by Jonathan Littell. Additionally, Tim Blake Nelson’s The Grey 
Zone (2001) also falls into this category.  
    With the exception of Austerlitz, all of these texts are used to discuss the trends of 
emotional distance and escalating voyeurism.23 While the desire to inhabit the Holocaust 
through prosthetic memory has featured in at least one pre-21st century text, the seeming 
standardisation of this trend has only become apparent in recent years. One text is used 
specifically to embody this problematic shift in Holocaust fiction: The Tattooist of 
Auschwitz. Having established the existing flaws within this text, and traced their origins 
back to the other works featured throughout this study, it is then used to emblematise the 
problems besetting modern Holocaust fiction – becoming the standard against which all 
other modern texts should be judged.  
 
23 Despite its relatively late publication date, Austerlitz does not demonstrate the voyeuristic impulses 
demonstrated in the other texts. As such, it is used to demonstrate certain recurring trends in Holocaust 
fiction. Specifically, it is used with reference to Modiano’s text to emphasise the theme of the absent 
murdered. It illustrates the desire of the second generation to return some semblance of 
substance/physicality to the Holocaust dead.   
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    Finally, The Kindly Ones and Hope: A Tragedy represent modern texts which may be 
deemed valuable, given my established criteria. Their shared focus on bodies is not simply 
voyeuristic but, as Chapter Four argues, instructive. They provide some level of insight into 
our present cultural fixation with bodies and, specifically in Auslander’s case, critique our 
potentially unsalvageable emotional and experiential distance from the Holocaust.  
 
The Structure 
The thesis features four chapters. Chapter One, ‘Holocaust Synecdoche: Surrendering to the 
Simplifying Impulse’, addresses the gradual universalisation of the Holocaust. Chapter Two, 
‘Second-Generation Fiction and the Legacy of the Hinge Generation’, builds on this by 
discussing the impact of the second generation on Holocaust fiction. Specifically, it 
highlights the failure of transmission from parent to child and the heightened emphasis on 
the absent bodies of the victims. Chapter Three, ‘Visualising the Holocaust: Landmarks, 
Photographs and Post-Memory’, examines the extreme paucity of images regarding the 
fictional representation of the Shoah. Finally, Chapter Four, ‘Exploring the Limits of Modern 
Holocaust Fiction: From Fraternity to the Suffering Body’, unifies all of the previous 
arguments by analysing the limitations of modern Holocaust fiction.  
    Chapter One focuses on three specific examples of Holocaust synecdoche: the Auschwitz 
tattoo, the cattle car and what Alvin Rosenfeld has referred to as “the desirability of the 
Mutilated Woman” (1988, p. 164). It does so in order to establish a general overview of our 
current post-memory of the Shoah – portraying the gradual winnowing down of our 




    The significance of the Auschwitz tattoo is considered with reference to two texts: The 
Book of Questions and Eve’s Tattoo. The significance of the cattle car is then established 
with reference to three separate works of fiction: Lars von Trier’s Europa, Sebald’s The 
Emigrants and Steve Stern’s The North of God. By analysing the role of the train in post-
Holocaust culture, the chapter establishes not only the reductive and synecdochic nature of 
Holocaust memory but also its increasingly voyeuristic leanings. Apparent in these texts is 
a desire to view the cattle car interior as a metonymy for the Auschwitz world.  
    Finally, the chapter considers the blurring of Holocaust violence and sexuality. Using John 
le Carré’s Call for the Dead, The Painted Bird by Jerzy Kosinski and The North of God it 
explores the existing cultural desire to view the crimes of the Holocaust through an explicitly 
sexual lens – either through the eroticisation of the female sufferer or the reconceptualization 
of the Holocaust as a sexual crime.24 The complexity of the Holocaust, this thesis asserts, 
confounds the modern mind, and so it is often reframed through a more comfortable lens – 
that of sexual violence or the domination/possession of the survivor.25  
    Having established this trend of simplification and universalisation, Chapter Two 
addresses the role of the second generation in shaping our cultural conception of the Shoah. 
This chapter introduces not only the work of Eva Hoffman, but also Marianne Hirsch – 
whose concept of post-memory proves vital to all later assertions in this study.26  
    The first section discusses the failure of transmission, as it is portrayed in Thane 
Rosenbaum’s Elijah Visible. In Rosenbaum’s text, second generation children inherit only 
 
24 This chapter, it is important to note, contains two texts which do not technically fall into the category of 
Holocaust fiction. Europa and le Carré’s Call for the Dead do contain Holocaust themes, but they are not 
Holocaust texts. They are included here in order to illustrate the cultural prevalence of these examples of 
Holocaust synecdoche. By including them this chapter aims to imply that these images have become 
cultural standards, even for those not immersed in the world of Shoah commemoration.  
25 This trend also features in Chapters Three and Four. 
26 The concept of the “hinge generation” and Hirsch’s “post-memory” are both detailed in Chapter Two.  
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the symptoms of their parents’ trauma – the Holocaust is therefore both deeply felt and 
imponderably remote. Section two builds on this established distance from the Shoah by 
discussing two texts which demonstrate the unreachability and intangibility of the Holocaust 
dead: Patrick Modiano’s The Search Warrant and W.G. Sebald’s Austerlitz. These texts are 
used not only to illustrate the impossibility of recovery – emphasising our explicitly 
extermination-oriented conception of the Shoah – but also our increasing cultural focus on 
the materiality of the Jewish body.   
    Finally, building upon the established themes of emotional and experiential distance, 
Hope: A Tragedy is used to explore an entirely post-memorial vision of the Shoah. 
Auslander’s text, the chapter contends, serves as a critique of the present – highlighting our 
ever-diminishing attachment to the Shoah while also positing a nightmarish future in which 
the Holocaust only exists as a series of empty icons and poorly understood behavioural tics.27 
    Chapter Three further builds on the theme of distance by examining the role of atrocity 
imagery in shaping our depiction of the Holocaust.28 The first section of the chapter 
addresses our continuing reliance on certain landmarks within the Auschwitz camp and the 
need to revive the power of these commemorative sites by reattaching them to scenes of 
suffering. It focuses principally on Schindler’s List and Triumph of the Spirit, outlining the 
manner in which both Spielberg and Young have attempted to revive the power of Auschwitz 
by recreating scenes of suffering next to its iconic landmarks. It also addresses the impact of 
The Lili Jacob album on our visual vocabulary of the Holocaust. 29 
 
27 Symptoms transmitted from parent to child, but lacking any understanding of the experiential reality of 
the Shoah.  
28 As its critical foundation, this chapter employs the work of Barbie Zelizer and Janina Struk as both have 
written extensively on the visual representation of the Holocaust.  
29 This origins and contents of the Lili Jacob album are fully outlined in Chapter Three.  
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    The second section of this chapter builds on this work by critiquing our limited visual 
vocabulary for in-camp suffering by discussing the presentation of the Shoah in two texts: 
Art Spiegelman’s Maus and Pascal Croci’s Auschwitz. While Spiegelman demonstrates an 
understanding of the limitations of Holocaust fiction – and the impossibility of visually 
capturing the Holocaust past – Croci’s approach possesses a certain degree of desperation. 
Desperate to connect with the suffering of the dead, and to feel something of the atrocity, he 
not only ventures into the gas chamber but also physicalises, particularises and sexualises 
the image of the Jewish sufferer.  
    The final section of the chapter continues this exploration of Holocaust voyeurism and 
argues for the near impossibility of Holocaust Impiety. Contrasting the approaches to the 
subject in David Albahari’s Götz and Meyer and Tim Blake Nelson’s The Grey Zone, it 
argues that – as Chapter Two asserts – the Holocaust dead cannot be recovered. In response, 
modern creators are instead turning towards graphic recreations of Holocaust death. 
    The final chapter of this study explores the cultural shift towards prosthetic memory and 
a problematic fixation with the suffering Jewish body. Beginning with Ida Fink’s collection 
of short stories A Scrap of Time, it argues that only survivors – or those who lived in close 
proximity to the events of the Holocaust – can approach the Holocaust dead with a sense of 
“fraternal” familiarity. 30 Fink’s fiction, the chapter asserts, can represent the dead impiously. 
Modern creators, given our entirely post-memorial conception of the Shoah, cannot.  
    Section two outlines the inherently problematic nature of Heather Morris’s The Tattooist 
of Auschwitz. Given that it employs many of the problematic trends established in Chapters 
One to Three, it emblematises the current issues affecting the fictional presentation of the 
Holocaust. Not only is Morris’s presentation of the Auschwitz camp poorly textured and 
 
30 This term has been borrowed from Jorge Semprún, as is outlined in Chapter Four.  
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lacking any form of solidifying detail, but she reconceives the Holocaust as an explicitly 
sexual crime – depicting Holocaust suffering almost exclusively through a series of 
victimised female bodies.  
    Finally, the chapter focuses on two texts which explore this cultural preoccupation with 
the inhabitable sufferer and/or the material reality of Holocaust death: Hope: A Tragedy by 
Auslander and The Kindly Ones by Jonathan Littell. Auslander’s text is used to examine our 
cultural preoccupation with the body of Anne Frank – she is, this thesis asserts, the ultimate 
facilitator of prosthetic memory. Littell’s text, by contrast, is literally constructed around the 
image of a corpse.31 It represents the concept of the bodily and the material as taken to its 
logical extreme. As such, it is used to analyse and further critique our modern pre-occupation 
with the material aspects of Holocaust death.  
    In contrast with Morris’s text, this thesis suggests, both Auslander and Littell help to 
elucidate the more problematic trends in Holocaust fiction. They are informative and 
illustrative as to our own modern biases and limitations when addressing the Holocaust. As 
such, they may be thought of as “valuable”. In contrast to Eaglestone’s approach, therefore, 
this thesis asserts that modern Holocaust fiction tends not to illustrate broader truths about 
the nature of the Holocaust itself, but rather our own present relation to it.     
    In contrast with the current critical view of the Holocaust, therefore, this thesis argues 
from a position of representational restraint. Its uniqueness lies not only in the stance that it 
takes against the relative value of Holocaust fiction but also its opposition to the suggestion 
that fiction may approach the Holocaust impiously. While Budick suggests that Holocaust 
fiction no longer needs to justify its own existence, I contend that modern Holocaust fiction 
 
31 A photograph of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya’s body, as Chapter Four outlines, provided the first inspiration 
for the text. Kosmodemyanskaya was a Soviet partisan, whose corpse has come to exemplify generalised 
Nazi violence in certain instances in modern media. A lingering shot of her body can also be found in Abel 
Ferrara’s The Addiction (1995) as a totemic stand-in for the evils of the 20th century.  
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is foundationally problematic. Texts written following the beginning of the 21st century 
represent the culmination of the last half century’s reductive and universalist thinking 
regarding the Holocaust. While other critics and historians may have highlighted the 
problematic nature of our Auschwitz-specific conception of the event, I take this assertion 
further. Specifically, I argue that our Auschwitz-oriented conception of the event will 
commonly produce texts that are lacking in both contextual detail – as Chapters Three and 
Four argue, modern fiction struggles to engage with the inner-reality of the camps – and 
humanity. An Auschwitz-oriented focus, this thesis argues, generally leads to 
dehumanisation. As we are both unable to connect with the experiential reality of the 
survivor’s experiences within the camp or conceive of the murdered as anything other than 
distant, quasi-sacred figures, modern Holocaust fiction is severely limited in its approach. 
As Matthew Boswell and Benn E. Williams suggest, modern Holocaust fiction should 
possess the capacity to approach the Holocaust impiously – specifically, by examining the 
moral complexity of life in the grey zone. Uniquely, however, I assert that Holocaust fiction 
is broadly incapable of approaching the Holocaust impiously. At present, fiction frequently 
approaches the Shoah through the image of the suffering body – specifically, as a means to 
make the event accessible to a universal audience. We cannot understand the sufferer’s 
psychology, modern fiction suggests, but we can engage with their pain prosthetically. In 
order to correct this, I contend, fiction must shift away from its fascination with Auschwitz. 
If we cannot find a way to rehumanise and re-particularise the dead, our understanding of 
the event will continue to degrade and Holocaust fiction will become effectively worthless 
– serving only as a means to feel something of the Holocaust on a bodily level without 
understanding it from either a historical or psychological standpoint. In contrast to the 
current critical consensus, therefore, I argue that modern Holocaust fiction must be regarded 
with extreme suspicion.  
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Chapter I: Holocaust Synecdoche: Surrendering to the Simplifying Impulse 
 
This chapter addresses the gradual simplification and universalisation of Holocaust memory. 
It does this by focusing on three examples of Holocaust synecdoche – three symbols which 
have come to exemplify the Holocaust in its entirety. These are: the Auschwitz tattoo, the 
cattle car – and by extension associated representations of the rail system – and the 
sexualised female sufferer. By establishing our emotional and experiential distance from the 
events of the Holocaust, along with our increasingly reductive understanding of the events 
themselves, it establishes the thinking which has come to shape fictional representations of 
the Shoah. This, then, lays the foundation for the coming chapters. The discussions featured 
in this chapter are underpinned, additionally, with references to the work of Tim Cole.  
In his essay ‘The Social Construction of Moral Universals’, Jeffrey C. Alexander 
describes the transformation of the Holocaust from a distinctly Jewish event featuring 
particular human players into what he terms a “trauma-drama” (2009, p. 32). While the 
Holocaust was initially framed using a progressive narrative in the post-war period, he 
implies – as the genocide was to be used as a lesson to guide humanity towards a more 
“progressive and democratic future” (p. 31) – the emphasis gradually shifted towards a 
narrative focused on destruction. As he puts it: “In this new tragic understanding of the 
Jewish mass murder, suffering, not progress, became the telos towards which the narrative 
was aimed” (p. 32). Once the collective cultural emphasis shifted towards a focus on 
extermination, he goes on to state, the Holocaust began to lose its defining details – the 
historical and human specificities which once particularised it. Instead, it became a socially 
constructed universal – or rather, a “tragic narrative of sacred evil” (p. 32) The historical 
Holocaust, Alexander implies, was a discrete historical event with identifiable victims. Our 
current conception of the Holocaust, defined by our emotional and experiential distance from 
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the event, is simply an archetype. As he puts it, in order to undergo this transformation from 
history into “trauma-drama” the Holocaust had to shed certain elements along the way:  
As archetype, the evil evoked an experience of trauma greater than anything that could be 
defined by religion, race, class, region – indeed any conceivable sociological configuration or 
historical conjuncture. This transcendental status, this separation from the specifics of any 
particular time or space, provided the basis for psychological identification on an 
unprecedented scale. (p. 32) 
Our current conception of the Holocaust, therefore, is one in which its inherent Jewishness 
is de-emphasised. This is largely due to a rebranding of the Holocaust victim as the public 
at large sought to psychologically and symbolically identify with the victims of the Shoah. 
This was achieved largely, according to Alexander, through the “personalisation” of the 
trauma and its characters. As he states: “Rather than depicting the events on a vast historical 
scale, rather than focusing on... mass movements, organisations, crowds and ideologies, 
these dramas portrayed the events in terms of small groups, families and friends, parents and 
children, brothers and sisters” (p. 37). The Jewishness and Judaism of the victims, in short, 
has the tendency to interrupt our attempts to incorporate the Holocaust into the broader 
cultural context.32 The vast majority of non-Jewish readers, he claims, need something rather 
more universal as a way into the tragedy. The current cultural impulse, then, is one of 
simplification and commodification. We seek an active connection to the Holocaust, but 
what we receive and perpetuate is a diffuse after-image of the event; one crassly 
commercialised for the means of easy identification. 
    According to Alexander, this universalising tendency can be traced back to American 
attempts to transform Anne Frank into a “universal symbol of suffering and transcendence” 
(p. 38) in the 1950s. However, the trend was not solidified until 1978. If Anne’s story “laid 
 
32 As Chapter Four discusses, this is exemplified by the representation of Anne Frank in fiction.  
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the basis for psychological identification and symbolic extension on a mass scale” (p. 40), 
then the four-part drama Holocaust established a new representational norm. From 1978 
onward, therefore – according to Alexander – the emphasis in Holocaust fiction shifted away 
from the specifics of history towards a broader, more accessible, explicitly extermination-
oriented conception of the Shoah.33 
This tendency towards simplification has profoundly affected our fictional representation 
of the Holocaust. Fiction, I contend, perpetuates an Auschwitz-centric, extermination-
oriented view of the Holocaust stripped of subtlety and specificity. Auschwitz, specifically, 
has undergone a gradual simplification through its representation in both commemoration 
and media. Auschwitz I and Auschwitz II-Birkenau have been fused to create a mythic 
distortion which features in everything from the filmic representation of Auschwitz – Tim 
Cole speaks damningly of the Auschwitz featured in Sophie’s Choice, for instance, as it 
presents us with an “amalgam of different places” and “different chronological periods”, in 
which Sophie may “walk past Block 25 (in Auschwitz-II) on the way to the Commandant’s 
House (in Auschwitz-I)” (1999, p. 106) – to the active memorialisation of the camp itself. 
Both the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) and the Auschwitz 
Museum itself feature simplified, mediated representations of the Auschwitz complex. Both, 
for instance, give undue emphasis to the gateway sign, and yet we must question its centrality 
to Holocaust iconography. Though certainly recognizable, it does not necessarily correspond 
to the historical reality of Auschwitz – particularly when accounting for the prisoners’ actual 
 
33 This chapter takes the view that, from “the late seventies through the nineties” – what Barbie Zelizer has 
termed the “Third Memory Wave” (1998, p. 171) – Holocaust memory has been gradually shaped through 
both cultural commemoration and the representation of the event in media. Holocaust memory, this 
chapter contends, then calcified in the 1990s. The texts featured in this chapter therefore serve to illustrate 
the images and representational trends which have endured over the latter half of the 20th century and 
have come to dominate our current conception of the Holocaust. While the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum (USHMM) is referenced in this chapter, therefore, it has not influenced any of the texts 
in question – given that it did not open until 1993. Instead, it is used to represent the calcification of 
Holocaust memory. It embodies the ideas which came to dominate the third wave and, similarly, will impact 
our future conception of the Holocaust.      
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experiences of arrival. This is a point with which Tim Cole takes issue, particularly with 
regard to the artificial narrativisation of the Auschwitz tour:  
The tourist’s experience of ‘Auschwitz-land’ starts at the gate proclaiming Arbeit macht frei, 
and ends at the reconstructed Crematorium. It is a manipulated tour which makes claims to 
authenticity, and yet owes much more to the constructed symbol ‘Auschwitz’… an amalgam 
of the pre-1942 gateway of Auschwitz-I and the post-1942 gas chambers of Auschwitz-II… 
collapsed together in an attempt to create an authentic tourist experience. (p. 110) 34 
Though the attempt may have been to simplify for the sake of coherence, this distortion has 
led in fact to the mythification of the Auschwitz complex. Its physical dimensions have been 
elided and simplified for the sake of narrative simplicity, as Auschwitz-I is being used to 
inauthentically represent the horrors of Auschwitz-II. This is further complicated by the use 
of historical props gathered largely from Auschwitz-II, which bombard the viewer with 
categorical evidence of mass murder which has, nevertheless, been removed from its original 
context. Having been taken from Birkenau, it now conjures the idea of the gas chamber and 
the crematoria impressionistically. This has been made worse as, in their quest for 
authenticity, the USHMM has borrowed certain items from Auschwitz and shipped them to 
the US. Now, at an even further remove from the site of mass killing, the notion of Auschwitz 
has become even more abstract. Both institutions, in short, peddle mediated versions of the 
concentrationary journey – from arrival to mass slaughter, with borrowed props inviting 
abstract images of mass killing. This leads to an ever more diluted understanding of the 
Auschwitz complex and, I contend, the Holocaust in general, as rather than questioning our 
preconceptions regarding the systematic slaughter of millions, we rely instead on familiar 
narratives which are repeated and solidified through memorialisation. This chapter examines 
 
34 Cole’s term ‘Auschwitz-land’ will be used frequently throughout the study as a form of shorthand. It 
refers, as the quotation implies, to the culturally processed vision of the Auschwitz camp. Rather than 
recalling the site accurately it has become a vague fusion of specific landmarks and associated ideas – such 
as the Arbeit-gate, the Birkenau entrance, the gas chamber, the crematorium and more common 
evocations of barbed wire and watchtowers.  
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the extent to which this simplified notion of Holocaust reality has affected our fictional 
representations of the subject. More particularly, the chapter addresses the notion of 
Holocaust synecdoche as, rather than representing the subject directly, writers have a 
tendency to represent it abstractly – choosing one of several key signifiers. This chapter 
focuses on three instances of Holocaust synecdoche specifically: the Auschwitz tattoo, the 
cattle car and the Mutilated Woman.35 The first section examines the shifting cultural 
conception of the Auschwitz tattoo, from a signifying symbol of an internee’s personal 
suffering to something rather more generic and lacking in specificity. While Edmond Jabès’s 
The Book of Questions is used to examine the former point, Eve’s Tattoo by Emily Prager 
introduces the possibility that the tattoo has experienced a degree of conceptual slippage in 
recent years – becoming instead the logo for the reconceptualization of the Holocaust. This 
is then connected with the simplification of Auschwitz, which has been discussed with such 
clarity by Tim Cole. The second section of the chapter, meanwhile, builds on this notion of 
simplification – examining the degree to which the cattle car, and by extension the railway 
itself, has been used to symbolically encompass the nature of the Holocaust. Lars von Trier’s 
Europa introduces the notion that the railway does not simply invoke the image of the 
Holocaust, but rather possesses the potential to transmit its essence across the intervening 
landscape – effectively carrying the taint of Auschwitz back to the heart of Germany. It is 
then also used to illustrate the cattle car’s capacity to bring the past into the present, in a 
fashion which is frequently echoed by memorial institutions across the United States. W.G 
Sebald’s The Emigrants and Steve Stern’s The North of God are then used to discuss the 
concept of representational restraint, using the different museological uses of the boxcar as 
a point of comparison. Finally, the chapter transitions into a related topic – the train car and 
 
35 While the placing of the Mutilated Woman beside two objects may seem incongruous, this example of 
synecdoche has been included in order to stress that writers of fiction – survivors and nonwitnesses alike – 
do tend to brazenly objectify female sufferers. They are rarely allowed to tell their own stories, but rather 
they are spoken for and eroticised by male observers.  
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instances of sexual assault having been curiously linked in fictional representations – the 
image of the sexualised sufferer.36 This section argues that Jewish victims of the Holocaust 
are frequently portrayed using the same archetype – one of mute passivity. They exist, 
commonly, as a prop for the narrator – a means to boost their waning masculinity. This 
section will examine the degree to which fiction has endorsed and perpetuated this image of 
the suffering Jewish woman as the purest embodiment of victimhood.  
 
The Depreciating Value of the Auschwitz Tattoo 
As an enduring and all-encompassing symbol of the Holocaust, the Auschwitz tattoo is 
arresting in its potency. It has been described as a “marker for evil, theft, murder and power” 
(Baum, 2010, p. 47) and yet its most immediate and most forceful association is with the 
Auschwitz complex itself. This is thanks, largely, to the fact the prisoners were exclusively 
tattooed there. As Rob K. Baum’s quote implies, however, the tattoo also invokes the image 
of a de-particularised Holocaust. “Evil, theft, murder and power” are singularly vague terms 
which hint at the broader genocidal process – from arrival to extermination. The tattoo, it 
seems, is only ever able to conjure the image of the mythic Auschwitz written of by Cole. In 
her essay describing the enduring cultural significance of the KZ tattoo to Jewish culture at 
large, Dora Apel provides the specific example of Marina Vainshtein – a young Jewish 
woman whose body art features all of the visual touchstones commonly associated with the 
mythic Auschwitz. Apel states:  
On her upper back, the central image represents a train transport carrying Jewish prisoners in 
striped uniforms toward waiting ovens. Smoke billows above the train cars while a swastika, 
represented in negative space, wafts through the ashes that are spewed forth by the 
crematorium chimney… Below the train and brick lined ovens, a tattoo represents the 
 
36 Both Steve Stern’s The North of God and Jerzy Kosinski’s The Painted Bird link instances of sexual excess 
or sexual violence to the cattle car.  
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notorious inscription on a number of concentration camp gates, Arbeit macht frei. (2001, p. 
306)  
Without wishing to impugn her life choices, it is possible to say that Marina Vainshtein’s 
tattoo is, quite literally, a living canvas of Holocaust reductionism. It is a pictorial 
representation of the metaphorical journey taken by tourists at Auschwitz. It is a visual 
checklist of the landmarks and signifiers which have been culturally entrenched by both the 
USHMM and the Auschwitz complex, to say nothing of the texts which then perpetuate these 
images.37 From the Arbeit Macht Frei gate, to the images of smoking chimneys and prisoners 
clad in striped uniforms, this tattoo unreflectively replicates the standard images which have 
come to define our visual vocabulary of the Shoah. Auschwitz, therefore, has become a series 
of interlinked symbols. We may, for instance, create an associative link between the 
Auschwitz tattoo and the associated images of smoke and ash. These images certainly feature 
in Vainshtein’s tattoo and, similarly, they are among the only genuine signifiers of the 
Holocaust in Edmond Jabès’s The Book of Questions.  
The Book of Questions is defined by its singular evasiveness. A wilfully difficult text 
which avoids narrative coherence at every turn and imparts little about its central characters, 
Sarah and Yukel, it chooses to orbit the Holocaust rather than addressing it directly. It is an 
ardent rejection of 19th-century realism and a moral challenge to those who would seek to 
represent the events of the Holocaust explicitly. Berel Lang summarises Jabès’s approach to 
the topic as follows:  
The enormity of the Nazi genocide against the Jews is evident, goes without saying. Because 
of this, it cannot be represented with the usual poetic or fictional devices that would… 
“epitomise” it, exhibit features by which the narrator might more fully imagine or realise it. 
 
37 The landmarks and visual signifiers which define the representation of the Auschwitz camp will be further 
addressed in Chapter Three.  
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At best, the writer would here only labour the obvious: what artifices could more fully realise 
the facts of such events. (2003, p. 105) 
For Lang, the nature of the Holocaust will always overwhelm writers of fiction. Fiction 
cannot hope to enlarge upon the events of the Holocaust, as it represented a series of a 
previously unfathomable horrors. The writer, as such, cannot expand upon it imaginatively. 
At best, one can merely represent the raw facts as they transpired, as to expand upon them 
risks distorting or diluting Holocaust fact with literary figuration. It is because of this that 
Lang treats Jabès’s text as one of the worthier attempts at Holocaust representation. The only 
way to bypass the moral and conceptual pitfalls of direct representation, according to Lang, 
is to create a work that is, by definition, anti-representational. Jabès achieves this by 
explicitly avoiding direct references to the Holocaust, by forsaking a coherent narrative voice 
and by allowing the subject to speak for itself: 
Here, in contrast to intransitive writing, the subject, not the author, is written: in effect the 
subject writes itself. The narrative voice – so far as we refer at all to what is not quite clearly 
an anthropomorphism – is the voice of history; the object itself takes over, construing the form 
and means in addition to the literary content. (p. 108)        
According to Lang, therefore, Jabès avoids the editorial embellishment that usually comes 
with fictional representations by acting essentially as a medium through which Holocaust 
history can convey itself. There is no attempt to narrativise the events in question.  Indeed, 
the text does not feature a narrative of any kind. Instead, Jabès presents a series of 
thematically related dialogues from a series of Orthodox Jews. Given its determinedly 
indirect approach, the text must employ a series of striking images in order to signal its 
relation to the Holocaust – images which possess the power to invoke the atrocity indirectly.  
The coda of the novel can be found in the juxtaposition of two lines. In a conventional 
narrative, Sarah and Yukel’s plight would have been explicitly depicted and their suffering 
would have been narrativized. Jabès, however, overtly references their lack of inclusion, 
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having a character state: “You hardly talked about Sarah and Yukel” (1991, p. 122). In 
response someone, effectively standing in for Jabès himself, replies: “It is the whole truth I 
wanted to express. And truth is a scream, a stubborn, ineradicable image which pulls us out 
of our torpor. An image which overwhelms and nauseates us” (p. 122). This functions as 
Jabès’s meta-commentary on the nature of his project. Sarah and Yukel do not feature as 
characters as this would limit the scope of the text, rendering it small and partial. One cannot 
encompass the Holocaust in its entirety if we are limited by the need to narrativise, interpret 
and reproduce the events of the past. And yet arguably, at this stage in the text, Jabès is still 
aiming to create a clear associative link with the Holocaust itself. Though Lang claims that 
Jabès only features a handful of minor references specific to Auschwitz – “The SS man, the 
number tattooed on an arm, the yellow star” (Lang, 2003, p. 105) – I contend that Jabès lays 
the groundwork for the coming revelation with earlier, still relatively brazen references to 
ashes and smoke. We must consider, for instance, the following example: “After the road, 
/and before the road,/ there are stones/ and ashes scattered on the stones./ The book/ rises 
out of the fire/ of the prophetic rose,/ from the scream of the sacrificed petals./ Smoke./ 
Smoke” (Jabès, 1991, pp. 41-42). Those familiar with survivor writing will understand the 
iconic potency of the word “smoke” in this particular context. It features not only in the 
writing of Charlotte Delbo and Fania Fénelon, but is also dominates Seweryna 
Szmaglewska’s account of her time spent in Birkenau.38 Smoke and ashes are natural 
corollaries when discussing Auschwitz, as one always seems to produce the other. The 
smoke not only defines, but quite literally permeates every aspect of the camp for 
Szmaglewska:  
 
38 This image also appears in some of the earliest cultural representations of the Holocaust. Paul Celan’s 
Todesfuge, for instance, includes the lines “then as smoke you will rise into air/ then a grave you will have in 
the clouds” (1996, p. 65).  
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In the barracks and among the barracks, under the sky and above the earth, in the movable air, 
heavy and motionless as a solid body it fills the mouth, the throat, the lungs, it soaks into the 
clothes, it penetrates the food. From the two nearest crematories, two pillars crawl out in dark 
billows, hitting straight into the sky and then falling down in spirals. (2001, p. 244)  
It is understandable, then, that the notion of smoke over Birkenau recurs time and again in 
survivor writing. For those fortunate enough to escape the extermination process, it existed 
as an all-pervasive reminder of its nearness. The slaughter of new arrivals in 1944 became 
mentally linked with this one all-pervasive by-product. Szmaglewska may not have 
witnessed their passing, but evidence of it did leach into her clothing and corrupt her food. 
It choked the living on a near daily basis at times of high intake and so, in their future 
attempts to recount their time in the camps, it became one of the central ways in which they 
bore witness. As such, the mention of it here cannot be accidental.  
Even with the additional image of “ashes scattered on the stones”, however, there is a 
certain degree of ambiguity to Jabès’s extract – enough, for instance, to elude Lang. The 
clearest and most concise piece of evidence comes not in the form of the SS man, therefore, 
but the tattoo. Though the surrounding text may have been designed to repel easy 
interpretation, Jabès is certainly clear about the nature of the tattoo: “We both have the 
number of our expiration tattooed on our forearms” (1991, p. 162). This is then linked 
associatively with “the ashes of Jews sent to the ovens” (p. 163) on the following page. The 
juxtaposition of these two images has a clear effect on the reader. The tattoo is connected, 
permanently and intractably, with the image of Jews being sent to the crematoria. 
Automatically, this text is not simply concerned with the Holocaust at large, but with 
Auschwitz as the embodiment of the Nazis’ murderous intent. For all his many stylistic 
contrivances, and his attempt to avoid the reductive qualities of realism, Jabès has managed 
only to perpetuate a particular image of the Holocaust – one limited conceptually by its 
selection of stock images. The tattoo, given its in-built specificity, can only ever bring to 
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mind the mythic Auschwitz, which has come to dog the majority of modern fiction. This 
extreme hesitance regarding direct representation, therefore, does have an inbuilt flaw. It 
relies rather too heavily on what the reader brings to the table. When an author relies entirely 
on a series of abstractions, the reader is left with only one impression: that there must 
somehow be truth in synecdoche, that the whole can be adequately encompassed by its parts. 
The truth of the matter, I contend, is rather different. This synecdochic conceptualisation of 
the Holocaust has led to its untimely mythification. It has lost, in effect, its historicity and 
specificity, becoming instead a series of simplistic abstractions. “Auschwitz-land” (Cole, 
1999, p. 110), in effect, has become our truth. This has a great deal to do with our present-
day methods of commemoration and the extent to which the Holocaust has now been 
universalised, as Alexander would have it. This inherent tension is illustrated in Eve’s Tattoo 
by Emily Prager. If Jabès’s text illustrates the transformation of the historical Holocaust into 
a small series of interlinked images – a mythic distortion which stands in for the event itself 
– then Prager’s text illustrates the natural end point of this conceptual distancing. In Jabès’s 
text the tattoo may hint at a distorted vision of the Holocaust but it is still worn by a survivor, 
which anchors it to the past and lends it a sense of historical legitimacy. Prager’s text, by 
contrast, explores the relative signifying power of the tattoo when it has been removed from 
its original source. The tattoo does not, this chapter asserts, possess the same power when it 
is worn by a nonwitness. 
    Before addressing Prager’s text, however, I must first outline the work of Daniel Brouwer 
and Linda Horwitz and their beliefs concerning the cultural value of the “progenic” tattoo.39 
The Auschwitz tattoo, they contend, has not merely lost its sense of specificity but rather it 
 
39 While Prager’s text predates this trend, which seems to have risen to prominence in the 2000s, it is useful 
to consider the differences between Eve’s tattoo and those worn by the grandchildren of survivors. Eve’s 
tattoo, this chapter argues, is more abstractly symbolic as it does not represent part of her cultural 
inheritance. It does not represent sincere memorialisation, but rather an attempt to rebrand a specifically 
Jewish tragedy.   
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has become, in recent years, a tool to be used in the “resignification” (Brouwer & Horwitz, 
2015, p. 545) of the Holocaust. Detached from its original bearer, it has been transformed 
into an abstract symbol – representing the post-memorial Holocaust rather than serving as 
proof of a lived experience. This “progenic” tattooing, most frequently worn by the 
grandchildren of survivors, has come to typify the commemoration and mythical distortion 
of the Holocaust. They, after all, are not survivors and so their understanding of the Shoah 
is dependent on media and other commemorative sources. Brouwer and Horwitz explain:  
in this case resignification works through a combination of the tactical retention of some prior 
meanings and active denial of another… on progeny’s bodies, they index not their lived 
experience of the Holocaust but the fact of the Holocaust, and they index not the wearer’s 
ability to recall directly but to recall their mediated memories of the Holocaust through 
“imaginative investment, projection and creation… at a generational remove (p. 545). 
The progenic tattoo, then, exists as a distortion of the original. Whereas the survivor’s tattoo 
spoke of lived experience and genuine trauma, as well as the capacity to add productively to 
our collective knowledge about the Holocaust, the progenic tattoo speaks only of mediated 
memories. In this extract, Brouwer and Horwitz even invoke Marianne Hirsch’s concept of 
postmemory – a concept which will be further outlined in Chapter Two – as they speak of 
the nonwitness’s “generational remove” from the events of the Shoah. Their vision of the 
Holocaust is entirely mediated, Brouwer and Horwitz imply, relying on filtered cultural 
representations of the Holocaust. It may therefore be implied that the bearer of the progenic 
tattoo contributes nothing to our understanding of the events in question, beyond their own 
filtered, indirect, poorly substantiated understanding of the Shoah – one no doubt tainted by 
decades of standardised memorialisation and filmic reproduction.40  
 
40 While this statement may seem unduly harsh, the concept of the failed transmission of trauma will be 
detailed in the following chapter. This dissertation explores the notion that – given the impossibility of 
transmitting suffering from the parent to the child – the second and third generations are only able to 
access their relatives’ suffering through mediated representations of the Holocaust.  
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The progenic tattoo, therefore, has created a level of problematic distance between the 
original bearers’ lived experiences of the Shoah and their grandchildren’s attempt to connect 
to this unreachable Holocaust past. The progenic tattoo’s power, therefore, rests only in its 
capacity to speak to an experience that the third generation cannot understand. It signals the 
entirely mediated nature of their understanding of the Shoah and yet, at the same time, it also 
serves to commemorate their grandparents’ actual suffering. After all, the tattoo does still 
serve to commemorate its original wearer, to whom these children have an emotional 
connection. The Holocaust is their generational inheritance – albeit one they cannot 
understand or touch. Eve’s Tattoo explores what happens when this link back to an original 
survivor is lost. The Holocaust past is not an inherited legacy but rather it becomes an 
assumed identity.    
    Eve’s Tattoo focuses on a New York-based writer who, on the morning of her 40th 
birthday, decides to have the number of an Auschwitz prisoner tattooed onto her left forearm. 
While, at first, this seems to be a response to her general lack of fulfilment – her 40th birthday 
having acted as an emotional spur – the tattoo also has two other implications. Firstly, Eve 
wishes to use it to shock her friends out of their early-90s complacency – it is used as a 
rebuke against the comfort and apathy of the period – and, subconsciously, she also wishes 
to seize the Holocaust from her Jewish boyfriend. As a closeted anti-Semite, she wishes to 
possess this uniquely Jewish event and wear it as her own, essentially disempowering his 
Jewish heritage. In order to do this, however, she must de-particularise and universalise the 
tattoo’s meaning.41   
Initially, Eve describes her vision of the tattoo as follows: “To me, this tattoo is about the 
fate of women” (Prager, 1993, p. 12). Already, then, the tattoo exists as a disembodied 
 
41 Eve’s tattoo, it is important to note, has been borrowed from a woman in a photograph. However, as Eve 
knows nothing about her history – and she is blonde, like Eve herself – she is able to project various 
identities onto this nameless victim.  
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marker – a means to make a broader point about the Holocaust, rather than denoting the 
suffering of a specific internee. Though this sentiment serves, throughout the text, as Eve’s 
personal self-justification for her aggressive use of the tattoo, her intent is not really to 
educate others about the fate of women. Her intent is to project her own rebranded, de-
Judaised interpretation of the events of the Shoah while simultaneously seeking her own way 
into the events of the Holocaust – her own non-Jewish claim to victim status. Echoing 
Alexander’s theory of universalisation, Eve is looking for a means to strip the Holocaust of 
its particularities in order to make it more accessible. It cannot be an inherently Jewish drama 
and, in her view, sufferers cannot possess their own distinct identities. They are, instead, 
supposed to stand only as inhabitable shells.42 
Before discussing Eve’s own personal attempt at symbolic identification, I must first 
discuss how her particular interpretation of the Holocaust is being disseminated. In seeking 
to memorialise it in her own way, to act as the mouth-piece for its non-Jewish rebranding, 
Eve seems to understand that the one unchangeable element in the telling of Holocaust-
themed narratives is the basic format – the “trauma-drama” with extermination as its end 
point and telos. This effectively embodies Alexander’s theory of universalisation. As he puts 
it: “The quality of compulsively returning to the trauma-drama gave the story of the 
Holocaust a mythical status that transformed it into the archetypal sacred-evil of our time” 
(2009, p. 34). Not only has Eve internalised the broader format of the trauma-drama – all of 
her stories follow the standardised memorial narrative of establishing preface, deportation 
and extermination – but she also adopted the secular sacralisation of the Holocaust as well. 
Each time she tells a story she expects, and the tattoo commands, a period of awed reverence 
following the revelation of each character’s stock death in Auschwitz. This is perhaps best 
illustrated by her second attempt at “enlightenment”: “Eva died of typhus in Auschwitz soon 
 
42 While this theme will recur throughout the dissertation, it is discussed in detail in Chapter Four.  
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after her arrival… Eve lowered her eyes to indicate she was done and silence reigned” 
(Prager, 1993, p. 41). It is this final performative indulgence that rings hollow for the reader, 
particularly when we begin to understand precisely how Eve interprets the Holocaust in its 
entirety. She has clearly internalised a mythic version of Auschwitz, an incarnation stripped 
of any complexity or structural specificity. She understands it simply as the logical endpoint 
of the Holocaust narrative, the point from which all meaning emanates – everything must be 
tragic and anti-redemptive. This is because, quite simply, Eve conceives of the Holocaust as 
something indefinably sacred. She knows that one is supposed to bow one’s head 
reverentially at the end of a story, because the enormity of the Holocaust as the “archetypal 
sacred-evil of our time” (Alexander, 2009, p. 34) demands it.43 And yet, Eve’s Holocaust is 
broadly an imaginative one – it is a trauma without concrete victimhood, fuelled by 
imaginative overinvestment. We receive solid proof of this in Eve’s one encounter with an 
actual survivor, named Jacob Schlaren. In response to the question “How do you feel?”, Eve 
replies with the following: “Ashamed to talk to you. You experienced it. I’m humbled in 
your presence” (Prager, 1993, p. 145). There is something disturbingly unreflective about 
Eve’s exaggerated display of reverence. This is simply another instance of the survivor as 
secular saint – a by-product of the mythification of the Holocaust – as Eve, once again, 
knows none of the specifics. It is here that Prager uses Schlaren to illustrate the difference 
between the mediated Holocaust, as Eve understands it, and the lived one. Their tattoos are 
placed in explicit contrast with one another. After rubbing her arm to see if the mark is 
permanent, he responds with the following: “So… you came to the camp in ‘forty-four about 
when Primo Levi came. Late in de war. Perhaps that’s how you survived” (p. 144). Here we 
have a detail-oriented, specifically Jewish, entirely historical understanding of the Holocaust 
 
43 Eve is, in effect, weaponizing the concept of Holocaust Piety, as she is counting on her listeners to lapse 
into the appropriate response – an unreflective sentimentality which is founded on a depthless 
understanding of the Holocaust.  
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placed in contrast with one driven by fantasy and supposition. Eve’s tattoo corresponds not 
with one fixed history but with six reductive, imaginative Evas, each having been designed 
to embody another aspect of an explicitly female and rarely Jewish vision of Holocaust. 
Actual details, such as the corresponding link between the number itself and the period of 
arrival, are antithetical to Eve’s understanding of the Holocaust. Eve, after all, is a product 
of the culture of memorialisation. Just as is the case in the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum, in Eve’s Holocaust individual stories have been “submerged in favour of the grand 
narrative” (Linenthal, 1997, p. 189). Though in the strictest possible sense Eve is attempting 
to tell the story of six individuals – Klein, Hoffler, Berg, Merlo, Beck and Hertz – these 
fictional inventions do not represent a particularised, factual vision of the Holocaust. Instead, 
each one represents another contrivance, another carefully calibrated character designed to 
foster easy identification for the listening audience. This is facilitated by the tattoo’s lack of 
fixed ownership, and its value only as an icon of the departicularised Holocaust. Its meaning 
can therefore vary depending on the needs of the listener. Eva Hertz, given that the audience 
for this particular story is a pair of Carmelite nuns, is presented as a Maximillian Kolbe-
esque martyr – “shot for conducting a layman’s mass on Christmas day” (Prager, 1993, p. 
174). Meanwhile, in the veterinary office, Eva Beck becomes a rescuer of Jewish animals 
scheduled for euthanasia. After being sent to Auschwitz she dies doing hard labour in 1942. 
In both of these instances there is a clear element of contrivance. These are not three-
dimensional, vital characters. They are half-hearted non-Jewish archetypes designed to tug 
at the heartstrings of each listening audience and to foster their symbolic identification 
through a vague web of shared traits.  
Eve’s clear intent is not education, but the desire to forge a non-Jewish connection to the 
Holocaust. This is epitomised in the story of Eva Merlo, a German Red Cross nurse forced 
into a cattle car by a member of the SS after attempting to help the Jews mid-transport. Eve 
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then goes on to describe her fate as follows: “Attempts were made to free her. But the papers 
got lost in the bureaucracy of the camp, and so did Eva. She was gassed by mistake at 
Auschwitz three months later” (p. 91). Eve, therefore, has imaginatively created a scenario 
in which a non-Jew is gassed, expanding the remit for a particularly Jewish fate and – in 
doing so – securing her own right to share in the Holocaust.  
It is important to note that the Auschwitz tattoo, in all of the above instances, is only ever 
able to conjure a vision of the mythic Auschwitz. There is a profound lack of detail, in each 
and every performance, when Eve finally reaches the Auschwitz portion of the narrative. It 
functions, simply, as a performative punchline. It is the portion of the story which links, 
explicitly, the institution of Auschwitz to its embodying tattoo. As such, with every new 
improvisation, Eve is further cementing the notion that the tattoo implies only this vaguely 
defined vision of Auschwitz. The tattoo has become the logo for the myth, while also serving 
as an emotional trigger. Once its meaning has been established for the audience – the link to 
the mythic Auschwitz having been explained through reference to an imaginary Eva – the 
tattoo then triggers the audience’s learned, respectful silence. In essence, therefore, the tattoo 
has come to act as the logo for Eve’s rebranding of Holocaust history. Proof of this can be 
found in one explicit instance which carefully outlines the role of the tattoo. Immediately 
following her first performance – the story of Eva Klein, the one unambiguous Jew – Eve 
describes the effect her prop tattoo has had on her audience:  
The tattoo was perfect and terrible. She was pleased with its effect on the dinner party. Eva 
Klein has been the right choice. Even Benny Slinky has been visibly moved… Everyone had 
identified. For a few minutes the tattoo had jolted them from the lethe of middle-class life and 
they suddenly looked not sophisticated or cynical, not fed up or bored… just human, exposed. 
(p. 29) 
Frustrated with the apathy which seemed to dominate life in the upper-echelons of the 
middle-class in the fiction of the 1990s, she uses the tattoo to shock people out of their 
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bourgeois boredom by forcing them into a moment of “pious” reflection – to borrow Gillian 
Rose’s term.44  Again, Eve’s vision may be defined as traditionally pious as it represents a 
singularly depthless vision of the Holocaust which remains committed to the notion of 
ineffability. For her, it is a poorly understood tragedy packed full of hollow players – figures 
she can prosthetically wear and inhabit when she needs an emotional kick. When the end 
goal is engagement rather than learning, identification rather than understanding, the tattoo 
transmits only a distortion of historical fact. Eve’s sanitised reinterpretation of the Holocaust 
echoes the culturally produced vision of the Shoah critiqued by Alexander and Cole. Her 
understanding of the events has been culturally limited through memorial repetition and 
fictional reproductions, and so she is only able to pass on her inherited understanding of the 
Holocaust – the brand at the centre of the Shoah Business. 
Prager’s text, therefore, hints at the prospect of a singularly worrying future regarding 
Holocaust knowledge. Her text implies that, following the death of the survivor generation, 
Holocaust knowledge will become entirely post-memorial in nature and, consequently, will 
become a shallow distortion of the event almost entirely removed from the experiential and 
historical reality of the Shoah. This concern becomes particularly relevant as our culture 
moves into what Brouwer and Horwitz have termed the “fourth generation” of Holocaust 
commemoration. This is building on the work of Barbie Zelizer, who defined the nature of 
the three existing stages. While phase one constitutes the information gathering process 
immediately following the liberation of the camps, and phase two relates to the period of 
selective amnesia that lasted from 1945 until the trial of Eichmann, phase three would seem 
to encompass our current age of commemoration. Spanning from the “1970s to the present”, 
Brouwer and Horwitz define this Third Wave as follows:  
 
44 The term “pious” relates specifically to Rose’s concept of “Holocaust piety” (Rose, 1996, p. 41).  
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“memorialization took shape as a concerted undertaking, the Holocaust newly established both 
as an academic subject and in more popular cultural representations.” In this third wave, 
official memorials, monuments, and museums have proliferated, and survivors have shared 
their stories in overwhelming numbers in person and across a wide range of media productions. 
(Brouwer & Horwitz, 2015, p. 541) 
This third phase, then, marks the period of memorialisation – the point in time in which the 
Holocaust lost its solidity and specificity as a factual event, and the fictional and 
commemorative began to take precedence. While the presence of living survivors provided 
a much-needed counterpoint to the ever-broadening redefinition of the Holocaust – from the 
creeping Aryanisation of Anne Frank to the aesthetic distortions of the Holocaust miniseries 
– there are now very few living survivors to distinguish fact from fiction. This encompasses 
the nature of the fourth phase:  
In the fourth wave, whose commencement we are temporalizing in relation to the death of all 
Holocaust survivors, all testimony will be in the form of secondary, mediated texts—the 
photographs, writings, and recorded stories of survivors but not their living, enfleshed, co-
present testimony. (p. 543) 
I contend that Eve’s Tattoo, for all its creative shortcomings, forecasts and provides a 
satirical mascot for the fourth wave of Holocaust commemoration. It unwittingly predicts 
the problematic trends which will come to dog all future attempts to represent the reality of 
the Holocaust in fiction. Eve wishes to engage with the Holocaust past, but in order to do so 
she must shape a series of prosthetic identities – poorly defined characters that she may live 
in temporarily in order to experience their suffering. While Prager could not possibly have 
taken influence from Alison Landsberg’s theory of “prosthetic memory”, Eve’s bodily 
engagement with Holocaust suffering does mirror the prosthetic engagement with filmic 
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suffering which Landsberg describes in her text. Prager has therefore unknowingly predicted 
our present fascination with the suffering body.45    
The tattoo captures the gradual dilution of the historical Holocaust over time. Its cultural 
evolution charts its progress from a unique identifier attached to a living survivor, to a 
totemic image used to embody the vague concept of mass extermination and finally its use 
as simply a behavioural trigger. In Prager’s text, the tattoo has become a depthless icon – a 
sign designed to trigger a pious response in Eve’s listening audience. Eve’s tattoo has power, 
but it is a non-specific power. Her Holocaust is entirely ineffable as her characters are 
depthless and psychologically unapproachable. Eve’s listeners are not remembering the 
Holocaust dead, or experiencing a felt connection back to the Shoah; instead, they are 
recalling the Holocaust miniseries or other culturally cemented visions of the Holocaust.   
As a form of Holocaust synecdoche, however, the tattoo is a relatively abstract symbol. 
It may contain within it evocations of the extermination process, but these are indirect. By 
contrast, the cattle car is often used as a more direct form of shorthand for those wishing to 
invoke death in the gas chamber indirectly, as it has come to symbolise the driving force 
behind the Nazi push towards industrial mass murder. As Oren Baruch Stier puts it:  
trains are some of the most significant and recurring symbols of the Holocaust, for they 
represent a turning point in the destruction of European Jewry. Deportation via railway marked 
a systemic shift from mobile murderers and stationary victims to stationary murderers and 
mobile victims. (2005, p. 83)          
The railcar, therefore, presents those looking to memorialise the Holocaust with a clear 
symbolic link to the gas chamber – a synecdochic icon which is able to hint at its existence 
without having to risk its direct representation. Both Auschwitz and the United States 
Memorial Museum, after all, have standardised the experience of the deportee – creating a 
 
45 Chapter Four of this dissertation addresses Landsberg’s theory in more detail.  
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direct linkage between the train, as the universal method of transportation, and the 
crematorium. Moreover the train car is not simply a corollary of the killing process, but 
rather it is able to conjure Auschwitz in absentia – to remind us, through osmosis, of the 
selection process, which narratively leads back to the gas chamber. In short, it is the most 
prevalent and culturally recognisable item of Holocaust synecdoche which exists today. 
 
The Many Facets of the Cattle Car 
As Jabès illustrated, historical uses of synecdoche pivoted around a core of unsayability. As 
was noted in the Introduction, few now subscribe to this notion that the Holocaust is an 
inherently unrepresentable subject. The overwhelming majority of texts attempting to 
represent the horrors of the Holocaust, even those which may be deemed gratuitous, do 
adhere to one abiding principle, however: that one must stop at the periphery of the gas 
chamber. The core of unsayability is not gone, therefore, but rather it has narrowed. 
Auschwitz has come to define our current cultural conception of the Holocaust because, as 
Tim Cole notes: “Unlike the camps in the West, Auschwitz had been the site of mass killing 
by gas, and thus its gas chambers became the centre of the ‘Holocaust’ world” (1999, p. 
101). This represents only a partial truth, as it neglects entirely the 1.6 million killed at 
Treblinka, Chelmo, Belzec and Sobibor. As few survived these camps, and only Auschitz 
and Majdanek still remained relatively intact at the end of the Second World War, they have 
not been centralised in either Polish or American commemorative culture. Treblinka exists 
within the prevailing American narrative, for instance, as an evidentiary aside, as both the 
Washington Memorial Museum and the Florida Holocaust Museum feature train tracks from 
Treblinka as part of their exhibit. The cattle car, however, has been generally linked to 
Auschwitz contextually, given the relative abundance of evidence which survived from that 
camp specifically. As Linenthal describes it:  
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after visitors walk through the railcar on the third floor, to their right are extraordinarily painful 
photographs, taken by a member of the SS in May 1944, of Jews transported from Hungary 
standing on the ramp at Auschwitz, most of them destined for immediate murder in the gas 
chambers. Two brothers, dressed alike in matching coats and caps, fear etched on their faces, 
gaze at the camera, into the eyes of the visitors. (1997, p. 174) 
The cattle car, then, does not supply its own evidentiary value. Having walked through the 
railcar, which itself fosters symbolic identification – a moment of empathetic unease in 
which one imagines one’s own potential confinement – the visitor is immediately bombarded 
with pictures depicting the unloading of new Hungarian arrivals in 1944.46 As Linenthal’s 
language implies, these pictures do not simply foster identification. Instead, they seem to 
prompt a degree of emotional over-investment. In describing the picture of the two boys – 
which he then goes on to display, as if to stress its universal potency – Linenthal speaks 
evocatively of the “fear etched on their faces”. This is loaded language, which tells the reader 
only that this particular image has punctured his reserve – that more than any other it has 
brought the Holocaust home to him. As such, the railcar – which should encompass a 
multitude of sins – has been linked very specifically to the crimes committed in Auschwitz. 
The scope of the cattle car as a symbolic item has not simply been narrowed, but it has been 
standardised and solidified by the associative evidence provided by the Memorial Museum. 
When we think of the cattle car, we must bring to mind the ramp at Auschwitz. We may 
even find evidence of this, it seems, in the supposedly neutral Hall of Remembrance, which 
marks the end of the tour in the Memorial Museum:  
at the end of the tour visitors are allowed to walk into an exhibit area that brings back a sense 
of reassurance and reverence, the 70-foot-high hexagonal Hall of Remembrance… This room 
is meant to be a space for quiet contemplation, but you are still surrounded by steel-braced 
 
46 Their extermination, while obviously unrepresented, is clearly implied.  
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walls inviting you to recall the crematoria, and a “V-shaped ramp evoking the railway sidings 
at Auschwitz” (Hasian, 2004, p. 82) 
These architectural details are able to recall the mythic Holocaust – the established narrative 
framed around the cattle car and the death camp – without actually representing either of 
these images literally. Not only can the mythic vision of the Holocaust be invoked through 
the image of the V-shaped ramp, but also the tracks themselves can be viewed as an arterial 
link which carries the essential essence of the Shoah all the way from the unloading ramps 
back to the very heart of post-war Germany – infecting every portion of track in-between 
with an unusual potency. This becomes particularly evident when we try to decode the role 
of Zentropa, the fictional stand-in for the Deutsche Reichsbahn, in Lars von Trier’s Europa.  
    The film’s foreground and background details were generally filmed separately. As such, 
the principal actors – the characters existing in post-war Frankfurt – often find their image 
directly juxtaposed with footage filmed in Chojna, Zachodiopomorskie. Given the setting of 
the film, it is only fair to presume that the inclusion of footage from Poland – including the 
use of a genuine pre-war traincar on Polish tracks – is another deliberate detail, adding literal 








Figure 1: A frame illustrating the use of layering in “Europa”. While the foreground 
material was recorded in Germany, the background had been captured in Poland.47 
 




In Figure 1, for instance, we see the moment prior to the introduction of the sleeping car 
which will prove central to the plot of the film. Here we have the deliberate inclusion of the 
German foreground and the Polish background. In overlaying these two images, von Trier 
visually depicts the simplified deportation journey which has now become part of our 
established conception of the Shoah.48 In this one frame, he manages to link the German 
railcar – and by extension, those linked associatively with the industry – back to Polish soil 
and, more crucially, Polish rails. In doing so he has visually elided the link between the 
Deutsche Reichsbahn and the concentration camp. The Holocaust exists subtextually in this 
image, lurking in the background of the frame. The subtitles for the scene, specifically the 
use of the phrase “human transportation”, then add additional context. In light of the fact 
that the majority of named or featured passengers on the sleeper car happen to be Jewish – 
namely the newly appointed Mayor Ravenstein and the characters identified simply as 
“Jewish Man” and “Jewish Wife” – the phrase “human transportation”, with its unsettlingly 
euphemistic connotations cannot help but invoke the Holocaust past. In this text the Shoah 
still has the capacity to haunt the present.  
    The presence of post-war Jews returning to their homes affirms this, as their initial 
deportation is passively hinted at here. Trains previously carried these individuals away from 
their homes and now they are returning to a land which is still brimming with Nazi 
sympathies. The Nazi past, as the film illustrates, is still palpably present in many ways – 
often lurking in the literal background of the frame. 
    This idea is literalised in the sequence in which Maximilian Hartmann, a former railway 
magnate, is forced by his American ally to sign de-Nazification papers. A Jewish individual 
is brought into his home in order to corroborate an invented story – one designed to pacify 
 
48 The USHMM, as was noted above, links the rail car to the idea of extermination. This is also the same 




the American authorities. Maximillian’s mindset during this process is aptly illustrated by 
the contrast between the background and the foreground of the image.  The frame shifts from 
a shot of him standing before his window to an image of him standing in front of       
Figure 2: 
Maximillian stands 




visible behind him is 
a raised rail track 








Figure 3: A rear-








the de-Nazification questionnaire itself. This then fades away to be replaced with the image 
of a train slowly creeping into the shot from the upper-left hand corner. Again, all of the 
crucial details exist in the background, which frequently seems to embody those elements 
suppressed by the post-war German consciousness. The Holocaust is always present. By 
linking the images of the questionnaire and the train car, von Trier has linked the two 
associatively. This visual association allows the film to emphasise the falsity of the 
document, while also signifying that the root cause of Maximillan’s culpability lies in the 
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German transport system. Though never stating it explicitly, the film once again draws a 
distinct visual parallel between the railcar and Nazi guilt. The slow creep of the train, passing 
by on an elevated platform beyond the Hartmanns’ window, seems to highlight its 
insinuating power. Maximillian’s culpability cannot be denied, as the railway will always 
provide an inextricable link back to the concentration camp.     
    This is by no means von Trier’s most graphic evocation of the Holocaust, however, as the 
films seeks to wrench the Shoah out of the unconscious and into the light – or out of the 
background and into the foreground.  Having been continuously prompted by the unseen 
narrator to “go deeper” – the whole film being narrativised as a hypnotic journey into the 
heart of “Europa”, with the Holocaust serving as the conceptual core of the European 
experience – Kessler is told to explore the unseen recesses of the sleeper car. As the narrator 
puts it: “You are being led through the train. You are led through carriages you never knew 
existed” (von Trier, 1991, 56:02). One of the carriages that he passes through depicts a scene 
which will be immediately recognisable to anyone familiar with those liberation pictures 
which sought to represent the horror of the camps. The brief glimpse of gaunt men, partially 
clad in prison stripers and occupying bunks immediately brings to mind every photograph 
which attempted to represent the interior-reality of Dachau, Ebensee or Buchenwald.49 All 
feature roughly the same visual details, from the positions of the men to their nearly uniform 
expressions – all facing the camera with a mixture of apathy and agony, while some sit and 
some stand to better display their malnourished bodies. They all represent  
 
49 Ebensee may seem a comparatively uncommon choice, given its relative obscurity. Though it was only a 
subcamp of Mauthausen, the images recorded during its liberation have become emblematic of the types 
of photographs captured during the liberation process. Barbie Zelizer, for instance, uses a picture captured 




Figure 4: One of the unexplored compartments on Kessler’s sleeper car. 
 
Figure 5: Photograph #78358, taken from the visual archive of the United States Holocaust 




an homogenised and barely distinguishable vision, which speaks generally of Holocaust 
suffering. One cannot, for instance, discern which might represent Buchenwald and which 
might represent Ebensee on first glance.50 Given the content of the scene, then, and the 
arrangement and appearance of the actors, it seems clear that von Trier is trying to bring to 
mind the concentration camp.51 The similarities between Figures 4 and 5, for instance, are 
striking – with one appearing to mirror the other. This represents an attempt to bring to life 
the post-war atrocity image. While the previous scenes have merely insinuated the railcar’s 
relation to the Holocaust past, this sequence has brought the concentration camp space into 
the present. This is the sin at the heart of Germany’s national consciousness which the film’s 
characters have conspicuously tried to ignore. It may not be relegated to the Nazi past but 
lingers on through its enduring connection to the railway. According to this logic, therefore, 
this association may never fade with time. The railway will always carry the taint of Europe’s 
Holocaust history. 
    Looking at the sequence from another standpoint, however, it may also be said that von 
Trier has inadvertently mimicked a common commemorative use for the cattle car. In certain 
memorial sites, such as the Dallas Holocaust Memorial Centre, the cattle car is used as a 
device to transition from our everyday reality in the Holocaust past:  
because boxcars, as the primary vehicles of deportation, served as initiations into the logic of 
the Nazi “Final Solution”… its emplacement suggested that one must pass through this space 
to understand the events represented inside. The DHMC privileged this symbolic, initiatory 
space over an alternative narrative of deportation. (Stier, 2005, p. 85) 
 
50 The visual similarities which seemed to define the vast majority of post-liberation images will be further 
discussed in Chapter Three. It is Barbie Zelizer’s contention that, through their poor attribution and general 
visual similarities, these post-liberation pictures presented a visually non-descript account of the atrocity. 
One camp could not be distinguished from another visually, meaning the whole atrocity could be defined by 
a handful of like images.  
51 By replicating these images, he has literalised the railway’s connection to the concentration camp.  
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Just as visitors to the Dallas Memorial Centre must first pass through the boxcar in order to 
process the reality of the Holocaust, Kessler is made to walk through a similarly symbolic 
boxcar which has effectively compressed the reality of the concentrationary universe into 
one small space. For the viewer, at least, the synecdochic value of the boxcar is clear: as a 
cultural symbol, it is inextricably linked to the extermination process. In this instance, the 
train car is not simply facilitating the Holocaust but quite literally housing it, creating a rare 
example of visual synecdoche in which the signifier literally contains the thing it is trying to 
abstractly signify. This is where the profound lack of specificity in the image of the internees 
comes back into play as, once again, it can quite literally embody the whole of the Holocaust 
– representing, as it does, undifferentiated suffering.  
    Von Trier’s film functions as a study of the synecdochic potency of the boxcar. As is the 
case in the three American memorial institutions which use the boxcar as a commemorative 
centrepiece – those centres in Washington, Dallas and Florida – von Trier conceptualises the 
train car as both a point of transition – the point at which one is induced into the nightmarish 
logic of the Holocaust – and as a free-standing invocation of Auschwitz.  
Having already established the broader symbolic view of the boxcar, there is one more 
facet which must be addressed: the notion that the cattle car can be used to embody the 
debate regarding restraint versus representation. Traditionally, it has been used to embody 
the distant Holocaust, as in Aaron Appelfeld’s Badenheim, 1939 (1979) or Helmut’s story 
within Rachel Seiffert’s The Dark Room (2001). However, it can also be used to foster 
identification with the suffering victim or to indulge certain representational excesses – 
specifically manifesting, as will shortly be detailed, in an unhealthy fixation with the grim 
reality of confinement. Evidence of this can be seen in both the commemorative uses of the 
cattle car and in its use in fiction.  
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 Ideologically speaking, one may construe the sealed boxcar as representing the purest 
form of ideological restraint. This certainly seems to align with Oren Baruch Stier’s 
interpretation of the boxcar display in the Florida Holocaust Museum:  
Because the railway car in St. Petersburg is closed, it suggests a distinct representational 
scheme. It preserves its mysterious quality, requiring visitors to supplement what they see of 
the car’s outside with mental images of the experiences of those who have seen its inside or, 
rather, the inside of boxcars like it. Keeping the car closed thus preserves its “sanctity,” since 
no one is allowed to violate its inner space… Presenting the inside of the car as “off-limits” 
suggests that at least some of the Holocaust is off-limits too. (2005, p. 95)  
The statement, then, posits that there are two commemorative modes when representing the 
Holocaust: respectful distance and voyeuristic excess. To focus on the interior of the boxcar, 
according to this line of reasoning, is to invite imaginative overinvestment – the underlying 
assumption being that to represent the horrors of the actual deportation journey is either 
ethically dubious or artistically redundant, given the inability of the author to exceed the 
details of reality. The sealed boxcar, on the other hand, infers that certain aspects are beyond 
the ethical limits of worthwhile commemoration.52 Fiction faces precisely the same 
representational quandary, as while some choose to maintain a reverential distance from the 
events, others choose to fully inhabit the cattle car interior. While their foundational elements 
bear a striking resemblance to one another at times, W.G. Sebald’s The Emigrants and Steve 
Stern’s The North of God approach the matter of representation from entirely different 
viewpoints. While Sebald opts for marked restraint, Stern chooses to wallow in the 
excremental excesses of the deportation journey. Beginning with Sebald, the train, and by 
extension the deportation journey, exist as a persistent undercurrent throughout Paul 
 
52 While still bringing to mind an abstract, extermination-oriented conception of the Holocaust. It simply 
approaches the same subject from a position of ineffability. The horrors of the Holocaust cannot be 
understood and must not be represented.  
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Bereyter’s story. Though Paul did not experience deportation directly, having instead served 
for six years in the motorized artillery, we can see elements of it creeping into his 
subconscious. His post-war claustrophobia, which frequently manifests in the form of violent 
outbursts towards his pupils, can be traced directly to the reflexive hatred that he harbours 
for the Aryan townspeople. Though “he always held affection” (Sebald, 2002, p. 43) for the 
children, and he was additionally keen to stress this, the feeling of confinement prompted 
“an utterly groundless violence in him on more than one occasion” (p. 44). This violent 
response is only “groundless” in the purely immediate, situational sense. His students have 
not actually done anything to prompt it in the present moment. Instead, this sense of 
confinement has created a cognitive link back to the image of the train car which bore his 
lover Helen Hollaender “probably to Theresienstadt” (p. 50).  
    Sebald’s direct references to the train system are deliberately minimal. Beyond the explicit 
reference to the “special train” which conveyed Helen to her untimely death, there is only 
one other extract which helps to contextualise Paul’s suicide. When trying to rationalise his 
death, Mme Landau notes the following:  
I soon realised, it was for Paul a perfectly logical step. Railways had always meant a great deal 
to him – perhaps he felt they were headed for death. Timetables and directories, all the logistics 
of railways, had at times become an obsession with him. (p. 61) 
In a story driven entirely by the unspoken, this is the most explicit justification given for 
Paul’s death. The phrase “perhaps he felt they were headed for death” once again reminds 
the reader of the deportation process and its inferred destination – with Theresienstadt 
existing only as a transitional camp. What is of more significance is the imagined ultimate 
destination – here a nebulous death in the concentrationary system. Moreover, the culpability 
of the German populace at large, or rather those responsible for the running of the railway, 
is invoked through the reference to “timetables and directories”. Echoing Europa, the 
distance between Auschwitz and the armchair executioners in Germany is being deliberately 
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elided. Responsibility for the Holocaust always manages to trace its way back along the line, 
seeking out those who facilitated the mass deportation of Europe’s Jewry.53 
    Both texts, therefore, assume that the responsibility for Holocaust death cannot stop at the 
camp gates. Instead, it can be traced back to the very heart of German industry, with civilians 
indirectly facilitating the slaughter of millions. Paul’s suicide, therefore, can only be viewed 
as a symbolic extension of this notion. He kills himself on the rails because they 
synecdochically epitomise the Holocaust in its entirety and Jewish death specifically. 
Feeling, potentially, that the Shoah somehow passed him by – that, like George Steiner, he 
survived on the basis of a technicality – he seeks to redress the balance by dying on the rails. 
While Sebald represents the boxcar exclusively from the outside, representing a 
completely pious and therefore distant approach, Steve Stern almost seems to revel in its 
interior. While the cattle car serves mainly as a framing device, a justification for Velvl 
Spfarb’s bizarrely coprophilic Jewish folktale, the description of the space itself is always 
pointedly excessive. Having made note of the loss of personal dignity – “a quality that 
seemed redundant in the jolting car, where every private function was exposed to public 
scrutiny” (Stern, 2008, p. 53) – Stern then describes the morass of human waste inside the 
cattle car:  
Velvl struggled along with the widow to keep the child (who slumped like a ragdoll) from 
sliding into the stew in which they stood… A trickle of lump brown broth coated Velvl’s arm, 
signalling that the girl had also succumbed to the dysentery that was rife in the railway car. (p. 
63) 
 
53 This sentiment is relatively common in fictional representations of the Holocaust. In Jerzy Kosinski’s The 
Painted Bird, for instance, the boy speaks admiringly of those distant planners who wielded so much power: 
“I recalled the trains carrying people to the gas chambers and crematories. The men who had ordered and 
organised all that probably enjoyed a similar feeling of complete power over their uncomprehending 
victims” (2000, p. 220). 
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As the use of the descriptive terms “stew” and “broth” imply, this is not the cattle car being 
represented with Sebaldian discreetness. Stern revels in the atmospheric detail, describing 
with unseemly relish the thick layer of pervasive filth which seems to coat the inhabitants 
while also infecting the secondary narrative – Velvl’s story.54 Uncomfortably, however, 
there is also a contrived attempt to mix the faecal with the literally sexual:  
young people, reduced to their rawest instincts, ground themselves against one another in full 
view of the doleful company and, in their thirst, licked the sweat from each other’s necks… 
he might have suffered the full impact of his situation and succumbed as well to his baser self. 
But the young widow’s eyes – it was a safe bet that she was a widow… would not release him. 
(pp. 54-55)  
This is a text, in short, which borders on the pornographic in quite literally every sense. Not 
only is it wilfully explicit in terms of its featured details, not only can we say that it brings 
the cattle car to life as a mobile Gehenna of filth and debauchery, but it also “wrenches the 
suffering body out of its proper historical context” and makes it into “the object of our own 
desires and identifications” (Dean, 2004, p. 36). Stern is problematically overwriting the 
historical reality of the Holocaust by focusing excessively on the themes of “Sex” and 
“Shit”.55 Unable to connect with the emotional reality of transit to the death camps he instead 
chooses to revel in bodily excess. While sexuality was potentially an element of the pre-
camp experience – Arnošt Lustig, for instance, states in The Unloved: The Diary of Perla S. 
(1985) that people did “all kinds of things with their bodies when they [knew they were] 
going East” (1996, p. 145) – and human waste was certainly present in the cattle car, Stern 
has chosen excess over the humanity of his characters.   
 
54 Velvl’s story is discussed in detail in the following section, as it is directed towards a female sufferer. 
55 Berel Lang draws attention to three common elements which were often missing from ghetto or camp 
diaries. These are “Sex, Shit, and Status” (2005, p. 124). He claimed that writers often exorcised a particular 
degree of “self-censorship” (p. 124). He believes that diarists had the tendency to avoid direct references to 
wartime sexuality, the pervasive atmosphere of filth within the ghetto or camp or instances of wartime 
complicity – namely Kapos, the Jewish police or the Judenrat. By contrast, I contend, these are the three 
components which have come to preoccupy modern authors.  
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    Both the open and closed conceptions of the synecdochic cattle car, then, contain 
significant problems in terms of representation. While one chooses to pack the story with 
lurid details, the other is able only to conjure the faint image of the mythic Holocaust. Sebald, 
thanks to his restraint, leaves the matter rather too open. He relies entirely on the reader to 
fill in the associative blanks. As was proven with The Book of Questions, when the emphasis 
is placed on the reader to fill in their own representational blanks, they are essentially 
guaranteed to conjure a traditionally depthless and pious vision of the Holocaust – one 
almost certainly framed around certain images from the Auschwitz camp. Auschwitz, after 
all, is now culturally inextricable from the image of the cattle car, as the cattle car has been 
shown to lead to the crematoria. This association has been standardised through decades of 
cultural reproduction and, most crucially, legitimised by the memorial narratives. As such, 
both approaches inevitably lead us back to a deliberately vague, easily processible image of 
the death camp.  
    The fictional representation of the boxcar often seems to feature another pivotal emblem 
of Holocaust suffering: the image of the female victim. Often sexualised and always 
designed for easy identification, the female victim has always served as the embodiment of 
Nazi cruelty. This archetype, more than any other, has come to epitomise Jewish victimhood. 
 
  
The Enduring Legacy of the Sexualised Sufferer    
As Janet Jacobs noted, there is a tendency – at least in visual terms – to represent the 
extremity of the Holocaust via the image of the suffering female body. Using the tattoo 
collage featured in Auschwitz as something of a template, she notes that there is a singular 
emphasis on the one female example – which carries an additional gendered connotation. As 
she puts it: “the women become larger, more obvious in their degradation, suffering and 
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humiliation, while the men recede into the ethnic background” (2010, p. 14). The reason for 
this seems not to be simply the greater potential for symbolic extension – images of wounded 
women often appealing to the viewer’s primal sense of protectiveness – but rather the 
undercurrent of sexuality which seems to exist in the framing. Describing the one image of 
a tattooed female prisoner, she notes: “The upper limits of the photograph are bounded by a 
skirt which appears to have been raised intentionally for the camera. Had the image stood 
alone… it might be mistaken for a 1940s pornographic postcard” (p. 14). While the pictures 
depicting the male tattoo are presented neutrally, then, there is an unseemly undercurrent of 
voyeurism evident in this representation of female suffering. It is this curious co-mingling 
of sentiments – the automatic empathy inspired through images of female suffering, 
frequently infused with a tinge of “sadomasochistic eroticism” (p. 14) – which I explore 
throughout this chapter. Though Jacobs has expressed the fear that excessive academic 
emphasis on this topic, however well intentioned, will contribute “to a literature on Nazi 
genocide in which the violated Jewish female is re-inscribed in post-Holocaust memory” (p. 
19), I contend that the image of the violated Jewish female is already inscribed in post-
Holocaust memory – an immovable standard, represented with astonishing frequency in the 
fictional reproduction of the Holocaust. Fiction which features female sufferers or survivors 
often tends to resort to the sexualisation of their plight or the romanticisation of their 
suffering. 
Sharon Oster, for instance, discusses the sexualisation of female suffering in both Jerzy 
Kosinski’s The Painted Bird and William Styron’s Sophie’s Choice. She notes that, in both 
texts, the featured women have been transformed into a new archetype, whose “only agency” 
is “to fuck and to suffer” (2003, p. 103). While Kosinski’s text replaces authentic Holocaust 
suffering with scenes of sexual violence, Styron’s text introduces an additionally 
problematic element. Sophie is erotically interesting to Stingo, the novel’s protagonist, 
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because she has suffered. As Oster puts it, her “punishment and sex appeal” have become 
“intertwined” in a “new singularly perverse type of sex object” (p. 101). Styron’s non-Jewish 
character, therefore, is erotically drawn to a survivor partly because she bears the scars of 
the Holocaust.56  
Holocaust fiction, therefore, frames the horror of the Holocaust through the image of a 
woman’s suffering body. While it does not contain the level of sexualisation of evident in 
Sophie’s Choice, John le Carré’s Call for the Dead does represent Holocaust suffering 
through the representation of one particular survivor – a woman named Elsa Fennan. A great 
deal of emphasis is placed on her suffering body and, while it is not as overtly sexual as 
Stryon’s text, the story does revolve around male attempts to dominate and master a female 
sufferer – in order to counter their own masculine insecurities. There is, therefore, still an 
element of sexualisation present in these interactions.   
 Call for the Dead, though it is not actually a Holocaust text, is a novel entirely concerned 
with the image of the suffering woman, and in this case depicts a survivor’s attempts to break 
away from her status as a victim. The male characters in the novel are intent to view Elsa 
Fennan simply as someone passive and wounded, and cannot acknowledge that she survived 
the Shoah with her sense of self intact. When she is first described by George Smiley in the 
text she is epitomised by two qualities – an unbecoming emotional severity and the physical 
frailty that comes with years of suffering: “Foreign, Jewish too, I gather, suffered badly in 
the war, which adds to the embarrassment. She is a strong-minded woman and relatively 
unmoved by her husband’s death. Only superficially no doubt” (Carré, 2012, p. 16). This 
 
56 This non-Jewish sexual attraction to suffering also features in ‘Cake’, a short story by George Steiner, in 
which a young American academic finds himself drawn to two separate suffering Jewish girls. The first is a 
young woman brutalised on a train, who has cinders rubbed on her face by the German occupiers. The 
second is Rahel, a waif-like Jewish girl with whom he forms a confused romantic attachment. His lust for her 
is suffused with images of the first girl’s suffering: “For a moment, I was certain it was Rahel, that it was into 
her skin they had rubbed the cinders” (1996, p. 228). Tellingly, this moment occurs during their first (and 
only) sexual encounter. Steiner’s protagonist, as such, has half-consciously eroticised the image of Jewish 
suffering.      
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latter statement, I contend, factors into her later treatment throughout the novel. There is an 
underlying supposition, or rather a desperate need, for the masculine characters in this text 
– represented generally by Smiley – to fracture her emotional hardness. As her body has 
visibly been marked by her wartime experiences – a great deal of emphasis is given to her 
post-war frailty – Smiley is intent on maintaining his vision of her as a frail, passive, 
traumatised victim. Though, upon first meeting her in person, he notes that she conveys an 
“impression of endurance and courage” (p. 19), all of his following interactions with her 
seem designed to undercut this harder edge to her character. Not only is it necessary to his 
role as spy, as he hopes by fracturing her reserve she will come to confide in him, but there 
also appears to be an element of manful pride in the desire to overmaster her – to force her 
into a position of emotional submission. Essentially, he wishes to remould her into a more 
tolerable archetype of female suffering – one of cowed dependence and feminine frailty. In 
keeping with the narrative which dominated the post-war period – the return to pre-war 
normalcy which featured, as a key element, the appropriately domestic woman – any 
categorically unfeminine behaviour, such as a lingering post-war resentment or sense of 
defiance, is viewed as something which must be corrected by the men in the novel. 57 We 
can see for instance, after their first meeting, that Smiley has created an internal narrative, a 
comfortable archetype to which he expects her to conform:  
He could not believe that Elsa Fennan had killed her husband. Her instinct was to defend, to 
hoard the treasures of her life, to build about herself the symbols of a normal existence. There 
was no aggression in her, no will but the will to preserve. (p. 33)      
 
57 As Barbie Zelizer notes, photographs reproduced in the British media sometimes focused on the 
representation of women carrying out domestic duties within the camp setting. She references, specifically, 
a photograph of women peeling potatoes in post-liberation Bergen-Belsen. Run as a front-page photo in the 
British News Chronicle, Zelizer states that it linked the concept of women’s survival to “so called normal or 
domestic routine” (2001, p. 260). The image, therefore, stressed the return to normalcy that was expected 
of female survivors following the Holocaust.    
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As befits the narrative of the day, she is not expected to retain even the merest hint of post-
war hostility. Instead – in keeping with the idea of untainted, unaltered femininity – Smiley 
assumes that her sole aim is to return to domestic life, putting these events behind her. His 
presumptuousness is later compounded when he notes: “I think I understand her suffering” 
(p. 34). There is an underlying assumption here that Elsa, and by extension the horrors that 
she has suffered, can be reduced, categorised and rendered in a form that’s readily coherent. 
By looking at this one particular survivor, Smiley has begun to feel that he has ready access 
to the horrors of the Shoah. He believes that he has a handle on her plight and that he fully 
understands her post-war mentality – thereby understanding the depths of her psychic scars 
and the absence of any desire for vengeance. She does not hold anger, he assumes, but rather 
has learned to live in a state of constant, quiet submission: “He was an oppressor, but she 
accepted oppression” (p. 19). Smiley’s assumption, here, is that the Nazis have conditioned 
Elsa to be perpetually passive. She should not have the capacity to fight or resist any longer 
as her experiences under Nazi rule, and in the camps, have broken her body and her will.  
By looking at this one particular female survivor, Smiley has begun to feel that he has 
ready access to the Shoah in all its extremity. That this one female body with “frail hands” 
(p. 98) and the face of an “eternal refugee” (p. 19), which has been compared evocatively to 
the “carcass of a tiny bird” (p. 115), in some sense summarises the event in its entirety. This 
quality of synecdoche, this understanding that the Holocaust has been adequately 
represented through her frailty, fuels his presumptuousness. Without having experienced the 
camps directly, and with this one survivor’s body as his window onto the nature of the 
atrocity, Smiley clearly believes that he understands the reality of the prisoner’s daily 
struggle within the camps: 
It was an enchanting smile; her whole face lit up like a child’s… Smiley suddenly had a vision 
of Elsa as a child… He saw her as a wheedling Backfisch, fighting like a cat for herself alone, 
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and he saw her too, starved and shrunken in prison camp, ruthless in her fight for self-
preservation. It was pathetic to witness in that smile the light of her early innocence, and a 
steeled weapon in her fight for survival. (p. 32) 
Using only her body as his guide, Smiley feels that he has unpicked both the depths of her 
character and the reality of her in-camp experiences. He imagines her as a ruthless figure in 
the camps – he leaves no room for the kind of comradeship or humanity spoken of by Primo 
Levi, Joan Ringelheim and Seweryna Smaglewska. Her childlike smile is described as being 
“pathetic” as it acts as a reminder of her pre-war innocence, starkly contrasting with the 
woman Smiley now believes her to be – a woman debased by her in-camp acts of selfishness. 
None of these statements are based in evidence, but rather are fuelled by Smiley’s many 
assumptions. Her emaciation and her emotional hardness have led him to believe that she 
was callous and self-interested while interned. Moreover, Smiley also feels that he 
understands the psychology of the internee, as he has effectively imagined himself into 
Elsa’s shoes. This form of extreme emotional engagement suggests that Smiley feels he has 
a grasp on the internee’s mentality. As John le Carré’s text is a spy thriller, however – 
founded on a film noir-style misreading of a woman’s character – these assumptions can 
only be read as being inherently flawed. Elsa still possesses considerable post-war anger.    
Without this key misapprehension, Elsa’s role as one of the novel’s key conspirators 
would have been discovered immediately. Upon discovering that she has been meeting with 
Dieter Frei – the novel’s central villain – Smiley redoubles his efforts to force her back into 
a state of passivity. It is in this sequence that we begin to detect another facet of this dynamic, 
a quasi-sexual subtext to Smiley’s attempts to master her emotionally:  
When he spoke his voice was gentle, concessive. To Elsa it must have seemed like a voice she 
had longed for, irresistible, offering all strength, comfort, compassion and safety. She… then 
fell to her side in a gesture of submission. She sat opposite him, her eyes upon him in complete 
dependence, like the eyes of a lover. (p. 93)   
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For Smiley, a character emasculated by his wife Ann’s frequent and flagrant infidelities, this 
scenario provides him with the illusion of sexual dominance. In seeking to provide her with 
masculine comfort – the story repeatedly marginalises the masculinity of her Jewish 
husband, a character defined by his child-like dependence – Smiley is able to bolster his 
sense of white, British potency. It is not incidental that she is described as looking at him 
with the “eyes of a lover”. Nor is it trivial that the very first line in the story concerns Ann 
Sercomb – establishing her as Smiley’s chief preoccupation and the source of his present 
insecurities. From the outset, therefore, it is clear that he conceptualises Elsa as the epitome 
of feminine victimhood. In essence, these two women have been placed in opposition, with 
Ann as the embodiment of the youthful, the wayward and the uncowed. In order to retain 
even the vaguest semblance of manhood, therefore, Smiley needs Elsa to represent 
unambiguous victimhood – a woman who will yield to the slightest pressure, thus 
reaffirming his masculinity. To return to Oster, the only agency generally accorded to the 
synecdochic female victim is her capacity to “to fuck and to suffer”. Or, in this instance, to 
yield obligingly to the masculine reassurances of her non-Jewish saviour, thus reaffirming 
his sexual superiority over the Jewish male in the process.  At no point in the story is Elsa 
given agency. Her betrayal of Smiley is construed simply as another moment of masculine 
dominance. When watching her in collusion with Dieter Frei, Smiley describes Elsa as being: 
“animated and articulate like a puppet brought to life by her master” (p. 124). It is the lot of 
the former internee, it seems, to simply be buffeted about by wills greater than her own. To 
yield to every post-war expression of dominance, as this corresponds with the established 
image of the passive, brutalised, grateful Jewish survivor, seeking the guidance of a firm 
masculine hand. As Jacobs notes, the Holocaust constituted a “cataclysmic break in the 
history of masculinity” (2010, p. 36), with the cultural conception of the Jewish male having 
shifted towards an image of feminised passivity – having failed to protect their women. It is 
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this flawed foundational assumption that fuels Smiley’s actions throughout the novel and 
rebrands Elsa as easy prey. He is, in essence, capitalising on the work of the Nazis by seeking 
out a product of the concentrationary environment and trying to use her towards his own 
ends – a moment of dominance over one already used to domination.  
    The inherent tension in the novel, therefore, revolves around the notion that a survivor 
may try to break out of the narrow, somewhat romantic archetype of the female sufferer and 
try to regain some semblance of selfhood. In trying to do this however she ultimately dies as 
a passive tool in the schemes of dominant men. She even predicts her own fate in the line: 
“I’m the wandering Jewess, the no man’s land, the battlefield for your toy soldiers” (Carré, 
2012, p. 102). Ultimately, this is indeed the case. She is the passive landscape upon which 
men conduct their schemes and express their power. For Smiley, and by extension for all of 
the authors who will be cited in this section, there is a profound eroticism lurking behind this 
idea. As Auschwitz survivor Karen Goertz has noted in the past: “The idea of having absolute 
power over someone arouses feelings of pleasure” (Jacobs, 2010, p. 43). In a text concerned 
first and foremost with Smiley’s emasculation, therefore, it seems only logical to conclude 
that Elsa represents – despite, or perhaps even because of her ruined body – a masculine 
fantasy of victimhood.   
    Returning to Stern’s The North of God, the young Jewish widow featured in this novella 
also aligns with the image of the passive sexualised sufferer. Whereas Elsa Fennan at least 
had the capacity for self-expression, however, Stern’s female sufferer is entirely mute. 
Indeed, this silence can only be said to heighten her symbolic potency, as – given that she is 
almost literally an object, being corpse-like in her stillness – she is a character ripe with 
imaginative potential. She has no characteristics of any kind to get in the way of the 
narrator’s romantic suppositions. She is simply a blank slate waiting to be imbued with 
broader meaning. In this regard she cannot help but remind one of the deceased mother of 
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Bergen-Belsen, referenced by Barbie Zelizer – beautiful, motionless and vulnerable to the 
voyeurism of the male viewer.58 The tendency in both instances, it seems, is to remould this 
expressionlessness into something pleasingly romantic and/or domestic. This is evident in 
the following extract:  
Unless you counted the dowdy Mehitabel… Velvl, despite his better than two-score years, had 
never known a woman intimately. He felt a little ashamed that he should impose himself on 
this one, desolate in the absence of a husband who had doubtless perished in the current 
epidemic of death; but that his own death was also imminent… emboldened him, and he 
resolved to try to beguile the young woman with a story of the legendary friend of his youth. 
(Stern, 2008, pp. 52-53)  
While Velvl may understand on an intellectual level that his interaction with the young 
woman counts as an imposition, this does not curb his behaviour. He has begun to imagine 
himself as her temporary husband and, at least for the duration of the journey, as a surrogate 
father to her child. The story itself, therefore, takes on another connotation. Having explicitly 
mentioned that Mehitabel counted as his only pre-deportation experience of sexual intimacy, 
the story is depicted as something approaching a sexual act. This explains the violence of 
the telling, the fact that Velvl simply begins speaking – unbidden and with relentless 
enthusiasm – about the sexual misadventures of his legendary colleague. Their physical 
arrangement in the train car is also relevant, as Velvl notes: “Besides, pressed against her in 
the crush of human freight, with the child wedged awkwardly between them, it would have 
been more cruel to say nothing than to distract them with a frivolous tale” (p. 53). While this 
clearly represents Velvl’s attempt at self-justification – Velvl claims that he is speaking only 
 
58 Zelizer describes a picture entitled ‘Corpse of mother at Bergen-Belsen, April 17, 1945’ which, though it 
did not make it into the press following the liberation of the camps, has become the subject of later 
fascination. As the woman is both “nude and beautiful” (1998, p. 117), the photograph is open to an 
element of sexualisation or romantic reconceptualization. She notes that Robert Morris later “painted an 
erotic gloss” (p. 179) over the image, literally reframing it as a photograph depicting a woman who has 
“innocently fallen asleep” (p. 179). The tendency to romantically recast and repossess the suffering woman 
is certainly evident in post-Holocaust culture.   
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out of politeness – it can also be read as his attempt to salve his own conscience. Velvl has 
convinced himself that he is speaking in order to distract her from the horror of the situation, 
and yet his story is also charged with an undeniable sexual energy. With the child acting as 
a literal physical barrier, and the crush of bodies preventing free movement, this story must 
suffice as the outpouring of his sexual energies – this is what gives it its priapic urgency. He 
is talking at her after all, talking over her grief and forcing this narrative upon her – freighted 
as it is with sexual imagery. Indeed, Velvl tries to make the meaning of the story clear to the 
mother – that it is taking the place of a sexual encounter – by infusing his highly sexed tale 
with descriptions which mirror their current environment. He continues to include references 
to the excremental, which connects his story to the environment of the cattle car. Note the 
following sequence from the story of Hershel and the succubus, which takes place inside a 
“privy”: “But the creature rocked her hips as if in a shukeling prayer – and despite his 
exhaustion and the fetid surroundings, despite everything he’d previously deemed to be 
decent, the scholar responded to her beckoning movements” (p. 39). The atmosphere in 
which this story takes place, the overcrowded boxcar, is one of rampant dysentery. As such, 
it is telling that he chooses to paint a particularly lurid picture of a sexual encounter which 
takes place in an outdoor lavatory. He is telling a story, in effect, about two people who yield 
to their animalistic impulses and copulate in an environment exactly like their own. It is his 
attempt, I believe, to infuse their dynamic with a frisson of sexuality – to make his story 
more pointedly relevant. He is attempting to participate in the “indecent” sexuality of the 
cattle car without actually having sex. None of this, however, seems to register on the widow 
in any way. She is, in every respect, the perfect embodiment of vacancy. She gives him 
nothing. She infers nothing. She is merely passive and unresisting. There is only one instance 
in which she shows even the merest flicker of an expression:  
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he expected that at any second the woman might snap out of her trance, clap hands over the 
little girl’s ears, and cry, “A shandeh!”He ought to be ashamed of himself! But instead, Velvl 
discerned the fishtail flicker at the corner of her bloodless lips, which he decided was the 
stillbirth of a smile. He mourned its passing, then resolved that his story… must never end. So 
long as he could keep the mother and daughter captivated, he could keep them safe. (p. 54)    
All the while, then, he is waiting for a rebuke and when none ever comes he feels licensed 
to go on with the telling of his story. This passage displays his problematic relationship with 
the nature of consent. He freely admits that the “stillbirth of a smile” is an ambiguous sign 
– perhaps not even a smile, given that it never actually evolved into an expression. As a 
stillborn smile it is nothing more than an expressionless twitch. All it amounts to, then, is 
another instance of emotional transposition on the part of the man. The woman is as pliant 
and unmoving as a corpse and so there is nothing to block Velvl’s attempts to transform her, 
however unwillingly, into a frightened widow in need of his masculine reassurance. Once 
again, the sexualised sufferer exists only as a tool – the means by which a nearly virginal 
man seeks to simulate the feeling of married life in his final hours.  
While the text itself seems to consider Velvl’s storytelling to be in some sense heroic – 
an act designed to displace the horror of the gas chamber – the end of the novella compounds 
its dubiety. Following their arrival at Auschwitz, Velvl’s ersatz family is violently split apart:  
Velvl glimpsed, in the adjacent ranks of women, one from whose arms dangled a spindly, bug-
eyed little girl. The child was torn from the mother’s arms and carried like a defective 
mannequin across the platform, where she was flung atop the tangled heap of bodies in a 
truckbed, while the hysterical woman fell to her knees in the thickening mist. (pp. 95-96)   
It is significant that the principal tragedy here is not Velvl’s, but rather the mother’s. It is she 
who has lost her husband and child to the violence of the Holocaust. We are never given her 
perspective, however, as that does not fit the established archetype of the female victim as 
masculine prop. She does not exist to convey her own narrative but rather to be narrativised 
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by the resident man. This, by contrast, makes Velvl Spfarb’s act of storytelling seem even 
more unseemly. He is a priapic stranger, hounding a woman literally to the gates of 
Auschwitz and beyond, inserting himself into her plight. This rather blurs Velvl’s moment 
of implied heroism, then, when he rejects his position of safety, having passed through the 
selection process, and joins her en route to the gas chamber. As an emotional prompt for the 
reader, a German officer states, somewhat leadingly: “This is the place where all stories end” 
(p. 98). As such, the reader is primed for Velvl’s final act of “defiance”. The narrative has 
attempted to reconceptualise Velvl’s simulated sex act as something heroic – a rejection of 
life in favour of one last distracting tale. However, this is undermined again by his choice of 
listener. He once again seeks out his adopted wife – now reeling from the loss of her child 
and having been wounded by one of the guard dogs:  
he reached her – at least he believed it was her… He grabbed hold of her clammy hand and 
squeezed tight, feeling a corresponding sensation envelop his heart… When finally she turned 
toward him… the widow greeted Velvl with a look of unalloyed terror – the kind of look he 
supposed the Angel of Death himself must have been accustomed to seeing in his victims. 
Nevertheless, buffeted by the storm, he continued his story. (p. 99)  
This is the last instance in the text in which the surrounding Holocaust narrative features. 
Stern’s clear assertion, therefore, is that Velvl continued the telling of his story right up until 
the point of dying, providing a supposed moment of solace to his adopted wife. The phrase 
“buffeted by the storm” certainly contains a connotation of heroic endurance, and yet Stern 
has never clarified the degree to which the widow has taken comfort in Velvl’s verbal assault. 
The terror on her face – which acts as a spur for Velvl, engaging his drive to protect and 
distract her – may just as easily be construed as uncomprehending horror. The problem 
inherent in the novella is that Velvl’s act of storytelling has never needed the active 
participation of a second party. Problematically, therefore, Stern has compounded the 
objectification and eroticisation of the female sufferer. She at once emblematises the true 
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horror of the Holocaust – it is she, after all, who experiences a moment of genuine loss – and 
yet she is construed simply as a mute prop, a voiceless emotional spur which prompts Velvl 
to acts of heroism. She, however, does not possess agency. She is merely a suffering body 
upon which the horrors of the Holocaust are visited.    
    Jerzy Kosinski’s The Painted Bird also features the image of the mute sexualised sufferer. 
In this instance, however, the emphasis is not on the male desire to speak for her or to 
emotionally dominate her. Instead, Kosinski aims to reconceptualise the Holocaust as an 
explicitly sexual crime – a trend which carries forward into modern literature.  
    The suffering Jewish woman in Kosinski’s text is clearly an emblematic character, 
designed to speak to the broader reality of Jewish suffering. This is evident, first and 
foremost, thanks to her connection to the cattle car. Kosinski’s text, as Lawrence Langer has 
implied, does not look to explicitly replicate the horrors of the Holocaust. Instead, Langer 
suggests, Kosinski’s work is a piece of Holocaust fiction which aims “to discover legitimate 
metaphors that might suggest without actually describing or even mentioning its world” 
(Langer, in Vice, 2000, p. 68). Kosinski’s text, therefore, aims to capture the essence of the 
Holocaust without explicitly referencing the camps themselves. This is signalled through the 
use of the train, which again acts as a contaminating link back to the concentrationary 
system. This becomes particularly evident in the sequences in which the possessions of 
deportees fall from the cattle car. As the boy notes, various objects come to line the tracks 
after the cattle cars pass, from scraps of paper to notebooks and calendars. Most crucially, 
however, pictures also fall from the passing trains:   
The pictures were of course the most desirable to collect, since few in the village could read… 
The women giggled and whispered to one another about the pictures of the men, while the 
men muttered obscene jokes and comments about the pictures of the girls. People in the village 
collected these photographs, traded them, and hung them in their huts and barns. (Kosinski, 
2000, pp. 101-102)  
76 
 
From a post-Holocaust standpoint, these images are totemic stand-ins for the dead. Just as 
the photographs hanging in the Tower of Faces in the USHMM speak to the fate of the 
missing, these pictures stand-in for the murdered in Kosinski’s text. Commemorative 
institutions, however, also use these images to humanise the dead.59 In Kosinsi’s text, by 
contrast, the photographs are merely erotic objects traded by Polish locals. The Jews for 
them are simply a commodity, a thing to be used to satisfy one’s base desires. The pictures, 
therefore, represent both the scale of the atrocity and the sexual dehumanisation of the 
victims, as the dead are literally transformed into erotic possessions. If the trading of these 
photographs may then be taken as a broader metaphor about the nature of Holocaust 
violence, then Kosinski is identifying two key aspects: the dehumanisation of the victim and 
the sexualisation of their suffering.  
    Kosinski does seem to conceive of the Holocaust as an explicitly sexual crime. This is 
made clear in the afterword to his novel: “another Jewish attendant described the SS guards 
nonchalantly feeling the sexual parts of every adolescent girl who passed on her way to the 
gas chambers” (p. xxii). For Kosinski the killing process is not impersonal and dispassionate, 
but rather sexual and dehumanising. He describes throngs of girls being fondled on the way 
to their de-personalising deaths, as if this was SS standard practice – an inveterate part of 
the killing process. He, therefore, views Holocaust suffering through the plight of one 
specific victim – the dehumanised girl.  
    Kosinski then takes this idea to its logical extreme by graphically depicting the rape of 
one teenage sufferer. Just as the pictures speak to the fate of the missing in general, this 
 
59 Yaffa Eliach’s tower exhibition in the USHMM, for instance, is designed to recapture a sense of Ejszyszki (a 
Lithuanian shtetl) as it existed in the pre-war period, before the liquidation of its inhabitants. Eliach’s 
connection represents a carefully constructed arrangement, which aims to capture the emotional reality of 
the community. As Edward T. Linnenthal notes, she intended for the collection to be “an organic whole, a 
living memory of the town” (1997, p. 182) and so photographs of families that had feuded were not placed 
next to one another. This, therefore, may be said to represent a partial resurrection – an attempt to 
particularise and humanise the deceased.  
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Jewish girl must be viewed as a totemic sufferer – her experience stands in for all of those 
unseen women bound for Auschwitz. Both, Kosinski would have it, will be dehumanised 
and sexually debased.  
    The young Jewess is taken aside by one of the Poles named Rainbow – a widower and 
apparent simpleton – in order to “spend the night” (p. 104). She is then violently raped, 
despite being injured. For Kosinski, the brutalised Jewish girl represents absolute 
victimhood. She has no agency of any kind. She is described only in terms of her ethnicity, 
her foreignness and her suffering. She “babbles” (p. 103) in a language no one can 
understand, before later uttering “strange words in her language when his touch grew 
rougher” (p. 104). As such, the text denies her the capacity for self-expression. Though she 
tries to speak, meaning is never transmitted. She cannot encourage empathy or establish even 
her basic humanity. Instead, she exists simply to be debased and to die like an animal – all 
while embodying her entire race through her emphasised ethnicity. Kosinski emphasises her 
“thick eyebrows and very black eyes” (p. 102) as racial signifiers, to signal her difference 
from the locals. She is, in short, the novel’s only totemic Jewish female and, as such, 
embodies Jewish femininity and, by implication, the fate of the Jewish sufferer.  
    Her status as an object is further affirmed as, during her violent rape, the girl becomes 
sexually conjoined with her rapist – in a fashion similar to coital lock in dogs or wolves. 
Unable to free himself, Rainbow calls for assistance and has the girl violently cut away, with 
less compassion than one would show an animal: “I could see nothing; I only heard the girl’s 
last piercing shriek… At dawn I ran to the knothole… On the threshing floor, close to the 
wall, a human shape lay stretched out flat, covered from head to foot with a horse blanket” 
(p. 108). The Jewish girl, therefore, is regarded as having less inherent worth than an animal. 
She is an object to be utilised and then discarded. Rainbow’s rape of the Jewish girl is 
categorically not about her, as she is simply another consumerist item – another thing 
78 
 
collected from the side of the train tracks, like the pictures collected by the townsfolk. 
Indeed, she is regarded has having less worth than the photographs, which are at least traded 
and fetishized. This dehumnisation becomes complete as she is transformed into a “human 
shape” beneath a horse blanket. She is not a person but a usable mass of flesh. That is how 
she is viewed by the Poles in Kosinski’s text. In short, as Langer suggests, Kosinski has 
populated his world with “creatures whose values coincide with those of Auschwitz, as if no 
other [world] had ever existed” (1977, p. 167). Through their proximity to Auschwitz and 
the passing of the cattle car, the Poles have learned to devalue Jewish life. These are not 
people, as far as they are concerned, but objects bound for extermination. Objects which, 
lacking basic humanity, may also be put to other unseemly sexual uses.  
    Similarly, and just as crucially, Kosinski has replaced direct representation of mass 
gassing with an explicit focus on sexual violence. As this thesis argues throughout, while the 
emotional and experiential reality of industrial mass murder is almost impossible to 
represent, sexual violence is a more instinctually understandable crime. Kosisnki, however, 
rather over-emphasises this element and, in so doing, creates a singularly warped picture of 
the Holocaust.  
    Sexual violence, as recent research has revealed, was certainly an element of the atrocity. 
While the laws of racial purity may have curbed the standardisation of sexual violence by 
German forces, it did not eliminate it entirely. As Helene J. Sinnreich notes, sexual violence 
on the part of the Nazis was perhaps more likely to take place on the administrative fringes 
of the Reich: “Nazis in charge of localities were sometimes at odds with central Nazi policy 
not only with regard to accepting bribes or other indiscretions but also in relation to creating 
an atmosphere conducive to sexual abuse” (2010, p. 109). The sexual exploitation of Jewish 
women within the camp system was certainly not routinized, as Robert Sommer clarifies, as 
there is “no evidence of a Jewish woman being exploited” (2010, p. 53) within the brothel 
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system. However, survivor accounts have occasionally referenced isolated instances of 
sexual abuse at the hands of the SS. While the precise scale of these assaults is hard to 
quantify – as rape during the Holocaust was not commonly recorded in official documents 
or spoken of by victims after the fact – enough evidence exits to assert that “some degree of 
sexual contact between Jewish women and German soldiers did occur” (Flaschka, 2010, p. 
92). Sexual violence was provably an element of the atrocity, therefore. To represent the 
violence of the Shoah purely in the form of sexual assault, however, represents a 
fundamental misrepresentation of established fact. It was a part of the Holocaust, though not 
its defining element. 
    Fiction should, I contend, possess the capacity to represent the reality of sexual violence 
during the Holocaust. Rather than simply presenting a scenario in which Jewish women are 
menaced by cartoonishly demonic members of the SS – as has become standard in 
representations of the camps – it should instead represent the broader reality of wartime 
sexuality.60 As Nomi Levenkron has noted, sexual violence was not solely attributable to the 
Nazis, as women were also likely to be subject to assault at the hands of “the Germans’ 
collaborators” and even “Jewish men in the ghettos and camps” (2010, p. 17; p. 18). Survivor 
writing also features a number of references to “sex for food” (p. 20) arrangements, in which 
privileged prisoners would prey upon the vulnerabilities of the starving in order to barter for 
sex.61 The reality of sexual interactions during the Holocaust should therefore not be 
portrayed with pious reductivism, in which the participants are either mute yielding victims 
or lascivious Nazis. The moral reality, as is suggested by the variety of forms of sexual threat, 
is rather more grey. One could argue, for instance, that The North of God provides a 
 
60 The Pawnbroker (both Edward Lewis Wallant’s 1961 novel and Sidney Lumet’s 1964 film), Schindler’s List 
(1993) and The Tattooist of Auschwitz all feature the sexualisation of Holocaust violence, with passive 
victims being exploited by monstrous Nazis.  
61 Instances of this are referenced in several survivor texts, including Olga Lengyel’s Five Chimneys and 
Magda Herzberger’s Survival.  
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genuinely impious insight into male wartime sexuality, as it does allow the reader to fathom 
the motives of a would-be assaulter. Velvl’s pursuit of the mute widow is in keeping, for 
instance, with Lisa S. Price’s theory of rape. Analysing the role of rape in former Yugoslavia 
she notes: “I AM only to the extent that you are not – male because you are female, Serb 
because you are Muslim, soldier because you are a civilian” (2001, p. 213). Velvl used the 
femininity of the widow, and her pliancy, to reaffirm his own masculine identity. His 
maleness stems from those elements which he takes from her – he projects his self-affirming 
fantasy onto her and solidifies it through her lack of resistance. If rape follows this pattern 
of gender affirmation, then Stern has impiously represented the thinking behind Jewish 
wartime sexual assault. This, however, represents a relatively charitable reading of the text, 
as Velvl is still heroized. The story is not meant to be read as a deconstruction of his wartime 
emasculation, but rather as a humanising tale of emotional co-dependence in extreme 
circumstances. Nevertheless, Stern’s text does demonstrate that an impious presentation of 
wartime sexuality is possible. The sexual grey zone can be represented, but modern fiction 
frequently does not capitalise on this possibility. Instead, the presentation of the Jewish 
suffering body is both pious and exploitative. The reader is not meant to understand their 
plight or the complex motivations fuelling wartime sexual compromise. Instead, they are 
meant to connect to scenes of sexual suffering on a bodily level.62   
 
Conclusion       
Our current conception of the Holocaust, therefore, has been shaped by our partial 
understanding of the mass extermination process. As is demonstrated in sections one and 
two, the icons which have come to embody the Shoah tend only to invoke a simplified 
 
62 The notion of forming a bodily connection to the events of the Holocaust, or of engaging with these 
scenes as “prosthetic memories”, is further discussed in Chapter Four.   
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version of the Auschwitz site. The tattoo, which once invoked the idea of a survivor’s lived 
suffering, now hints only at the processed reproduction. As Eve’s Tattoo demonstrates, the 
tattoo does not possess the capacity to connect one with the reality of Holocaust suffering. 
When worn by anyone other than a survivor, the tattoo merely serves as a logo which 
indicates their limited understanding of the Holocaust. As all nonwitnesses must rely entirely 
upon post-memorial media and commemorative sites in order to flesh out their 
understanding of the Shoah, the nonwitness’s Auschwitz tattoo can only emblematise this 
post-memorial vision of the event. It has become a sign which indicates their distance from 
the Holocaust, and the entirely constructed nature of modern Holocaust memory.  
    Additionally, as the texts featured in section two illustrate, the cattle car has served as an 
embodying icon for the atrocity for the greater part of the last half-century. This is also 
problematic, however, as it continues to perpetuate a simplistically exterminationist view of 
the Shoah. By using the cattle car as a synecdochic symbol, Holocaust fiction – and, by 
extension, commemoration – is perpetuating the idea that Shoah can be summarised by the 
vision of deportation and death in the gas chamber. This clearly ignores the broader reality 
of the Holocaust, which also encompassed death in the occupied territories at the hands of 
firing squads.  
    Section three, vitally, then illustrates the consequence of this simplifying trend. By 
focusing on the example of the sexualised sufferer, it explores the problematic emotional 
distance which has come to define our relation to the Shoah. Unable to connect with the idea 
of Holocaust suffering on an emotional level, as we understand the Shoah only as a vague 
assemblage of related images, it has instead been reconceptualised as a sexual crime – 
something the nonwitness can understand, to a certain degree. This gap in authenticity, or 
post-memorial knowledge, has then been filled in – as Sharon Oster noted – with women’s 
suffering bodies. While John le Carré’s Call for the Dead represents a comparatively early 
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response to the suffering woman – a male desire to master her in order to reassert their own 
masculinity – Kosinski’s simple sexualisation of Holocaust suffering is more representative 
of the approach taken by modern fiction.63 In Carré’s text, after all, the Holocaust is not a 
remote event. Given its setting, and Elsa Fennan’s lingering anger, it can be said the wounds 
of the Shoah are still very much present. For modern authors, by contrast, the Holocaust has 
become impossibly remote. The suffering woman is not a figure to whom they can form a 
connection in the present and so there is no desire to sexually master her. Instead, she has 
become an abstract symbol – a device used to illustrate the horrors of the Holocaust. This is 
again problematic as it rules out the possibility of an impious approach to the Shoah. If we 
cannot conceive of the victims as people – if they come to exist only as suffering bodies – 
then we cannot hope to represent the Holocaust with depth. As Stern’s text demonstrates, 
the potential does exist to impiously depict the sexual reality of life during the Holocaust. 
Culturally, however, we cannot move beyond the objectification of the female sufferer. We 
are presently doomed to the endless reproduction of Elsa Fennans and Helen Hirschs – 
emobodying women, whose suffering is meant to abstractly represent the horrors of the 
Holocaust. Women without agency or personality, whose suffering we are meant to feel but 
not understand. This is problematic as, this thesis contends, it runs the risk of forever limiting 
our conception of the Shoah. We are not remembering the event, but rather a simplistically 
vague distortion.   
    Chapter Two continues to build upon the theme of emotional distance by discussing the 
inherent unreachability of the survivor’s experiences, and the extent to which the second 
generation understand their parents’ Holocaust pasts. Vitally, it also continues to explore the 
 
63 Despite Kosinski’s text having been first published in 1965. The sexualisation of Holocaust suffering, it 
should be noted, is not a new trend. Yehiel Dinur’s The House of Dolls also took this approach to the subject 
in 1955. This objectification of the female sufferer, given that it does not rely on emotional depth, simply 
aligns well with our present conception of the Holocaust.  
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cultural fascination with the Jewish body. This seems to stem, the chapter argues, from the 





















Chapter II: Second-Generation Fiction and the Legacy of the Hinge Generation 
The guardianship of the Holocaust is being passed on to us. The second generation is the hinge 
generation in which received, transferred knowledge of events is being transmuted into history, 
or into myth. (Hoffman, 2005, p. xv) 
When Eva Hoffman speaks of the children of survivors as the “hinge generation”, she 
conceives of them not simply as the inheritors of their parents’ knowledge, but also crucial 
figures in the shaping of Holocaust memory. The second-generation child is in the unique 
position, she argues, of being able to clarify and recode their parents’ experiences – ensuring 
that at least something of their Holocaust suffering will be passed on to future generations. 
She conceives of the second-generation child as an interpretive mouthpiece, re-ordering their 
parents’ testimony into something less fragmented than what was originally presented. This 
statement may seem both sweeping and judgemental; yet it is Hoffman’s belief that survivor 
testimony communicates very little beyond the existence of trauma. In a position in keeping 
with Marianne Hirsch’s concept of post-memory, she describes the children of survivors as 
receiving only partial fragments of their parents’ experiences – isolated scenes which come 
to define their vision of the Holocaust. These “dark amulets” (Hoffman, 2005, p. 10), as she 
calls them, make up the entirety of her own parents’ Holocaust testimony, with the rest of 
their experiences being represented only through traumatic silences. This experience, she 
claims, is common to the children of survivors:  
Many others who grew up in households like mine remember the torn, incoherent nature of 
those first communications about the Holocaust, the speech broken under the pressure of pain. 
The episodes, the talismanic litanies, were repeated but never elaborated upon. They remained 
compressed, packed, sharp. I suppose the inassimilable character of the experiences they 
referred to was expressed – and passed on – through this form. (p. 11) 
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For Hoffman, then, the second generation is able to learn nothing coherent from their 
parents’ recollections. Their experiences were not presented as chronological narratives, 
complete with an easily digestible and codifying moral. Instead, the child receives only an 
impenetrable fragment, or potentially a series of fragments. Though these episodes come to 
dominate the child’s understanding of the Holocaust – Hoffman herself, for instance, is still 
plagued by the image of the peasant’s cabin in which her parents sought refuge for two years 
– they do not actually transmit any usable information. The only thing that is successfully 
transmitted from the first generation to the second, then, is the idea that a given experience 
may be “inassimilable”. By this she means that the survivor was not able to incorporate the 
most traumatic of their Holocaust experiences as processed memory. As Cathy Caruth notes, 
the victim was “never fully conscious during the [event] itself” (1991, p. 187) and so the 
moment continues to exist in the recesses of their psyche as an unresolved wound. As such, 
it cannot be assimilated into any spoken narrative. Here, Hoffman is drawing a sharp 
distinction between spoken testimony and the actual experiences of survivors, as oral 
communication is simply not a suitable vehicle for the transmission of Holocaust trauma. 
Without actually using the terms, Hoffman is utilising Lawrence Langer’s notions of 
“common memory” and “deep memory”.64 If “common memory” may be thought of as 
spoken narrative – the Holocaust experience that survivors can actually tell – then “deep 
 
64 While these terms have been popularised through their use by Lawrence Langer, they originated in the 
writing of Charlotte Delbo. Langer translates an excerpt from Delbo’s original 1985 publication La mémoire 
et les jours as follows: “I have the feeling that the ‘self’ who was in the camp isn’t me, isn’t the person who 
is here… And everything that happened to this other ‘self’, the one from Auschwitz, doesn’t touch me now… 
so distinct are deep memory [mémoire profonde] and common memory [mémoire ordinaire] (Delbo, in 
Langer 1991, p. 13). In her text, Delbo notes that when she speaks of Auschwitz in the present, the words 
“don’t come from deep memory” (p. 7). This, according to Langer, is due to the fundamentally inarticulable 
nature of the Auschwitz experience, as conventional language lacks the power to convey experiences which 
are often “beyond analogy” (p .12). As such, deep memory is not openly expressed, but rather – as his 
analysis of video testimony demonstrates – it intrudes on the present in the form of silences: “We wrestle 
with the beginnings of a permanently unfinished tale, full of incomplete intervals, faced by the spectacle of 
a faltering witness often reduced to a distressed silence by the overwhelming solicitations of deep memory” 
(p. 21).   
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memory” corresponds with the inexpressible and irresolvable experience itself. James E. 
Young highlights the difference between these two forms of memory as follows:      
common memory is that which “tends to restore or establish coherence, closure and possibly 
a redemptive stance,” whereas deep memory remains essentially inarticulable and 
unrepresentable, that which continues to exist as unresolved trauma just beyond the reach of 
meaning… every common memory of the Holocaust is haunted by that which it necessarily 
leaves unstated, its coherence a necessary but ultimately misleading evasion. (2003, p. 24) 
If common memory represents the survivor’s desire to give order to their chaotic experiences 
by reshaping them into something coherent, then deep memory is the counterpoint which 
renders this a fruitless endeavour. All attempts at testimony are fundamentally undermined 
by the fact that they represent only a partial reality – they represent the stories that survivors 
are able or willing to tell. In his analysis of the speech patterns of Mary R., Holocaust 
survivor and docent in a St. Louis-based museum, Michael Bernard-Donals stresses the 
insufficiency of her testimony. Her speech acts as a veneer, papering over her trauma without 
ever successfully conveying it. As he puts it: “The silences and hesitations that appear 
throughout this section of Mary R.’s interview mark the spaces in which the experience of 
her mother’s death cannot be narrated but nevertheless continue to haunt her” (2003, p. 203). 
For Bernard-Donals, therefore, the worth of Mary R.’s testimony lies not in what has been 
said, but in her telling pauses. The reality of Mary R.’s loss cannot be transmitted, as it exists 
exclusively in her silences. According to this reading, therefore, a survivor’s testimony only 
has worth as a potential lens through which the careful listener or reader may detect the 
traces of trauma. The actual words themselves communicate very little of the survivor’s lived 
experiences, and so the priority becomes searching for the signs of deep memory. As Richard 
Crownshaw puts it: “Deep memory registers in the breakdown of testimonial language and 
signals a supposedly purer and unmediated form of memory event” (2010, p. 29). Once the 
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dutiful listener or reader has actually been able to discover this “breakdown in testimonial 
language”, however, what has actually been learned in the attempt? While we may be able 
to discern its existence, we are fundamentally incapable of touching or experiencing the 
foundational trauma which has now become deep memory. When a trauma is fundamentally 
inaccessible, and conveyed entirely through the absence of expression, we must resign 
ourselves to one final realisation: the horrors of the Holocaust cannot be transmitted or 
conveyed. This is the enduring legacy of deep memory.  
    Borrowing the dual concepts of the “hinge generation” and “deep memory”, this chapter 
assesses the ways in which second-generation fiction has sought to shape our broader 
cultural understanding of the Holocaust. All of the texts featured in this chapter are united 
by their shared assertion that the trauma of the Shoah, and therefore the reality of genuine 
knowing, remains the firm property of the survivors themselves. There is, to borrow a phrase 
from Hirsch, an “unbridgeable gap” (2012, p. 80) between survivors and their descendants. 
At the very most, the second generation may state that they have borne witness to their 
parents’ trauma – that they have detected its presence in the lapses of their parent’s speech 
and their lingering anxieties. They cannot, however, claim to share in it or to understand it – 
despite their desire to take on their parents’ representational burden. Using this concept as 
its foundational premise, this chapter claims that all of the featured works of fiction – 
whether they have been written by or are simply concerned with the second generation – 
seek to convey one foundational message: that the lived reality of the Holocaust cannot be 
recaptured and is therefore doomed to erasure. As the second generation failed to either 
inherit or transmit their parents’ bodily trauma, their understanding of the Holocaust has 
become an entirely mediated one. Post-memory has taken the place of genuine 
understanding, as our entire conception of the Shoah has become founded upon the 
“numberless images” passed down to us through “books, films and photographs” (Young, 
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2000, p. 44). This entirely mediated form of memory, which focuses explicitly on the cultural 
reproduction of the Shoah – the texts, photographs and memorial representations which seek 
to represent it after the fact – comes to form the third category of memory which proves 
central to this chapter.  While “common memory” and “deep memory” refer specifically to 
the survivor, therefore, “post-memory” refers explicitly to our culturally produced 
conception of the Shoah.     
    The first section of this chapter refers specifically to Thane Rosenbaum’s collection of 
short stories, Elijah Visible. It focuses on the representation of Holocaust transmission, as 
Rosenbaum explores the distinction between deep memory and post-memory. Despite their 
wish to share in their parents’ trauma, he implies, second-generation children cannot access 
the Holocaust as an experiential reality. Though they may claim it as their natural 
inheritance, their understanding of the Shoah always remains profoundly mediated. This then 
transitions into the second section of the chapter, which expands on the notion of post-
memory by featuring two texts which are principally concerned with the concept of 
Holocaust absence. Patrick Modiano’s The Search Warrant and W.G Sebald’s Austerlitz 
both highlight the impossibility of recovering the Holocaust dead. Both authors 
conceptualise death in Auschwitz as an entirely destructive process which yielded no bodies 
and thereby robbed the Holocaust dead of their individuality. In both cases, the principal 
characters of these texts become obsessed with the concept of irretrievability. They cannot 
accept the notion of the intangible, unreachable dead and so they become intent on restoring 
a sense of materiality and individuality to those lost in the Holocaust. Their attempts, 
however, only highlight the unreachability of the Holocaust dead and our own reliance on 
post-memory. When the dead leave nothing behind, beyond a series of disembodied 
artefacts, we must rely entirely on post-memorial sources in order to form even a fractional 
understanding of the Shoah. The final section of this chapter then takes the concept of post-
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memory to its logical extreme, by examining a text in which the central characters have no 
substantiating connection to the Shoah. Shalom Auslander’s Hope: A Tragedy features a 
world in which the Holocaust has been effectively commodified. Rather than existing as a 
series of particular events, it has been transformed into a series of empty symbols. By closing 
with this text, and analysing Auslander’s vision of a rootless Holocaust, I come to the 
conclusion that the “hinge generation” have forever shaped the content of Holocaust fiction 
- specifically, by passing forward the message that the Holocaust cannot be accessed or 
understood by subsequent generations.    
 
Thane Rosenbaum and the Failure of Transmission 
A common thread unites the works of Eva Hoffman, Marianne Hirsch and Dana Wardi: all 
three authors believe in the transmission of a certain strain of Holocaust trauma from parent 
to child. While Wardi speaks of the “perpetuation of the stigma”, as the survivor-mother 
passively transmits her own “non-verbal and almost unconscious messages” (1992, p. 58) to 
her child, Hoffman notes that she received the Holocaust as her “first knowledge, a sort of 
supercondensed pellet of primal information” (2005, p. 6). In unpacking Hoffman’s 
phrasing, we must first note that these are not the clear communications of common memory 
– these are not coherent stories, rehearsed and clarified by her survivor parents over many 
years. As this knowledge is both “supercondensed” and “primal” it represents the non-verbal 
signs of her parents’ unprocessed trauma – their unreachable deep memories. In the most 
technical sense, the survivor parent is communicating something that is simply not passed 
through spoken or even conscious channels. As Hoffman continues: “There was a casting of 
a shadow, a transference of an immensely heavy burden. There were signals conveyed along 
subterranean passages from survivors to their descendants that injected anxiety into the 
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latter’s veins” (p. 60). These “subterranean passages” are all forms of passive transmission, 
from the survivor parent’s behavioural quirks to their generalised anxiety. In short, it is the 
physical and unconscious manifestations of their trauma. These, in turn, are then passed on 
the second generation, who inherit their parents’ symptoms as their Holocaust inheritance. 
According to this logic, therefore, a certain element of the Holocaust is transmissible. The 
child cannot inherit the experiential reality of their parents’ lived trauma, but can inherit the 
symptoms of their suffering. Indeed, as Wardi notes, second generation children were even 
bombarded with these parental messages while still in-utero. Fuelled by an inherent distrust 
of their new post-Holocaust husbands and unable to process the deaths of their pre-war 
families, pregnant survivors would often flood their unborn children with “neurohormonal 
substances” (1992, p. 59) which would transmit anxiety to them in the womb. The Holocaust, 
therefore, has been transmitted to the second generation, as something tangible has passed 
from parent to child. However, it would be incorrect to claim that the second generation has 
truly inherited their parents’ Holocaust trauma. At the very most, we may say that they have 
inherited only  the survivor’s symptoms.65 As Hoffman notes, the first generation cannot 
communicate their lived experiences to their children: “The attic in my imagination, to give 
only the most concrete example, probably bore no resemblance to the actual attic in which 
my parents were hidden” (2005, p. 34). Hoffman, therefore, cannot access the experiential 
reality of her parents’ experiences. In order to reconstruct even a partial vision of their 
suffering she must still rely on the post-memorial tricks of “imaginative investment, 
 
65 Marianne Hirsch also speaks of these inherited symptoms, with children coming to manifest their 
parents’ Holocaust behaviours:  
“The language of family, the language of the body: nonverbal and precognitive acts of transfer occur most 
clearly within a familial space, often taking the form of symptoms. It is perhaps the descriptions of this 
symptomatology that have made it appear as though the postgeneration wanted to assert its own 
victimhood, alongside that of the parents, and to exploit it. To be sure, children of those directly affected by 
collective trauma inherit a horrific, unknown, and unknowable past that their parents were not meant to 




projection, and creation” (Hirsch, 2012, p. 4). Her image of their attic, even though it is 
forever lodged in her mind as a second-hand traumatic memory, bears no resemblance to 
their actual experiences. All that she has truly inherited, therefore, is the residue of post-
Holocaust anxiety without ever actually having lived through the event itself. She carries the 
symptoms of the survivor, but understands the Holocaust only as a depthless abstraction. 
Crucially, the vision of the attic is later displaced by that of the concentration camp: “I had 
grown up with the subliminal expectation of catastrophe and the received ‘memory’ of mass 
death in my very bones” (Hoffman, 2005, p. 238). Though her parents were not in the camps, 
Hoffman still claims to have received the memory of “mass death” – clearly relating to the 
concentrationary system. Her parents’ particular memories, therefore, have been overwritten 
by the image of the concentration camp. Their memories, it seems, did not possess enough 
cultural relevance to have resonance. As she herself notes, the camp serves as the modern 
“locus classicus” (p. 193) for the Holocaust. She may not have a familial stake in the image 
of the camp, but she certainly understands that it now defines what is quintessentially of the 
Holocaust. The experiential reality of the Holocaust has become little more than an 
abstraction, centred around the concept of mass extermination and linked to a series of 
images and commemorative sties. This is our post-memory of the Shoah. When the second 
generation’s only true inheritance amounts to little more than “the subliminal expectation of 
catastrophe” the only possible result is a vision of the Holocaust devoid of specificity and 
depth.   
    Practically all of the stories featured in Thane Rosenbaum’s Elijah Visible address this 
concept of failed transmission to varying degrees. Despite presenting nine distinct versions 
of Adam Posner – all with different professions, specific family histories and at different 
stages in their personal development – Rosenbaum’s stories are united by a fixed view of 
cross-generational inheritance. In short, all nine Adams embody the concept of post-
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memory: while they may bear the emotional traces of the parents’ Holocaust experiences, 
they have only a partial and historically diluted vision of the Shoah as an event. As Hirsch 
outlines, despite the comparative shallowness of post-memory, it does have a similar potency 
to lived memory:     
Postmemory is not identical to memory: it is “post”; but, at the same time, I argue, it 
approximates memory in its affective force and its psychic effects… These “not memories,” 
communicated in “flashes of imagery,” and these “broken refrains,” transmitted through “the 
language of the body,” are precisely the stuff of the postmemory of trauma, and of its return. 
(2012, p. 31) 
Despite lacking access to the original experience, therefore, the second generation may still 
suffer the psychic after-effects of their parents’ trauma. While they have no experiential 
understanding of the Holocaust, relying instead on secondary sources and their own 
imaginations to fill in the representational gaps, they still experience the trauma of having 
lived through the event. This is profoundly problematic as, to borrow a phrase from Anne 
Karpf, it means that the second generation have not lived the “central experience” (1997, p. 
146) of their lives. They feel a profound emotional proximity to the Holocaust, surpassed 
only by the survivors themselves, and yet their understanding of the Shoah is partial at best. 
This feeling of near-genetic inheritance is mentioned explicitly in two of Rosenbaum’s short 
stories. In ‘The Cattle-Car Complex’ the first Adam Posner is described as having inherited 
his parents’ transportation-related claustrophobia: “Adam himself knew a little something 
about tight, confining spaces. It was unavoidable. The legacy that flowed through his veins. 
Parental reminiscences had become the genetic material that was to be passed on by 
survivors to their children” (Rosenbaum, 1996, p. 5). In a similar sense to Eva Hoffman, 
therefore, this Adam has absorbed one of his parents’ stories as a defining vision of 
Holocaust horror. Unlike Hoffman, however, this Adam believes that the horror of 
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deportation has been passed on to him as a “psychogenetic endowment” (Hoffman, 2005, p. 
34). He speaks of the horror of claustrophobia as having been “passed on through his genes”, 
which hints at his belief that trauma can be fully inherited as a form of genetic memory – 
that his parents have transmitted the felt reality of their cattle car experiences as part of his 
genetic make-up. In truth, this is a flawed presumption, as Rosenbaum highlights in his use 
of the cattle car as the story’s central image. Given that Rosenbaum provides explicit 
mention of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) and Yad Vashem in 
the collection’s titular story – ‘Elijah Visible’ – it is only reasonable to assume that he has a 
functional understanding of the cattle car’s broader symbolic significance as an access point 
for those looking to gain greater insight into the Holocaust. By experiencing the cattle car 
interior, and reflexively imagining the reality of transportation, one is theoretically brought 
closer to the deportees’ experiences. As Rosenbaum seems to know, however, this is deeply 
flawed logic. The cattle car does not create a moment of genuine engagement with the 
Holocaust past, it only creates a depthless prosthetic memory. Alison Landsberg describes 
the role of the cattle car in commemoration as follows:  
Inside it is dark and small and empty, and yet the thought that one hundred bodies once filled 
that car haunts the space. Its emptiness produces a kind of cognitive dissonance as you attempt 
to reconcile its present emptiness with the fact that people were at one time crammed into its 
interior. The effect… is an odd sense of spatial intimacy with those people who are at an 
unbridgeable distance, who are conspicuously absent. (2004, p. 133)           
A vital part of Landsberg’s theory of prosthetic memory is its physical aspect, in which a 
person bodily experiences a moment of engagement with the past. As this quotation 
illustrates, the cattle car engages on a purely physical level. Just as one is shocked into a 
feeling of emotional proximity by the camera’s closeness to suffering in Schindler’s List, 
one is made to imagine the crush of bodies in the cattle car space. Its authenticity as a relic 
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hints at the presence of previous victims, and so this creates what Landsberg terms the 
“illusion of unmediated proximity” (p. 123) to the Holocaust dead. One feels their potential 
closeness, the previous claustrophobia of the space and, just as crucially, one feels their 
absence on a physical level. Simultaneously, one feels an “odd sense of special intimacy” 
and the conspicuous absence of the murdered. This form of purely physical engagement, 
however, creates only the illusion of proximity. The Holocaust dead still remain hopelessly, 
untouchably absent and their mental state still remains unapproachable. The victims remain, 
to borrow a phrase from one of Wardi’s patients, “ghosts without definite faces” (1992, p. 
106). While the cattle car does serve as a common space in which the Holocaust may be 
experienced by nonwitnesses, therefore, this experience is an unquestionably shallow one. 
Something may be felt, but prosthetic memory has the capacity only to convey historical 
generalities. The gap between our experience and theirs remains unbridgeable, and so we are 
able only to experience the fact of their absence.   
    While we may seek to approach the Holocaust through bodily identification, therefore, 
the attempt is doomed to failure. Prosthetic engagement cannot yield anything of the event 
beyond a simplistic focus on materiality – manifesting as a desire to touch the past by 
reconnecting bodily with certain historical experiences. It is my contention that Rosenbaum 
understands this, and so Adam’s over-identification with his parents’ suffering is to be 
viewed with extreme criticality. This is proven by Rosenbaum’s use of the cattle car as his 
story’s defining image, an exhibit which seems to embody depthless bodily connection with 
the Holocaust past. While Gary Weissman believes that this story may be described as a 
“romantic fantasy”, in which an American Jew is literally transformed into a “full-fledged 
Holocaust victim” (2004, p. 15), I contend that the story is intended as a scathing critique of 
the second generation’s tendency to absorb their parents’ experiences. The second 
generation may feel that they have a genetic claim to their parents’ Holocaust histories, and 
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yet their vision of the event is founded on a thin tissue of assembled references – shared 
visual cues and scenes replicated time and again across all forms of media. 
    Adam’s central thesis in this story would seem to be that parental reminiscences are quite 
literally passed on through the blood. The Holocaust is his genetic legacy, and his parents’ 
suffering has been transmitted to him without any loss in fidelity. The crux of the story comes 
in the moment in which Adam’s identity, following a short period of being trapped in an 
elevator, effectively blurs into that of the new arrival at Auschwitz. The doors to the elevator 
open and Adam is described as follows:  
Adam was sitting on the floor, dressed in soiled rags… He presented the men of the transport 
with an empty stare, a vacancy of inner peace. As he lifted himself to his feet, he reached for 
a suitcase stuffed with a life’s worth of possessions… Adam emerged, each step the 
punctuation of an uncertain sentence. His eyes were wide open as he awaited the 
pronouncement: right or left, in which line was he required to stand?  (Rosenbaum, 1996, p. 
11) 
Scenes of arrival and selection, as the following chapter addresses, are now beyond 
ubiquitous in our cultural reproductions of the Holocaust. This is true both of the 
representation of the Holocaust in media and in a commemorative setting.66 Numerous 
photographs in the visual archives of Yad Vashem, for instance, depict the arrival of the 
Hungarian transports in the May of 1944, just as the USHMM juxtaposes its cattle car 
experience with photographs of Hungarian children awaiting selection on the Judenrampe. 
As with all of Adam Posner’s mentions of specific Holocaust scenes, I argue, this scene is a 
profoundly mediated one. In truth, Adam has only internalised two points of visual reference 
for the Holocaust. The other is the stock image of the gaunt prisoner, enshrined through 
 
66 Chapter Three analyses the role of the arrival process in Holocaust media. 
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numerous liberation pictures: “Liberate us! We are starving! We are skeletons, walking 
bones, ghosts! Get us out of this hell!” (p. 10) This extract is profoundly telling, as here we 
see the blurring of his two Holocaust touchstones. He mainly imagines himself trapped in 
the cattle car and yet here, momentarily, he falls back on the image of the liberated prisoner. 
The word “liberate” is supposed to act as a mental spur, I contend, as it draws the reader 
back to a particular set of Holocaust images – namely those taken in the days immediately 
following liberation. As Barbie Zelizer notes, the photographs which began to emerge during 
the period of liberation were all of a singularly common type: “Nazi brutality came to be 
repeatedly visualised through the depiction of survivors – small groups of survivors who 
looked full view into the camera, often from behind barbed wire or the barriers of 
unidentified camps” (1998, p. 160). In drawing us consciously back to the moment of 
liberation, therefore, while marrying this with the image of the skeletal prisoner, Rosenbaum 
is reminding us of the origin of this image. In short, Adam is emotionally transposing himself 
into a variety of ready-made and culturally standardised Holocaust scenes. He is trying to 
take the burden of experience upon himself, and yet his understanding of the Shoah – beyond 
his inherited anxieties – amounts to a vague assemblage of borrowed imagery.  
    Returning to the final scene, then, in which his elevator has “become a transport”, it is 
telling that Adam greets his would-be perpetrators with a “vacancy of inner-peace”. This is 
not the expected reaction for a new arrival in Auschwitz and it is therefore the one detail out 
of place. Adam’s inner-peace, I contend, can be traced to the satisfaction of his memory 
envy. As Susan Bernstein notes, memory envy may be described as “a psychic consequence 
of the excesses of sympathetic identification where one desires ‘strong memories’ that carry 
cultural capital as historically valuable” (2003, p. 154). The second generation, according to 
this statement, face a continuous internal struggle in which their own daily experiences, 
anxieties and accomplishments are continuously overshadowed by their parents’ Holocaust 
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pasts. The lives of the second generation, in short, have no cultural cache or historical 
relevance – especially when placed in contrast with their parents’ semi-mythic status as 
Survivors, with a capital “S”. As has been noted by Eva Hoffman, therefore, it is only natural 
that, over time, the second-generation child will gradually develop a “tacit sense of their own 
inadequacy, or banality” (2005, p. 69). The end of ‘The Cattle Car Complex’, as such, marks 
the moment in which Adam effectively renounces his own inherently banal identity and 
instead gives himself up to visions of grand suffering, albeit unquestioningly manufactured 
ones.   
Adam’s moment of peace, therefore, is not to be taken as a sign of his romantic ascension 
from nonwitness to survivor, but rather we are to read it critically as a sign of his egotism. 
His feeling of tranquillity is simply an indication of his self-delusion, as he has convinced 
himself that his fraudulent vision of suffering is the same as the real thing. Rosenbaum, 
however, is keen to stress that this is a conceptual impossibility.  In all of the other stories 
featured in Elijah Visible a clear distinction is drawn between the experiences of the survivor 
and the post-memorial fantasies of the second generation.  
    ‘The Cattle Car Complex’, consequently, must not be viewed in isolation, but should 
instead be measured by the content of the other featured stories. Erin McGlothin also 
believes that every story in the collection should be viewed intertextually, though her 
emphasis is on the character of Adam and his possible polyidentity – his unorthodox 
upbringing having shattered his core identity into a multitude of Adams: 
Adam is the fractured product of the Shoah, a conglomeration of multiple pieces that cannot 
be retrofitted together to make a whole… Like his parents… he is broken and incomplete, for 
the impact of the traumatic memory he has inherited from them necessarily precludes a whole, 
continuous self. (2006, p. 47)        
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McGlothlin, therefore, reads this as the stylistic literalisation of the second generation’s 
inability to understand their defining trauma. They have no access to their parents’ Holocaust 
pasts, in which they share an emotional stake, and so they are unable to form a stable identity. 
Each incarnation of Adam, given that they all exist in their individual bubbles, represents a 
different fragment of a divided self. It is my contention, however, that McGlothlin has 
chosen to focus on the wrong thing. The focus should not be on the concept of polyidentity, 
as the name Adam Posner simply serves as a serviceable placeholder. It is not one man split 
nine ways, but rather nine distinct second-generation figures. Their shared name merely 
invites the reader to examine the differences and commonalities which carry over from each 
Adam to the next. By referring to each as Adam, Rosenbaum is simply heightening their 
symbolic significance, as each Adam becomes a totemic second-generation character. They 
are designed to represent common traits in the second-generation community, with their 
shared experiences representing culturally recognised parts of the second-generation 
upbringing. The first Adam, therefore, is designed to represent something of an outlier. He 
represents the delusional over-identification of a child who believes he understands the 
trauma of his parents. However, as the first story stresses, what Adam takes to be an authentic 
reproduction of the Holocaust past is merely a borrowed tissue of culturally enshrined post-
liberation images. His vision of the Holocaust is entirely manufactured, having been based 
purely on his limited visual vocabulary of the events. All of the other stories in the collection 
are therefore designed to highlight the falsity of this first Adam’s thinking.  
In the fourth story, ‘An Act of Defiance’, Adam also regards the Shoah as his genetic 
inheritance. Crucially, however, he also notes that his understanding of it is entirely 
theoretical:  
The Holocaust survivor in me was passed on through the genes. Who knows how many 
generations it will take to cancel this virus from the blood… Me, Adam Posner, unharmed in 
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New York, never even the victim of a veiled anti-Semitic remark, an entire ocean and a full 
generation removed from the ghettos and the camps. My DNA may be forever coded with the 
filmy stuff of damaged offspring, the handicap of an unwanted inheritance. (Rosenbaum, 1996, 
p. 63) 
Here, then, we see the literal articulation of Hirsch’s concept of post-memory. Rather than 
believing in the transmission of unmediated experience, this Adam describes his inheritance 
simply as the damage done by his parents. He understands that, for him, the Holocaust can 
never be felt as an experiential reality. By mentioning the entire ocean and full generation 
which separate him from the camps, he is consciously highlighting the fact that the Holocaust 
must remain a post-memorial abstraction. It is telling that Holocaust inheritance is described 
as a “virus”. No information is being transmitted, it is simply a series of contextless 
symptoms which manifest across the generations. This is again in keeping with Hirsch’s 
thinking, as this reiterates the impossibility of transmitting “lived experience”. As such, 
while Adam still feels a profound emotional connection to the Holocaust – having described 
the weight of carrying it as a burden – his understanding of the events remains superficial. 
Indeed, the text goes out of its way to highlight Adam’s reliance on heavily mediated written 
sources, while also undermining the depthlessness of post-memory. The most telling 
moment of the text comes following the arrival of Adam’s Uncle Haskell – a genuine 
survivor of Auschwitz. From the outset, Adam draws a clear distinction between the 
authority of the survivor and his reading: “Now, nearing eighty, he was a walking ghost of 
horrors past. I imagined what he looked like, this witness who wouldn’t go away, this author 
of all that silent testimony” (p. 58). Automatically, a distinction has been drawn between the 
power of spoken/written testimony and the traumatic silence of the survivor. Whereas 
written testimony amounts to the safe, distant, tempered product of common memory, Uncle 
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Haskell’s silent testimony contains the raw evidence of incommunicable suffering: the 
undiluted essence of the Holocaust.  
    This distinction between the authenticity of the survivor and the postness of Holocaust 
writing becomes clearer in a later moment, when Uncle Haskell is literally juxtaposed with 
Adam’s personal library:  
Books that he had neither heard of nor read welcomed my uncle. The historians, philosophers, 
the psychologists, the theologians, the novelists, the poets, the playwrights – all had 
appropriated the Holocaust, making the suffering universal…the wail and shriek of the 
twentieth century. A cottage industry of Holocaust speculation had risen from the ashes of the 
dead… (p. 65)  
In this extract Adam links together two core concepts – universalisation and appropriation. 
By referencing the transformation of the particular Holocaust into the “wail and shriek of 
the twentieth century”, Rosenbaum echoes Alexander’s theory. The specific suffering of 
Adam’s uncle is being literally contrasted with the cottage industry of post-memorial 
discussion which has transformed the Jewish stories of the past into a “master symbol of 
evil” (Alexander, 2009, p. 56). The Holocaust is not understood as a crime with identifiable 
Jewish victims in our broader cultural sphere, Rosenbaum implies, as it has instead become 
a moral universal, a standard by which other atrocities will be judged in the future and a 
lesson for the whole of humanity.  
    Placed alongside the presence of his uncle, Adam is now disgusted by his Holocaust texts, 
as they represent the gradual de-particularisation of the Holocaust. This recalls, for instance, 
Anne Frank’s gradual Americanisation – in which she was gradually stripped of her Jewish 
identity. This was done, as Chapter Four argues, to facilitate the identification of non-Jews 
with particular Holocaust sufferers. Problematically, however – as Susan David Bernstein 
has noted – this kind of departicularised portrayal of Jewish individuals can facilitate what 
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she terms “promiscuous identification”. She defines this concept as the “unreflective 
assimilation of the read subject into an untroubled reading self” (2003, p. 146). As these 
characters lack their own fixed identities, she implies, readers can often form an unhealthy 
level of identification with them – as they transpose their own qualities onto the suffering 
body of, for instance, Anne Frank. ‘An Act of Defiance”, therefore, served to particularise 
the Holocaust survivor – to block off the nonwitness’s tendency to identify with their 
suffering. By highlighting the individuality of the survivor, and the unreachability of their 
experiences, it serves as a direct response to ‘The Cattle Car Complex’.  
    While ‘An Act of Defiance’ may be the only text in the collection to explicitly discuss the 
distinction between the survivor’s experiences and the post-memorial reproduction of the 
Holocaust, the final two stories – ‘Lost, in a Sense’ and ‘The Little Blue Snowman of 
Washington Heights’ – solidify Rosenbaum’s stance on transmission. In both cases, the 
stories focus heavily on parent-child dynamics, with a particular emphasis on what second-
generation children stand to learn from their parents.    
Both stories focus on the unfitness of survivor-parents. This is perhaps most explicitly 
stated in ‘Lost, in a Sense’ when the eighth Adam wonders about the logic of survivors 
bearing children:  
All survivors must have contemplated this dilemma… Wasn’t someone interested in 
discussing the awesome responsibility of child rearing, and the disqualifying circumstances 
that would have made them particularly unfit for the task? Why burden a new generation with 
such an unwanted legacy? (Rosenbaum, 1996, p. 172)      
This Adam once again speaks of the inevitability of a second-generation legacy. Here, 
crucially, it is the only thing that his parents transmit to him. They do not have the capacity 
to provide a nurturing environment or to foster a stabilising atmosphere in the home. As Erin 
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McGlothlin notes, this is the one theme which remains consistent across the nine Adams: 
“In every story, the parents recede into the background, living ghosts who are themselves 
haunted, and it is the Holocaust that emerges as Adam’s true parent” (2006, p. 48). None of 
the parents presented in Elijah Visible emerge as dynamic characters. They are merely 
presented as insular bundles of post-Holocaust anxiety – people who are not simply defined 
by their trauma, but who embody it through their every moment of existence. When 
McGlothlin notes that it is the Holocaust who parents Adam, she infers that Adam’s parents 
are literally Shoah anxiety made manifest. Adam’s parents transmit nothing of themselves, 
conveying no usable information about either their pre-war lives or their Shoah-experiences, 
and so Adam’s sole inheritance remains the anxieties which have been transmitted from 
parent to child. Rosenbaum, echoing Hoffman’s general position, therefore believes in the 
transmission of a certain element of the Shoah – namely a common series of symptoms, 
manifesting as generalised anxiety. All of the Adams feel the root of the Holocaust in their 
bones, as a form of genetic inheritance, but they cannot connect with its experiential reality 
– something which remains locked away in their parents’ deep memories.  
    While ‘An Act of Defiance’ stressed the constructed nature of the post-memorial, ‘Lost, 
in a Sense’ takes this a step further by incorporating our temporal and emotional distance 
from the Holocaust as a vital plot element. Throughout the story, the suffering of Adam’s 
parents is juxtaposed with the comparatively banal death of a close neighbour. This man’s 
slow death from cancer, unlike the abstract vision of suffering conjured by his parents, 
strikes Adam as an approachable tragedy: “The same guy who used to swim laps in the pool 
and run us around the park now got winded so easily. The Adonis reduced to a skeleton… 
Different but somehow more real than the walking bones my parents may have brushed up 
against in the camps” (Rosenbaum, 1996, p. 178). There are two vital elements to unpack 
from this statement. The use of “may have” pointedly suggests that Adam has no real 
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understanding of his parents’ concentration camp reality. Their time in the camps is 
understandable only as a post-memorial abstraction, with Adam having filled in the blanks 
in their stories with common post-war imagery. This then corresponds with the second 
element of the quotation, as Adam notes that the image of this wasting man is simply “more 
real” than his second-hand vision of the Holocaust. Adam experiences this cancer death as 
approachable suffering, in contrast to his parents’ Holocaust experiences which stand only 
as an imponderable abstraction – a series of standardised, frequently reproduced images 
which cannot correspond with his daily reality.  
    Here, Adam is not only expressing the depthlessness of his post-Holocaust inheritance, 
but also its inherent uselessness. Despite growing up in a home where “apocalyptic 
preparation” (Rosenbaum, 1996, p. 174) had become the norm, Adam is fundamentally 
unprepared to deal with real grief. Adam’s vision of death, for instance, is entirely founded 
on that which he has inherited from his parents: “Mr Isaacson’s end was not death as they 
knew it: so powerfully abstract, in which naked bodies holding infant children were shot and 
thrown into ravines, buried over in mass graves in anonymity” (p. 179). Given that these 
images correspond with our established post-memory of the Holocaust – here presented as a 
meshing of standard atrocity scenes, though specifically evoking images from the likes of 
Liepaja and Ivangorod – the reader must question whether these images truly correspond to 
Adam’s parents’ conception of death. Given that he has already stressed his fundamental 
lack of understanding of their wartime experiences, they must be interpreted as his post-
memorial projections. As Hirsch notes, even the most “intimate familial transmissions” are 
“mediated by public images and narratives” (2012, p. 29). Unable to understand the private 
reality of his parents’ pasts, the gaps in his knowledge have been filled in with publicly 
available images. This is a story in which the concrete reality of Auschwitz, or Majdanek in 
the case of Adam’s mother, remains fundamentally irrecoverable. Adam speaks of his 
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parents’ perspective, and yet he has no conception of their past experiences or their inner-
life in the present. 
    Once again, therefore, this story must be taken as a firm rebuttal of Adam’s thinking in 
‘The Cattle Car Complex’. This is the second story to have explicitly emphasised the entirely 
post-memorial nature of Adam’s thinking, though more emphasis has been placed in this 
instance on the impenetrability of his parents. They remain entirely closed-off figures, whose 
pasts remain firmly unarticulated. Adam has a diffuse, generalised understanding of the 
Holocaust – founded entirely on the images he has absorbed from media at large. This 
constitutes the whole of his understanding of the event. Unable to understand his parents’ 
particular experiences, he simply has to fold them into this mythic vision of the camps – 
founded largely on visions of walking skeletons and other culturally reproduced atrocity 
images.      
    The final story of the collection, ‘The Little Blue Snowman’, takes the vision of the 
impenetrable survivor-parent to its logical extreme. While other stories may have 
emphasised the fragility of survivor parents, stressing their profound psychic damage and 
literal frailty, here we see the image of two survivors frozen in a state of perpetual trauma.67 
When the young Adam of this story – by far the youngest featured in the collection – returns 
home from kindergarten, having trudged through a snowstorm, he encounters the following 
scene: “The door was already open. The room completely dark. By the window, two naked 
bodies were shuddering in the darkness. Two pairs of terrorised eyes” (Rosenbaum, 1996, p. 
205). In ending his collection on this note, Rosenbaum clearly wishes to mark this as the 
central thesis of his collection: for survivors, the past exists as an unprocessed wound. It 
 
67 Rosenbaum’s ‘Bingo by the Bungalow’ also deals with the notion of survivor parents who have been 
debilitated by their wartime traumas. In it, a father has been so sapped of his emotional reserves that he is 
literally killed by a minor instance of post-war stress.  
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cannot be relegated to the past, as the nature of trauma seems to preclude recovery. The 
Holocaust, in short, is ever-present. Adam’s parents, here, have lapsed back into the 
experiential remembrance of the Holocaust. Adam, meanwhile, is unable to reach them 
emotionally. He has no concept of their inner suffering, just as they have no grasp on the 
present. They exist in two irreconcilably different worlds. He can see the terror in their eyes, 
and he can internalise it as his own panic, but he cannot understand its origins. This is the 
very summation of Rosenbaum’s thesis of unreachability: an uncomprehending child faced 
with literally speechless and unreachable parents.  
    Returning to ‘The Cattle Car Complex’, therefore, one can argue that the collection has 
been designed with a certain degree of circularity. The final story serves as the ultimate 
rebuff to the notion that the Holocaust can be accessed by the second generation. In reality, 
all second-generation children stand to inherit from their parents is survivor symptomology. 
As Mrs. Turner, the school nurse and stand-in child psychologist, notes in ‘The Little Blue 
Snowman’: “The parents have turned this little boy into a concentration camp survivor, and 
he wasn’t even in the camps!” (p. 200). Adam has inherited his parents’ survivor behaviours 
without having lived their trauma. Rosenbaum continuously draws this distinction by 
stressing that while the second generation may share the foundational symptoms of their 
parents’ trauma, they have no understanding of its origins. The experiential reality of the 
Holocaust remains the sole province of the survivor-parent. Elijah Visible can only be read, 
therefore, as a firm rebuttal against the occasional presumptuousness of the second 
generation and their fantasies of witnessing. The first Adam may feel a moment of 
tranquillity, having discovered the root of his suffering, but this is based on a false 
foundation. As this collection continues to reiterate, every second-generation child 
understands the Holocaust only as a collection of borrowed imagery – the standard set of 
images enshrined in our collective cultural memory of the event. As Eva Hoffman states, the 
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second generation inherits “not the event, but its shadows” (2005, p. 66). The first Adam’s 
stance, therefore, may be charitably described as tragic self-delusion. He has convinced 
himself that the Holocaust can be approached and that the suffering of his parents may be 
lived vicariously. Every other story in the collection, however, functions as a systematic 
rebuke to this mode of thinking.  
    Returning to the concept of the “hinge generation”, therefore, it is clear that Rosenbaum 
has used his fictional exploration of the second generation to convey a specific point. 
Namely, that all nonwitness writing must maintain a reverential distance from certain aspects 
of the Holocaust. Rosenbaum’s representation of the second generation, I contend, perfectly 
aligns with Alison Landsberg’s vision of prosthetic memory. As his text illustrates, our 
unbridgeable emotional and experiential distance from the Holocaust has left the second 
generation with something of a quandary. Though they feel a profound sense of 
connectedness to the Holocaust, given their inherited anxieties, they cannot engage with it 
fully. Any attempt to touch the Holocaust in the present will be, unavoidably, entirely 
depthless. As Rosenbaum illustrates, the Holocaust may be engaged with on a purely bodily 
level – through imagined physical suffering in the cattle car – but our present-day conception 
of the event is based entirely on a post-memorial reconstruction.  
    Referring back to Gillian Rose’s concept of Holocaust Piety, therefore, Rosenbaum has 
used his short stories to critique post-memorial attempts to engage with the Holocaust past. 
Rose’s theory focuses specifically on fictional attempts to approach the psychology of 
sufferers and survivors in order to make the Holocaust fathomable. Pious fiction, she argues, 
keeps the Holocaust ineffable by refusing to approach the inner life of its characters. As ‘The 
Cattle Car Complex’ illustrates, one cannot truly reconnect with either the experiential or 
psychological reality of Holocaust suffering. No incarnation of Adam Posner is able to 
understand his parents’ mindset or to fathom any of their experiences during the 1940s, and 
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so they must maintain a frustrated distance from the Shoah. All one can achieve in reality, 
as this thesis discusses further, is a depthless moment of connection with scenes of physical 
suffering. In place of a truly impious moment of access to the Holocaust past, as Rose would 
have it, one is only able to access a prosthetic memory of bodily suffering. One may be able 
to touch the Holocaust on a purely material level, by walking through the cattle car space or 
feeling a sympathetic moment of physical discomfort while watching Schindler’s List, but 
one cannot reconnect with either the Holocaust dead or the present-day survivor on a human 
or empathetic level. All attempts at impious engagement, Rosenbaum’s text suggests, are 
therefore inevitably doomed to fail. In place of this, Chapters Three and Four discuss further, 
nonwitnesses have instead become fascinated by the physical elements of Holocaust 
suffering – from the raw materiality of death to the victim’s suffering body. Gratuity, in 
short, has come to replace impiety. The following section, which focuses specifically on 
Patrick Modiano’s The Search Warrant and W.G. Sebald’s Austerlitz, begins to outline the 
cause for this shift in perspective – as, frustrated with the absence of bodies, both authors 
come to focus on the concept of materiality.         
 
The Failure of Recovery 
Young, in At Memory’s Edge, discusses the inherent complications that come with 
commemorating the Holocaust – namely, how can one commemorate an intangibility? The 
Holocaust, despite the aforementioned post-liberation photographs from sites such as 
Bergen-Belsen and Buchenwald, has been reconceptualised as an atrocity which yielded no 
bodies. As Auschwitz has come to form the conceptual core of the Holocaust world, mass 
extermination – and the transformation of bodies into ashes – has become the dominant 
image of the atrocity. As such, our models of commemoration tend to revolve around similar 
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themes – a focus on artefacts, for instance, or monuments which invoke the abstract concept 
of cremation while also conspicuously highlighting the absence of the murdered. Both the 
Bibliothek, the memorial to the Nazi book burnings found in the Bebelplatz in Berlin, and 
Rachel Whiteread’s Judenplatz Holocaust Memorial in Vienna literalise the concept of 
absence while tacitly hinting at the concept of Jewish extermination. Young describes Micha 
Ullman’s Bibliotek monument thus:  
A steel tablet set into the stones simply recalls that this was the site of some of the most 
notorious book-burnings and quotes Heinrich Heine’s famously prescient words, “Where 
books are burned, so one day people will be burned as well.” But the shelves are still empty, 
unreplenished, and it is the absence of both people and books that is marked here in yet one 
more memorial pocket. (2000, p. 107)   
Both Ullman’s and Whiteread’s memorials, to borrow a phrase from Robert Storrs, stand as 
“the solid shape of an intangible absence” (Storrs, in Young, 2000, p. 112). The very nature 
of this intangibility is implied by Heinrich Heine’s quotation, as the burning of books, along 
with their conspicuous absence, is automatically contextualised and given a significance 
beyond itself. The bookshelves remain empty in continued acknowledgment of the worst 
excesses of the Nazi era. The concept of Jewish death is invoked in the form of a pure 
abstraction, tied simply to the concept of burning. While the monument is multi-layered, 
therefore – as it does also serve to commemorate the book burning itself – it consciously 
invokes Auschwitz as the end point of Nazi persecution. Additionally, as Young notes, 
Whiteread’s monument not only represents the “destruction itself” but also gestures “silently 
towards the acts of reading, writing, and memory that had once constituted this people as a 
people” (p. 113). Both monuments, as such, include – as part of their intended messaging – 
an abstract vision of extermination. While they do speak to the destruction of Jewish life, 
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and the incremental shifts in policy which led to their extermination, they also invoke the 
spectre of Auschwitz and the indirect evocation of mass death.  
    Horst Hoheisel’s “Warm memorial” at Buchenwald also invokes this vision of 
extermination. Young describes it as a slab of concrete containing a “radiant heating system” 
which brings it to a “constant 98.6 degrees Fahrenheit (36.5 degrees Celsius) that might 
suggest the body heat of those whose memory it would now enshrine” (p. 105). Even though 
Buchenwald was not classed as a killing centre, therefore, this memorial pivots around the 
notion of absent bodies. It aims to add a degree of physicality and materiality to those who 
have been transformed into smoke and ash. At the core of our cultural conception of the 
Holocaust, therefore, there has always been a foundational preoccupation with bodies – with 
the need to particularise and physicalise the Jewish dead. The concept of mass extermination, 
after all, serves only to anonymise the Holocaust dead by transforming separate and 
identifiable bodies into an abstract vision of commingled ash. It is for this reason that 
Auschwitz represents the dead abstractly, through the image of piled objects. Referencing 
the piles of shoes presented in Auschwitz, Liliane Weissberg notes: “Homogenised as one 
group, these shoes speak as a mass and exemplify mass murder” (2001, p. 23). These objects 
do not have the capacity to individualise their owners, therefore, but rather speak to the 
anonymising nature of industrial mass murder. Given the absence of bodies, and considering 
the sheer number of the murdered, the Holocaust dead have been effectively anonymised by 
the process of mass killing. We cannot recover a sense of the individual from these 
homogenous piles or the ashes disposed of in the Vistula. And yet, the compulsion clearly 
exists to reconnect with the Holocaust dead – to give them back an element of physicality.    
    The two texts considered in this section, Patrick Modiano’s The Search Warrant and W.G. 
Sebald’s Austerlitz, address the attempt to recover an individual who has been lost in the 
fires of Auschwitz. The protagonists of both novels understand the Holocaust simply as a 
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depthless abstraction – a collection of distant horrors to which they have no felt connection. 
Their desire to give form back to the murdered, this chapter suggests, is symptomatic of their 
desire to connect with the Shoah – to close the emotional distance they feel from the event 
as nonwitnesses. There is, I contend, a prurience to their determination – a palpable 
Holocaust envy, grounded in their inability to understand the reality of the event.  
Beginning with The Search Warrant, there is a curious similarity between the narrator’s 
perception of Dora Bruder and Shimon Attie’s Writing on the Wall project, in which 
Germany’s missing Jews were partially re-embodied as ghostly projections onto the city’s 
walls. Young explains:  
Like many Jewish Americans pre-occupied by the Holocaust and steeped in its seemingly 
ubiquitous images, he saw Jewish ghosts in Europe’s every nook and cranny: from the 
Scheunenviertel in Berlin to the central train station in Dresden… For Attie, however, private 
acts of remembrance… were not enough. He chose, therefore, to actualise these inner visions, 
to externalise them, and in so doing make them part of a larger public’s memory. (2000, pp. 
64-65)       
Attie’s artistic vision is founded on the concept of mass extermination. The Holocaust dead 
have no substance, having been reduced to ash. Their extermination is hinted at 
emblematically through their recreation as ghostly projections – they have become people 
made of air, like Celan’s dead. Attie believes that he is merely literalising their felt presence, 
as he claims to feel them as they haunt the streets of Berlin. By projecting their images back 
onto the streets of the present, therefore, he is theoretically collapsing the distance between 
the modern day and the victims’ past. As such, he is effectively trying to transform an erased 
group of people into an approachable reality – to tie these vanished people back to the 
material reality of the present. Just as the cattle car added a physical component to the absent 
dead, as one was sharing the space that they previously occupied, the streets of Berlin are 
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being used to physicalise the absence of the Holocaust dead. This approach echoes 
Modiano’s attempted resurrection of Dora Bruder. However, it is first important to note that 
Attie’s ghosts come with serious conceptual limitations. While his photographs do represent 
the former inhabitants of Scheunenviertel – he was able to cull several images from the 
Berlin archives, all representing life in the 1920s and 1930s – his representations are not 
intended to literally evoke the missing. Instead, his visuals are designed to critique the 
German perception of the Jewish other. As Young puts it:  
Because German Jewry itself was often so well assimilated as to appear effectively invisible, 
Attie has had to rely on the image of the Ost-Juden to make visible the otherwise invisible 
Jews of Germany – even though they themselves were not representative faces of German 
Jewry itself… It would be easy to work up sympathy in Germans for all the Jews who were 
murdered “even though they looked just like us”. But it is the idea and treatment of ‘the other’ 
that concerns Attie… (p. 71)  
The people of Scheunenviertel, therefore, are not being haunted by humanised victims of the 
Holocaust – who have been individualised and reconstituted by Attie’s process. Instead, they 
are being persecuted by a generalised representation of the racial Other. If Attie’s installation 
may act as a testament to anything, therefore, it is the impossibility of representing anything 
beyond the mythic after-image of the Holocaust. One may literalise the haunting of the 
Holocaust dead, bringing them forcefully back into the present, but this can only ever serve 
as a partial resurrection. We cannot restore their voices or imbue them with humanity, as 
Modiano’s attempt to recover Dora Bruder ultimately attests.   
The first point of connection between Modiano and Attie is evident in their shared desire 
to link the Holocaust dead back to a specific place. Just as Attie sought to reintegrate the 
people of the past into the landscape of the present, Modiano’s narrator views the landscape 
of Paris as the only legitimate means of approaching Dora Bruder:  
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They are the sort of people who leave few traces. Inseparable from those Paris streets, those 
suburban landscapes where, by chance, I discovered they had lived. Often, what I know about 
them amounts to no more than a simple address. And such topographical precision contrasts 
with what we shall never know about their life – this blank, this mute block of the unknown. 
(Modiano, 2014, p. 23)       
Like Attie, therefore, the narrator is overly conscious of the presence of the murdered on the 
streets of the present day. Their absence has a material reality to him, as he seems aware of 
the gaps left by their missing bodies. However, there is also a paradox at play here. While 
he clearly feels a physical and emotional connection to the missing Bruders – the word 
“inseparable” speaks to both his preoccupation with them and the intensity of his feeling – 
he knows nothing about them as people. Like the vast majority of the Holocaust dead, their 
pre-war lives have become a “blank” as few signs remain to fill in the details of their 
identities. This lack of particularising detail, rather than complicating the narrator’s attempt 
to connect with Dora Bruder, only serves to intensify his desire to identify with her.   
We can see evidence of this in a later extract, as the narrator imagines her Sunday journeys 
back home from her convent school:  
I wandered around the neighbourhoods, weighed down after a while by the sadness of those 
other Sundays when it was time to return to the convent… She would have put off the moment 
when she must enter the gate and cross the courtyard. She prolonged her walk, choosing streets 
at random. It grew dark. The Avenue de Saint-Mande is quiet, bordered by trees. I forget 
whether or not there is a stretch of open ground. (p. 123)   
This extract is symptomatic of the narrator’s core presumption. At an earlier point in the 
novel he states: “That afternoon, without knowing why, I had the impression of walking in 
another’s footsteps” (p. 44). He is not simply aiming to reconstruct a narrative map of Dora 
Bruder’s life, therefore, but rather he is trying to “walk in her footsteps” by imagining, and 
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thereby vicariously experiencing, her past reality in order to absorb an element of the atrocity 
itself. This is an example of prosthetic memory – albeit a prototypical one, as it lacks 
Landsberg’s ethical restrictions.68 It is clear, for instance, that Modiano’s narrator has 
experienced his connection to Dora’s past physically, as a sensuous memory. By walking in 
her literal footsteps he is trying to merge with her pre-war self. We see the moment of elision 
in the first line of the extract: “I wandered around the neighbourhoods, weighed down after 
a while by the sadness of those other Sundays when it was time to return to the convent”. 
The sadness he speaks of is purely his own imaginative invention. He knows nothing about 
Dora’s inner-self and has merely transposed a series of likely emotions onto the ghostly 
image he has reconstructed of her – the Luftmensch he has decided to project on to the streets 
of Paris. 
    While the narrator will later acknowledge that he will never really know “how she spent 
her days” (p. 137), conceding that she must ultimately remain hopelessly irretrievable, this 
moment in the text still reads as an extreme instance of over-identification. The narrator tries, 
in a quite literal sense, to inhabit the mind and body of one who has passed. He assumes her 
identity, blurring the temporal distance between the two of them. While a prosthetic memory 
does involve a “deeply felt” (Landsberg, 2004, p. 3) experience which did not originate 
“organically” (p. 26) in one’s own body, Modiano’s narrator exceeds this by beginning to 
confuse his own memories with those of Dora. Or rather, the version of Dora Bruder which 
he has invented.  
By presenting the reader with this sequence, therefore, Modiano is highlighting the 
paradox at the centre of the nonwitness’s approach to the Holocaust. While they may 
 
68 As Landsberg notes, prosthetic memories: “do not erase differences or construct common origins. People 
who acquire these memories are led to feel a connection to the past but, all the while, to remember their 
position in the contemporary moment” (2004, p. 9). Prosthetic memory, therefore, is not designed to foster 




intellectually acknowledge their distance from the Holocaust dead, they still wish to connect 
with them – to touch them, in some sense. This can only be achieved through depthless 
moments of bodily identification, which ultimately yield nothing of value.    
Both Attie’s work and The Search Warrant, then, are founded on the notion of absence. 
As Modiano’s narrator puts it: “I have a sense of absence, of emptiness, whenever I find 
myself in a place where they lived” (2014, p. 24). It is the quality of this particular absence 
which unites the two works. There is a unique quality which comes with the spectre of the 
Holocaust dead. They have not simply been murdered, but the manner of their killing has 
robbed them of all particularity. Attie’s Luftmenschen, and by extension Dora Bruder herself, 
are not vividly realised victims of the Holocaust. They are not people with dimensions or 
fixed interior lives. They are totemic stand-ins for the Holocaust many – Primo Levi’s 
sommersi, who cannot be resurrected from the flames of the Holocaust. Their transformation 
into smoke and ash, or the absence of a tangible body providing a stable identity, renders 
them ill-defined and nebulous. The only physical remnant of their passing, as was noted 
previously, comes in the objects that have been left behind. As such, both works imply the 
fundamental irretrievability of the Holocaust dead.  
    Erin McGlothlin, however, disagrees with this stance, arguing that Modiano is able to 
restore something of Dora Bruder: 
although evidence of Dora’s struggle in Paris is all but non-existent, it can be made manifest 
for the reader by the joint exercise of memory and imagination. In this way, despite the nearly 
total resistance to the reconstruction of her life he encounters in the archives, Modiano is 
nevertheless able to recover Dora’s memory by writing her into the text as a real body on the 
street. (2006, pp. 138-139) 
McGlothlin’s core position is that Modanio’s text acts as a counterbalance to the years of 
bureaucratic self-censorship which erased Dora Bruder from existence. However, by 
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describing Dora as a “real body on the street”, and thus emphasising this aspect of 
physicality, McGlothlin has effectively fallen into a common post-memorial trap. She is 
assuming that the re-physicalisation of Dora Bruder somehow equates to a genuine 
resurrection of the lost girl. McGlothlin’s insinuation is that Modiano’s narrator has achieved 
something substantial by re-imagining Dora back onto the streets of modern day Paris, and 
mapping out her previous paths so that he may walk in her now inhabitable shoes. As the 
final paragraph of Modiano’s text states, however, nothing of Dora’s actual identity has been 
recovered. He concedes that he will never know any of the details of her wartime 
experiences, as that “is her secret” (Modiano, 2014, p. 137). In dying, Dora has become 
entirely unreachable – taking all of her experiences with her to the grave. Her ghost may be 
placed back into the Paris streets, but this will only ever be a post-memorial projection – a 
fantasy created by nonwitnesses. The narrator’s final concession, therefore, is that despite 
his best efforts he has done nothing to revivify the absent Dora Bruder. By focusing too 
excessively on the notion of Dora Bruder as a “real body”, McGlothlin has therefore fallen 
into the post-memorial trap of assuming that the body may be used to impart something 
meaningful about the Holocaust. As this thesis argues, however, this excessive focus on the 
body and the physicalisation of the Holocaust dead never yields anything positive. As 
Modiano’s narrator infers, he will never be able to approach Dora Bruder impiously. She 
must remain entirely unfathomable to him. Her body, therefore, serves only as a hollow shell 
– a prosthesis that may be worn by those looking to touch the Holocaust, but which will 
ultimately impart nothing about the victim. It is, in short, simply a tool designed to facilitate 
Holocaust voyeurism. The real Dora Bruder remains irrecoverable. 
The theme of irrecoverability, as Crownshaw and Hirsch discuss, is also central to 
Sebald’s Austerlitz. While both stress Austerlitz’s reliance on the artefactual, it is Hirsch 
who is blunter in her appraisal of his search:  
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The confusion experienced by Sebald’s character, the profound losses he has suffered, his 
helpless meanderings and pointless searches, and the beautiful prose that conveys absence and 
an objectless and thus endless melancholia, all this combined with blurry, hard-to-make-out 
photographic images, speak somehow to a generation marked by a history to which they have 
lost even the distant and now barely “living connection”. (2012, pp. 41-42) 
Once again, the word “absence” is being used in a Holocaust-specific context. Austerlitz’s 
parents have not simply been killed, but they have been absorbed into the collective 
anonymity of the Holocaust dead. His later fixation on finding an image of his mother, 
therefore, stems from his need to give her back an element of solidity – to reimbue her with 
form in order to dispel the lurking image of the ash cloud which haunts this text. Indeed, 
despite the absence of direct representation – or even direct mention of the name Auschwitz 
– Sebald’s text is laced with post-memorial references to that camp in the East. In describing 
the deaths of Hugo and Lucy Sussfield, two people killed following their deportation in 
1944, Austerlitz states that they dissolved “into the empty air” (Sebald, 2011, p. 363). This 
phrase is particularly evocative as it hints at the imagined loss of substance which seems to 
define his vision of Holocaust death. Their bodies have been stripped of form and they have 
been transmogrified into smoke and ash. This corresponds with the fixed, inherited vision of 
death in Auschwitz which has come to define our post-memorial understanding of the 
Holocaust. Austerlitz understands his parents’ murder simply as a depthless abstraction – 
they were transported and killed before dissolving into the empty air. In conjunction with 
this, it cannot serve as a mere coincidence that Austerlitz’s search for his father is 
immediately juxtaposed with the following scene:  
a television screen measuring at least two square metres and fixed high on the wall was just 
transmitting pictures of the great palls of smoke which had been stifling the towns and villages 
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of Indonesia for weeks on end, and dusting grey ash over the heads of all who for any reason 
ventured out of doors. (p. 356)    
Though the television may be depicting images from Indonesia, the placement of this scene 
clearly implies that Sebald intends for it to carry an element of subtext. In the very next 
moment, Austerlitz tries to imagine his father occupying the streets of Paris: “I sat in this bar 
too for hours on end, trying to imagine him in his plum-coloured double-breasted suit, 
perhaps a little threadbare now, bent over one of the café tables” (p. 358). In a fashion 
singularly reminiscent of Modiano’s text, Austerlitz is trying to place his father back on the 
streets of modern day Paris as a “real body”. His fixation on the minute details of his father’s 
clothing represents a desperate attempt to clothe his father in some kind of materiality. 
Austerlitz may be no closer to recovering the human essence of his father, or to form even a 
basic understanding of his persona, but he can imagine the texture of a threadbare suit. In 
reality, however, Maximillian must remain a memorial ghost. The previous sequence tells 
the reader this by creating a cognitive link with the image of smoke and ash. By placing this 
scene from Indonesia in conjunction with Austerlitz’s imaginary reconstruction of his father, 
Sebald has intentionally primed the reader for the hopelessness of the attempt.  
This vision of anonymising destruction returns again in a later scene in which Austerlitz 
imagines his father boarding a train from the Gare d’Austerlitz:  
an idea came to him of his father’s leaving Paris from this station… soon after the Germans 
entered the city. I imagined, said Austerlitz, that I saw him leaning out of the window of his 
compartment as the train left, and I saw the white clouds of smoke rising from the locomotive 
as it began to move ponderously away. After that I wandered round the deserted station half 
dazed. (p. 406) 
While Austerlitz may outwardly maintain the hope of one day encountering his father – he 
goes on to claim that he will “continue looking” for him (p. 408) – the imagery provided by 
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Sebald continuously hints at the manner of his death. Given the previously discussed 
significance of the train in Holocaust culture, one can only assume that Sebald has positioned 
it here as a visual shorthand for Maximillian’s likely extermination. The smoke pouring from 
the locomotive further bridges the gap, drawing the reader’s mind back to the image of the 
crematoria smokestack. This image of the smoking train, it must be noted, has become a 
standard form of visual shorthand in our post-memory of the Holocaust. The opening scenes 
of Trimuph of the Spirit (1989), for instance – a film which details the deportation of a family 
to Auschwitz – opens with the image of a steam train pulling into a station: 
 













Figure 7: A 
still from 
‘Triumph of the 
Spirit’. The 







69 All still from: Young, R.M. (Director). (1989) Triumph of the Spirit [Motion Picture] [DVD]. Germany: Crest 
Movies. (2014)  
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As this sequence acts as a preface for the coming events, it can be inferred that the director, 
Robert M. Young, intends for it to serve as an emotional primer for his audience. Without 
entering into the confines of Auschwitz, he has effectively conjured the spectre of industrial 
mass murder. It is not the train which is the focus of the frame, but the smoke which gradually 
obscures the background image, as Figure 7 illustrates. The connection to the crematoria is 
then made explicit in a later sequence as, having depicted the moments of undressing prior 
to extermination, Young then cuts to the image of smoke rising from a chimney. Again, the 
smoke comes to dominate the frame – standing in for the grim reality of mass death. Just as 
Young prefaces the events of his film with this evocation of mass extermination, then, Sebald 
uses this image to explicitly infer Maximillian’s fate.   
This becomes more apparent when considering the additional historical significance 
which Sebald attaches to the Gare d’Austerlitz. Tellingly, Austerlitz describes his initial 
feeling upon entering the station as one of “being on the scene of some unexpiated crime” 
(p. 407). Following his earlier visit to the Ghetto Museum in Terezín (Theresienstadt), it is 
clear that Austerlitz does understand the historical significance of the railway system. 
Having examined the exhibits there he notes the following: 
I traced the railway lines running through them, felt blinded by the documentation recording 
the population policy of the National Socialists… I was confronted with incontrovertible proof 
of the setting up of a forced labour system throughout Central Europe, and learned of the 
deliberate wastage and discarding of the work-slaves themselves, of the origins and places of 
death of the victims, the routes by which they were taken to what destinations (pp. 278-279)  
In viewing these records, Austerlitz comes to understand that the railway system served as 
the principle means of transportation for the Reich’s victims. Their paths from the ghettos to 
the various concentration and extermination camps of Germany and Poland are retraceable. 
A tangible connection runs from these sites, the locations of their eventual deaths, all the 
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way back to their homelands. The train system is again portrayed as an arterial link which 
carries the essence of the Holocaust back to those countries which carried out organised 
deportations. The Gare d’Austerlitz, in short, will never be able to fully expiate the crimes 
of the past, because the vast majority of historical railroad lines which once carried people 
from Paris to the murderous camps of the East still exist. France, in other words, is forever 
bound to its history of complicity by the permanence of the railroad. While the dead may not 
be returned to the streets of Paris bodily, therefore, this one physical element of their 
extermination remains. 
There is one further physical element which links the Gare d’Austerlitz to the crimes of 
the past, however. Employing that other common remnant of the Holocaust dead, their 
abandoned possessions, Austerlitz implies that France will likely still contain certain pieces 
of evidence which would implicate its people in the crimes of the past:  
Thus, on the waste land between the marshalling yards of the Gare d’Austerlitz and the Pont 
Tolbiac… there stood until the end of the war an extensive warehousing complex to which the 
Germans brought all the loot they had taken from the homes of the Jews of Paris… All who 
had taken part in any way in this highly organised programme of expropriation and 
reutilization… must undoubtedly have known that scarcely any of those interned in Drancy 
would ever come back. (pp. 401-402) 
The Austerlitz-Tolbiac storage depot, thus, contains another potent signifier of Holocaust 
absence – the objects left behind by those who have been deported. However, as is generally 
the case with object-based commemoration, the items cannot convey anything meaningful 
of their owners. These objects point only at a generalised vision of extermination, as is 
implied by their nature as everyday, unremarkable things: “In the years from 1942 onwards 
everything our civilization has produced… from Louis XVI chests of drawers, Meissen 
porcelain, Persian rugs and whole libraries, down to the last salt-cellar and pepper-mill, was 
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stacked there in the Austerlitz-Tolbiac storage depot” (p. 402). None of these items hint at 
the individuality of the Holocaust dead. An inevitable consequence of storing several 
examples of the same generic household item – from the profusion of rugs to the 
indistinguishable mass of salt and pepper shakers – is that a certain impression begins to 
form. The human specificity of Jewish suffering across mainland Europe is buried 
underneath a mountain of similar items. One cannot determine individual ownership or pick 
out particularising details when presented with a mountain with indistinguishable things.     
    This becomes yet more problematic when we factor in the word “reutilization”, as 
Austerlitz has raised the probability that these items will still be in circulation. In ‘Brick by 
Brick’, a 1995 project which saw the projection of everyday turn-of-the-century household 
items onto the enormous brick columns of the Rheinhalle in Cologne, Shimon Attie once 
again brought the crimes of the Holocaust back into the present. By drawing the viewer’s 
focus towards these commonplace antiques, Attie has raised certain questions regarding the 
provenance of these items: “What were you doing during the war… To whom did that table 
belong before the war? Is it an ill-gotten gain, a Nazi-sanctioned piece of war booty? Or was 
it passed down innocently from one generation to the next?” (Young, 2000, p. 82). Rather 
than providing a concrete answer to this question, Young notes, Attie allows it to “float in 
the space of the art fair” (p. 82). The viewer is made to ponder their own second-hand 
complicity as they consider the origins of every item. The crimes of the past, therefore, carry 
on into the present in the form of these slight memorial traces. Given that the confiscated 
items housed in the Austerlitz-Tolbiac storage facility have been reintegrated into society, 
having been passed on the wilfully ignorant populace, the likelihood is that certain people in 
our present-day post-memorial society may have inherited items with an undisclosed past. 
The crimes of the Nazi state, therefore, continue into the present in the form of these tokens 
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of annihilation. They cannot specify the time or place in which their owners died, however, 
and so they bring to mind only a generalised image of mass extermination.  
    This, despite his principal character’s moments of ill-judged positivity, is Sebald’s 
intended message. He wants the reader to come to terms with the irrecoverability of a specific 
Holocaust past – or the resurrection of one of the murdered. Material traces of the murdered 
may remain in modern society, but these speak only to the generalised concept of mass 
extermination. In order to counter his mother’s erasure, therefore – and to distinguish her 
from the rest of the murdered – Austerlitz becomes intent on recovering her image. He begins 
by scanning a film recording of the Theresienstadt camp in the hope of recovering some 
concrete trace of her – of fixing her image in his mind. In reality, however, he cannot find 
her and so he must resort to an invented image, a fantasy based around its material qualities:  
I imagined seeing her walking down the street in a summer dress and lightweight gabardine 
coat, said Austerlitz: among a group of ghetto residents out for a stroll, she alone seemed to 
make straight for me, coming closer with every step. (Sebald, 2011, p. 343)     
Her coat, he notes, would be lightweight and gabardine. He can imagine the texture of her 
clothes, but she remains a faceless abstraction. This anonymity may be linked to the setting 
of the video. As James Wood notes, Auschwitz was the place to which “most of the surviving 
Jews of Theresienstadt were eventually taken” (p. xxv). As such, Sebald is specifically 
invoking the idea that Auschwitz has the power to anonymise the dead. Though he does not 
mention it by name, he explicitly alludes to the Auschwitz camp in order to make this 
connection explicit. Particular emphasis is paid to the “Hydrogen-cyanide chamber” which 
had been “introduced by the Kommandantur in an all-out campaign against infestation with 
lice” (p. 336). This can only be read as an unambiguous allusion to the gas chambers of 
Auschwitz and the Zyklon-B compound which was used therein. According to the 
Encyclopaedia of Chemical Technology, Zyklon-B was broadly composed of Hydrocyanic 
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acid (HCN, or prussic acid) and one other additional element: “The German Cyclon B was 
a mixture of this acid with diatomaceous earth creating the blue crystalline substance often 
described” (Höss, 1996, p. 155). As such, the inclusion of prussic acid, along with 
particularly pertinent references to the extermination of pests, will inevitably conjure images 
of death in Auschwitz. The historical complexity of Theresienstadt has been simplified and, 
in its place, Sebald has left the standardised memory of mass extermination in Auschwitz. 
Austerlitz’s mother, therefore, is currently being eclipsed by the mass of faceless deportees 
transported from Theresienstadt to their common doom. 
    Austerlitz’s quest to recover a sense of his mother ends, ostensibly, when he discovers a 
picture which matches the “dim memory” (Sebald, 2011, p. 353) he has carried since early 
childhood. As Crownshaw notes, however, despite receiving external verification from Věra 
– the mother’s former neighbour and Austerlitz’s one-time nursemaid – even the authenticity 
of this image must be called into question: “If all images have so far proved unreliable, the 
immediate verification of this one seems conspicuous” (2010, p. 75). In truth, however, the 
actual validity of the image is of little import. All that is required is licence from a third 
party, some form of external verification, to give the image meaning. As Crownshaw puts 
it: “witnesses are needed to corroborate history; the past and past objects cannot speak for 
themselves” (p. 68). The image itself, therefore, possesses no innate properties of any kind. 
It evokes nothing of the dead and will not act as a substantiating bridge, reconnecting 
Austerlitz with his deceased mother. In reality, it is merely a screen onto which he can project 
his own associations. Austerlitz, by bringing with him his desperate need to attach a sense 
of fixity to his mother’s memorial ghost “animates these photographs with a life they do not 
possess on their own” (p. 68). Having been granted permission by Věra, Austerlitz is able to 
use this image to flesh out his remembrances of his mother. The only thing Austerlitz has 
been able to recover from the fires of Auschwitz, therefore, is a fixed shape for his mother. 
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He has solidified his image of her body, even if it may – in actuality – prove to be someone 
else. All that we may recover of the Holocaust dead, therefore – Sebald’s text implies – is a 
partially materialised form onto which we may project our fantasies. We cannot recover the 
Holocaust dead as people, but we can partially rematerialize their spectres. Just as Modiano’s 
narrator wills Dora Bruder back onto the streets of Paris, Austerlitz is able to partially 
physicalise his image of his mother. Or rather, to finally add fixed proportions to her body. 
    Both authors, in exploring the issue of recovery, mean to transmit the same message to 
future generations. Both wish to highlight the desperation of the second generation and the 
profound emotional dissatisfaction which comes with distance. There is no alternative to the 
post-memorial, they tell us, and all of our attempts to connect with the Holocaust dead will 
prove hopelessly superficial. The text addressed in the following section, Shalom 
Auslander’s Hope: A Tragedy, takes the idea of the post-memorial Holocaust to its logical 
extreme by creating a world in which the Shoah is remembered only as a mythic vaguery. 
Having accepted the message of the hinge generation, he seems to suggest, we are doomed 
to remember the Holocaust only as a mythic agglomeration of standardised post-memorial 
images.   
 
Shalom Auslander and the Rootless Holocaust 
The first section of this chapter established the notion of inherited trauma, or rather the 
possibility of inheriting its symptoms without having access to the experiential reality of the 
Holocaust itself. While the vast majority of Rosenbaum’s stories focus on the passive 
transmission of Holocaust trauma through the survivor’s behaviours – their general anxieties 
gradually passing on to their children through shared proximity – Rosenbaum also hinted at 
the possibility of genetically transmitted trauma. His characters spoke of the Holocaust as 
existing in their bones, implying that these anxieties may have been with them since birth. 
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This aligns with Wardi’s suggestion that survivors may have passed on their anxieties to 
their children through a flood of neurohormonal substances, as their post-war anxieties were 
chemically transmitted to their children while still in the womb. While these texts, then, 
seemed to endorse the concept of genetic transmission as a possibility, they did not possess 
sufficient scientific knowledge at that point in time to support this thinking. In the 
intervening years, however, research has been done which suggests that the genetic 
transmission of trauma is a real possibility.  
Following on from the research of Rachel Yehuda, an increasing amount of emphasis has 
been placed on the concept of Epigenetic Transmission. At its most basic level, Catherine 
Malabou notes, epigenetic transmission differs from simple genetic heredity due to its 
impermanence: “epigenetic inheritance is reversible, meaning that it can cease at some point 
of the transmission chain” (2018, p. 189). It is not, then, a permanent genetic characteristic 
which will affect every future generation. It is instead the direct genetic result of a particular 
environmental experience – for instance, a period of profound stress or prolonged starvation 
– which will then be passed along to the second generation. Natan Kellermann expands on 
this by noting the following:  
“The body keeps the score”, not only in the first generation of trauma survivors, but possibly 
also in subsequent ones. Because of their neurobiological susceptibility to stress, children of 
Holocaust survivors may thus easily imagine the physical suffering of their parents and almost 
“remember” the hunger, the frozen limbs, the smell of burned bodies and the sounds that made 
them scared. (2013, p. 34) 
It is important to note the level of equivocation which surrounds the word “remember” in 
this extract. Of course, the second-generation child cannot inherit their parents’ memories as 
an experiential reality. What has been transmitted is merely the epigenetic log of the 
experience. The second generation, therefore, do indeed inherit something of their parents’ 
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Holocaust experiences – as the first section of this chapter outlined. Specifically, in the form 
of inherited symptoms. As Kellermann implies, the children of sufferers will often develop 
a biological inability to cope with all forms of stress. Even comparatively minor triggers, he 
states, may prompt disproportionate reactions:  
The epigenome thus would function like a “switch,” which has the inherent ability to turn 
certain functions “on” or “off.” From such a point of view, offspring of trauma survivors would 
be somehow “programmed” to express a specific cognitive and emotional response in certain 
difficult situations… This bug would for example switch on a panic attack and instruct the 
genes to prepare for “fight and flight” when triggered, as if the individual were thrown into a 
Nazi persecution manuscript of catastrophic proportions, even in a relatively non-threatening 
situation. (p. 35) 
Rather than contradicting the assertions of those theorists who argue for the psychological 
influence of survivor parents, epigenetic research merely provides a genetic grounding for 
some of their core notions. While Wardi may have argued for the learned inheritance of 
certain behaviours, Rachel Yehuda’s research suggests that second-generation children are 
also genetically pre-disposed towards bouts of reflexive anxiety. As the above excerpt 
argues, the children of survivors are genetically primed to react to relatively common 
stresses with a level of anxiety comparable to that of Nazi persecution. As such, we may re-
examine certain elements of ‘The Cattle Car Complex’. The extremity of Adam Posner’s 
reaction may indicate that, on a genetic level, he has indeed inherited a certain element of 
his parents’ experiences. The taint of their Holocaust trauma is made manifest in his inability 
to cope with certain forms of triggering pressure. This lends genuine scientific substance to 
the idea that his parents’ reminiscences “had become genetic material that was to be passed 
on by survivors to their children” (Rosenbaum, 1996, p. 5). In the very strictest sense, he is 
entirely accurate. As Rosenbaum seems to understand intuitively, however, even if a certain 
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level of genetic inheritance existed, this would not mean that the child would inherit their 
parents’ experiences in their totality. Once again, all the second-generation child may receive 
is symptoms of a trauma they themselves have not experienced. As Eva Jablonka puts it:  
it is important to emphasize that the specific trauma is unlikely to be inherited. So the fact that 
children of Holocaust survivors dream of the Holocaust was not transmitted through gametic 
epigenetic inheritance... What could have been inherited is the disposition to have nightmares, 
and of course if they know something about the Holocaust through primary exposure, from 
stories and so on, the nightmares will take this form. (Jablonka, in Kellermann, 2013, p. 35)  
While epigenetics may therefore, in some cases, provide a scientific rationale for the 
inheritance of certain traumatic behaviours, it cannot directly transmit the lived experience 
of the Holocaust from the survivor to their offspring. At the very most it merely provides an 
element of materiality, creating a tangible link between the child and their parents’ history. 
It effectively ratifies the profound feeling of emotional investment spoken of by Hirsch and 
Hoffman, as their very genes have literally been affected by their parents’ Holocaust 
suffering. However, that is not to imply that their understanding of the Holocaust can ever 
evolve beyond the realm of post-memory. They may behave in a fashion similar to that of 
the survivor, but their understanding of the Holocaust remains partial and mediated.  
    Effectively, therefore, a post-memorial vision of the Holocaust has been created which is 
comprised of two elements: the symptomatic expression of trauma and post-memory. As the 
children of survivors have no experiential link back to their parents’ suffering, the only thing 
to authenticate their connection to the Holocaust comes in the form of this epigenetic link. 
This, however, is only visible to external observers when it manifests in the form of their 
inherited anxiety. Or, put another way, in a series of recognisable behaviours – behaviours 
which have already been charted, codified and then represented in various forms of media 
as they gradually slip into the realm of post-memory. As such, we effectively have a version 
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of the Holocaust which exists entirely through signification. As the previous two sections 
have illustrated, our substantiating link to the past has always been tenuous. Our inability to 
connect with the victims of the Holocaust, either living or dead, has created a vision of the 
Shoah which fixates purely on surface details. Having abandoned all hope of connecting 
with the survivor’s experiential reality, and thereby getting to grips with the nature of their 
trauma, we must instead focus on the lapses in their speech and their pregnant silences. This 
obsessive focus on expressed behaviours has left us in a precarious position. If the 
experiential reality of the Holocaust cannot be accessed, and if authentic suffering is visible 
only through a series of behaviours, then what is to distinguish genuine evidence of trauma 
from the mere pretence of it?70 Moreover, if our conception of the Holocaust is entirely 
removed from the experiential reality of suffering, what do we stand to inherit beyond our 
increasingly reductive post-memory of the event? Shalom Auslander goes some way towards 
answering these questions in Hope: A Tragedy. 
    Auslander’s novel differs from the previous texts in that, rather than representing 
characters with a genuine connection to the Holocaust, it pivots around a Holocaust 
pretender. The novel’s principal character, Solomon Kugel, exists to explicitly problematise 
the concept of Holocaust inheritance. His mother, problematically, has adopted the persona 
of a Holocaust survivor. Despite having been born in Brooklyn in 1945, she has adopted a 
series of behaviours which are supposed to hint at her Holocaust history. In Hope, from the 
very start, the Holocaust is represented entirely through a series of established images. The 
Holocaust, according to Auslander’s reading, has devolved into a series of signs without a 
 
70 This is a potentially dangerous viewpoint as it has been previously abused by Holocaust deniers. However, 
it is neither Auslander’s intention – not the intention of this dissertation – to endorse the standpoint of the 
deniers. Rather, Auslander’s text is further illustrating the problematic universalisation of the Holocaust. 
Specifically, he highlights the inherent danger of reducing the Holocaust to a series of borrowable symbols 
and affectations. It is then open, the text suggests, to potential abuse by pretenders.   
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corresponding point of signification. This first becomes apparent in his reference to the 
Auschwitz tattoo.  
    Though he is initially sceptical of the old woman he finds in the family’s attic – a 
monstrous incarnation of Anne Frank, who will come to haunt the rest of the narrative – he 
is convinced of one thing: that she’s a survivor. This is due to the “fading blue-black 
concentration camp numbers tattooed on the inside of her pale forearm” (Auslander, 2012, 
p. 32). His reaction upon seeing the tattoo is to revert to a kind of reflexive reverential awe 
– a position of automatic restraint and respect: “he had seen them, those damned numbers, 
and the numbers meant that Anne Frank or not, consumed by madness or not… the old 
woman was a goddamned Holocaust survivor” (p. 34). The phrase “goddamned Holocaust 
survivor” perfectly punctuates the significance of the survivor-figure in Solomon’s world. It 
comes at the end of a long list of extenuating circumstances which should, in principle, make 
any rational person baulk. However, the concept of being a survivor has very specific, and 
yet fascinatingly abstract, connotations for Solomon. It is clear that the survivor’s tattoo has 
a profound signifying power – given that it figuratively stops him in his tracks, curbing all 
of his natural, rational responses to the situation. However, as Auslander goes on to 
demonstrate, Solomon’s understanding of the Shoah is profoundly limited. The tattoo, 
therefore, only has the power to invoke his simplistic post-memory of the event.  
Recalling another instance from his early childhood, Solomon describes a scene in which 
his mother produced a rather generic-looking lamp and declared: “That, she said with a sigh, 
That’s your grandfather” (p. 76). As the comic punchline to this sequence, Solomon turns 
the lamp over only to discover that it says “Made in Taiwan” on the lamp’s base. Confronting 
his mother with this fact, she haughtily defends her position: “Mother looked at him, 
disappointment and anger in her tearstained eyes… Well, they’re not going to write Made in 
Buchenwald on the base, are they? she snapped” (p. 77). This is representative of Mother’s 
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general approach to the Holocaust. She seizes on certain standard instances of post-memorial 
iconography and then seeks to claim ownership of them. In his text The Lampshade: A 
Holocaust Detective Story from Buchenwald to New Orleans, Mark Jacobson describes Billy 
Wilder’s role in transmitting the image of the lampshade to an American audience. The 
image “entered the wider American mindset” (Jacobson, 2011, p. 102) thanks to the footage 
utilized in the post-liberation propaganda feature ‘Death Mills’ – the editing for which had 
been overseen by Wilder himself. As Jacobson puts it:  
A lampshade allegedly to have been constructed on the orders of Ilse Koch appears several 
times in the footage shot the day of the Weimar march. It is visible as part of what is described 
by the narrator as “the parchment display,” an array of camp evidence Weimar residents were 
forced to view. (p. 103)  
Given that this sequence once again revolves around the forced viewing of Nazi atrocity – 
Weimar residents having been made to witness the crimes of their countrymen – the 
lampshade may be considered literally totemic of Nazi atrocity. As the editor of this footage, 
Wilder has singled out this one item as an embodying artefact, one which economically 
captures the essence of Nazi brutality. Given the frequency with which this footage was 
viewed – Jacobson notes that this documentary was shown as a “regularly scheduled feature” 
(p. 102) in the United States – it is only natural that it would then come to occupy a central 
place in the American cultural consciousness. Proof of this can then be found in Sylvia 
Plath’s ‘Lazy Lazarus’, in which she invokes the spectre of skin “Bright as a Nazi 
Lampshade”. The presumption inherent in this reference is that the American populace at 
large holds this image of the Nazi lampshade as part of their inner storehouse of Shoah 
iconography.  
This adoption of lazy iconography is later echoed in another sequence in which a young 
Solomon is handed a box which, ostensibly, contains the remains of his great-grandmother: 
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“The inside of the box was lined with purple velvet and the base was covered in purple satin, 
upon which sat a smooth white bar of soap” (Auslander, 2012, p. 80). Having aged slightly 
since the lamp incident, Solomon is rather less accepting of his mother’s eccentricities and 
so he decides to question the legitimacy of this item. “Her name was Ivory? he asked. Mother 
frowned and grabbed the soap from him. Her eyes filled with tears. Well, they’re not going 
to write Auschwitz on it, are they? she said” (p. 81). While there is a certain degree of 
historical validity to the Buchenwald lamp, the image of the bar of soap exists as something 
of an oft-perpetuated Holocaust exaggeration. Just as Mother notes in this instance, there is 
an enduring presumption in post-memorial culture that the bodies of the dead were 
frequently repurposed in the form of soap. She considers it to be a commonplace activity 
and links it specifically to the Auschwitz camp. Historical research, however, has proven 
that claims of this nature were greatly exaggerated. Indeed, while the bar of soap often 
surfaces as a persistent idea in Holocaust testimony, it is significantly harder to verify. 
Speaking specifically of the Warsaw ghetto, Myron Taylor suggested that the bodies of the 
dead had been put to unseemly uses. He claimed that their corpses had been utilized for 
“making fats” (Taylor, in Sereny, 1983, p. 141) and their bones had then been put to use as 
fertilizer. As a corrective to this, however, Gitta Sereny informs that: “the universally 
accepted story that the corpses were used to make soap and fertilizer is finally refuted by the 
generally very reliable Ludwigsburg Central Authority for Investigation into Nazi Crimes” 
(p. 141). As a point of clarification she then states that while only one experiment was ever 
made with “a few corpses from a concentration camp” (p. 141), the process proved 
impractical and so the whole idea was duly abandoned. Mother’s determined focus on this 
image, therefore, illustrates the entirely constructed nature of her Holocaust knowledge. She 
has absorbed the images which have been perpetuated in the intervening years, and these 
have formed the entirety of her conception of the Shoah.  
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The focus, so far, has explicitly been on the nature of Mother’s knowledge and the 
profoundly mediated message that she has actively passed on to Solomon. However, just as 
previous sections focused on the nature of unconscious transmission and adopted 
behaviours, Mother’s attempts to actively mimic survivor-trauma needs to be considered. 
This also forms a crucial part of her simulation, as she consciously adopts certain 
standardised behaviours in order to sell her performance. This chapter has already outlined 
the silence which exists between survivors and their children. The children have often only 
been told a handful of embodying stories. Nadine Fresco, who conducted a great many 
interviews with the children of survivors, describes their experiences as follows:  
the forbidden memory of death manifested itself only in the form of incomprehensible attacks 
of pain… The silence was all the more implacable in that it was often concealed behind a 
screen of words, again, always the same words, an unchanging story, a tale repeated over and 
over again, made up of selections from the war. (1984, p. 419) 
This screen of words is marked by its consistency and its insinuating power. When masking 
their trauma, she implies, survivors will always use the same phrases – essentially stock 
expressions. Their narratives, in effect, have calcified in the telling. These unchanging 
phrases serve as employable screens, and so their repeated use continues to hint at the vast 
reservoir of inarticulable trauma which exists just beneath the surface. Auslander further 
demonstrates the artificiality of Mother’s performance by having her mimic this behavioural 
trait. Whenever she speaks of her suffering, she always employs the same expressions: 
“Kugel never asked Mother which war she was referring to… Her references were vague: 
Those sons of bitches, she said, or Such cruelty, or Whole families destroyed, or Never 
again” (Auslander, 2012, p. 75). These are stock phrases, designed to hint at the existence of 
an inarticulable trauma. Mother clearly understands the mechanism and has internalised this 
as something that survivors commonly do. While genuine survivors will also employ 
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fragments of their experiences, however – just as Hoffman’s parents spoke of their cottage 
– Mother has no direct experience of the Holocaust. Bearing this in mind, her frequent 
repetition of these phrases merely highlights their artificiality. They are no longer 
expressions of trauma but Holocaust slogans. They may prompt an immediate emotional 
reaction from the audience, but this is merely a shallow reflex – another example of Gillian 
Rose’s unexamined Holocaust sentimentality.  
    The parent-child dynamic in Hope can therefore be read as a satirical re-working of the 
pattern of Holocaust transmission examined in the earlier portions of this chapter. Solomon 
is, to all intents and purposes, a second-generation child. His mother may not be a genuine 
survivor, but she has assumed their expected behaviours. Her general modus operandi, as 
the text notes, is to adapt her behaviour until it is functionally indistinguishable from that of 
the survivor: “Mother had been hiding bread around the house ever since reading that this 
was common behaviour among survivors of the Holocaust” (p. 161). Though Mother does 
not understand the origins of this behaviour, this is clearly a lingering manifestation of the 
in-camp practice referred to as “organisation”. She has read that it is something that is 
commonly done and so has worked it into her ongoing performance, altering its parameters 
every time she learns new expected behaviours.  
    In terms of pure appearances, therefore, Mother does enact the behaviours of the survivor. 
While her performance is depicted in a semi-comic light, Auslander is still highlighting the 
problematic potential of our post-memorial Holocaust world. Whereas before survivors 
embodied the real event – the experiential reality of the Shoah, which nonwitnesses could 
not experience – in Auslander’s world real survivors have become irrelevant. Given the 
unreflective focus on symbols in Hope, the survivor as a concept has no value. Their genuine 
suffering is irrelevant, as they now exist merely as a series of imitable behaviours. People, 
in Auslander’s reality, cannot see beyond the surface of the symbol, as they cannot connect 
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with the historical reality of Shoah. If our conception of the Holocaust continues to degrade, 
Hope implies, the original event will be lost, having been replaced with an overly reductive 
after-image.     
     This focus on surfaces is further explored through Solomon’s simulated Holocaust 
inheritance. In practice, it is almost entirely identical to Adam Posner’s. In both instances, 
the children inherit only a generalised sense of anxiety and a contextless fear of persecution. 
For the Adam Posner of ‘Lost, in a Sense’ and ‘The Little Blue Snowman’, his connection 
to the Holocaust exists exclusively as a form of generalised anxiety. His parents had been 
able to transmit only their lingering sense of wartime panic and their desire to prepare for 
every conceivable eventuality. Adam has therefore inherited a level of anxiety proportionate 
with their Holocaust suffering, but he has no fixed enemy. In ‘The Little Blue Snowman’, 
Adam shows that he is pathologically afraid of all authority figures. For reasons almost 
entirely beyond his comprehension, he physically attacks a policeman during a school trip: 
“Adam had not been to the battle, but yet his soul feared the enemy – some enemy” 
(Rosenbaum, 1996, p. 198). As Rosenbaum notes, he has not experienced the battle – the 
tension of actually living in occupied Europe and experiencing the reality of ghettoization – 
and yet his body and mind are primed for it. He has inherited a level of panic and neurosis 
equal to that of a genuine survivor and yet he has no functional understanding of the 
Holocaust.  
    It is telling, therefore, that on the surface Solomon’s inherited vision of the Holocaust 
mirrors Adam’s flawlessly. He too has inherited an abstract anxiety from his mother. Rather 
than pertaining specifically to authority figures, however, he has internalised a general 
persecution complex. His paranoia revolves around an imagined second Holocaust. This, as 
with Adam Posner’s example, is merely another example of directionless catastrophising, as 
Solomon has no specific cause in mind. His starting position is: “Someone would have to 
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hide them… If something happened. If what happened? Something. What? Whatever” 
(Auslander, 2012, p. 108). Solomon’s anxiety, therefore, has no basis in reality. It is not the 
product of a genuine external threat, but simply the manifestation of his inherited panic.  
    A significant portion of Chapter Eleven of Auslander’s text is then dedicated to planning 
the logistics of this act of hiding, despite the clear absence of an earthly need to hide. 
Solomon, relying as ever on processed Holocaust themes, decides that the only option is for 
his family to seek refuge in an attic. Two solid pages are then spent debating which of the 
2400 residents of Stockton might offer the family shelter. Solomon eliminates all of the 
available possibilities before settling on a final family – the Dooners. However, he then 
recalls having once borrowed a lawnmower of theirs that he forgot to refill: “Nice planet, 
Kugel thought; he and his family were going to die in a concentration camp because of a 
stupid lawnmower he forgot to refill” (p. 111). Solomon, therefore, has adopted the panic of 
the second-generation children, which manifests as a fear of future catastrophes. His neurotic 
fixation on the minutiae of hiding – how he might factor in his wife’s dye allergy or his own 
issues with gluten – points to his mother’s impact on his general psychic wellbeing. She has, 
in effect, transformed him into a second-hand survivor, just like the various iterations of 
Adam Posner. Despite the absence of an originating trauma, Solomon’s Holocaust 
inheritance has adopted precisely the same character as that of an actual second-generation 
child. Auslander, therefore, is gradually obscuring the division between reality and this clear 
simulation. The only difference between the two lies in Adam’s felt connection to his 
parents’ Holocaust past. The phrase “his soul feared some enemy” would seem to harken 
back to this concept of a biologically inherited Holocaust – a trace of the trauma that is 
literally passed on through the survivor’s genes. Solomon, however, clearly does not have 
an epigenetic link back to the Holocaust. While Adam’s case involves the passive 
transmission of genuine trauma, therefore, Solomon’s Mother is only transmitting the 
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surface-level myth of the Shoah. Solomon’s behaviours certainly seem to mirror those of a 
genuine second-generation child and his inherited paranoia seems legitimate in nature. This 
is the result, I contend, of his semi-conscious desire to fully inhabit the position of the 
second-generation child. While he may acknowledge the ludicrousness of his mother’s 
claims on an intellectual level, an element of his psyche requires the Holocaust and so is 
willing to put aside all criticality in order to buy into the fantasy. Or, put another way, he 
legitimises his own inherited trauma by participating in his mother’s simulation.  
    Modern attempts at Holocaust engagement, Auslander implies, are driven specifically by 
a perverse need to engage with the Holocaust. In the context of this novel, the Kugels are 
driven by a need to engage with the Holocaust as fully inhabiting a Shoah fantasy is, 
ironically, less painful than living with the inherent randomness of daily life. It is better to 
imagine the unremitting horror of constant persecution than to live with the uncertainty of 
some unimagined future suffering. This is best articulated by Solomon’s brother-in-law 
Pinkus, who attempts to explain Mother’s fixation with the Shoah. People, he claims, are 
fundamentally unable to exist in the stable present. Rather than living in the moment and 
trying to find a measure of contentment, they are wont to catastrophise and to exist in a state 
of panic and pessimism:  
What would we have done without gas chambers and ovens?... What would we have done, 
Pinkus continued, without Dresden, without Srebrenica, without the Katyn Forest and the 
Killing Fields?... peace frightens us. Expecting hell, we’re ill-prepared for heaven. It’s like 
watching two men carry a pane of glass across a busy highway: we expect it to break, we know 
it will, the situation itself is so precarious that we almost want to see a car drive through it. (p. 
242) 
Our understanding of man’s capacity for evil, and the existence of previous instances of 
persecution, has left us in a constant state of wariness. Rather than spending our every 
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waking moment anticipating the next great calamity, Pinkus claims, people would rather 
fully embrace a historical tragedy. “Agony is ecstasy” as it is better to experience the 
certainty of direct suffering than to wait for life’s next unknowable trauma. In a 
fundamentally chaotic universe happiness can only be found in the face of an immediate and 
all-consuming sense of danger. In a way that is both conscious and wilfully unconscious, 
therefore – as he has had to ignore many inconsistencies regarding his mother’s story – 
Solomon has fully surrendered himself to his mother’s delusion. He will not be the victim 
of another of life’s unknowable calamities, but rather he must prepare for a second Shoah. 
His Holocaust-related panic provides a paradoxical sense of stability as it gives form to his 
generalised fear of the future. According to his post-memory of the Shoah, persecuted people 
hide in attics in times of trouble.71 Though his understanding of the Holocaust may be lacking 
in detail, therefore, it certainly sets limits for his vision of future trauma and thus provides a 
curious sense of comfort.  
    In practice, therefore, Mother has been able to transmit her manufactured Holocaust 
suffering to her child. In this sense, her method of transmission is functionally identical to 
that of a genuine survivor. In willingly participating in her simulation, and adopting the 
essence of her neurosis, Solomon validates her constructed trauma. She has passed on the 
essence of her experience to him, and he has manifested a set of inherited symptoms. To the 
external observer, therefore, nothing distinguishes the simulated reality from real epigenetic 
transmission. In Auslander’s world, there is no difference. He has created a nightmare world 
in which the historical Holocaust has become entirely unreachable, having been replaced by 
a post-memorial reproduction of the event. The complexity of the Holocaust is gone, having 
been replaced by embodying images of soap and lampshades. Similarly, the survivor’s 
 
71 The post-memorial focus on hiding in attics also features in Nathan Englander’s What We Talk About 
When We Talk About Anne Frank.  
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experiences have now been effectively erased, or rather rendered irrelevant as survivor status 
has been transformed into a set of imitable behaviours. Our post-memorial obsession with 
surface details and codified behaviours, he seems to say, could result in a world in which the 
identity of the survivor can effectively be “put on”, simply through the adoption of certain 
quirks and affectations. This already has parallels in the real world, as Binjamin Wilkomirski 
sold his survivor status by openly weeping at events and donning a tallith-inspired shawl in 
order to imbue his readings with a special “sacral dignity” (Maechler, 2001, p. 283). Post-
memorial culture, therefore, runs the risk of eclipsing the experiential reality of the Shoah. 
An excessive focus on icons and signifiers can only lead to a singularly depthless conception 
of the event, which only manages to obscure the human and historical realities of Holocaust 
suffering. This, the thesis contends, presents a profound problem for Holocaust fiction.   
 
Conclusion  
This chapter argues that the second generation have impacted our broader societal 
conception of the Holocaust – specifically, by affirming the contention that survivor parents 
transmitted little of their experiences beyond small fragments of story, their accessible 
common memories and the symptoms of their trauma. Their deep memories of Holocaust 
suffering, the experiential core of their experiences, remain unreachable. However, the 
second generation still retain their feeling of connectedness to the event. This, the chapter 
argues, likely relates back to their epigenetic connection to their parents’ Holocaust 
suffering. They have inherited their parents’ anxiety, and yet they have not experienced the 
original trauma. As such, the Holocaust exists as a phantom presence – permanently 
affecting their lives and yet remaining frustratingly distant. Thane Rosenbaum’s short stories 
effectively convey the quality of this inheritance by focusing on both the Adams’ almost 
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biological feeling of connectedness to the Holocaust – it is often framed as having been 
passed down in their blood – and their profound lack of knowledge. The Holocaust exists 
for all nonwitnesses, Rosenbaum’s text suggests, as a post-memorial abstraction. Nothing 
can be done to rectify this, as the survivor is the sole possessor of deep memory. 
    Rosenbaum, Modiano and Sebald are therefore in agreement regarding the reachability of 
the Holocaust: we cannot fathom the experiences of the living and we cannot connect with 
the plight of the Holocaust dead. In both instances, we can only resort to our post-memory 
of the Shoah. This is problematic for the reasons illustrated by Modiano and Sebald as, 
unable to connect with the Holocaust dead as fully contextualised people, nonwitnesses are 
instead prone to focus on the image of the body. Just as Austerlitz and Modiano’s narrator 
began to emphasise the physical aspects of the murdered – such as their clothing or their 
relation to the streets of Paris or Berlin – modern-day authors have come to focus on the 
materiality of Holocaust suffering. As Modiano’s text suggests, the desire clearly exists to 
connect with the murdered on a deeper level – to engage with their wartime experiences and 
the reality of their suffering. However, our post-memory of the event cannot possibly hope 
to satisfy this impulse. Instead, as Modiano’s text demonstrates, the nonwitness is likely to 
focus on the sufferer’s body. This desire to rematerialize the body does not stem from a wish 
to recover the lost, I contend, but rather to create an inhabitable shell – an identity into which 
the viewer/reader can step. Modiano’s text substantiates this assertion, as his narrator 
physicalises the image of Dora Bruder only so that he may walk in her “footsteps” (Modiano, 
2014, p. 44) and connect with the Holocaust on a prosthetic level. The second generation, 
therefore, have laid the foundation for bodily engagement. By signalling that the deep 
memory of Holocaust suffering is unreachable, and that the Holocaust dead are 
unrecoverable, they have established the need for another form of engagement. If the sufferer 
cannot be understood, then they may instead be prosthetically inhabited. This, as Chapter 
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Four outlines, has arguably become normalised in modern attempts to engage with the 
Holocaust. As Austerlitz establishes, however, these attempts at bodily engagement 
generally prove fruitless. These spectres, as Austerlitz discovers, communicate nothing of 
the dead or their experiences. Instead, they are merely shapes onto which the nonwitness 
projects their post-memory of the Holocaust. Austerlitz’s search for his mother ends, after 
all, when he discovers her picture. Beyond seeing her image, which gives shape to her absent 
body, he can learn nothing more.        
    Finally, Auslander’s text also introduces a vital element into the discussion. Specifically, 
by highlighting the dangers inherent in post-memory. In his text, the Shoah exits only as a 
post-memorial distortion. He has created a world in which the survivor’s deep memory of 
the event – the actual reality of Holocaust suffering – has become irrelevant. Instead, the 
characters in Hope only understand the Shoah as a collage of poorly understood icons and 
imitable behaviours. The risk modern culture runs, Auslander’s text implies, is that post-
memory may forever eclipse the human reality of the Holocaust – from the sufferer’s actual 
experiences to the specific details which particularised them as people. If we cannot find a 
way to re-engage with the sufferer on a human level – for instance by engaging with the 
specifics of their pre-war communities, as Yaffa Eliach’s tower attempts to, or the complex 
reality of their time in the ghetto, as Alan Mintz has suggested – then we run the risk of 
falling into Auslander’s trap. We may, also, come to view the Holocaust only as a series of 
reductive post-memorial icons.  






Chapter III: Visualising the Holocaust: Landmarks, Photographs and Post-Memory 
As the previous chapters have outlined, the Anglo-American cultural understanding of the 
Holocaust has undergone a gradual conceptual narrowing. In the first wave of 
commemoration, immediately following the liberation of certain camps by the British and 
Americans, our understanding of the Holocaust was broadly defined by those images 
produced by the British and American press. As Janina Struk notes, no pictures of the 
liberation of Auschwitz appeared in British newspapers and “hardly any reports” (2004, p. 
147) appeared regarding the liberation itself. As such, our visual vocabulary for the atrocity, 
as experienced on a human level, came to be defined by pictures from camps such as Bergen-
Belsen, Buchenwald and Nordhausen. As Barbie Zelizer puts it, these images of “mounds of 
corpses, gaping pits of bodies” and “haunted faces behind barbed wires” became what Saul 
Friedlander described as an “indelible reference point of the Western imagination” (Zelizer, 
1998, p. 1, p. 14; Friedlander, 1993, p. 1). However, as the texts which have been addressed 
thus far have illustrated, the fictional representation of the Holocaust does not revolve around 
the representation of camps in Germany itself, but rather has shifted towards the 
representation of industrial mass murder in Auschwitz specifically – or, as in the case of 
W.G. Sebald’s Austerlitz and Arnost Lustig’s The Unloved: The Diary of Perla S, in 
Theresienstadt which is conceptualised as a holding pen for those bound for Auschwitz. In 
short, therefore, Holocaust fiction is pulled in two contrary directions. It uses Auschwitz as 
a metonym for the Holocaust, but it has no existing visual vocabulary for suffering in 
Auschwitz. Despite the fact that the Soviets had, to a certain degree, recorded their 
liberations of Auschwitz and Majdanek, these visual records have not entered the Western 
cultural consciousness with as much cultural impact as the British and American imagery. 
Struk notes that, in their presentation of Soviet images from Majdanek, the British press did 
not focus on the “emotive images of human suffering” (2004, p. 142) used in their 
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presentation of the camps liberated by the Western allies. Instead, they focused on the 
industrial nature of mass murder – from the representation of the “gas cells”, to “piles of 
shoes and boots” and a “pile of identity cards” (p. 142). The Eastern camps, therefore, were 
presented in the Western media in an explicitly evidential and deliberately unemotive 
fashion. I argue that this has contributed to a dual presentation of the Holocaust. While 
Auschwitz remains a recurring feature of Holocaust fiction, modern creators lack the visual 
vocabulary to explicitly portray human suffering within the camp setting. As such, our 
representation of the camp itself commonly revolves around a standard set of landmarks. 
Dan Stone, for instance, describes our current conception of the Auschwitz camp as follows:  
even since the first photos of Auschwitz, the meaning imputed to it has been encompassed in 
the symbolic framework of the barbed wire, the ramp, or the famous entrance gate. These 
things are important parts of the camp, yet they are not the camp but only how we wish to keep 
seeing it. (1995, p. 57)  
We have, according to Stone, a fixed conception of the camp based around certain common 
landmarks and physical elements. With unerring reliability, fictional representations of 
Auschwitz cycle through a standard set of culturally enshrined locations – from the Arbeit 
Macht Frei gateway in Auschwitz I to the imposing entrance of Birkenau and the unloading 
ramp. As Stone implies, however, these locations do not represent the reality of Auschwitz 
but rather its post-memorial reproduction. Such is our emotional and experiential distance 
from the Holocaust that we have no earthly conception of its inner reality, as it was 
experienced by the internee.72 It stands simply as a series of recognisable locations, to which 
we have an ever-diminishing emotional connection.  
 
72 The phrase “inner reality”, which is utilised throughout this chapter, refers to the experiential reality of 
the Auschwitz camp, which exists beyond the Birkenau entrance. It is the reality which exists within the 
deep memory of survivors and which cannot be communicated to, or reached by, the nonwitness.  
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    Given that we may now only connect with the Holocaust through the post-memorial 
approach of “imaginative investment, projection, and creation” (Hirsch, 2012, p. 5), our 
ability to represent human suffering within the camps is limited by our visual vocabulary of 
the Shoah. As such, given the lack of available images representing suffering within the 
Auschwitz camp, modern Holocaust fiction is now limited to two general sources. The first, 
as has already been noted, is the culturally enshrined liberation imagery captured by the 
British and American Allies. The second is the Lili Jacob album, which was recovered from 
the Dora-Nordhausen concentration camp. 
    The Lili Jacob album, often referred to simply as ‘The Auschwitz Album’, represents the 
only existing visual resource depicting the sorting of arrivals on the Birkenau ramp. 
Containing 193 images, spread over 56 pages, the album exhaustively charts the arrival, 
selection and eventual processing of new arrivals from Subcarpathian Rus (Ukraine) in the 
May of 1944. The pictures were taken by the Erkennungsdienst, or Identification Service, 
within the camp itself. As such, they do represent the perspective of the perpetrator which, 
as the first section of this chapter discusses, has unavoidably influenced our cultural 
reproduction of the Shoah. Though the images have been in circulation since 1949, with 
seven of the pictures having been published in a text entitled The Tragedy of Slovak Jewry, 
it is reasonable to assert that they did not enter into our collective memory of the Shoah until 
the early 1980s. This, it should be noted, is despite their use as evidence in the Eichmann 
trial in 1961. Struk notes:  
Lili Zelmanovic kept the photo album until 1980, when she was finally persuaded to hand it 
over to Yad Vashem Martyr’s and Heroes’ Remembrance Authority in Israel… The 
photographs in the album were to become central to the visual representation of the Holocaust. 
Apart from their value as evidence, they would be imbued with an emotional intensity and 
reproduced in books, films and museums worldwide. (2004, p. 102) 
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While the vast majority of the new arrivals experiences remain undocumented we do have 
an exhaustive visual archive recounting the deportee’s first hectic moments within the 
Auschwitz camp. Pictures depict people being hurried from the train by the Kanada 
Kommando, the moments immediately following their sorting at the hands of the SS and, 
perhaps most significantly, their slow walk towards the gas chamber. These images, along 
with those photographs captured by the Western allies, have come to form the majority of 
our visual vocabulary for human suffering during the Shoah.  
    Auschwitz has become the “black hole into which all images of the Holocaust are drawn” 
(Struk, 2004, p. 189). Our fictional representations of it are therefore comprised of two 
elements: Auschwitz landmarks and representations of human suffering assembled from 
various sources, most of which do not correspond with the Auschwitz site. As such, the 
fictional representation of the Holocaust is now driven by a specific impulse – something 
akin to Gary Weissman’s “fantasies of witnessing” (2004, p. 4). The sites themselves, this 
chapter argues – though they may still prove emotionally potent spaces – cannot evoke the 
experiential reality of the past. In other words, they cannot provide nonwitnesses with the 
sense of emotional connectedness to the Holocaust which they have come to crave. Modern 
creatives are therefore keen to re-inject a sense of human horror into these commemorative 
sites, which now possess the “cold soul of a museum” (p. 2). In their desire to feel something 
of the Shoah, therefore, they position scenes of human suffering inside the modern camp 
setting – scenes borrowed, most commonly, from the Jacob album. This attempt to recreate 
documented scenes of historical suffering, and to place them back into the context of the 
ageing Auschwitz camp, clearly represents an attempt to reattach an increasingly absent 
sense of horror to a present-day landmark. Modern Holocaust fiction, in short, aims to make 
us all second-hand witnesses to the atrocity, as these crimes are brought to life for a second 
time.   
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This frustration regarding our emotional distance from the Shoah reaches its logical 
culmination in the representation of the gas chamber interior. Frustrated with their limited 
access to the Holocaust past, which has been constrained by our visual records, modern 
creators have resorted instead to imaginative projection and creation. This, once again, leads 
to a focus on the minutiae of human suffering and an overemphasis on the body. This 
increasingly results only in a voyeuristic impulse to explore the unrepresented areas of 
Auschwitz and to imaginatively recreate scenes of suffering – namely, death in the gas 
chamber.   
    Utilising Robert M. Young’s Triumph of the Spirit, Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List 
and Art Spiegelman’s Maus, the first section of this chapter addresses the representation of 
the arrival process in Auschwitz. It describes the use of specific landmarks in Holocaust 
fiction – namely the entranceways of Birkenau and Auschwitz I – before outlining the ways 
in which human suffering has been reattached to these spaces. It focuses on the use of the 
Lili Jacob album as a template to shape the representation of human suffering in Holocaust 
fiction.  
    The second section of this chapter then addresses the fictional representation of suffering 
and death inside the Auschwitz camp. It focuses specifically on two texts: Art Spiegelman’s 
Maus and Pascal Croci’s Auschwitz. Both of these texts, it suggests, have utilised borrowed 
imagery. While Spiegelman is conscious of the constructed nature of his vision of 
Auschwitz, however – as he is haunted by the inadequacy of his own presentation – Croci is 
rather more brazen in his approach. Despite his determination to represent the reality of death 
within the Auschwitz camp, however, Croci still fails to connect with the Shoah on an 
emotional level.  
146 
 
Finally, the last section of this chapter builds on the work of the previous two sections 
by featuring two authors who have clearly sought to reconnect with the Holocaust in a radical 
fashion: namely, by explicitly recreating death by gassing. While the other texts featured in 
this chapter have pivoted around this one core of unsayability, David Albahari’s Götz and 
Meyer and Tim Blake Nelson’s The Grey Zone aim to connect with the Holocaust past by 
imaginatively recreating this previously unrepresentable moment of suffering. It argues that 
several creators have confused the concepts of Holocaust Impiety and what I shall refer to 
simply as Holocaust gratuity. Though they claim to be attempting to connect with the 
perpetrators and victims of the Shoah on a fundamentally human level, I argue that their 
underlying aim is more voyeuristic in nature. They are not looking to rationalise the event, 
but rather to luxuriate in its horrors. 
    The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to highlight the increasing level of frustration which 
has come to dominate the fictional representation of the Holocaust. This, it argues, stems 
partly from our limited visual vocabulary for representing the horrors of the Shoah. As the 
greater part of the atrocity remains unseen, and therefore broadly unrepresentable, modern 
creators are instead resorting to their own imaginative recreations of the Shoah’s innermost 
horrors. Gratuity and an obsession with the suffering body have now become, I contend, 
common elements in Holocaust fiction, as the final chapter then goes on to address.     
 
Representing the Arrival Process 
As Chapter One argued, our current conception of the Auschwitz camp has been altered by 
commemorative culture. Both the Auschwitz site itself and the USHMM have portrayed the 
camp as a linear journey with a few key points of reference. As Cole noted, the Auschwitz 
tour conspicuously, and misleadingly, “starts at the gate proclaiming Arbeit macht frei, and 
ends at the reconstructed Crematorium” (1999, p. 110). It, in effect, has placed two points 
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on our visual roadmap of suffering in Auschwitz. The USHMM expands on this by also 
bringing in that other symbolic Auschwitz visual, the Birkenau entrance. This location, as 
Keilbach and Wächter have noted, is commonly photographed using the same aesthetic 
standard – an attempt to mimic the original image captured by Stanislav Mucha in 1945, in 
the months immediately following the liberation of the camp. They describe its particular 
qualities as follows:   
The impression of being devoured… is evoked by the picture independently of knowing the 
"right" direction of the gaze, as the central perspective of its construction pulls the beholder 
inside. At the same time, it transmits a feeling of desertedness, a feeling created by the vastness 
of the area, the snow, and the absence of people… The presentation of an empty place with no 
people… can also be read as a hint at the tracelessness of the victims and the horrors that befell 
them, implying the impossibility of a photographic depiction of them. (2009, p. 73)  
Our post-memorial conception of the Birkenau entrance, therefore, is very much defined by 
this post-war image. Though Mucha’s framing may hint at its capacity to devour, given that 
the mouth of the entrance is positioned at the centre of the frame, the image is characterised 
by the emptiness of the foreground. It is yet another evocation of the absent dead, with the 
absence of people – either living or dead – serving only to remind the viewer of those who 
have vanished into substanceless oblivion. What the image really communicates, therefore, 
is the concept of ineffability. The empty foreground communicates to the viewer that the 
suffering of European Jewry remains forever beyond our grasp, with only a handful of 
locations standing in for the atrocities of the past. It is therefore telling, this chapter argues, 
that post-memorial media has frequently sought to re-employ this image. The desire exists 
to revive the Holocaust dead simply in order to place them back into these environments. 
Struk, for instance, has frequently spoken of the image of the old woman, accompanied by 
two children, which has been erected on the path leading directly to the gas chamber. 
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“Whoever they were”, she tells us, “they have been condemned to tread the path for ever” 
(2004, p. 216). In order to properly contextualise the Auschwitz space, therefore, it is 
considered necessary to revive the Holocaust dead and to place them back on the path to the 
gas chamber. As Struk implies, there is something inherently problematic in this desire to 
revive the sufferer in order to satisfy those in the present. It is symptomatic of our emotional 
and temporal distance from the events themselves as, in order to reaffirm our connection 
with the Shoah, we must visually and imaginatively dig up the dead in order to place them 
back into the Auschwitz landscape. It is precisely this desire which underpins the vast 
majority of post-memorial Holocaust fiction. Modern fiction may claim to represent the 
Holocaust dead with impious depth, as the final section of this chapter discusses, but all that 
it presents in actuality is an endless procession of suffering bodies.  
    However, this attempt to revive the Holocaust dead – in either cinematic or literary terms 
– has generally been constrained by the limits of our visual imagination. In order to return a 
sense of historical horror to these present-day sites, modern creators have come to rely 
specifically on scenes of arrival and selection. By passing sequentially through the different 
stages of the arrival process, this section of the chapter will cover the ways in which modern 
media have sought to recontextualise these locations by placing images of suffering back 
into Auschwitz. 
    Both Triumph of the Spirit and Schindler’s List actively aimed to restore the presence of 
mass extermination and visible Jewish victimhood to the Auschwitz site. Both films chose 
to film on location and, with varying degrees of intrusiveness, both aimed to erect a 
simulated gas chamber/crematoria on the site itself.73 Ultimately, however, only Triumph of 
 
73 In The Texture of Memory James E. Young describes the “fake gas chamber and crematorium complex”, 
which stood for “months after filming” of Triumph of the Spirit was completed. This structure was erected 
“within meters of the ruins of the real gas chambers” (1993, p. 144). 
In Fantasies of Witnessing, meanwhile, Gary Weissman quotes from a time article which stated that “Mr. 
Spielberg planned to use hundreds of extras at Auschwitz and that he would be filming a fake gas chamber 
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the Spirit would erect a gas chamber within the grounds of Auschwitz. Spielberg, by contrast, 
was only allowed to film outside of the camp gates. In this regard, both films took a present-
day location defined principally by its symbolic significance and artistically wound back the 
clock in order to reintroduce the suffering victim into the Auschwitz landscape. Nowhere is 
this more evident than in both films’ use of the Birkenau gate as a forbidding transitional 



















Figure 9: A still from ‘Triumph of the Spirit’ depicting the train emerging.  
 
there” (2004, pp. 170-171). Ultimately, however, he chose instead to film the camp from the outside, 
filming the train as it emerged “into a mirror replica of Auschwitz’s interior” (Weissman, 2004, p. 171). 
While his desire to revive the Auschwitz space is evident, therefore, his access to the camp was more 
limited than Robert M. Young’s earlier production.    
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In Triumph of the Spirit, the camera’s rapid approach to the camp gate serves as a stark 
counterpoint to the representational restraint of the memorial image. In place of reverence, 
hesitance and a commitment to the ineffable we have the camera’s determined push towards 
the camp interior. The railway tunnel is not simply an abstractly evocative void, imagined 
to be like “the mouth of an ogre’s cave” (Matthiessen, 2014, p. 29), but it serves as a real 
transitional point into the space beyond. The camp interior is not unknowable or 
unrepresentable, but rather it is a space into which Young is determined to take the viewer. 
This becomes evident as we pass through to the other side, with Young depicting the train 
as it emerges from the train tunnel – as is illustrated in Figure 9. The belching smoke, which 
the camera lingers upon as it drifts ominously towards the guard tower, is then mirrored by 
the smoke from the crematoria. In this sense, through a form of visual shorthand, Young 
illustrates his commitment to returning destruction to Auschwitz. The Birkenau gate is no 
longer a static relic, but a revived symbol of extermination. The gaping mouth of the 
Birkenau gate has been made to swallow new victims, with their impending deaths having 
been heavily implied through the film’s inferential focus on billowing smoke. Extermination 
is not simply a historically and emotionally distant abstraction, barely traceable in the current 
Auschwitz site; instead, Young revives the dead and reconnects them to this specific camp 
landmark.          
Figure 10: A still 
from ‘Schindler’s 
List’, depicting the 






74 All stills from: Spielberg, S. (Director). (1993). Schindler’s List: Special Edition [Motion Picture] [DVD]. UK: 
Universal. (2004)   
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In a remarkably similar fashion to Young’s approach, Figure 10 depicts Spielberg’s attempt 
to combat the emotional remoteness of the post-war memorial image. This frame represents 
a stark counterpoint to those empty, evocative shots which characterised all post-Mucha 
attempts to photograph the site. In place of the desolate, snow-covered landscape of the camp 
interior – whose lack of visual evidence invokes the irrecoverable absence of the dead – we 
have a visually busy scene, crowded with people and striving to evoke the reality of arrival 
and unloading. In packing the frame in this fashion, Spielberg revivifies the camp space by 
re-introducing both the victim and the perpetrator to the location. In this regard, his evocation 
of Holocaust horror is rather more explicit than Young’s, as it takes place in the literal 
shadow of the Birkenau gate and involves both parties. This sequence, I contend, is 
emblematic of Spielberg’s frustration regarding the concept of a fundamentally 
unrepresentable Holocaust. If Mucha’s picture starkly implies the futility of all attempts at 
representation, and the unbridgeable distance between the memorial present and the reality 
of the past, then Spielberg counters this by filling Mucha’s empty frame with calamity, noise 
and recreated horror. In this regard, he shows both his commitment to reconnecting the 
Auschwitz site to its Holocaust past and his brazen dissatisfaction with a non-visual approach 
to Holocaust suffering. The Shoah can be depicted, he actively implies, and yet a certain 
limit has been placed on the mind of the creative. As with all of the texts featured in this 
chapter, Schindler’s List highlights the weakness of its own attempt at representation through 
its use of profoundly mediated visuals. In short, no matter the intent, the creative’s visual 
imagination is handicapped by a lack of available visual evidence. The cinematic Holocaust 
extends approximately as far as our collective memory will allow. This would explain, I 
contend, the frequency of disembarkation and selection scenes featured in visual media, as 
this serves as the one portion of the arrival process for which we have a detailed visual 
reference point. This part of the sufferer’s experiences can be partly visualised, as it has been 
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captured on film. Beyond this, arrival is merely characterised by a sequential tour through a 
series of iconic visual checkpoints.  
    The Birkenau entrance is not the only point in the Auschwitz landscape with significance, 
however. Modern fiction also tends to focus on the Arbeit-gate in Auschwitz I, which 
continues to possess a certain kind of cultural significance. As Andrea Liss notes, the sign 
has come to occupy a dubious place on our post-memory of the Shoah:  
this canonical inscription looms large in reconstructed memory. It has come to represent the 
threshold that separates the world of the living from the unspeakable beyond the gate. And yet 
the cliché trivialises the experience of the extermination camp through its misappropriation of 
signs. The steel gate bearing this famous inscription did not, in fact, have a central position in 
the history and architectural schema at Auschwitz. Very few Jews deported there ever saw that 
gate. (1998, pp. 72-73)      
Though the mythic memorial construction of Auschwitz, as Cole would have it, posits a 
straight line from the gates of Auschwitz I to the gas chamber, this simply is not reflective 
of the geographical complexity of the Auschwitz site. Anglo-American culture has, post-
memorially, over-emphasised its importance within the Auschwitz world. As Liss continues, 
new arrivals would not pass through it but rather they would be immediately taken by truck 
or marched to Birkenau. Later, a railway would transport new arrivals to the Birkenau 
subcamp directly, and so the Arbeit Macht Frei gate only has value for the nonwitness. It 
certainly was not a featured stop on the new arrival’s path to extermination, as the main 
Auschwitz camp was not principally exterminationist in its design. Even those entering into 
Auschwitz-I, it should be noted, did not pass through this entranceway following the work 
of the expansion programme of 1942. Instead, it may be thought of simply as our transitional 
point into the world of commemoration and an emblematic signpost for the Holocaust in its 
entirety. Through the narrativization of the Auschwitz museum itself, and the corresponding 
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Figure 11: A frame from ‘Maus I’, depicting arrival in Auschwitz (Spiegelman, 2003, p. 
159). 
 
Art Spiegelman’s decision to depict the Arbeit Macht Frei gate in the final moments of Maus 
I has particular relevance here, as it illustrates the role this iconic landmark has assumed in 
the post-memorial imagination. As Spiegelman implies during his interviews in MetaMaus, 
this image was always intended to possess a certain exaggerated prominence. It is the largest 
single image featured in Spiegelman’s graphic novel and so its symbolic significance cannot 
possibly be overstated. As Spiegelman’s illustrations are always drawn and then printed in 
exactly the same size, it is clear that he intended for this image to draw in the reader’s 
attention and, having done so, encapsulate the coming horrors of Auschwitz.75  
 
75 In At Memory’s Edge Young notes that Spiegelman drew Maus using a “one-to-one ratio”, ensuring that 
his original version would perfectly parallel the “finished version” (2000, p. 19). 
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    Coming as it does at the very end of Maus I, it serves as the only direct visual evocation 
of the Auschwitz camp in the entirety of Volume I. As such, Spiegelman is relying on its 
broader symbolic resonance in order to communicate the horror of the coming events. At 
this point in the narrative, Auschwitz stands as an unexplored space. Spiegelman has not 
articulated the distinctions between Auschwitz-I, Auschwitz-II and the Buna-Werke, and so 
the reader is simply being presented with the image of the camp as a mythical abstraction. 
Much like the narrativized exhibition on the third floor of the USHMM, and the Auschwitz 
tour itself, Spiegelman is using the Arbeit-sign as a simplified symbolic marker. It is the first 
step in a journey which culminates in death in the gas chamber. This much is implied by 
Spiegelman’s accompanying text: “And we came here to the concentration camp Auschwitz, 
and that from here we will not come out anymore… We knew the stories – that they will gas 
us in the ovens” (2003, p. 159). As such, Spiegelman has deliberately presented the reader 
with a compressed image of the Auschwitz camp. For the moment, it exists principally as a 
mythical blur. While there are two certain points in the camp’s landscape, the iconic gate 
and the crematoria, everything else presently exists for Spiegelman as an unrepresentable 
void. Rather than simply trying to revive a present-day landmark through a renewed 
proximity to suffering, the image hints at Spiegelman’s lack of knowledge concerning the 
inner reality of Auschwitz and his trepidation regarding the possibility of future 
representation. 
    This trepidation is stated explicitly in a sequence in Maus II, in which Artie visits his 
therapist Pavel – a “Czech Jew, a survivor of Therezin and Auschwitz” (p. 203). The theme 
of survival dominates their interaction from the outset, as Artie explores – in a fashion which 
also invokes the writings of Karpf – the inadequacy of his own life when placed in 
comparison with his father’s: “No matter what I accomplish, it doesn’t seem like much 
compared to surviving Auschwitz” (p. 204). The very use of the word “Auschwitz” hints at 
155 
 
Artie’s mythic conception of the camp. He cannot fathom the reality of his father’s suffering, 
but he does conceptualise it as something momentous – something entirely removed from 
the approachable norms of life in “Rego Park” (p. 204). This is emphasised by the fact that, 
throughout this sequence, Artie is presented as having shrunk in size. Before visiting his 
therapist, Artie shrinks down to the size of child having noted both that he sometimes does 
not “feel like a functioning adult” and that, relatedly, his “father’s ghost still hangs over 
[him]” (p. 203). Artie, I contend, is infantilised by the mythic vision of his father’s survival 
in Auschwitz. His own life’s achievements – given that they represent the normal, 
fathomable world – cannot possibly measure up to surviving Auschwitz. He cannot view 
himself as a man, as a functioning adult, as he exists in a world peopled with survivors. He 
cannot regain his own proportions in Pavel’s office as he too represents a survivor – someone 
else who survived the mythic world of Auschwitz. The crux of Artie’s insecurity is then 
revealed towards the end of the therapy session as he confesses: “Some part of me doesn’t 
want to think about Auschwitz. I can’t visualise it clearly, and I can’t BEGIN to imagine 
what it felt like” (p. 206). Artie’s insecurity, therefore, stems from his lack of knowledge 
concerning the inner reality of Auschwitz. He does not wish to represent it in fiction, as he 
knows that his representation of the camp will lack authenticity. Artie expresses a specific 
anxiety that he cannot represent the finer details of the Auschwitz tin shop: “I have no idea 
what kind of tools to draw. There’s no documentation” (p. 206). This attention to minute 
detail, and the apparent level of insecurity that it has invoked, illustrates Artie’s anxieties 
concerning representation. He, as a nonwitness, cannot ever fully grasp the finer details of 
life within the camp. As such, he must rely on documentation. This post-memorial distance, 
however, proves inadequate to the task of representing the genocide and therefore 
compounds his insecurities. Pavel then helps him by identifying the specific tools Vladek 
may have used – “a cutter – like a giant paper cutter – and maybe an electric drill press or 
156 
 
two” (p. 206). It is only after receiving this extra level of detail that Artie’s mood improves: 
“I don’t understand exactly why… but these sessions with Pavel somehow make me feel 
better” (p. 206). Artie is pacified, in this instance, as Pavel has helped him to connect with 
the historical reality of the Holocaust. He has injected an element of authenticity into Artie’s 
presentation and, in so doing, partly demystified the Shoah. While a solution is found in this 
case, however, it still stands as proof of Artie’s underlying concern: that his text cannot 
possibly hope to capture the experiential reality of his father’s past.     
    While Spiegelman’s use of the Arbeit-gate may be pointed, therefore, he has still 
internalised the image of it as a form of visual shorthand. It is still, unavoidably, a landmark 
in our mythic conception of the Auschwitz camp. The other vital part of our common 
memory of Auschwitz, thanks to an increasing cultural awareness of the Lili Jacob album, 
is the process of unloading itself. This represents the next element in the imagined journey 












Figure 12: Jews from Subcarpathian Rus (Ukraine) undergo a selection on the ramp at 
Auschwitz-Birkenau. Photograph Number: 77241 (USHMM). Originally from The Lili 




Figure 13: A still from ‘Triumph of the Spirit’, illustrating the Arouch family’s arrival in 
Auschwitz-Birkenau. 
 
Returning to Triumph of the Spirit, one can detect a comparatively early visual indication of 
the Lili Jacob album’s cultural influence in Young’s attempt to replicate the reality of arrival 
in Birkenau. Following their passage through the Birkenau gate, the Auroch family are 
immediately unloaded from their cattle car. The frame is filled with the crush of bodies and 
the entire sequence possesses a remarkable sense of historical fidelity, which would seem to 
be traceable back to those images from the Jacob album. 
    There is a marked similarity between Figures 12 and 13. Beyond the density of the crowd, 
the presence of the Kanada Kommando in their prison stripers and the emergence of two 
gendered lines, we also have the alignment of the cattle car at the extreme edge of the frame. 
Young’s shot has attempted to mirror the angled composition of the perpetrator’s image. 
Both have been composed in order to capture the scale of the crowd. The original images, it 
must be noted, were captured by SS-Hauptscharführer Bernhardt Walter and SS-
Unterscharführer Ernst Hofmann of the Erkennungsdienst, or Identification Service. 
Though their common duties tended to involve the photographing of non-Jewish prisoners 
– and, as Struk notes, certain experiments and medical curiosities for Johann Paul Kramer 
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and Josef Mengele – this album was intended as a gift for the camp commandant. As such, 
rather than humanising the victims, they are objectified by the perpetrator’s gaze. Its 
recreation in cinema, then, represents an ethical misstep. Young’s enthusiasm for 
authenticity has blinded him to the more problematic elements of the image. He has assumed 
the position of the Erkennungsdienst photographer, sitting safely on the periphery of the 
unfolding chaos of selection. He has become, in effect, a post-memorial Holocaust voyeur. 
Not only has he resurrected the dead using the Jacob images as a template, and fastidiously 
recreated them down to the last detail, but he has assumed the perspective of the emotionally 
vacant perpetrator.  
    The issue lies not with the content of the frame, which clearly reflects the reality of the 
events, but with the origin of the image. In her essay ‘Choosing Not to Look’, Susan A. 
Crane considers the issue of authorial intent, and places particular emphasis on the nature of 
the Nazis’ gaze. She characterises the Nazi viewpoint as follows:  
Bernd Huppauf argues that the Nazi gaze was never only sadistic (or at least not only sadistic). 
Huppauf instead suggests that the Nazi gaze was "empty": that the Nazified photographer's 
"de-corporealizing gaze" characterizes all of their atrocity images alike, and represents an 
attempted documentary neutrality or objectivity that "give[s] rise to the hope of creating a 
memory removed from historical time." The Nazi gaze rendered victims into objects, bodies 
into things framed by the camera. (2008, p. 318) 
Crane’s contention is that the Nazi gaze was not overtly sadistic, but rather empty of all 
sentiment. The photographed Jewish subject is not a person, someone whose terror has 
emotional resonance, but rather they serve simply as intellectual curios. They are 
photographed with pure emotional abstraction. The Jacob album, in keeping with this theory, 
encapsulates this imagined sense of documentary neutrality. The people in these images are 
merely objects in front of a camera, to be herded from one location to another before being 
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transformed into a literal object – a body, depersonalised and de-particularised amidst a mass 
of other bodies.  
    The use of these images by latter-day filmmakers and creators, thus, further problematises 
our emotional connection to the Holocaust. Our emotional distance from the events has led 
to an apparent desire to fictionally recreate these scenes of suffering. However, the pictures 
being utilised as our visual baseline come – in the instance of the Jacob album – from 
explicitly Nazi sources. As such, in our haste to simulate a fantasy of witnessing on film, we 
have begun to replicate images intended to objectify the victims of the Holocaust. We are 
reviving the Holocaust dead, but only as they were envisioned by the Nazi gaze. As Jaimey 
Fisher implies, one must go to extraordinary lengths in order to avoid the unintentional 
reproduction of the de-humanising Nazi perspective. Péter Forgác, he suggests, is only able 
to reimbue the body of a naked Jewish woman with humanity and “substantive agency” 
(2012, p. 256) by utilizing footage filmed by her soon-to-be husband. The perpetrator 
perspective, he suggests, will always contain a contaminating element of Nazi influence. 
Only the “private gaze of the Jewish filmmaker”, he suggests, can resist the Nazi intent to 
“utterly de- (or rather sub-) humanise” (p. 256) the Jewish people.  
    By reproducing images contaminated by the Nazi gaze, therefore, we are merely 
perpetuating the image of the Jewish dead as bodies without humanity. We are, in effect, 
actively setting aside their personhood and placing the emphasis specifically on what they 
will endure physically. As such, each new film or text which perpetuates these images will 
further add to our disregard for the Holocaust dead as people and simply intensify our interest 
in their bodies as an experiential tool – a thing we may engage with, or even potentially step 
into, in order to understand something about the horrors of the Holocaust.  
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    While Young’s use of the Lili Jacob album serves to remind the viewer of the objectifying 
quality of these images, Spielberg’s use of the Jacob images speaks more to the idea of 
representational restraint. For Spielberg, I contend, the Holocaust dead are still unreachable 
and unknowable. His use of these images indicates his unwillingness to cross certain 
representational boundaries. He will not, in short, violate the sanctity of the gas chamber 
sincerely or represent the deaths of the exterminated in detail. 
 Figure 14: A still from ‘Schindler’s List’, representing the extermination of those Jewish 
people not saved as part of the Schindlerjuden.  
  
As Rose notes, the use of water and not gas in Spielberg’s contrived “extermination” 
sequence induces “a regressive identification… with the few women who are saved” (1996, 
p. 47). In other words, the film is only able to empathise with the plight of the living. While 
the camera willingly follows the Schindlerjuden into a false gas chamber, the actual 
Holocaust dead are depicted only at a literal distance. By placing them on the other side of 
the fence, Spielberg is actively implying that the Shoah dead – though they may be invoked 
visually – cannot be approached by the post-memorial filmmaker. They are simply too 
remote from the present. Rather than seeming like approachably human individuals, they 
have been transformed into embodying victims of the atrocity. They have become 
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representative stand-ins for the many who must go unrepresented and this, correspondingly, 
has stripped them of their humanity and particularity. We cannot, in short, ever hope to 
redress the anonymising power of death in the crematoria. The Holocaust dead will never be 
reconceptualised as individuals with agency, but rather will be forever used as tragic props.  
    As Figure 14 illustrates, Spielberg’s depiction of those bound for the gas chamber closely 
mirrors a specific selection of images found in the Jacob album – those showing the march 
towards the gas chamber. The images themselves, it must be noted, are relatively non-
descript. Each features a small band of people, usually comprised of women and children, 
walking in front of the iconic Auschwitz fencing. They are not hurrying, indeed the images 







May 1944, Women 
and children on 
their way to gas 
chamber no. 4. Yad 
Vashem Photo 
Archives. Item ID: 
35059. Archival 
Signature: 4522.  
 (https://photos.yadvashem.org/photo-details.html?language=en&item_id=35059&ind=2) 
While these images may seem comparatively neutral, given that they do not depict the 
eventual fate of the new arrivals, they do still possess the dehumanising power of the other 
images in the Lili Jacob album. The Jewish dead are, once again, portrayed as suffering 
bodies. Spielberg’s presentation differs from Young’s only in our visual distance from the 
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Holocaust dead. While Spielberg does not shy away from inhabitable moments of human 
suffering, as his gas chamber sequence illustrates, he wishes to draw a discreet veil over the 
Holocaust dead. They, he seems to assert, must remain unapproachable. However, this may 
not be a position that he adopts wholeheartedly. While he does come down on the side of 
representational restraint ultimately, his film has flirted with the representation of death in 
the gas chamber.           
    Joshua Hirsch, for instance, describes Spielberg’s approach as falling somewhere in the 
ethical middle ground of visual representation:  
The sequence thus concludes with a nod to the modernists, showing only the entrance and exit 
to the “true” gas chamber, but not the inside… it resolves the dilemma of a point of view inside 
the gas chamber by not committing itself to a realist “yes” or a modernist “no,” but by playing 
a yes/no game – by quoting both strategies. (2004, p. 149)  
Hirsch’s insinuation, therefore, is that Spielberg’s visual approach to the atrocity is 
deliberately non-committal. He has effectively attempted to venture into the Holocaust’s 
darkest recesses, as the committed realist would, and yet he also concedes that certain aspects 
of the Shoah cannot and should not be represented, in the fashion of the modernist Resnais. 
If Night and Fog (1956), as Hirsch suggests, is designed to illustrate the failure of images 
“to capture the reality of the past” (p. 52) and the inadequacy of archival footage as a means 
to capture the nature of the Holocaust, then Spielberg’s film partly seems to endorse this 
modernist sentiment. Our available visual records, he seems to suggest, represent a partial 
and unsatisfying vision of the atrocity. And yet, as is evident from his representation of the 
shower sequence, his film seems to be straining against these representational limits. He 
clearly considers a moment of impropriety and yet ultimately concedes that the Holocaust 
dead should not be touched. By flirting with the representation of the gas chamber, however 
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– and therefore straying into the realm of imaginative reproduction – Spielberg has opened 
a dangerous door. By passively hinting at his frustrations regarding the limits of 
representation, and the supposed unreachability of the Holocaust dead, Spielberg has 
inadvertently encouraged others to follow in his footsteps.     
    Tim Blake Nelson’s The Grey Zone, therefore, can be seen as a deliberate response to 
Spielberg’s film. While Spielberg may have hinted at his frustration, having begun to 
simulate a moment of gassing before ultimately backing away, Nelson’s film aims to fully 
engage with the horrors of the Holocaust. He makes his position clear, first and foremost, by 











Figures 16 & 17: Two 
stills taken from Tim 
Blake Nelson’s ‘The 
Grey Zone’.76 
 
76 All stills from: Nelson, T.B. (Director). (2001). The Grey Zone [Motion Picture] [DVD]. Holland: Bridge 
Entertainment Group. (2003)   
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Figure 16 almost faultlessly replicates the contents of the Jacob album. The distance of the 
figures from the camera is almost identical, and the additional contextual information – 
again, the subjects’ proximity to the wire and the relative period dress – is perfectly mirrored. 
It is worth noting that the events of the film take place during precisely the same period in 
which the pictures were taken, with both depicting the arrival of the Hungarian transports in 
the summer of 1944. Given Nelson’s mania for authenticity and replication, therefore – as 
Matthew Boswell has noted, the film takes place in an “80 percent scale replica” (2012, p. 
164) of Crematoria II, complete with the authentic sprinkler heads and period-appropriate 
brickwork – it is beyond question that Nelson used these images as a reference point. On the 
surface level, then, we may say that Nelson has intentionally mimicked Spielberg’s 
modernist approach to the subject matter. By showing the crowds, and pointedly juxtaposing 
them with the image of the smoking chimney, Nelson has employed the characteristically 
indirect approach to their extermination. However, Nelson does not stop here. Whereas 
Spielberg uses this imagery to reiterate his commitment to non-representation, Nelson’s film 
appears to be an explicit response to Spielberg’s restraint. Boswell similarly assumes that: 
“Schindler’s List is the cinematic reference point that The Grey Zone specifically defines 
itself against” (p. 164). For Spielberg, these images are ultimately used as markers for the 
impossibility of representation. For Nelson, they are empty tokens of the distant Holocaust. 
He uses them to highlight their inability to convey the horror of the event. This becomes 
apparent in Figure 17, as the camera has pulled away from the characters in order to 
incorporate a view of the chimney. They are now remote, distant and faceless. They are 
specks on the horizon, linked only to the concept of mass extermination. Memorial imagery, 
Nelson asserts, cannot humanise the dead. It can only invoke the image of an unsatisfyingly 
remote atrocity. Instead, he infers, we must approach it directly.  
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    Nelson’s approach to this material, I contend, is emblematic of the modern filmmaker’s 
growing frustration with the temporally and emotionally distant Holocaust. The available 
images have done little to counter the ineffability and untouchability of the Shoah. This, 
then, has led to a growing frustration on the part of modern creators. Beginning with 
Spielberg and then continuing with Nelson, creators have begun to express a deep 
dissatisfaction with the notion of a temporally and emotionally remote Holocaust. Both wish 
to approach the more unrepresentable elements of Holocaust suffering and, specifically, to 
imaginatively recreate death in the gas chamber.77 Unable to conceive of the Holocaust dead 
as real people, given the objectifying quality of the Lili Jacob album, they instead sought to 
depict them as suffering bodies. These visual records, then, have merely served to compound 
the emotional distance from the Holocaust dead which was outlined in the previous chapter.   
    The focus, thus far, has been on the initial stages of the deportee’s arrival, for which a 
certain level of visual representation exists. The following section, by contrast, explores the 
fictional recreation of life and death within the Auschwitz camp itself – for which we have 
no visual guide, at least in terms of photographic representations.78 It explores the images 
which have came to stand in for the reality of Auschwitz, and relatedly, the frustration which 
this post-memorial distance from the event has provoked. It has created, I contend, the desire 




77 Nelson’s desire to recreate death in the gas chamber interior will be addressed in greater detail in the 
final section of this chapter. This section is intended to simply outline the origins of his frustration and his 
desire to carry Spielberg’s attempt at representation to its ultimate conclusion.  
78 It should be noted that a sketchbook depicting life in Auschwitz does exist. Representing “the only set of 
drawings made in the camp depicting the extermination of Jews deported by German Nazis to Auschwitz” 
(Auschwitz-Birkenau, 2012), it provides an unparalleled glimpse into the inner reality of Auschwitz. 
However, as the text was only published in its entirety in 2012, the collection’s cultural influence is 
currently minimal.  
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Representing Life and Death in Auschwitz 
In contrast to the camps liberated by the Western allies, the liberation of Auschwitz and 
Majdanek went comparatively unrecorded. This was due, in large part, to the Eastern troops’ 
relative lack of resources when compared to the British and American media machine. As a 
prototypical example of the Soviet approach to documenting atrocity, Struk provides the 
example of Adolf Forbert – one of the first Polish soldiers to arrive at the Auschwitz site. 
Armed with “only 300 metres of film, a camera ‘of the Bells and Howell type’… and one 
Leica” (2004, 146) he spent two days attempting to document the extent of the atrocity. 
Given the nature of the event and his profound paucity of resources, this would prove a 
logistical impossibility. At the very most, he may have hoped to capture a handful of 
embodying images – in this case, a series of photographs of corpse piles and shots of 
prisoners incongruously posing with cans of Zyklon-B. While his pictures and footage were 
later “filed away” (p. 147) by the Soviet state, Forbert’s attempt to capture the reality of 
Auschwitz perfectly justifies the lack of corresponding post-liberation imagery stemming 
from the Auschwitz site. While British and American liberators were able to saturate the 
media with images – as Struk notes, the American media machine had a system in place to 
disseminate pictures to the British and American press within a period of 24-hours – the 
Soviets not only lacked the resources to disseminate images, but they also lacked images to 
disseminate. A lack of photographers and a corresponding strain on their resources meant 
that the liberation of Auschwitz went broadly unrecorded.  
    As Struk infers, the vast majority of available images of the Auschwitz camp stem from 
the same film. Titled Chronicle of the Liberation of Auschwitz, it has been attributed to 
four Soviet Army filmmakers. Given that the footage was captured in 1945, it is 
representative only of the final stages of the crime. Like the photographs taken by the 
Western allies, it captured residual traces of the atrocity – “mass graves, the sick in the 
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hospital, the camp grounds, the piles of hair, suitcases, shoes” (p. 147). While some of 
these images have come to define our post-memorial representation of the event – with a 
specific emphasis on the piles of hair, suitcases and shoes – it is still the images captured 
at Bergen-Belsen and Buchenwald which are commonly used as reference points for 
human suffering.79 
    As Zelizer stresses, the media’s careless use of post-liberation Holocaust imagery has 
forever complicated our visual relationship with the Holocaust. Photographs 
documenting atrocities in one camp are frequently used to illustrate articles discussing 
another, which set a problematic precedent for the future. As Zelizer puts it: “Often, the 
public was told little or nothing about the place being depicted, leaving the photo to 
function instead as a generalised spot of Nazi horror” (1998, p. 93). The Holocaust, 
therefore did not emerge as a visually distinct atrocity. It emerged instead as a vague blur 
of similar images, often featuring non-descript piles of bodies, which could be used to 
illustrate any camp being discussed in a given article. This has essentially laid the 
conceptual groundwork for the future absorption of all imagery by the Auschwitz camp 
as, from the outset, the Holocaust has stood as an atrocity without specificity or proper 
attribution. If the bodies of Belsen and Buchenwald serve as only “generalised spots of 
Nazi horror”, forever removed from their original sources in order to serve as typifying 
images of Nazi evil, then they will inevitably be pulled into the black hole of Birkenau.  
 
79 It must be noted that Lee Miller’s Dachau photographs also occupy a crucial place in the American 
conception of the Holocaust. Miller’s photographs focus explicitly on a train which arrived from Buchenwald 
on the 28th of April, 1945, containing “almost 3000 corpses” (Sliwinski, 2010, p. 402). As Sharon Sliwinski 
notes, her camera depicts both “the terrible tangle of corpses inside the train, as well as the solitary, fragile 
bodies that lay on the tracks below” (p. 395). While they do speak to the horror of the atrocity, therefore, 
they do not align with the common images which are frequently replicated in Holocaust fiction. As Chapter 
Two established, the train is conceptualised as a mode to transport to the camps rather than a site of 
Holocaust death. Similarly, Miller’s focus on individual bodies – she captured images of “three different 
corpses next to the train, each agonizing in its solitude” (p. 401) – does not correspond with the images of 
mass death frequently reproduced in Holocaust media. The dead, as this chapter illustrates, are rarely 
pictured in isolation. As such, the impact of Miller’s work is not explored in this analysis.   
168 
 
    Given the lack of available imagery relating to life in Auschwitz, therefore, it is 
inevitable that the gaps in our knowledge are filled in with a selection of these post-
memorial standards. However, as Zelizer implies, our collective cultural memory of the 
Western camps is also severely limited in nature. Though many images exist, they all 
happen to conform to particular types. This section focuses on two of these specifically – 
shots of survivors standing in close proximity to barbed wire and the ever-ubiquitous 
corpse pile. It begins with reference to Art Spiegelman’s Maus, before moving on to 
Pascal Croci’s Auschwitz. It focuses on the ways in which both texts have created a vision 
of Auschwitz which is entirely post-memorial in nature. While Spiegelman knowingly 
incorporates this into his text, understanding the insufficiency of his representation, Croci 
struggles with the notion of an unrepresentable atrocity. His failure to connect with the 
Shoah on an emotional level, I argue, has resulted in a problematic focus on the suffering 
female body. 
    Spiegelman has incorporated images of survivors either behind or in close proximity to 
barbed wire into both of his iterations of Maus. When asked by Hillary Chute in MetaMaus 
if any of his illustrations had been based on particular instances of atrocity photography, he 
recalls “that ubiquitous photo by Margaret Bourke-White of prisoners at the liberation of 
Buchenwald” (Spiegelman, 2011, p. 54). The original three-page version of Maus – 
published in Funny Animals in 1972 – stands as a proof-of-concept, a tentative stab at 
creating a narrative which manages to encompass (and also compress) the events of the 
Holocaust into a digestible form. It covers a number of the same story beats – the discovery 
of the attic, arrest, incarceration and Vladek’s semi-cathartic burial of the man who betrayed 
their hiding place – as well as providing a template for Spiegelman’s later stylistic approach 
to the subject.  
169 
 
    With their angular faces and vacant, unfocused eyes the mice in Spiegelman’s illustration 
capture the essence of the original image. Intended to act as a mirror to Bourke-White’s 
original, we can see the degree of specificity with which certain elements have been 
captured. Focusing specifically on the two men to the far right of Bourke-White’s original – 
a taller man with what might be construed as a paunch and a shorter, more harried individual 
partially obscured by a man with cane – we can see that Spiegelman has provided exact 
equivalents for them in mouse form. While this demonstrates a precise attention to detail, 
the rest of the image is rather more impressionistic in its approach. Rather than replicating 
this image of Buchenwald with unquestioned fidelity, the image incorporates elements from 
other pictures. While Bourke-White’s image represents the spine, 





















Figure 18: The “splash panel” from Spiegelman’s 1972 prototype version of ‘Maus’. 
Originally printed in ‘Funny Animals’ by Apex Novelties, San Francisco. The comic was 














Figure 19: Margaret Bourke-White's original image, taken in Buchenwald in the April of 
1945. 
 
the foundation upon which other elements are placed, smaller details have been incorporated 
from other associated images. The open-shirted mouse third from the left, for instance, has 
more in keeping with the survivors of Ebensee than with those liberated in Buchenwald. 
Visually, the comparatively dapper survivors of a camp that was, in effect, self-liberated 
may not be able to encompass the extent of the horrors alone. In order to emphasise their 
degradation, therefore, Spiegelman has dressed some in rags – handpicking elements from 
other images to create a perfectly emblematic summary of the prisoners’ suffering. This is 
entirely in keeping with the practices of our memorial culture which prioritises symbolism 
over accuracy, as false attribution and generalisation have always been commemorative 
staples when it comes to the representation of the Holocaust. As Zelizer noted: “Images also 
generalized the witnessing that had been recounted with precision in the verbal narratives of 
reporters” (1998, p. 100). Rather than verifying the context of specific written reports, then, 
the published photography of the post-war years served to effectively erode any sense of 
specificity that the article may have created. This early unwillingness to particularise, to 
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specify the origins of each image and therefore establish the various camps as discrete 
entities, has led precisely to the situation in which we now find ourselves – with Auschwitz 
as both the commemorative and conceptual heart of the atrocity. It is the black hole which 
swallows all other commemorative images. As they were not specifically attached to other 
camps initially, these images easily slide into our poorly constructed vision of life in 
Auschwitz. Early commemorative culture, after all, established the notion that the horrors of 
the Holocaust are broadly interchangeable. Any picture, therefore, can be used to represent 
the atrocity. And, as Auschwitz has come to represent the whole of the atrocity, any image 
can be used to represent life and death in Auschwitz.  
    Though this image is not fully replicated in the finished version of Maus, Spiegelman does 
include a frame which contains some of the same core elements. Prior to the start of Chapter 
I in Maus II, Spiegelman uses Figure 20 as an introductory image: 
Figure 20: An 
illustration from Art 
Spiegelman’s 
‘Maus’, depicting a 
solitary Vladek 










As Vladek is again looking “full into the camera” and he is positioned “behind barbed wire” 
(Zelizer, 1998, p. 160), it is clear that this image contains several of the reference points 
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common to the post-liberation survivor images. Given that his knowledge of Bourke-White’s 
picture has been well-established, this image demonstrates the impact of her framing on 
Spiegelman’s post-memorial mind. As it features prior to the start of Chapter One of Maus 
II, this is the first picture to represent the reality of life within the camps. Before this, the 
reader was left with a picture of the Arbeit-gate. As such, this image is designed to trigger a 
natural association in the reader’s mind. The audience is supposed to recall Bourke-White’s 
picture and its former use as a totem to represent the general suffering of the Holocaust. It is 
then, in short, designed as another form of visual shorthand, aiming to hint at the 
impossibility of representing suffering in Auschwitz. Spiegelman has no experiential 
understanding of his father’s experiences. His visual recreation of life in Auschwitz is 
amassed from a handful of post-memorial sources. This image of Vladek on the other side 
of the barbed wire exemplifies the entirely constructed nature of Spiegelman’s 
representation. It is, like his image from the first Maus, a corruption of an original source – 
a picture from another camp which has come to represent life in Auschwitz. It is thus another 
example of post-memorial “imaginative investment, projection and creation… at a 
generational remove” (Brouwer & Horwitz, 2015, p. 545). By showing only one individual 
and not several men, Spiegelman is highlighting the constructed nature of this image. All 
representations of the Auschwitz space, this picture implies, will be assembled from assorted 
post-memorial sources. Visual media, Spiegelman tells us, cannot replicate the Holocaust 
past. It remains unknowably distant. 
    The entirely post-memorial nature of Maus becomes clearer when Spiegelman later 
incorporates that other common atrocity image: the corpse pile. Figure 21 illustrates 
Spiegelman’s use of the tangles of bodies common to representations of the Bergen-Belsen 
camp. It could not be said to resemble the bodies neatly “stacked atop a wagon” (Zelizer, 
1998, p .112) in Buchenwald or those “laid out” side by side like “apparel” left to “dry in 
173 
 
the sun” (p. 99) like the dead in the courtyard at Nordhausen. Instead, Spiegelman represents 
a tangle of corpses “thrown together so indiscriminately that it was difficult, if not 





Figure 21: A 
frame from 
‘Maus’ showing 
Art sitting on top 
of a pile of 
corpses. 
(Spiegelman, 




Whereas the dead in Buchenwald and Nordhausen are at least partly identifiable, as they are 
shown as separate and distinct bodies, Spiegelman has gone for the Belsen-esque tangle of 
corpses as it is entirely anonymising. It represents Holocaust death as a pure abstraction, 
without identifiable victims. Whereas a picture of a person conveys a sense of “individual 
agony” (Zelizer, 1998, p. 111), this representation of the dead as a confusing mass of limbs 
captures “the far reaching nature of the atrocity” (p. 111). As such, Spiegelman has chosen 
this picture as his embodying image to represent the Holocaust dead in their entirety. He sits 
atop them as they represent the murdered who continue to haunt his text, hinting at its 
insufficiency. It cannot hope to revive them as individuals or represent their suffering 
authentically. He can, as the image itself implies, only represent their suffering through a 
handful of chosen images. Images which, as they do not represent the reality of death in 
Auschwitz – given the comparative lack of bodies in the Auschwitz camp – also represent a 
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misleading portrayal of the atrocity. Spiegelman is, in effect, being haunted by the problems 
underpinning the representation of the Holocaust.  
    This becomes evident two pages later, as the corpse pile continues to haunt the frame. As 
Artie walks to meet his therapist, tangles of dead Jewish mice litter the streets. Pavel’s 
survivor status, like Uncle Haskell’s impact in Elijah Visible, is highlighting the 
inauthenticity of Artie’s post-memory.80 As a survivor of Auschwitz, Pavel understands the 
experiential reality of the camp. Artie, however, has no functional understanding of the 
reality of Auschwitz. He must concede that post-memorial representations are cobbled 
together from broadly unrepresentative sources. Both his therapist and his father possess 
deep memories of the Shoah – memories his fiction cannot hope to access. The persistence 
of this image of the corpse pile, therefore, represents Artie’s continuing unease regarding his 
attempt to represent Auschwitz. Given our explicit reliance on these post-memorial images 
from the Western camps, all nonwitness creators must concede to the ineffability of the 
Shoah. All fictional representations of Auschwitz, Spiegelman implies, are complicated by 
their problematic representation of the Holocaust. The camps cannot be portrayed with a 
tolerable level of authenticity, as our fictional reconstructions of the Auschwitz space are 
always post-memorial distortions based on a limited set of common images.    
    Pascal Croci’s Auschwitz further concedes to this impossibility through its use of two 
specific representations of mass death. 
 
80 Uncle Haskell’s role in Rosenbaum’s story is addressed in Chapter II of the dissertation.  
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Figure 22: A page from Pascal Croci’s ‘Auschwitz’ representing the overflow of bodies in 
the summer of 1944. The second panel clearly illustrates the burning of the bodies in 
makeshift pits, an image which is borrowed directly from an actual photograph taken by the 
Sonderkommando (Croci, 2009, p. 45).81  
 
81 While the pictures included from this text have been sourced from the 2009 Spanish edition of Croci’s 
Auschwitz, all featured quotations are extracted from the 2004 English language version. In terms of their 
presentation, these two versions of the text are identical.    
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Figure 23: One of four covert pictures 
taken by the Sonderkommando in the 
“autumn of 1944” (Struk, 2004, p. 113). It 
represents the burning of the dead in 
outdoor pits, as the four crematoria in 
Birkenau could not handle the abundance 
of new arrivals. Yad Vashem Photo 
Archives. Item ID: 103371. Archival 












In Figure 22 two types of atrocity images are evident. The standard anonymising corpse pile 
dominates two of the frames, as Croci has fallen back on the same standardised imagery as 
Spiegelman. Once again, this is emblematic of the general issues one is faced with when 
representing a broadly unrepresented atrocity. These tangles of bodies, in a perfect 
replication of their history in Britain and America’s mass media, are used to represent the 
atrocity in its entirety. As the “referential data surrounding the photo’s time and place” has 
always been regarded as something of an irrelevance, any image of bodies may be used as a 
representative stand-in to show the “scope of the atrocity” (Zelizer, 1998, p. 99) while also 
emphasising the dehumanising nature of the killing process. From the initial face in the 
topmost frame, Croci transitions into the Belsen-inspired tangle of bodies. By doing this he 
reiterates the transformation of the Holocaust dead from people with discrete identities into 
anonymous corpses, lost in amongst the now nameless others. 
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    This generalised representation of death is starkly contrasted, however, by the atrocity 
image represented in the second frame. Comparing Figures 22 and 23, it becomes 
immediately apparent that Croci has copied the picture taken by the Sonderkommando with 
a deliberate attention to detail. This is evident not simply in the positioning of the figures 
standing over the bodies – as in both a male figure stands at a curious angle, as if he has lost 
his balance among the bodies – but also in the relative framing of the image. As Franziska 
Reiniger notes two of the images captured by the Sonderkommando are bordered “by a black 
frame” (2013, n.p.). This frame, according to Alter Fajnzylberg – a member of the 
Sonderkommando present at the taking of the picture – is the doorframe of the “Western 
entrance leading from the outside to the gas-chamber of Crematorium V” (Struk, 2004, p. 
114). While Figure 23 does not feature the frame, as many incarnations of this picture have 
been cropped “to highlight the “important” details” (Reiniger, 2013, n.p.), Croci has chosen 
to represent this element. As such, he is drawing the reader’s attention back to the originating 
image. This border attaches the image to a specific time and place and, at the same time, 
reminds the viewer of its origins. The border, after all, hints at the covert nature of the 
photograph, while also reaffirming the picture’s value as evidence. In short, Croci wishes to 
imply that the Shoah has been seen and represented. To borrow a phrase from Reiniger, the 
picture proves “that the unimaginable is imaginable” as “nobody can deny the existence of 
the pictures” (n.p.). Put another way, Croci is using this image as it does provide an actual 
glimpse into the representation of death in Auschwitz. This formerly unimaginable reality 
has been concretely realised in the form of this one picture. By inserting it into his text Croci 
seems to be actively implying that death in Auschwitz can be shown and that it is no longer 
unimaginable.  
    By immediately juxtaposing this picture with the generic replication of the dead from 
Belsen, however, Croci has undermined his core position. As Reiniger notes, the 
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Sonderkommando images do not encompass the whole of the atrocity but rather they 
represent “only one moment of the ‘truth’” (n.p.). They stand simply as the representation 
of one moment in time, a partial glimpse into the reality of body disposal “somewhere about 
midway through 1944” (Struk, 2004, p. 114). The broader cultural acknowledgement of 
these pictures – which, as Keilbach and Wächter have stated, happened “quite recently” 
(2009, p. 75) – means, simply, that we do now have a limited number of visual references 
relating to death in Auschwitz.82 These images, however, provide only a partial and 
fragmentary glimpse into the atrocity, as is evident in Croci’s need to flesh out his scenes 
with other substituting images of mass death. Despite the boldness of its approach, therefore, 
Auschwitz has done little to argue for the representability of the Shoah. The reality of the 
atrocity, simply put, remains broadly beyond our understanding. In reality, all his text has 
accomplished – with its vivid recreations of the Holocaust dead – is to draw the reader’s 
focus back on to the suffering Jewish body. His failure to connect with the Holocaust on an 
emotional level, I contend, has led him – as is the case with many modern creators – to focus 
specifically on the material reality of the Holocaust dead and, additionally, the representation 
of the suffering body.  
    This may be taken as a relatively severe reading of Croci’s text, given his assertion that 
he wished “to avoid voyeurism” as well as the “perverse effects of fixed images of nudity” 
(2004, p. 79). It was for this reason, he states, that he did not attempt “visual representation 
of the gas ovens” (p. 79). Despite pivoting around this one core of unsayability, however, it 
is worth noting that Croci has attempted to represent the horrors of the Holocaust. He may 
not have sought to sexualise his atrocity imagery, but he has represented death in Auschwitz 
 
82 As Keilbach and Wächter note, the photographs were featured in an exhibition entitled Mémoire des 
Camps in the year 2000, before being reproduced in a book by Georges Didi-Huberman in 2003 (2009, p. 
76). As such, it may be reasonably asserted that they had entered into the public consciousness during the 
first decade of the new millennium.   
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in physical rather than emotional or psychological terms. His text, after all, provides several 
vivid recreations of the Holocaust dead. Meanwhile, he also uses the character of Ann – a 
child who survives the gassing process, who has clearly been designed in response to a real-
world event – as an embodying survivor.83 Whereas the actual child on whom this story was 
based was soon murdered by Oberscharführer Mussfeld, after having been sheltered by the 
Sonderkommando for a few short hours, Croci decides to build on her story in a fashion that 
is both familiar to modern fiction and still dishearteningly perverse.  
Figure 24: A page from 
‘Auschwitz’ showing the 
opening of the gas chamber. 
The character of Ann is the 
only identifiable figure among 
the Holocaust dead (Croci, 











83 In his text Auschwitz: A Doctor’s Eyewitness Account, Miklós Nyiszli tells the story of a “frail young girl, 
almost a child” (2012, p. 80) who survived the gassing process. 
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Figure 25: A panel 
showing a series of 
images discovered 
following the evacuation 
of the camp in Pascal 
Croci’s ‘Auschwitz’. A 
highly sexualised image of 
Ann features at the top 
right of the frame (Croci, 






Describing Figure 24 Croci has stated that he wanted his reader to “feel crushed by this 
incredible vision of horror” (p. 79). He hopes, in short, that they will be overwhelmed by the 
sheer scale of the atrocity on display and, similarly, shocked by the dehumanising and 
departicularising nature of death in Auschwitz. The vast majority of the faces are, after all, 
entirely unrecognisable. However, Croci’s intentions are once again undermined by the 
reality of his presentation. The anonymous dead are automatically deprioritised by the 
author’s focus on Ann. As she is the only identifiable character within the image, she 
becomes the text’s point of focus and, therefore, Croci’s totemic suffering body. He cannot 
form an emotional attachment to the nameless and faceless dead and so he has created a 
figure to embody the Holocaust sufferer. Ann is being used to ensure that Croci feels 
something of the Holocaust. As prosthetic memory relies on our physical “proximity” 
(Landsberg, 2004, p. 125) to the victims of the Holocaust, Ann’s literal physical closeness 
to the viewer signals her role as a prosthetic tool. She is the suffering body who makes the 
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Holocaust approachable for Croci. The horror of the Shoah is communicated explicitly 
through her pain.  
    Compounding the problematic nature of Croci’s representation is his desire to imbue 
Ann’s suffering with an unwelcome element of sexuality. While he previously claimed that 
he chose to avoid the direct representation of gassing, as he did not want to appear 
voyeuristic or to invoke the “perverse effects of fixed images of nudity” (Croci, 2004, p. 79), 
the reality appears rather different. In making this statement Croci was tacitly implying that, 
should he have wished to, he could have represented the reality of death in the gas chamber. 
It was, he asserts, merely a sense of propriety that stopped him from doing so. However, as 
has already been argued, Croci’s text stands simply as a tissue of assorted references. He has 
borrowed principally from two distinct commemorative sources which suggests that, like all 
modern creators, his understanding of the Holocaust is entirely post-memorial in nature. 
Death in the gas chamber remains entirely unimaginable. It is for this reason, I contend, that 
he chooses to switch to a more approachable form of Holocaust horror.84  
    As Figure 25 illustrates, Ann survived her experiences in the gas chamber only to undergo 
a sustained period of sexual abuse at the hands of an SS officer. She is shown wearing a 
man’s uniform and cap in a candid image which has been taken either during or in the 
moments following a sexual encounter. This is evident in her state of undress and her tilted 
expression, which both seem to imply her feeling of degradation. In place of the 
unimaginable reality of death in the gas chamber, therefore, Croci has instead reconceived 
 
84 While the use of the term “approachable” may seem controversial, I use it only to infer that sexual 
violence has featured in the fictional representation of the Holocaust. It is viewed culturally as a more 
inherently representable crime than death in the gas chamber which, as Barry Langford has noted, is 
frequently regarded as being beyond the limits of ethical representation. The gas chamber door, he states, 
represents “a literal threshold of unrepresentability… beyond which depiction ceases to be permissible or 
even possible” (1999, p. 32). By contrast, therefore, sexual assault represents a more societally 
comprehensible form of violence. Sex for survival dynamics have even been explored Impiously, albeit in 
the context of the Bosnian war, in Juanita Wilson’s As If I’m Not There (2010).   
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of the Holocaust as a sexual crime. The image not only records her sexual exploitation at the 
hands of a German officer, given that she is clearly dressed in a German uniform, but also 
seems to suggest that this was both a common occurrence and even a point of fetishistic 
pride for the officer involved. As Chapter One argued, sexual violence was certainly an 
element of the Holocaust. Survivor testimony indicates, as Joan Ringelheim notes, that 
female prisoners were “vulnerable to abuse of their sexuality”, specifically in the form of 
“humiliation, molestation, rape and sexual exchange” (1985, p. 743; p. 746). While, 
theoretically, the inclusion of the sexual violence may constitute a fuller and more authentic 
representation of women’s suffering, therefore, this representation is foundationally 
problematic. Ann’s scenario, given that it represents a relatively long-standing arrangement, 
constitutes an instance of private sexual slavery. While Levenkron notes that Jewish women 
“in parts of Galicia in Poland and elsewhere” (2010, p. 19) were kept as sexual slaves, along 
with those in certain forced labour camps, it is not described as a common practice in 
Auschwitz. Rather, as Sinnreich has demonstrated, reports from the Auschwitz camp reflect 
a more opportunistic, aggressive form of sexual assault.85 By contrast, Croci’s picture 
portrays a more romantic form a degradation – a perpetrator who seems to revel in his assault 
by dressing his victim in his ill-fitting clothes. This is not a considered, impious 
representation of a woman’s wartime suffering, but rather one which is  literally objectifying 
– her sexual assault is framed using the perpetrator’s picture, which doubly objectifies her 
by transforming her into a sexual object. Croci is not aiming to represent the past 
authentically, but to engender an emotional response through the creation of a deliberately 
salacious image. By sexualising Holocaust violence, Croci is able to make himself feel 
something about the atrocity. He may not be able to experience the reality of sexual assault 
 
85 As she puts it: “Several survivors of Auschwitz… have testified that women were dragged from their 
barracks by guards and raped” (2010, p. 111). 
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experientially, but he can experience an emotional response. The idea of shame is emotive 
and easily graspable to the nonwitness, whereas death in the gas chamber represents a crime 
for which we have no visual reference points – beyond, that is, the sketches of David Olère.86 
    Both of the previous sections, therefore, have served to outline our post-memorial distance 
from the Shoah. As the first section illustrated, only a partial record exists regarding the fate 
of new arrivals in Auschwitz. The Jacob album has allowed a partial insight into the moments 
immediately following their arrival in the camp, though the moments following their march 
to the gas chamber have broadly gone unrepresented. The gradual cultural acknowledgement 
of the Sonderkommando images, however, has provided another partial glimpse into the 
reality of Holocaust suffering. These images have illustrated the reality of corpse disposal 
and, in other shots not detailed here, the final moments of a particular band of women as 
they were hurried into the gas chamber itself. However, as Croci’s text served to illustrate, 
these images represent only partial glimpses into a broadly unfathomable atrocity. The 
Holocaust remains, for those still constrained by the limits of post-memorial imagery, 
hopelessly and unsatisfyingly remote.  
    Croci’s approach, however, exhibited a certain level of visual daring. He demonstrates a 
desire to transgress beyond the limits of most previous texts – to represent the inherently 
unrepresentable. This is emblematic, this chapter argues, of the general thinking of current 
creators. Frustrated by the notion of an imponderably distant Holocaust, they have instead 
sought to violate its most sacred spaces in the hopes of approaching the sufferers on a human 
level. As the next section explores, both David Albahari and Tim Blake Nelson have written 
texts which attempt to resurrect the Holocaust dead impiously – providing real and 
 
86 David Olère was a survivor of the Auschwitz camp, who was formerly attached to “the Sonderkommando 
in Crematoria III” (Sujo, 2001, p. 110). His illustrations, as such, provide an unprecedented insight into the 
workings of the crematoria.    
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unmediated access to these figures, while also making their experiences accessible to the 
nonwitness. As this thesis outlines, however, this attempt is always doomed to failure. The 
Holocaust dead, as Chapter Two established, will always remain unreachable. In place of 
actual engagement, I contend, we have developed an unhealthy fixation with the more 
gratutitous aspects of Holocaust suffering – from the desire to recreate Crematorium III as a 
tangible, explorable space to the graphic depiction of Holocaust death and the suffering 
body. Gratuity, I argue, will always inevitably result from any attempt at Holocaust Impiety.  
 
A Gratuitous Approach to Representation 
Gillian Rose defines the concept of Holocaust Piety, as enshrined by the likes of Wiesel, 
Adorno and Habermas, as a conscious commitment to the untouchability and inexplicability 
of the Holocaust:  
To argue for silence, prayer, the banishment equally of poetry and knowledge, in short, the 
witness of ‘ineffability’, that is non-representability, is to mystify something that we dare not 
understand, because we fear that it may be all too understandable, all too continuous with what 
we are – human, all too human. (1996, p. 43)  
The texts addressed thus far, I contend, have chosen to opt for the conventionally pious 
approach. While choosing to display certain aspects of the atrocity, their reliance on 
available imagery and conscious avoidance of the gas chamber has illustrated their 
commitment to the ineffability of the central Holocaust crime. Even Pascal Croci, for 
instance – despite his intent to illustrate the horrors of the Holocaust – treated the gas 
chamber interior with a certain level of representational restraint. Though he intended to 
provide “no visual representation of the gas ovens” (2004, p. 79), he clearly violated this aim 
by illustrating a frame which does take place in the gas chamber interior. Instead, he merely 
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adhered to his desire to avoid “the perverse effects of fixed images of nudity” (p. 79). In the 
gas chamber, for Croci, the dead must remain clothed, as they should not be unduly 
sexualised. This prohibition, tellingly, only applied to the limits of the gas chamber space, 
as he was perfectly content to illustrate the naked dead once they had passed beyond the gas 
chamber door. The gas chamber interior, therefore, represents the one space in our culturally 
constructed vision of the Holocaust which still remains comparatively sacred. Culturally, as 
Barry Langford notes, the gas chamber door represents the “threshold of unrepresentability” 
(1999, p. 32), beyond which fiction commonly does not pass.  
   Rose’s theory, therefore, involves two key components. It focuses on both the visual 
representation of the atrocity and also our psychological proximity to those involved – both 
perpetrators and victims.  A text, Rose claims, should provoke a “crisis of identity” (1996, 
p. 46) within our own breasts. Rather than maximising our distance from the characters 
presented, and reducing them to symbolic abstractions, an impious text should allow the 
reader to imagine their own potential corruption. Rather than conceding to the ineffability of 
the Holocaust, such a text would make it explicable by illustrating the steps which led to a 
given character’s moral downfall. We should understand their motivations while 
acknowledging that, but for the dint of circumstance, we too could be morally compromised.   
    Here, therefore, a distinction has been drawn between impiety and what may be 
considered simple gratuity. Though Rose blurs these concepts to a certain degree, I aim to 
reiterate the division between texts which actively aim to approach the morality of the event 
and those that simply wish to luxuriate in the horrors of the Holocaust. Rose, for instance, 
uses The Remains of the Day (1989) to exemplify the concept of an impious text. It is telling 
that, before discussing its inherent impiety, she chooses to stress its representational restraint. 
She characterises it as: “a film about violence in which not one blow is cast, a deeply erotic 
film in which not even a wrist is visible” (p. 51). The source of its impiety, therefore, lies 
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not in the extremity of its presentation, but in its capacity to approach the logic of the event 
– to de-mystify the morality of the age and, in so doing, make the perpetrator’s position 
imaginable. In examining the relationship between the servant and his master, and in paying 
particular attention to the servant’s collusion in his master’s politics, The Remains of the Day 
brings the nonwitness closer to understanding the logic underlying the behaviour of the 
perpetrator. It provides a logical, incremental insight into the small moments of moral 
compromise which can lead to an eventual calamity. Having understood the potential 
motivations of those involved, Rose claims, the audience will then be forced to examine the 
Holocaust from a position of knowledge. Rather than depthless, reactive sentimentality, she 
contends, they will come to view the event from a position of deeply affected knowing:  
Instead of emerging with sentimental tears, which leave us emotionally and politically intact, 
we emerge with the dry eyes of deep grief, which belongs to the recognition of our ineluctable 
grounding in the norms of the emotional and political culture represented, and which leaves 
us with the uncertainty of the remains of the day. (p. 54)         
On the basis of this argument, therefore, Holocaust Impiety has little to do with 
representational proximity to the heart of the Shoah. It is not about violating the sacred places 
of the Holocaust in order to visualise the full extent of the atrocity. Instead, it pivots around 
the approachability of those involved – both perpetrators and victims – and a desire to make 
them comprehensible to a post-memorial audience. Sentiment, Rose infers, is the product of 
our emotional and moral distance from the events of the Shoah. This distance, I argue, is not 
decreased by violating the internees’ dying moments, but rather by approaching them as 
humans – characterising them fully and forcing the viewer to inhabit their subject position. 
This does not merely involve the realisation of their suffering, it should be noted, but the 
reality of their daily struggle. There is a fundamental difference between Holocaust Impiety 
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and post-memorial voyeurism. Many works of fiction, this section argues, actively confuse 
the two.  
    David Albahari’s Götz and Meyer, emblematises this muddled approach to Holocaust 
Impiety. It is at once a text which aims to fathom the perpetrator’s mindset – with the 
unnamed narrator having attempted to imagine Götz and Meyer back into existence as fully-
realised individuals – and a novel which demonstrates an unhealthy fixation with the reality 
of extermination. These two elements fuse in a curious logistical blurring of Holocaust 
Impiety, which correctly assumes that a desire for emotional proximity also tends to 
correspond with a desire to violate the unseen places of the atrocity. One, it seems, cannot 
exist without the other. The intellectually curious, this novel implies, always harbour a secret 
voyeurism – a desire to approach the event without limitations.  
    It is perhaps more apt to say that the novel does not actively endorse this vision of impiety, 
but rather seeks to critique it in its presentation of the unnamed narrator. Self-identified only 
as “a teacher of the Serbo-Croatian language and the literatures of the Yugoslav peoples” 
(Albahari, 2004, p. 59), he is also the child of a Holocaust survivor – whose story he was 
never able to fully grasp, given his mother’s post-war reticence to speak of such things. The 
novel, as such, is presented as his attempt to historically and imaginatively reconnect with 
the events surrounding the extermination of his relatives. Returning to the themes of Chapter 
Two, we may therefore say that he has consciously assumed the position of the ‘memorial 
candle’, as defined by Dana Wardi:  
in most of the survivors’ families one of the children is designated as a ‘memorial candle’ for 
all of the relatives who perished in the Holocaust, and he is given the burden of participating 
in his parents’ emotional world to a much greater extent than any of his brothers or sisters. 
(1992, p. 6)  
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While the role of memorial candle is traditionally imposed – the child’s parents transform 
their child into a vessel for their post-Holocaust reminiscences – the narrator here has taken 
this role upon himself. His mother has not transmitted, either actively or passively, her latent 
trauma to him, but still he feels the compulsion to connect to the Holocaust. This stems, he 
contends, from a comparative feeling of rootlessness: “I had just turned 50, I knew where I 
was going with my life, so all that was left was to figure out where I had come from” 
(Albahari, 2004, p. 15). While traditional memorial candles receive their psychic fixation on 
the Shoah as part of their inherited birth right – transmitted perhaps in their mother’s milk, 
“perhaps in the blood” or perhaps in their parents’ “midnight screams” (Wardi, 1992, p. 48) 
– the narrator’s fascination with the Holocaust is entirely self-constructed. This represents a 
profound departure from the traditional model, in which the memorial child generally 
receives their family’s Holocaust inheritance as an unwanted legacy:  
I am actually carrying the whole family around on my shoulders… When they piled on me all 
the names of the dead relatives. I don’t believe they were thinking of me, they didn’t try to 
balance the injustice for me. Now I have no choice but to carry the dead on my back. (p. 28)   
Here, a second-generation child, named Arye, is speaking of the burden inherent in his three 
given names. He has not actively internalised the memory of his deceased relatives, but 
rather their memory has been imposed on him in the form of a tragic legacy. Albahari’s 
narrator, by contrast, has taken this burden upon himself. He is not being haunted by his 
family’s dead. Instead, he has wilfully, actively invoked them. This desire to participate in 
his family’s Holocaust history, I contend, is deeply significant. Unlike the Memorial Candle, 
he has not been burdened with an unwanted past. He is not being haunted by the murdered. 
Instead, he is actively trying to engage with them, which gives his quest an unseemly level 
of prurience. Like Adam Posner in ‘The Cattle Car Complex’ an excess of interest in the 
Holocaust past leads to a singularly gratuitous interest in Shoah suffering.      
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    Götz and Meyer begins with a seemingly earnest attempt at Holocaust Impiety. In the 
opening portions of the novel, the narrator’s focus revolves around fathoming the 
perpetrator’s mindset. Several references are made to Götz and Meyer’s capacity to 
compartmentalise; their generally cheerful disposition; their serene nights, untroubled by 
pangs of conscience and the role of technology in shaping their psychology as murderers. 
Of this specifically the narrator notes:  
They were, in fact, the best proof of how advances in technology enhance the stability of the 
human personality. They were living proof that Reichsführer Himmler had been right when he 
claimed that a more humane form of killing might ease the psychological burden felt by those 
members of the task forces assigned to shooting Russians and Jews. Here, Götz and Meyer felt 
no burden at all. Himmler would, I’m sure, have been delighted had he met them. (Abahari, 
2004, p. 7) 
Their Saurer truck, the narrator implies, provides a comparative degree of insulation from 
the reality of mass killing.87 The bodies, he goes on to note, are not even processed by 
German hands, but rather by Serbian prisoners. Entirely separated from the human reality of 
mass murder, Götz and Meyer may therefore maintain a certain degree of positivity, carrying 
out their daily activities with a cheerful kind of bonhomie. They drive along whistling and 
exchanging jokes, we are told. Götz, or perhaps it is Meyer – this the first indication of the 
problematic vagueness of the narrator’s imaginings – also sees no apparent hypocrisy in 
giving sweets to the children of the Fairgrounds camp:  
Even as they came into the camp, swung children up off the ground, Götz, or maybe it was 
Meyer, never thought for a moment of what was to come. Everything fitted, after all, into a 
larger plan, each individual has his own destiny, no-one, least of all Götz, or Meyer, could 
 
87 The Saurer trucks were large furniture lorries which had been converted to facilitate the gassing of Jews 
in the occupied territories. As David Cesarani notes: “The victims were loaded into the back, the doors were 
sealed, and exhaust fumes from the engine were piped into it until they were asphyxiated” (2016, p. 428). 
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change that. He was with the children, therefore, only while he was with them. As soon as 
he’d ruffled the last tousled head, given out the last sweet, lowered the last pair of little feet 
onto solid ground, they faded from his thoughts… (p. 3) 
Götz and Meyer, therefore, are protected by the mechanistic nature of mass extermination. 
Not only are they insulated from the reality of killing – with death having been 
compartmentally locked away in the hermetically sealed rear of their Saurer – but they may 
consider themselves to be mere cogs in an exterminationist machine. They are not active 
participants in a genocide, capable of acting with agency, but rather they are moving parts 
in Germany’s meticulously planned, routinised extermination of European Jewry. They 
have, according to this reading, been divested of free will. Having been absolved of all 
culpability, therefore, there is no hypocrisy inherent in showing certain moments of kindness 
to the camp’s children. For Götz and Meyer, the violence of the Holocaust has been literally 
partitioned. Enfolded within the safe embrace of their Saurer, the reality of the Holocaust 
stands as little more than an unseen abstraction. This represents a categorically impious 
approach to the subject matter. The narrator has approached the perpetrator’s perspective 
and rendered it fathomable. This, however, is almost automatically undercut, leading to the 
revelation of the narrator’s true purpose.    
    As the story progresses, the narrator concedes that despite his desire to bring Götz and 
Meyer into the present – he speaks of having drunk with them and smoked with them – they 
are flawed invocations, based on partial archives and his weak imagination: “Their faces 
continued to be white splotches, resembling flags of surrender, which was altogether the 
wrong impression, because if there was anyone in need of hanging out that sort of flag, it 
was I, not Götz and Meyer” (p. 123). Götz and Meyer have left behind comparatively few 
memorial traces. Though their names appear in certain files, we are told, there is “barely 
enough to fill a page” (p. 123). As such, they continue to exist as ill-defined distortions, 
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broadly indistinguishable from one-another. Rather than approaching them, the narrator has 
in fact conceded to their foundational inaccessibility. Two references are made in the text to 
their facelessness and their interchangeability serves as a running theme. At no point has the 
narrator truly approached Götz, or even Meyer. Instead, he has merely added texture to their 
formless spectres:  
there is practically no difference between Götz and Meyer: they are the same height, of 
ordinary build, they wear the same-sized boots. Fine, one of them has slightly wider feet than 
the other, which means that his boots chafe him a little more, but a little difference like that, 
or so they say, only emphasises their similarity… Götz actually could be Meyer, and Meyer, 
indeed, could be Götz. Maybe they are, who knows? (p. 115) 
Just as Austerlitz attempted to clothe the spectre of his father, or Modiano’s narrator 
attempted to physicalise the partial spectre of Dora Bruder, the narrator has attempted to add 
an element of materiality to his Holocaust spectres. Just as in those previous examples, this 
serves as a tacit concession to the vagueness of the narrator’s imaginings. Götz and Meyer 
remain historically remote characters. Their true motivations and rationalisations remain 
unknown. What the narrator has invoked is a pair of broadly indistinguishable figments 
based on unsatisfyingly vague sources. This adding of physical dimensions – from the 
relative shape of their feet to their style of walking – is weakly compensatory. The narrator 
is aiming for approachability, for a sense of proximity to the Holocaust, and yet all he has 
been able to recover is a pair of featureless mannequins devoid of human particularity.  
    This is emblematic, I contend, of Albahari’s position regarding Holocaust Impiety. Just 
as Modiano and Sebald ultimately conceded to the ineffability of the event and the 
irrecoverability of the dead, Albahari has shown that those who strive to resurrect the past 
are doomed to failure. We may recover only a partial, insubstantial half-vision of the dead, 
fleshed out largely by our own imaginings. These are not visions from the past, but products 
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of the post-memorial ego. Moreover, it may be said, Albahari seeks to interrogate the 
motivations underlying his narrator’s impious approach to the Shoah. This becomes apparent 
towards the end of the text, as the narrator’s fixation with Holocaust death intensifies.  
    Whereas, for Memorial Candles, the dead are always present – as they have been made to 
carry them on their shoulders – for Albahari’s narrator they are always frustratingly absent. 
Lacking the genuine sense of emotional connection that comes with the memorial child’s 
imposed legacy, he has been forced to take drastic measures to emotionally engage with his 
family’s Holocaust past. Having taken his students on a school trip – a bus journey which 
retraces the fatal route commonly taken by Götz and Meyer – the narrator effectively 
simulates the moment of gassing. Aiming to create a moment of engagement with the past, 
the narrator walks his students through a simulated moment of dying. In response to this, 
they manifest physical symptoms:  
Most of them were straining to breathe, one girl had clutched her throat, someone’s hand 
struggled feebly towards the window and then slid helplessly back, one boy covered his eyes 
with his hands, two girls had their arms round each other, their heads on one another’s 
shoulders, I saw some lips moving, but except for the driver’s soft whistling I heard no sounds. 
(pp. 148-149) 
Here, the narrator has adopted an identificatory model of education reminiscent of the 
approaches utilised by the USHMM.88 In order to make the Holocaust approachable for his 
students he has created a scenario in which they may be “interpolated into the position of 
 
88 The USHMM utilises bodily identification not only in its use of the cattle car, as Chapter Two established, 
but also through the use of identity cards. These, as Gary Weissman notes, are designed to maximise the 
visitor’s capacity to identify with their particular victim: “It seems that Americans can imaginatively put 
themselves in the place of Europeans; non-Jews can put themselves in the place of Jews… museum visitors 
can put themselves in the place of Holocaust victims” (2004, p. 82). Non-Jews, therefore, are asked to 
engage with the plight of the victims specifically through one body suffering body – the cards, it should be 
noted, are gendered to facilitate maximum engagement. Like Modiano’s narrator, they walk in the shoes of 
another from one floor of the exhibit to the next, following their path through the Shoah.   
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witness and would-be victim” (Bernstein, 2003, p. 143). However, as Albahari implies, this 
is a fundamentally problematic approach to the material. What have the students learned 
through this experience? At the outset of this task, the narrator provided each student with 
the name of a particular victim – crucially, one of his own fallen relatives. Having done so, 
his students are then told that they must “imagine them as whole people, their every move, 
every part of their body, each of you be the person, feel how that person’s muscles tense and 
their lungs fill” (Albahari, 2004, p. 144). Inherent in this request there is a foundational 
paradox. As the narrator’s own attempts to conjure Götz and Meyer have demonstrated, one 
cannot create a whole person from a nebulous abstraction. The Holocaust dead continue to 
exist as an unfillable void. As such, the students are not able to conjure these absent spectres 
as vital humans. Instead, they may only promiscuously identify with their moment of dying. 
This moment in the text clearly represents an excess of identification, with the students 
having physically manifested some of the symptoms of dying. Rather than reading this as a 
sincere attempt to engage with the Holocaust past, Albahari stresses its depthlessness. The 
children are not engaging with the Holocaust intellectually, but excessively engaging with 
this one grim aspect. This represents another example of Bernstein’s “promiscuous 
identification”.89 Once again, the “autobiographical ‘I’” (Bernstein, 2003, p. 147) is starting 
to blur with the vision of suffering being represented. As is clear in the students’ physical 
response to their simulated extermination, the boundary between self and other has clearly 
been elided in this instance. The narrator, in placing an excessive emphasis on the emotional 
and experiential reality of dying, has merely encouraged his students to egregiously over-
identify with one particular aspect of victimhood. He has, in effect, reduced the entirety of 
the Shoah to this one encapsulating moment of horror. Despite his earlier protestations, 
 
89 This concept is introduced in Chapter Two. 
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therefore, and his expressed desire to fathom the perpetrator’s mindset, we have discovered 
the heart of his Holocaust fixation – the experiential reality of the gas chamber interior.  
    This is later affirmed when he notes: “I found myself among my relatives, and I have no 
words to describe the sweetness I felt, that same way I felt when I hung the drawing of the 
family tree on the wall for the first time” (Albahari, 2004, p. 146). The narrator, however, is 
not among his relatives. In actuality, he is surrounded by a series of poorly constructed 
facsimiles. His students are wearing the identities of entirely decontextualized people, whose 
names have been borrowed from an atrocity of which they have no functional understanding. 
Therefore, the narrator has merely revived the partial spectres of his absent family in order 
to watch them die. This is simply not Holocaust Impiety, according to the established 
definition of the term. He does not reconnect with the dead on a fundamentally human level, 
reconstructing them as vital people with comprehensible motivations. Instead, he approaches 
them voyeuristically by reconstructing their moment of dying. This alone gives him a sense 
of emotional proximity to the heart of the Shoah. This, by the end of the text, is all that he 
has achieved. The dead remain irretrievably absent, but he has been “interpolated into the 
position of witness” (Bernstein, 2003, p. 143).  
    Behind the impious approach, Albahari seems to imply, there is a lurking sense of 
unseemliness. The narrator’s only imagined moment of emotional connection came in his 
simulated re-imagining of death by carbon monoxide. The root of his Holocaust fixation, 
therefore, lies not in the resurrection of the absent dead but in the unseemly desire to explore 
the unseen aspects of the atrocity. Holocaust Impiety, Albahari implies, must always end in 
promiscuous over-identification and barely suppressed voyeurism.  
    While Albahari is conscious of the impossibility of impious engagement, Tim Blake 
Nelson demonstrates no such awareness. The Grey Zone is positioned as a sincere attempt 
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to demystify the psychology of the Sonderkommando – to truly illustrate the psychological 
reality of life under the constant threat of death at Nazi hands. As Albahari’s text suggested, 
however, this attempt is ultimately doomed to failure.  
    Boswell, in his analysis of Nelson’s film, argues for its status as an impious text by 
stressing its emphasis on representing the plight of the Sonderkommando. He takes, at 
comparative face value, Nelson’s assertions that the film was intended to place the members 
of the Sonderkommando on the same line of moral continuity as the rest of humanity. They 
are not imponderably remote characters, according to Nelson, but rather we are supposed to 
consider our own potential corruptibility, when faced with the reality of the crematoria:  
As an audience member you ask yourself, how would I have responded? What would I do to 
save my own life? How far would I go in sacrificing my own morality? My own ideal of 
myself? Would I help kill to stay alive? (Boswell, 2012, p. 170)   
This statement does align with Rose’s definition of Holocaust Impiety, as it should allow the 
viewer to examine their own inherent potential for corruption. In examining the content of 
the film, however, I believe that Boswell finds comparatively little evidence to substantiate 
his core contention. He seems to consider The Grey Zone to be a categorically impious text, 
and yet it is a film fundamentally lacking in humanity. Rather than emphasising the interior 
life of the Sonderkommando, it is instead preoccupied with propelling the narrative towards 
its explosive climax – the armed rebellion of 1944. The flaw in Boswell’s position stems 
from one fundamental conception: that The Grey Zone exists as the representational opposite 
of Schindler’s List. If Spielberg’s film embodies the pious approach, Boswell presumes, then 
every attempt on Nelson’s part to counter its sentimentality must then constitute an attempt 
at Holocaust Impiety. This, according to the established definition, is not precisely the case.  
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    In terms of approachability, Boswell is able to cite comparatively few examples of 
Nelson’s attempt to illustrate the relative morality of the Sonderkommando. All of his 
explicit references pivot around one particular character – namely, David Arquette’s 
Hoffman. Having been responsible for the film’s one defining act of compassion – the 
temporary rescue of another Nyiszli-inspired girl in the gas chamber – he is also responsible 
for the most spontaneously brutal action perpetrated by a member of the Sonderkommando. 
In this sequence, a wealthy new arrival has been asked to surrender his watch. He resists, 
calling Hoffman a “Nazi liar” as he both literally and metaphorically spits in his face. The 
explicit acknowledgement of his complicity is too much for Hoffman to bear, and so he 
proceeds to beat the man to death while two members of the SS watch impassively. 
Hoffman’s sense of moral compromise is then compounded towards the end of the scene as, 
after shooting the man’s screaming wife with marked dispassion, a member of the SS then 
smilingly hands the watch to him. It is Boswell’s firm position that this sequence perfectly 
encapsulates the nature of the “grey zone”, as defined by Primo Levi in The Drowned and 
the Saved. Specifically, he cites Levi’s contention that National Socialism would not 
“sanctify” its victims, but rather that it would make them “similar to itself” (p. 168). Should 
this contention prove true, the sequence would perfectly reflect Rose’s drive to explore the 
“contagion of violence” (1996, p. 45) which affected many under the influence of National 
Socialism. She cites the Jewish police specifically, though the Sonderkommando could 
clearly also fall under this banner of forced complicity.  
    This sequence, and the one which follows – in which the camera focuses on Hoffman as 
he sits outside the gas chamber, with the screams of the dying clearly audible as we watch 
his pained expression – does provide the viewer with the fleeting sensation of emotional 
proximity to a member of the Sonderkommando. We may read Hoffman’s outburst as a 
vicious attempt to expiate his demons. Desperate to escape the truth of the man’s accusation, 
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he has tried to exercise his own self-hatred through a vicious assault. The reality of his 
situation, however, is immediately hammered home, as he is handed the watch by his would-
be oppressor in a smiling, almost collegial fashion. He is, he has come to realise, functionally 
complicit in the crimes of the SS. To those entering the gas chamber, he is broadly 
indistinguishable from the enemy – an enabler and facilitator of their genocide. What’s more, 
he may also be construed as a profiteer. In claiming the watch as his property, he has 
demonstrated his willingness to profit directly from the extermination process. While this 
can be construed as a moment of impiety, therefore, I contend that Nelson’s presentation of 
the sequence compromises this reading. His desire to inhabit moments of Holocaust horror 
has overridden his intent to approach the psychology of the Sonderkommando.  
    Rather than placing Hoffman on the same line of moral continuity as the rest of humanity, 
I contend, this sequence only serves to highlight the parenthetical morality of the 
concentrationary universe. Hoffman is, after all, steeped in the morality of the crematoria. 
His victim, by contrast, effectively embodies Western, middle-class, pre-concentrationary 
Jewish morality. Nelson is trying to embody Primo Levi’s assertion that it is “imprudent to 
hasten to issue a moral judgement” (Levi, 2009, p. 28) of those forced to collaborate in the 
concentrationary system. This serves to explain Hoffman’s motivations, as he resents being 
judged by those who have no understanding of his daily reality. He attacks the man for his 
failure to understand the particular morality of Auschwitz. We as audience members, 
however, must align ourselves with the man being attacked. As such, Nelson – despite his 
stated aims – has clearly distanced the values of the civilised world from those of the 
concentrationary system. He has, accidentally, conceded that Hoffman’s reality is both 
ineffable and imponderable. The civilised cannot possibly understand the reality of 
Auschwitz, which seems irrationally barbaric. As such, Nelson’s desire to manufacture 
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another scene of Holocaust horror has compromised his stated aims. By virtue of this 
sequence alone, I contend, Nelson’s film cannot be considered impious. 
    Boswell’s argument regarding the impiety of The Grey Zone, therefore, comes to seem 
rather weak. Indeed, his central justification for the supposed impiety of this sequence lies 
in Nelson’s choice of actor. David Arquette, he notes, provides the scene with additional 
context. The extremity of the violence is tempered by Arquette’s established cinematic 
persona as an amiable, semi-comic fool: “The actor’s celluloid history affects our response 
to modern European history; in this instance, the casting means that despite the violence of 
the murder scene, it captures the underlying tone of sympathy that marks Levi’s contention” 
(Boswell, 2012, p. 168). Boswell’s assertion, therefore, is that full comprehension of this 
scene, and by extension the ethical subtext of the film, is broadly reliant on a foundational 
knowledge of David Arquette’s career. In its wilful omission of the film’s actual content, 
this argument seems rather myopic. It presumes that the film’s attempt at Holocaust Impiety, 
and therefore moral complexity, is predicated entirely upon the audience’s universal 
knowledge of Arquette’s comparatively scant career in film. In stating this, Boswell is 
essentially admitting that the film’s actual presentation lacks nuance. The actions may be 
unforgivably and unfathomably brutal, but this is softened by the good will that has been 
generated by the actor’s other performances. When placed alongside the brutality of the 
sequence, and the audience’s inability to understand the reality of Hoffman’s underlying 
motivations, this argument simply does not seem valid. Despite his claims to the contrary, 
Nelson cannot access the morality of the Sonderkommando as their experiences remain 
unfathomable. Having no innate understanding of the corruptive power of National 
Socialism, Nelson can only hint at its presence – by indicating the passive SS officers in the 
background – while morally abstracting himself from Hoffman as a character. The inner 
logic of the Sonderkommando, as such, remains imponderably remote. What Nelson can 
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approach, by contrast – in a fashion eerily reminiscent of Albahari’s narrator – is the graphic 
representation of dying. Though his intent is superficially impious, therefore, his approach 
to the subject matter is simply gratuitous in nature. Unable to form a firm emotional 
connection with either the victim or the quasi-perpetrator, he resorts instead to the gratuity 
of the gas chamber.  
    Nelson’s gas chamber sequence, in keeping with the anti-redemptory stance of the project 
in general, is intended as a direct response to Spielberg’s faux extermination scene. While 
Spielberg merely approximates the new arrival’s perspective, by opting for the realistic 
swaying of the handheld camera, he does not actually imply a literal blurring of identities – 
we have not been transformed into one of the Schindlerjuden. Nelson, on the other hand, not 
only traps his audience within the perspective of the terrified internee, but consciously 
chooses an uncomprehending child as his chosen subject.   
 
Figure 26: A still from ‘The Grey Zone’ (2001), showing a close-up of the Anne Frank-inspired 






Figure 27: A still from ‘The Grey Zone’ (2001), representing the child’s perspective as she is 
led into the gas chamber.  
 
More so than any other cinematic evocation of Holocaust dying, this example is both 
conspicuously and excessively identificatory. It has been designed to maximise the 
emotional engagement of the viewer, while simultaneously shutting down their critical 
faculties. In effect, Nelson has crassly universalised the concept of death in the gas chamber 
by allowing this moment to be inhabited by all nonwitnesses. While Spielberg’s example 
was particularised – we may identify the Schindlerjuden as semi-distinct individuals – these 
are merely nameless, decontextualized, broadly accessible visions of suffering. We are 
inhabiting a quasi-Anne Frankian embodiment of wartime innocence – Lawrence Baron has 
previously argued that this choice of actress is not accidental, claiming that she embodies 
Nelson’s attempt to “challenge the optimism of Anne” (2005, p. 289) prior to her 
incarceration in Auschwitz – while being led into the gas chamber by a concerned mother. 
These are not definable people, in short, but simplistic archetypes. Everyone can read the 
suppressed panic of a dutiful mother, desperately attempting to mask her own anxiety. 
Similarly, we all understand the implications of the Anne Frankian child. Anne Frank, as 
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Chapter Four discusses, is not remembered as a distinct person but as a post-memorial 
distortion. Within the context of our post-memorial culture she has been stripped of her 
Jewishness, along with many other particularising characteristics, in order to make her 
identifiable to a non-Jewish audience. She is the prototype for the inhabitable sufferer. In 
order to facilitate our prosthetic engagement over the last half century, she has been 
transformed from a distinct girl into an empty vessel, which we experientially inhabit as a 
means to touch something of the Holocaust. As such, Nelson has manufactured a sequence 
which is both entirely stripped of particularising humanity and entirely open to audience 
participation. We can understand the reality of the Holocaust, he infers, by bodily inhabiting 
this one defining moment of horror.  
    In stark contrast to Spielberg’s restraint, Nelson’s aesthetic approach is to “show 
everything” (Boswell, 2012, p. 164). This is evident in his detailed depiction of body 
disposal. We see everything from the adding of Zyklon-B to the transportation of the 
deceased to the crematory ovens. The film even depicts the organised repurposing of hair 
and teeth as part of its drive towards de-mystification. In short, rather than emphasising the 
humanity of the Sonderkommando – from their relative degree of camaraderie to their 
frequent attempts to charitably assist the internees in the nearby women’s camp – the film 
chooses instead to immerse its viewers in horror and barbarity.90 No element of the atrocity 
shall remain ineffable for Nelson, including the moment of death itself. Though it does not 
feature in the initial sequence, the Anne Frank-inspired child has a moment of traumatic 
recollection following her recovery. She remembers the experience of being gassed, and this 
is shown on screen. Nelson, I argue, has no actual regard for the suffering of this child. She 
has no humanity or genuine complexity, she is valuable only in that she has a unique subject 
 
90 Miklós Nyiszli, for instance, has described the charitable efforts of the Sonderkommando: “Fully aware of 
this unbalanced situation, [they] distributed food and clothing to their less fortunate comrades whenever 
they could” (2012, p. 90). 
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position – she, alone, can serve as a functional witness to the extermination process. As such, 
she exists simply as the facilitator of his voyeurism. In borrowing her perspective, Nelson is 
able to see into the untouched recesses of the Shoah. This, in the end, is the overriding 
purpose of his film. Though he has previously claimed that his film is entirely about “being 
human” (Boswell, 2012, p. 169) – a claim Boswell wholeheartedly supports – there is little 
evidence of Nelson approaching his Sonderkommando characters as comprehensible 
humans. Instead, they are merely painted as brutal collaborators – subjects of a corrupting 
influence that the civilised world cannot understand. Having failed to gain either emotional 
or intellectual proximity to the Holocaust, therefore, Nelson’s only recourse is to fall back 
on Holocaust gratuity. This, however, does not accord with any definition of Holocaust 
Impiety. Nelson has not brought us closer to either the perpetrator or the sufferer. As 
characters, they still remain hopelessly simplistic. Nelson’s evocation of the atrocity does 
not unsettle our foundational sense of self, causing us to examine our own latent potential 
for violence. He has not de-mystified the human elements of the atrocity but instead has 
become overly pre-occupied with recreating the unseen aspects of the extermination process. 
This is not impious, but patently voyeuristic.  
    While the two previous sections, therefore, served to outline our emotional distance from 
the Holocaust – by highlighting the way in which the available photographs of the atrocity 
have only served to compound our emotional distance from it – this final section sought to 
examine the frustration this sense of distance has inspired in post-memorial authors. Both of 
the texts in this section served to problematise the idea of Holocaust Impiety. Both Albahari 
and Nelson seek to resurrect the dead and to engage with them impiously. The attempt, as 
Albahari’s text shows, is not only doomed to failure, but rather it is undercut by the true 
intentions of the nonwitness. Both Albahari’s narrator and Tim Blake Nelson abandoned 
their attempts to revive the Holocaust dead as vital, substantial characters and resorted 
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instead to elaborate recreations of Holocaust death. This form of crass bodily engagement, 
both texts suggest, will prove the end result of all texts which aim to impiously engage with 
the Holocaust past.  
 
Conclusion    
Implicit in almost every piece of Holocaust fiction, this chapter argues, there is a detectable 
subtext of frustration regarding the untouchability of the Holocaust. All of the texts cited 
here have effectively conceded to their own inadequacy through by using borrowed sources. 
Our limited visual vocabulary for the Holocaust has not merely determined the content of 
fictional representation – every text must rely on a certain set of images in order to maintain 
its sense of authenticity – but it has also shaped our emotional responses to the events 
themselves.  
    As the first section illustrated, those immediately killed upon arrival in Auschwitz have 
been forever placed beyond our reach. Conceptualised almost entirely through references to 
the Jacob album, we have come to view them as a homogenous mass of unreachable figures.  
Rather than humanising and particularising the victims of the Holocaust, these images have 
had precisely the opposite effect. The figures in these photographs, through their continued 
use as embodying images of the atrocity, have become totemic figures – embodying the 
broader nature of the atrocity and, therefore, losing their own distinct identities. It is telling 
that, when mimicking these images, filmmakers depict long queues of faceless individuals, 
passively walking to their doom. Our collective cultural memory of the Jacob album has 
been reshaped into a dehumanising blur of similar figures. Unable to conceive of them as 
people, therefore, modern creators have lost any sense of emotional attachment to the event 
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itself. This, accordingly, has led to an increased desire to emotionally reconnect with the 
atrocity.  
    Section two served to compound this sense of emotional abstraction by emphasising the 
lack of visible material regarding the inner reality of Auschwitz as a camp. As the discussion 
relating to in-camp suffering emphasised, all of the imagery that has come to define our 
vision of prisoner suffering has been borrowed from other sources. Every serving image – 
from the re-use of Margaret Bourke-White’s Buchenwald picture to the visual presentation 
of the corpse pile – serves to undermine its own sufficiency. Not only have these pictures 
been borrowed from other sources, but they also only represent a small portion of the atrocity 
itself – its post-liberation phases, generally speaking. The corpse pile, particularly, is not a 
serviceable image for our extermination-oriented conception of the Shoah. As our focus on 
Auschwitz has gradually increased, it has become less representative of the nature of the 
event. As such, those looking to reconnect with the inner reality of life in Auschwitz, must 
concede that the event is almost entirely beyond our powers of representation. Not only are 
the Holocaust dead unreachable, therefore, but the actual nature of the event itself is also 
largely beyond our imaginative grasp. 
    The discovery of additional images, as Pascal Croci’s text illustrated, has also done little 
to counter this problem. While the Sonderkommando photographs have provided a partial 
glimpse into the nature of the extermination process, these images only illustrate the 
experiences of one group in the summer of 1944. Croci’s presentation of Auschwitz still 
stands, simply, as a vague tissue of borrowed sources. He has no understanding of the 
experiential reality of the Shoah, and so his representation of Jewish suffering still relies on 
borrowed imagery. The Sonderkommando images may have expanded our visual vocabulary 
to a certain extent, but we still do not possess the resources to represent the whole of the 
atrocity. It must remain ineffable.     
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    Holocaust imagery, therefore, has placed a relative cap on our potential to reconnect with 
the atrocity. Due to the lack of available imagery, it remains imponderably remote. It is this 
remoteness that provided the fuel for the chapter’s final section. Unwilling to accept that 
both the victims of the Shoah and its experiential reality are beyond our reach, post-
millennial creators have begun to approach the Holocaust in a radically different fashion. If 
pre-21st century creators tended to opt for the traditionally pious option – building their 
projects around memorial sources – then modern creators are instead opting for an 
increasingly imaginative approach to the event. Both Albahari and Nelson experimented 
with the concept of Holocaust Impiety, providing texts which attempted to approach 
perpetrators, collaborators and victims on a human level. As Albahari’s text suggested, 
however, this proved to be a logical impossibility. One cannot reconstruct a human identity 
based on a partial archive and a name alone. Rather than creating tolerably comprehensible 
characters, both texts manufactured only poorly fleshed-out caricatures.  
    This failure to connect with the Shoah on a genuinely impious level, Albahari implied, 
can only lead to one natural consequence. When all other avenues fail, the post-memorial 
creator will inevitably resort to the representation of the gas chamber as their ultimate 
attempt to emotionally reconnect with the event. With all other sites lacking any form of 
resonance, following their many years of use as memorial staples, only the gas chamber 
retains the requisite emotional heft to enliven the atrocity once again.  
    Our collective cultural memory of the Holocaust, therefore, has reached something of a 
crisis point. Not only has the visual record of the atrocity been reduced to a handful of stock 
images, none of which fully embody the nature of the event, but we have lost any sense of 
emotional connection with the human reality of the Shoah. In place of Holocaust Impiety, 
we have only brazen gratuity. As Chapter Four outlines, it is my contention that – in our 
post-memorial present – impious engagement now stands as an impossibility. We cannot, at 
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this point in time, view the Holocaust dead as approachable humans. They have become, in 
modern Holocaust fiction, merely props to facilitate our engagement with the Holocaust past. 
The inhabitable Jewish body, in short, has effectively supplanted the possibility of impiety.  
    Focusing once again on Gillian Rose’s theme of Holocaust Piety and Alison Landsberg’s 
notion of prosthetic memory, the final chapter of this study asserts that only Holocaust 
survivors possess the capacity to represent the dead impiously. Modern attempts to represent 
life during the Holocaust, it argues, should be treated with a great deal of suspicion. In order 
to establish their relative value, it contends, we must consider once again employing Berel 















Chapter IV: Exploring the Limits of Modern Holocaust Fiction: From Fraternity to 
the Suffering Body 
This thesis began with reference to the modern contention, best articulated by Emily Miller 
Budick and Gavriel Rosenfeld, that Holocaust fiction is no longer required to justify its own 
existence. It was Budick’s specific contention that Holocaust fiction may no longer be 
considered “inadequate, inappropriate or even endangering to the task of representing the 
Nazi genocide” (2015, p. 1). 
    As the previous chapters have gone some way towards outlining, however, this matter is 
far from being resolved. As the experiential reality of the Shoah – the reality hidden in the 
deep memory of survivors – cannot be reached by the nonwitness, the Holocaust exists in 
the present as a distant abstraction. This, as Chapter Two outlined, is due to the 
fundamentally incommunicable nature of deep memory. As Jorges Semprun implies, this 
has been the case since the time of liberation. In The Long Voyage (1963), Semprun actively 
tries to communicate the reality of Buchenwald to two kindly French women. Struggling to 
find the words, and failing to recapture the sense of lived horror that once defined the camp, 
Semprun instead shows them a corpse pile – allowing the evidence to speak for itself. As 
Sara R. Horowitz notes, however, evidence alone cannot encompass the nature of the 
atrocity: “what they see, horrifying as it may be, does not help them understand his 
experience. The French women see a reality different from the one that the narrator shows” 
(1997, p. 35). The French women, rather than seeing real people only see an anonymising 
tangle of corpses. They see only bodies, and they are stunned by the harsh physicality of 
death – the “yellowed” flesh and “twisted” limbs and faces “hideous with terror” (Semprun, 




I'm thinking that one has to have experienced their death, as we have, in order to look at them 
with that pure fraternal expression .... It was stupid to try and explain to them ... these dreadful, 
fraternal dead need no explanation. They need a pure, fraternal look. (p. 75)  
What is fundamentally missing from the perspective of the nonwitness, therefore, is their 
capacity to view the dead with a feeling of fraternity, humanity or common understanding. 
We cannot approach them or gain a sense of their personhood. Instead, we have come to 
fixate on the body. Having resigned themselves to this position, and internalised the message 
of the first and second generation, latter-day artists have instead turned away from the human 
aspect of suffering toward the pure materiality of Holocaust death. As the previous analysis 
of Stern, Modiano, Sebald, Spielberg, Croci, Albahari and Nelson illustrated, post-Holocaust 
fiction has become obsessed with the concept of materiality, both in an attempt to return a 
sense of materiality to the Holocaust dead – to give the vanished back their bodies – and to 
step into the physical suffering of the Jewish body. In place of a Gillian Rose style 
psychological proximity to the person, we have instead developed a crude fixation with 
prosthetic memory and the Jewish body as a point of access to Holocaust memory.  
    This chapter builds on the work of the previous three chapters by discussing the 
impossibility of Holocaust Impiety in modern Holocaust fiction. It uses Gillian Rose’s theory 
of Holocaust Piety and Alison Landsberg’s theory of “prosthetic memory” to suggest that 
modern Holocaust fiction, thanks to its emotional and experiential distance from the 
Holocaust past, has turned instead towards a fixation on the human form. The Holocaust 
dead, in short, have been transformed into inhabitable bodies, who may be used to experience 
something of the Holocaust. It focuses on the work of Ida Fink, in order to assert that only 
those with direct experience of the Holocaust can impiously recreate the Holocaust dead in 
fiction, before exploring three texts which demonstrate an alarming focus on the suffering 
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body: The Tattooist of Auschwitz by Heather Morris, Shalom Auslander’s Hope: A Tragedy 
and Jonathan Littell’s The Kindly Ones. 
    Having highlighted the importance of Berel Lang’s work in the introduction, the thesis 
then comes back to his critical stance in a circular movement. Countering Budick’s position 
of acceptance regarding Holocaust fiction, the thesis instead argues that Lang’s standard of 
silence should be applied to works of contemporary Holocaust fiction. As Lang argues:  
Indeed, silence arguably remains a criterion for all discourse (Holocaust or not), a constant 
albeit phantom presence which stipulates that whatever is written ought to be justifiable as 
more probative, more incisive, more revealing than would be its absence or (more cruelly) its 
erasure. (2000, p. 18) 
Lang’s position, in effect, is that the Holocaust has already been spoken. A great many works 
of fiction have attempted to represent the experience, with varying degrees of success. The 
question is therefore not one of sayability, but rather of the worthiness of a given piece of 
material. As a foundational assumption, this chapter will assert, a piece of fiction must not 
further corrupt or compound our already partial understanding of the Holocaust.91 However, 
given our established experiential distance from the Holocaust – and its gradual 
simplification and universalisation – modern fiction frequently proves inadequate, 
inappropriate and indeed endangering to the task of representing the genocide.  
    The first section of this chapter focuses on two stories from Ida Fink’s collection A Scrap 
of Time. It argues that, in contrast to modern works of Holocaust fiction which simply utilise 
the Holocaust dead as inhabitable windows onto the atrocity, Fink’s text manages to 
 
91 A problematic piece of Holocaust fiction, this chapter contend, is one which either overemphasises 
certain elements of the atrocity – for instance, by depicting the Holocaust as an explicitly sexual crime, as 
this is indicative more of our post-memorial salaciousness than a desire to represent the atrocity 
authentically – or focuses excessively on graphic depictions of Holocaust suffering. This post-memorial 
obsession with the Jewish suffering body, and the material reality of the gas chamber or cattle car interior, 
yields nothing beyond a moment of prosthetic engagement with the Holocaust past      
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approach the murdered as fellow humans. Their suffering, in short, is rendered 
comprehensible. They are not simply post-memorial abstractions, stripped of particularising 
qualities, but rather Fink is able to view them with a Semprun-esque feeling of “fraternity”. 
This, the section argues, is a quality particular to the writing of survivors, as only they 
possess the understanding necessary to portray the dead with genuine impiety.   
    The second section then builds on this argument by analysing a defining example of 
problematic modern Holocaust fiction: The Tattooist of Auschwitz by Heather Morris. This 
section uses the work of Gary Weissman and Alison Landsberg to explore our current 
emotional distance from the Holocaust past. Morris’s text, this section argues, reads as a 
fantasy of witnessing as she struggles to connect with the experiential reality of the 
Holocaust. Instead, she must reimagine the horrors of Auschwitz through vividly describing 
the sexual suffering of certain internees. The constant brutality of the camp, therefore, is 
transformed into a more representable crime – rape or the persistent threat of sexual assault.92 
As such, Morris not only overemphasises certain elements of the atrocity but once again 
fixates on the suffering Jewish body. Using Lang’s standard of silence, this text is found 
unfit for a modern audience as it compounds our problematically narrow conception of the 
Holocaust.   
    Finally, this chapter features two texts which do add something to our understanding of 
the Holocaust: Hope: A Tragedy by Shalom Auslander and The Kindly Ones by Jonathan 
Littell. Both explore the centrality of the body in modern Holocaust fiction. Auslander does 
this through his deconstruction of the Anne Frank myth. His text ties our mythic conception 
of Anne Frank explicitly to our image of her as a smiling child. Our understanding of her is 
 
92 While this statement may seem controversial, as those who have not experienced sexual assault may be 
deemed incapable of imagining its experiential reality, Holocaust fiction does demonstrate a comparative 
willingness to represent sexual violence and its psychological ramifications. Beyond those texts already 
cited, it features in: Lustig’s novel Lovely Green Eyes (2000), Zivorad 'Zika' Mitrovic’s film Witness Out of Hell 
(1966) Liliana Cavani’s The Night Porter (1974) and Boaz Yakin’s Death in Love (2008).  
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therefore entirely depthless and tied to the idea of fixing her body in time. Littell’s text, 
meanwhile, will be analysed using the concept of Abjection. This idea not only underpins 
this text, this section will argue, but provides the key to unpacking Aue’s behaviour. Both 
texts, therefore, signal the centrality of the body to modern Holocaust writing while actively 
interrogating this idea. As such, they may be considered valuable as they do enhance our 
understanding of the Shoah by illustrating the nature of our current preoccupations. They 
highlight our obsession with the body and explore the impact of this on our view of the 
Holocaust. It is only by understanding our problematically narrow view of the Shoah that 
we may hope to alter it for the better. We may not be able to engage with the Holocaust dead 
as people, but we can shift our emphasis away from prosthetic memory.  
 
Ida Fink and a Feeling of Fraternity for the Holocaust Dead  
As has been established throughout this thesis, there are two central tenets to Gillian Rose’s 
theory of Holocaust Piety: distance and ineffability. These two themes become particularly 
acute when discussing these Holocaust dead, as was established in Chapters Two and Three, 
as post-memorial culture has deemed their suffering to be unreachable. They must remain 
figures on the other side of the fence – as was demonstrated in Schindler’s List through 
Spielberg’s “regressive identification” (Rose, 1996, p. 47) with the living.   
    By contrast, this section asserts, Ida Fink’s short stories approach the Holocaust dead with 
genuine impiety by both humanising them as individuals and authentically approaching their 
wartime mentality. Fink’s emotional and experiential proximity to the Holocaust, this 
chapter asserts, has directly contributed not only to the relative audacity of her fiction but 
also the legitimacy of her insight. Who else could approximate the experiential and mental 
reality of the murdered than writers who lived through the ghetto, survived the horror of an 
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Aktion or directly experienced the persistent fear of deportation to near certain death? Sara 
R. Horowitz expresses this position most concisely when she notes: “The closer the writer 
to what Primo Levi refers to as "the bottom" – those murdered by Nazi genocidal practices 
– the more the work could be construed as itself being a part, a trace, a fragment of the 
atrocity” (1997, p. 8). More so than any living author in the present, this chapter contends – 
and certainly to a greater degree than many of her contemporaries – Fink has come close to 
the conceptual bottom of the Holocaust. While she did not directly experience the camps, 
she did experience life in the ghetto and, as has been fictionalised in The Journey (1990), a 
period in hiding. As such, the murdered are not distant abstractions for Fink, but rather 
former neighbours. Their suffering is not hopelessly remote, but painfully immediate and 
distinctly comprehensible. She understands the prospect of death at the hands of the 
Einsatzgruppen and the emotional potential of being led to the killing fields. This was not, 
for her, a remote historical event but a genuine prospect.93 
    Two of Ida Fink’s short stories attempt to approach the perspective of those who are being 
exterminated. While ‘A Scrap of Time’ enters the subject position of a narrator who attempts 
to recount the last moments of her cousin, ‘A Spring Morning’ is unquestionably bolder in 
its presentation – choosing to represent the numb, silent horror of a father in the moments 
following the seizure of his family. In the final chapter of Voicing the Void, Sara Horowitz 
pays particular attention to the first of these two stories, arguing that it represents the 
 
93 This chapter subscribes to Ruth Klüger’s assertion that people who have gone through comparable 
experiences may be able to imaginatively engage with certain wartime events: “People who have 
experienced fear of death in cramped quarters have a bridge to understanding the kind of transport I have 
been describing… Europeans who have sat in air-raid shelters have something in common with me that 
Americans don’t” (2001, p. 94). As someone who lived with the prospect of death at the hands of a firing 
squad – a fate she understood, given the frequency with which it features in her stories – Fink is able to 
approach the mental reality of possible execution. Meanwhile, the “thundering train” (1987, p. 32) and the 
camps remain distant and abstract. Fink, in short, can write of ghetto clearances, and the mentality of the 
captured, as this represents a distinct possibility for her. She cannot conceive of life and death in the camps 
as these are not comparable to her experiences.     
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narrator’s earnest attempt to connect with her cousin David’s final moments. This is framed 
as a humane, indulgent moment of empathetic engagement:  
To do this, the narrator must temporarily place herself alongside David, become the we, and 
live out – in her imagination and in this narrative – an alternative different from the one she 
herself lived out the day of the first action. She must imagine what she can never know – 
David's last moments, last feelings, last posture, before he falls victim to mass slaughter. (p. 
223) 
In her phrasing, Horowitz suggests a certain nobility in the narrator’s actions. She notes that 
the narrator aims to “place herself” alongside her cousin, a phrase which implies an attempt 
at intimacy – a well-intentioned desire to fathom her cousin’s actions. Without wishing to 
impugn Horowitz, this reading of the character is patently false. Her post-memorial 
reverence for the Holocaust dead, I contend, has blinded her to the possibility that this is not 
a story of active engagement, but one of distancing and resentment. It does not represent the 
temporary breakdown of the distinction between an “I and we and not we and he” (p. 224), 
as she implies, but instead charts the narrator’s desire to distance herself from her frail, 
feminised, fatally neurotic cousin.94  The crux of Horowitz’s issue, and the source of her 
willingness to overlook the narrator’s contempt, can be found in one particular quotation: 
“Willingness to hear, remember, imagine, and tell compensates for absence of experience, 
and the narrator produces a good enough testimony – one that rescues David and his fraternal 
dead from oblivion” (p. 224). Horowitz has internalised the traditionally pious view of the 
 
94 While evidence of this will be provided through this section, it is worth noting for the moment that her 
cousin is perpetually othered and described in derogatory terms. He is not humanised, but rather described 
simply as one of the Impatient Ones – Jews driven to their own destruction by their latent anxiety and 
“inability to remain still” (Fink, 1987, p. 7). Fink’s short story is laced with references which imply that the 
boy’s psychology and experiences are inherently unknowable: “We would never have guessed that…” (p. 7); 
“Like us, not comprehending that the boy belonged to the race of the Inpatient Ones…”; “What our cousin 
experienced, locked up in that room, will remain forever a mystery” (p. 8). This is not a story of empathetic 
or impious engagement, but rather one which treats the dead as incomprehensible figures – defined by 
their neurosis and (in the boy’s case) his bookish femininity.   
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Holocaust dead. In dying, they have become figures of reverence to be viewed indirectly, 
and not to be treated as foundationally flawed human beings. To acknowledge the narrator’s 
stance of active resentment would clearly contradict the decades of cultural conditioning 
Horowitz has internalised, and so clear contextual details are overlooked.  
    To evidence my contention, one should not ignore the narrator’s desire to effectively 
“other” David, placing him in an alternate category of wartime Jews: “We would never have 
guessed that he belonged to the race of the Impatient Ones, doomed to destruction by their 
inability to remain still” (Fink, 1987, p. 7). More detail is then provided regarding this 
subgroup of people when the narrators goes on to note: “the Impatient Ones, who find it 
difficult to cope with isolation and who act on impulse” (p. 8). This does not represent an 
attempt to inhabit her cousin’s subject position. She does not wish to truly understand his 
mentality. His death does not require empathetic identification, as he may simply be written 
off as one of the compulsively neurotic, who fatally panic when left alone. By referencing 
the Impatient Ones, the narrator is not attempting to rescue David and his fraternal dead from 
oblivion. Instead, she is creating an us-and-them binary between the dead and the living. She 
is a survivor, whose qualities stand in direct opposition to David’s. He, on the other hand, is 
characterised only as a feminised Luftmensch, shown to be singularly lacking in terms of 
practical skills. This much becomes evident in her description of his personal qualities: “he 
was round-faced and chubby, not at all energetic, the sort of person who can’t be pulled away 
from his book, who smiles timidly, girlishly” (p. 7). The characterisation here is one of a 
portly, impractical and profoundly un-masculine youth. It is the final two words, however, 
which best indicate the narrator’s conception of his character. He is timid and girlish – an 
inherently useless and passive boy, existing in an era in which masculinity is already a 
sensitive subject. Loss of faith in masculine protection is a recurring theme in female-written 
post-war texts. Both Seweryna Szmaglewska and Krystyna Ƶywulska refer to it in their 
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Auschwitz texts. Ida Fink’s short story ‘Aryan Papers’ also implies that it exists as an 
element in her conception of the Holocaust. ‘Aryan Papers’ presents a scenario in which a 
16-year-old girl, robbed of every kind of parental support, must prostitute herself in the 
hopes of obtaining the transport papers necessary to her survival. In this text, the only 
featured men are would-be exploiters and passive bystanders. She must rely on her own 
agency in order to survive. In this world, the character of David epitomises failed 
masculinity. He is the very embodiment of male helplessness and an unwelcome reminder 
of the current order of things.95 
    It is David’s death, however, that most starkly contradicts Horowitz’s position regarding 
this text. The narrator presents, she claims, a “good enough” testimony, one which – through 
its powers of imaginative engagement – has related the human reality of David’s final 
moments. As written, Fink’s text would not seem to align with this position:  
At the first shots, our chubby, round-faced cousin David, who was always clumsy at 
gymnastics and sport, climbed a tree and wrapped his arms around the trunk like a child 
begging for his mother, and that was the way he died. (p. 10)  
David’s final moments, the narrator is careful to imply, are not invented. They come instead 
from a Polish eyewitness – a peasant, who “had not dared to speak at the time” (p. 10), but 
came back after the war and told the family everything. This is not, however, to be read as a 
straight relating of facts, but rather it is the story of David’s death as filtered through the 
narrator’s perspective. She refers to “our” cousin, explicitly reclaiming control of David’s 
narrative. The reference to David’s childlike begging, therefore, may be taken as her own. 
 
95 This, it should be noted, is further compounded by the narrator’s reference to David’s profession. When 
asked to write his profession by the occupiers he claims to be a teacher. The narrator is quick to undermine 
this assertion: “… although he had been a teacher for only a short time and quite by chance” (pp. 8-9). 
David, then, lacks the wherewithal or the motivation to seek out his own profession. His bookishness and 
inherent femininity, the narrator therefore implies, has left him perennially passive and impractical.   
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The very last line of the narrative, therefore, serves to infantilise David. It is a grim, farcical, 
ignominious death, entirely bereft of dignity. Given that it serves as the story’s final point of 
punctuation, it may also be read as being indicative of David’s character. For the narrator, 
this moment of dying perfectly encapsulates the entirety of his being – it is faultlessly 
representative of his essence. He was a feminine, passive, impractical boy, chronologically 
in the early stages of manhood and yet still inherently helpless. By identifying him as such, 
she is particularising his death. There is no potential to recall his fraternal dead, as the 
narrator has taken great pains to resurrect this one aberrant figure from the ashes. 
    At best, therefore, this may be classed as a complicated, singular act of remembrance. 
Fink’s narrator has recalled her cousin, but not out of a positive inclination to testify to his 
passing or to re-imagine him with any sense of fidelity. He is, at all times, a reductive 
caricature of buffoonish helplessness – or, put another way, the consummate victim. Given 
that this story is being recalled after the fact, in the post-war years, it is only logical to assume 
that the narrator is rationalising her survival. In A Double Dying, Alvin Rosenfeld speaks at 
length on the inherent psychological burden of survivorship. It is, he notes, “more 
punishingly cruel” in some ways than death, as one must come to live with the “prolonged 
stress of an unwanted, unearned life” (1988, p. 53). Bearing this in mind, the narrator’s 
characterisation of David may be read as a rationalisation. She is using him as the archetype 
of the Holocaust victim, the ultimate embodiment of helplessness and frailty. To survive 
required fortitude and ability, whereas David has been characterised as weak, feminine and 
impractical.  
    That is not to say that Horowitz’s position must be entirely discounted, however, as the 
narrator has technically rescued at least a part of David from oblivion. Though she does not 
approach his mindset, therefore, the text may still be taken as being relatively impious. While 
a traditionally pious view would depict the dead us unapproachable figures, solemnly 
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embodying an ineffable tragedy, survivors possess the capacity to humanise the dead – 
sometimes by showing a barely suppressed disdain for the murdered, which is still 
undeniably humanising.  Ruth Klüger, for instance, writes scathingly of her neighbours and 
her former Auschwitz associate Liesel, while also painting a singularly complex picture of 
her father. For Klüger, death has not sanctified these figures. They are still understood to be 
flawed humans. This distaste still hints at a certain kind of intimacy, as it is still able to 
characterise them as complex, formerly living people. Only in this one regard can ‘A Scrap 
of Time’ be viewed as an impious text. It does not enter David’s mindset, but it does partially 
humanise him.     
    ‘A Spring Morning’, by contrast, is inarguably more audacious in its approach. The story 
focuses on Aron, a man whose family will soon die at the hands of the SS. Unlike ‘A Scrap 
of Time’, which actively strives to distance the reader from any human attachment to David, 
‘A Spring Morning’ is unflinching in its attempts to focus on Aron’s final moments. It is, I 
argue, a story more deserving of Horowitz’s focus, possessing many of the qualities that she 
instead ascribed to ‘A Scrap of Time’. Though she does refer to ‘A Spring Morning’ in the 
introduction to Voicing the Void, this is only to make mention of the fact that it “explores 
the retrieval of impossible narratives, giving voice to stories consigned to muteness” (1997, 
p. 13). Aron’s story represents, she states, the retrieval of an “impossible narrative”, given 
the absence of survivors following the ghetto clearance. None would have survived to tell 
Aron’s story and so Fink’s engagement with his pain represents a “radical imagining” (p. 
13) – an attempt to engage with the experiential reality of the hours preceding one’s death. 
Having stated this, Horowitz does not return to the text and it is not considered in relation to 
‘A Scrap of Time’. This represents a curious failing on Horowitz’s part as, when viewed 
together, their relationship is profoundly instructive. Whereas ‘A Spring Morning’ avoided 
accessing David’s space, asserting that his experiences within his locked room would remain 
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“forever a mystery” (Fink, 1987, p. 7), ‘A Spring Morning’ actively enters Aron’s room. 
Specifically, it takes great pains to depict the small intimacies of its characters. As Aron and 
his wife await the arrival of the SS, having heard their trucks pass over the Gniezna river at 
5:00am, there is a strained moment of human connection between them:  
He stretched out his hand timidly, gently, stroked hers. She wasn’t surprised, although as a 
rule he was stingy with caresses, but neither did she smile. She shook his hand and squeezed 
it firmly. He tried to look at her, but he turned away, for something strange was happening 
inside of him… he knew that in a moment these rapid breaths would turn to sobs. (p. 42)  
In contrast with the scant emotional distance of ‘A Scrap in Time’, here the viewer bears 
witness to an almost unbearable moment of weighted intimacy. Fink has revived a set of 
animate, vital, complex people. Sol’s gesture, for instance, is minutely characterised. We are 
told that he stretches out his hand “timidly, gently” in order to stroke hers. This gesture has 
multiple levels of meaning. It covers everything from Aron’s general lack of experience in 
providing physical comfort – we are then told, additionally, that he has always been stingy 
with caresses – while also hinting at his awareness of the inadequacy of the gesture. He 
reaches out to his wife timidly as, on a foundational human level, he wishes to provide her 
with some semblance of comfort. And yet, inherently, he does not know how to do so. It is 
a uniquely human moment of attempted, and arguably failed, intimacy. In contrast with the 
characterisation of David, this approach represents genuine impiety as Aron’s mindset is 
comprehensible. The Holocaust dead are no longer abstract figures, but humans whose every 
gesture may be micro-analysed and understood.  
    This impious presentation of character psychology continues following Aron and Mela’s 
capture. As they walk to the killing grounds, their emotional responses to their impending 
deaths – from the cognitively paralysing nature of sustained fear to the emotional reality of 
their long-anticipated separation – are clearly articulated:  
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The man and his wife no longer spoke. They had said their last words in the house, when the 
door crashed open, kicked in by the boot of an SS-man… For three hours they stood in the 
square surrounded by a heavy escort. They didn’t say one word, it was almost if they had lost 
the power of speech. They were mute, they were deaf, they were blind. (p. 44) 
Here, Fink has genuinely attempted to put herself “alongside” Aron, imagining his “last 
moments” and “last feelings” (Horowitz, 1997, p. 223) in conspicuous detail. We have been 
made to witness the last spoken words of their marriage. Following their arrest by the SS, 
they have lapsed into what can only be described as a kind of animalistic paralysis in the 
face of danger. It is not resignation, but something primitive and automatic – the shutdown 
of their higher functions, as their bodies slip into panic. Here, Fink has managed to conjure 
up an image of mortal terror. This deadening of emotion and paralysis in the face of relentless 
brutality, more so than Spielberg’s dramatic manipulation or Nelson’s focus on the 
gratuitous, represents the very essence of Holocaust suffering. As Eric Sandberg notes, it is 
inherently difficult to express “the emotional impact of incessant violence” (2014, p. 235). 
This then also ties in with Irving Howe’s similar assertion that the Holocaust “is not, 
essentially, a dramatic subject” (1988, p. 189). A scenario in which masses of people are 
“barely able to respond to their fate” (p. 189), does not contain the potential for drama. Its 
grim relentlessness can only be presented as an exhausting, deadening weight – felt 
powerfully by the oppressed. This is precisely what Fink presents her reader with in her 
telling of Aron’s story.  
    Unlike most post-memorial attempts to represent the atrocity, ‘A Spring Morning’ does 
not represent a “fantasy of witnessing”.96 Such is our current level of emotional and 
experiential distance from the Holocaust, Weissman argues, that without emotionally and 
imaginatively engaging with it through the use of films, television programmes, museums 
 
96 Refencing Gary Weissman’s term “fantasies of witnessing” (2004, p4).  
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and memorial sites, it “threatens to seem distant, remote, unreal” (2004, p. 24). We cannot 
hope to touch the nature of the event – to feel what survivors “know in their bones” (p. 18) 
– and so we try to vicariously engage with it through representations of Holocaust suffering. 
Ida Fink, on the other hand – having lived through the ghetto in 1942, before spending the 
rest of the war in hiding – understands the emotional possibility of capture and death. She is 
also able, in the fashion of Jorges Semprun, to look upon the Holocaust dead with a fraternal 
eye, as she has lived alongside them and experienced their daily reality. She feels no need to 
dramatize, sensationalise or focus on the gratuitous, as she does not have to strain to feel an 
affective connection to the murdered. It is for this reason that she is able to provide them 
with a “good enough” testimony, performing a partial revival which not only rescues Aron 
but also his “fraternal dead” from oblivion. It is also important to note that, unlike ‘A Scrap 
of Time’, ‘A Spring Morning’ does make some attempt to extend this resurrection to the rest 
of the dead. In the final line of the story, Fink notes: “The procession moved on, like a 
gloomy, grey river floating out to sea” (1987, p. 47). Having spent the story particularising 
Aron and his wife, this final line reminds us of the others that walk alongside them in the 
procession. As we understand the inner complexity of Aron, we must also consider the 
multitude of similar inner lives which have gone unrepresented. We are reminded that, just 
like Aron, they too would be approachable, comprehensible human beings. Though this, it 
must be conceded, is the exclusive privilege of the survivor – those with a tangible, 
experiential connection to the Holocaust.  
    The text addressed in the following section, by contrast – The Tattooist of Auschwitz by 
Heather Morris – is used to exemplify the notion of an entirely depthless work of Holocaust 
fiction. This section argues that Morris’s text perfectly encapsulates the issues besetting 
modern Holocaust fiction. In stark contrast to the work of Ida Fink, Morris’s novel is 
concerned entirely with surfaces. Her Auschwitz is a paper-thin construction of post-
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memorial references, lacking anything resembling particularising detail. Most concerningly, 
however, her text is also peopled with inhabitable shells. Unable to connect with the 
Holocaust dead on an emotional level, and unable to imagine the inner reality of the gas 
chamber, she instead reconceives the Holocaust as an almost exclusively sexual crime and 
over-emphasises particular examples of female suffering. In the fashion of many writers and 
film makers before her, she comes to view the horror of the Shoah specifically through the 
suffering of one female body.      
 
The Tattooist of Auschwitz and the Problems Underpinning Modern Holocaust Fiction  
Gary Weissman states that the Mauthausen camp is now said to possess “the cold soul of a 
museum” (2004, p. 2) Focusing on the experiences of Michael Lax, a second-generation 
child looking to reconnect with his father’s experiences, he notes that these commemorative 
sites no longer possess the capacity to convey the horror of the Holocaust. Despite its status 
as a memorial site – a carefully curated, well-maintained, present-day commemorative centre 
– both Michael and his father demonstrate an expectation that it will be able to convey the 
experiential horror of the Holocaust: “he had come hoping to be swallowed up by the camp, 
to experience what Mauthausen had been for me in 1944… to actually feel the horror I had 
felt” (p. 1). The post-memorial generation, therefore, often carries the unreasonable 
expectation that commemorative sites will still possess the essence of the atrocity; that 
simply by inhabiting the space one may come to find a felt connection to the past. Or, at the 
very least, that the environment should facilitate easier emotional and imaginative 
engagement with one’s fantasies – Michael speaks, for instance, of his disappointment at 
how “clean and empty” (p. 3) the gas chamber space seems. In practice, however, the post-
memorial visitor finds only a “tidy camp” (p. 2) that conveys nothing of the Shoah. Lax’s 
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son, tellingly, only begins to feel a sense of connection to the Mauthausen space when his 
father begins recounting stories of human suffering: 
Michael’s desire to experience what Mauthausen had been for his father in 1944 gave way to 
a more basic effort to feel, to experience something, whatever would enable him to overcome 
his sense of estrangement from the Holocaust past. Finally it was hearing stories of how 
prisoners suffered and died in the quarry, told at the very scene of the crime, that enabled him 
to come closest to something of the missing horror, however fleetingly. (p. 5)  
Inherent in this idea is the problem which underpins modern Holocaust fiction. Incapable of 
understanding the lived human reality of Holocaust suffering we are instead intent on feeling 
“something”. In place of a fraternal association with the Holocaust dead we are left only with 
a series of loathsome extremes. Mauthausen only comes alive for Michael when he is able 
to tie it specifically to the vision of “helpless prisoners” (p. 3) being thrown from a cliff. As 
Weissman puts it, it was only after having viewed the “lake of the parachuters” that Lax’s 
son “came closest to realising his desire to experience what his father had felt” (p. 4). Of 
course, what young Michael has experienced in not an inkling into his father’s lived reality, 
but simply an emotional reaction of some form. Mauthausen becomes temporarily viewable 
for him through the window of human suffering – it momentarily possesses the power to 
affectively engage him, though only by focusing on a moment of gratuitous bodily horror.  
    The lesson to be taken from Weissman’s text, therefore, is that the complex human reality 
of the Holocaust has been transformed into a series of horrifying vignettes. Incapable of 
understanding the sustained brutality of daily life within the camp system, we have instead 
begun to fixate on small scenes of extreme horror. Just as Mauthausen only came alive for 
Michael when he was able to visualise the vivid deaths of helpless prisoners, we too can only 
connect with the Holocaust through a series of calculatedly affective scenes.  
223 
 
    By focusing on Heather Morris’s The Tattooist of Auschwitz, this section outlines the 
current issues facing modern Holocaust fiction. In keeping with Weissman’s position, it 
argues that Morris fundamentally struggles to engage with the experiential reality of the 
Auschwitz camp. As this study has illustrated, our current conception of Auschwitz is 
defined by a handful of embodying images. Tellingly, Morris touches on all of these. Her 
vision of Auschwitz is entirely post-memorial in nature and this is evident not only in her 
reconstructed vision of the camp but in her frequent attempts to touch the atrocity through 
scenes of bodily suffering. Unable to understand the experiential reality of daily life in 
Auschwitz, she instead provides the reader with a series of more accessible horrors – scenes 
of suffering which the modern-day reader may have some hope of understanding.  
    The three embodying images of the Holocaust discussed previously - the tattoo, the cattle 
car and the sexualised female sufferer - all feature prominently in Morris’ text. The tattoo, 
however, serves as the novel’s defining symbol. While, after the fact, the meaning of the 
tattoo has been reconceptualised, its meaning in survivor writing is commonly fixed – 
referring frequently to the idea of dehumanisation. As Krystyna Ƶywulska notes in I Survived 
Auschwitz: “I felt she was tattooing my heart and not my arm… In this one minute, with 
every prick of the needle, one phase of my life vanished” (2008, p. 16). The tattoo, here, is 
robbing Ƶywulska of her pre-Auschwitz identity. Having been shorn of her hair and stripped 
of her name she is now automatically rebranded as Prisoner No. 55908. The tattoo, therefore, 
is taken as being symbolic of the camp’s dehumanising properties. The Holocaust, after all, 
has been contextualised as a crime which took distinct individuals and transformed them into 
anonymising piles. For survivors, the tattoo has become the embodiment of this. It is telling, 
therefore, that Morris seemingly ignores the historical framing of the tattoo and instead uses 
it to signify her own vision of the atrocity. For Morris the tattoo serves as a semi-sexual 
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violation and an embodying sign of Lale Sokolov’s complicity. Lale, the eponymous 
tattooist of Auschwitz, was an Austro-Hungarian Jew who arrived in the camp in 1942.  
    Beginning with the first of these issues, Morris’s vision of Auschwitz is bizarrely laced 
with sexual menace. Twice, the act of tattooing is characterised as a form of “defilement”. 
When first speaking with Pepan, the current Tätowierer, Lale remarks: “Working for the 
kapo is not the same as defiling hundreds of innocent people” (Morris, 2018, p. 34). Taken 
on its own, this could simply be read as a curiously worded reference to the Jewish 
prohibition regarding tattoos. From a religious perspective, it does indeed represent a 
defilement. When given additional context, however, Morris’s preoccupation with the sexual 
begins to creep in: “Tattooing the arms of men is one thing. Defiling the bodies of young 
girls is horrifying” (p. 43). Here, the concept of defilement has been conspicuously re-
homed. Men can no longer be the victims, as the term now pertains particularly to vulnerable 
young women – it is not a religious crime, but an act of sexual violence. The tattoo serves 
as Morris’s embodying symbol of the atrocity, and so she attaches to it those values which 
she feels define all acts of Nazi violence. Additional context proves that she views Holocaust 
threat through an overtly sexual lens. This becomes apparent not only in her representation 
of the character Cilka, whose role in the story is addressed shortly, but also through her 
representation of Josef Mengele. In every scene in which he is featured, Mengele is shown 
to be both devilishly sinister and oddly lascivious. Lale, for instance, is made to work in 
close proximity with Mengele in one sequence. He watches as Mengele menaces a series of 
naked women. There are two specific references to their sexual vulnerability: “Mengele is 
examining one of the girls, roughly opening her mouth, grasping her hips, her breasts, as 
tears fall silently down her face” (p. 127). “He looks over at Mengele, who has another 
frightened girl in front of him, and is running his hands over her hair and down her breasts… 
Lale watches the girl shiver in fear” (p. 128). These sequences are pointedly sensationalist 
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in nature. Rather than having the feel of replicated history they have the hollow ring of 
Holocaust pornography. Morris cannot understand the reality of Holocaust threat and so she 
has transformed it instead into something she finds more comprehensible. Budick, 
significantly, has spoken of the sexual nature of her own Holocaust imaginings. Her 
childhood fears, she noted, often had a peculiarly sexual tinge as this represented a 
comparatively fathomable horror: “Rape, infanticide, and bodily mutilation all hover at the 
borders of our anxieties, fears and curiosities, quite irrespective of our interest in the 
Holocaust” (2015, p. 16). In short, the threat of sexual violence represents something 
relatively approachable in comparison with the daily reality of Holocaust living. This is not 
to say that one can approach the experiential reality of rape, but it does stand as a more 
artistically representable atrocity – given the abundance of works which have chosen to 
utilise it either as a narrative element or visual theme.98 Unable to effectively convey the 
grim reality of persistent dread, Morris has instead opted for the easier option – everyone 
may experience a moment of affective engagement when faced with a weeping naked girl or 
the threatening presence of an abuser.  
    Given that Lale has been forced to tattoo those women who successfully passed through 
Mengele’s selection process, he comes to associate the figurative defilement of tattooing 
with this literal defilement of young female flesh. Immediately after tattooing Mengele’s 
women he leaves the building, glancing again at a fenced-in area which contains naked 
 
98 As Ruth Harris notes, sexual violence was also employed as an emotive and processible image of wartime 
atrocity in the propaganda of the First World War. Harris describes the manner in which: “the actual 
victimization of women was transformed into a representation of a violated, but innocent, female nation 
resisting the assaults of a brutal male assailant” (1993, p. 170). France, unable to come to terms with its 
“near defeat” following the invasion of Belgium, and gripped by a “temporary panic” (p. 172), began to 
consider its own vulnerabilities. The metaphor of the raped woman is positioned, in this context, as being 
easily processible to the general public. It can be utilised by propogandists as its implications are 
comprehensible and, in contrast to the abstract reality of invasion, it represents a fathomable atrocity. 
From the 1910s, therefore – Harris notes that “it is difficult to think of an earlier historical example” (p. 174) 
of a country conceptualising war through the metaphor of rape – sexual assault has been positioned as an 
approachable element of war.       
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young women: “many lying down, some sitting, some standing, hardly any of them 
moving… Unlike the other fences in Auschwitz and Birkenau, this one is not electrified. The 
option for self-destruction has been taken from them” (Morris, 2018, p. 127). Given that this 
structure sits alongside Mengele’s workroom, this penned-in group of women is 
automatically reframed as some form of grim hareem. The use to which they will be put is 
not specified, and yet Morris distinctly hints at something sexual. It is telling that Lale “dry 
retches” (p. 129) upon seeing them. We do not know what their fate will involve, but they 
have certainly been left to the mercy of a supposed defiler. Lale’s dry heaving, therefore, 
may be read not simply as distaste regarding their fate but also his own feeling of complicity. 
By tattooing them – an act already categorised as a defilement – Lale has shown himself to 
be unwillingly complicit with the actions and aims of the SS. He may bridle at Mengele’s 
activities, but he is still contributing to the violation of these women. It is through this scene 
in which Lale’s tattooing is deliberately juxtaposed with this image of sexual threat that 
Morris establishes her baseline position. She has recontextualised the tattoo as an icon which 
not only carries an element of defilement but also one which embodies Lale’s complicity. 
This is relevant as it indicates precisely how removed Morris is from Holocaust history. She 
has effectively ignored the tattoo’s previously established cultural meaning. For survivors, 
the tattoo was commonly viewed as a sign of their own dehumanisation – both their 
transformation into a number and their separation from their pre-war selves. Instead, Morris 
uses it simply an empty icon which she may fill up with her own signification. Instead of 
dehumanisation, therefore, she has aggressively rebranded it as her own defining symbol of 
Holocaust violence – a sign of sexual violation and complicity.        
    This trend of superficially adopting the fixed iconography of the Holocaust continues in 
her presentation of the camp itself. Survivor writing often demonstrates a capacity to capture 
some of the finer experiential details of the Auschwitz space. For instance, several writers 
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have taken great pains to demonstrate the particular quality of the Auschwitz mud. Anita 
Lasker-Wallfisch, Fania Fenelon, Olga Lengyel and Pelagia Lewinska all make mention of 
it in their memoirs.99 It is Lewinska who is the most evocative, however, as she notes: “the 
entire camp is a bottomless pit of clayish mud that constantly sticks to our heavy shoes… it 
is hard to pull our feet out of the gluey stuff… each step taken… imposes a strain on our 
weakened bodies” (1993, p. 86). Lewinska’s writing carries the feeling of verisimilitude. 
Having inhabited the camp space, she is able to provide minute details about the lived 
experience of walking through the clayish, sucking mud. By contrast, Morris’s text takes a 
markedly superficial approach to the Auschwitz landscape. Her text features almost no 
descriptive embellishments of any kind and so her evocation of Auschwitz appears 
textureless and ill-defined: “The tops of the fences are lined with razor wire. Up in the 
lookouts Lale sees SS pointing rifles in his direction. Lightning hits a fence nearby. They are 
electrified” (2018, p. 15). Once again, Morris does not possess either the experiential or 
imaginative capacity to inhabit the Auschwitz space. It stands instead as a vague assemblage 
of common images: razor wire, watchtowers and electrified fencing. It is telling, therefore, 
that she does choose to apply more imaginative and descriptive power to Lale’s journey in 
the cattle car. The cattle car represents a comparatively approachable space. Though, as Ruth 
Klüger intimated, we may not be able to imagine the “fear of death in cramped quarters” 
(2001, p. 93) which was experienced by those riding in the cattle car, we can imagine 
ourselves into a position of claustrophobia. This is what allows Morris to paint her scene 
with an uncharacteristic boldness. She is careful to emphasise the “stench” (2018, p. 5) 
coming from the two buckets within the compartment. These are soon kicked over, creating 
in Lale a “rising tide of nausea” (p. 5). To this, she then adds a sense of the general press of 
 
99 Lasker-Wallfisch references the “nasty yellow mud which appeared as soon as the weather became bad” 
(1996, p. 81). Fenelon notes: “I looked with loathing at the Auschwitz mud into which I was sinking, a clay 
soil which never dried out” (1986, p. 31). Lengyel states: “the mud never disappeared. It was a sly and 
powerful enemy… Mud and the crematory – these were our greatest obsessions (1995, p. 130). 
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bodies: “His shoulder is wedged into Lale’s chest and Lale can smell oil and sweat in his 
hair” (p. 4). For Morris, this represents a genuine attempt at imaginative engagement. She 
can imagine the crush of bodies, and the odd moments of strained intimacy that this forced 
closeness seems to create. Moreover, she can imagine the pervasive stench of filth and the 
general atmosphere of corruption within the cattle car. As other works of fiction have 
confirmed – Steve Stern’s North of God, to name one key example – these are the currently 
understood components of the car experience: filth and confinement. This, at least, is what 
we still remember and understand of it post-memorially. What is missing once again, 
however, is an element of humanity. Both Benjamin Jacobs and Olga Lengyel write 
eloquently about the gradual breakdown of learned social norms which occurred within the 
cattle car. Jacobs particularly expresses the innate human shock of performing private 
actions in a public space: “Our biggest dilemma was satisfying our physical needs. 
Everything that we once did in private had to be done now in public… We tried to dispose 
of the excrement through the wired windows but were unsuccessful” (2001, p. 114). When 
combined with Lengyel’s reference to a “curtain” designed to protect the modesty of 
individuals who still view themselves as people of “culture and position” (1995, p. 16), one 
sees a profoundly human picture of wounded modesty. As survivors, Jacobs and Lengyel 
once again understand the human reality of the cattle car. Morris, on the other hand, is merely 
in a rush to portray a setting which she can vaguely understand. Like Andrea Liss, she has 
convinced herself that she can fathom the reality of the cattle car space. Unlike Liss, 
however, she does not find herself “embarrassed” by her moment of “trespass” (1998, p. 71), 
having graphically and excessively recounted the indignity of the now dead. Instead, this is 
one of the few sequences in Lale’s life which she depicts with a certain degree of confidence. 
She inhabits the cattle car space as this one of the few moments of the atrocity which she 
can approach. She, like Liss, can use this scene to experience a moment of prosthetic 
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engagement with the Holocaust past. It is the rest of the camp which confounds her 
imagination.  
    The third synecdochic image featured in the first chapter of this text was that of the 
sexualised sufferer, which Alvin Rosenfeld has also described as “the Mutilated Woman” 
(1988, p. 164). Rosenfeld’s position is that “authentic” Holocaust writings are, by nature, 
“peculiarly and predominantly sexless” (p. 164). For Rosenfeld, William Styron’s Sophie 
Zawistowska is emblematic of the nonwitness’s desire to re-sexualise an inherently sexless 
subject. Inherent within all nonwitnesses, he asserts, is an inborn tendency to associate 
atrocity with sexual violence. This is not, however, a problem limited to the “contemporary 
imagination, inflamed as it is by hyped-up sexual fantasies” (p. 164). Instead, as Ruth Klüger 
notes, this suspicion of SS sexual violence existed even during that period following the end 
of the war, in which “the Holocaust had no name yet… it wasn’t even an idea, only an event” 
(2001, p. 181):  
And there were, in fact, both men and women with whorehouse fantasies who wanted to know 
whether I had been raped… I was shaken, but I’d answer, no, not raped: they merely wanted 
to kill me. I’d explain the concept of Rassenschande, the rule again miscegenation Aryan style, 
because I found it interesting that a malicious idea could serve as protection (albeit not a 
foolproof one) against sexual abuse. (p. 184)   
From the late 1940s until the present day, therefore, nonwitnesses have automatically 
presumed that an element of sexual menace was inherent in Nazi violence. They simply 
cannot conceive of an atrocity which does not involve a base sexual component. As Klüger 
affirms, however, the image of the defiled woman cannot be taken as a defining emblem of 
the atrocity, as the Holocaust was not a crime driven by violation. To place undue emphasis 
on this element of sexuality is to distort the truth. Crucially, however, she is also careful to 
qualify this to a certain extent. Rassenschande, she claims, did provide protection in most 
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instances. As Chapters One and Three have argued, sexual violence did exist as an element 
of Holocaust suffering. This is also traceable to the Auschwitz camp though, as Robert 
Sommer notes, it was not an openly endorsed policy within the concentrationary system as 
there “is no evidence of a Jewish woman being sexually exploited” (2010, p. 53) within any 
of the official camp brothels. Sexual violence within Auschwitz, as Chapter Three notes, is 
frequently characterised as being more violent and opportunistic in nature. Sexual violence 
can therefore be construed as an undeniable element of the atrocity, but not its defining 
element. To reconceive of the Holocaust as an explicitly sexual crime, by conveying its 
horror almost exclusively through sexual threat, is to misrepresent the truth of the event.  
    It is telling, therefore, that Morris does resort to a scene of sexual degradation as her 
embodying realisation of Nazi threat. From the very moment of her introduction Cilka is 
automatically humanised: “She moves with the grace of a swan, a young woman unaware of 
her own beauty and seemingly untouched by the world around her” (2018, p. 89). This does 
not stem, I contend, from an impulse to lend her character authentic depth. Instead, Cilka 
has been identified as the perfect victim. She is both strangely lacking in vanity and entirely 
untouched by the corruption of the camp. She is not “starved and deformed” (Landsberg, 
2004, p. 124), as one might imagine the inhabitants of either the ghettos of the camps to be, 
but rather she is a modest woman in the full bloom of youth. In short, she is perfectly 
positioned to empathetically engage a broadly non-Jewish middle-class readership. It is with 
exceptional crassness that Morris then notes that she is also “untouched by the world around 
her”, considering her eventual fate in the novel. Morris, it seems, felt the need to stress her 
purity of character and spirit before forcing the audience to witness her serial defilement. 
    In Chapter Nine, set in the March of 1943, Cilka is seized from her workplace by two men 
in the SS and marched from the room with “confused and pleading eyes” (Morris, 2018, p. 
101) towards a sexual encounter with Lagerführer Schwarzhuber, the Senior Commandant 
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of Birkenau. This is the one scene of Nazi violence in the novel, it may be asserted, which 
Morris fully inhabits. She stresses the manner in which Schwarzhuber’s “nostrils distend” 
(p. 102), before launching into a quasi-pornographic depiction of Cilka’s undressing:  
He takes off his hat and throws it across the room. With his other hand he continues to hit his 
leg firmly with his swagger stick. With every whack Cilka flinches, expecting to be struck. He 
uses the stick to push up her shirt. Realising what is expected, with shaking hands Cilka undoes 
the top two buttons. (p. 102)      
For Morris, just as with Martin Lax’s son, the concentration camp is unable to create a felt 
connection with the Shoah. The only way for her to engage with it is through the imagined 
suffering of particular individuals. For Morris, Auschwitz clearly only comes alive through 
the minutely detailed sexual exploitation of Jewish women. With the fervour of a romance 
novelist, she recounts Schwarzhuber’s every gesture – from the flaring of his nostrils to the 
steady, rhythmic beating of his leg. All of these details are invented, and so Morris has 
clearly sought to invest this scene with a sense of tactile, textured reality. She is trying, in 
short, to feel a moment of bodily connection to the events of the Holocaust. She is 
experiencing its reality through the sense impressions which she has attributed to Cilka – the 
feel of the back of Schwarzhuber’s hand across her face and the disconcerting crack of the 
swagger stick against his boots. This is the Holocaust as both a vividly realised prosthetic 
memory and a literal fantasy of witnessing. This sequence, as with the presentation of Ann 
in Croci’s Auschwitz, misrepresents the nature of German-Jewish relationships in the camp. 
As Wanda Witek-Malicka of the Auschwitz Memorial Research Centre notes, Morris’s 
presentation in the text is foundationally problematic. Reiterating Ruth Klüger’s essential 
point regarding Aryan-Jewish relations she states the following:  
In practice, the possibility of maintaining such a long relationship… and, according to the 
book, a semi-explicit relationship between a Jewish female prisoner and high-ranking member 
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of the SS hierarchy was non-existent. The disclosure of such a relationship would have 
involved the accusation of race dishonour… and severe punishment for the SS man. (2018, p. 
12)    
As Morris notes in her text, Cilka had been grabbed by two SS men in order to be dragged 
to a room containing a “large four-poster bed” which “dominates” (2018, p. 101) the space. 
The purpose of her seizure, therefore, is framed as being entirely unambiguous. Its explicitly 
sexual component is clear not only in the large four-poster bed, but her confused and 
pleading eyes. Morris, as such, has framed her violation as a sanctioned and common event. 
It is not simply an established practice within the Auschwitz camp, according to Morris, but 
an archetypal form of Nazi violence, which has been endorsed by other members of the SS. 
Given the racial prohibitions concerning this manner of relationship, however, this kind of 
sustained sexual abuse – particularly when conducted without even the pretence of secrecy 
– is distinctly unlikely.100 As it is the only sequence of SS brutality that she truly inhabits, it 
must also be viewed as Morris’s embodying act of Nazi violence. The horror of Auschwitz 
is not found in the gas chamber but in the bed chamber. By presenting sexual assault as 
standard practice for the SS, Morris has positioned it as a vital part of “German genocidal 
policy and what became known as the Final Solution” (Sinnreich, 2010, p. 117). While it did 
occur and was provably “a part of some Jewish women’s experiences during the Holocaust” 
(p. 117) it should not be presented as the defining image of the atrocity.    
   Cilka’s rape, therefore – like the death of the parachuters for Michael Lax – vivified the 
Auschwitz space for Morris. It provided a bodily point of access to an historical event that 
 
100 That is not to say that instances of sexual violence were always covert in nature. Sinnreich records 
several instances of public sexual assault, including a report in which: “the Germans arranged a ‘show’ in 
which they took twenty Jewish women prisoners and raped them in front of one of the labour groups” 
(2010, p. 111). Sexual violence was also at times, therefore, used as a spectacle intended to demoralise. 
This is a different concept, however, from the open indulgence of Jewish and German sexual relationships 
described in Morris’s text.    
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is at once deadeningly familiar and hopelessly abstract. Her vision of Auschwitz is the very 
embodiment of a post-memorial construction, given that it has been built entirely upon a 
foundation of standard Holocaust imagery. Morris cannot provide characters with depth, as 
she has no earthly conception of the daily threats they faced. Her intention as a post-
memorial author, therefore, is not to recreate a sense of the Auschwitz space as a lived 
environment, but to craft a broadly pious and sentimental narrative designed to provoke 
moments of prosthetic engagement. This is affirmed by Witek-Malicka: 
The most common and most evocative symbols of Auschwitz (such as the Arbeit Macht Frei 
gate, numbers tattooed on the forearm, the gas chambers, Dr Mengele) have been woven into 
the content. Their goal, however, is to create a background for a story of the great love of two 
young people in the death camp. (2018, p. 16)        
Auchwitz for Morris, therefore, is not conceptualised as a vivid environment which her 
characters inhabit, but as a poorly constructed background designed to house her central 
narrative. As she only understands the Auschwitz space at a post-memorial distance, she has 
created a vague fusion built around the standard images and landmarks which have been 
identified throughout this thesis. As has been suggested throughout the previous chapters, 
however, this inability to connect with the Holocaust past on either an emotional or 
experiential level frequently results in an excessive focus on the suffering body. Just as Croci 
before her, Morris reconceptualises the Holocaust as a more culturally approachable crime 
– a sexual atrocity, understood through the suffering of one totemic individual. In place of 
impiety, therefore, we now have the prosthetic memory of sexual assault in Auschwitz. As 
with any representation involving a deliberate focus on the suffering body, this thesis 
contends, this does nothing to convey the broader truth of the Holocaust. In practice it merely 
serves to cater to post-memorial voyeurism and sensationalism.      
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    Contrasting Morris’s novel with the work of Ida Fink, therefore, we may detect a notable 
difference. While Fink is able to humanise her characters, having detectably engaged with 
their basic humanity, Morris merely creates a series of hollow puppets. With the exception 
of Lale and Gita – the only two individuals in the text provided even a semblance of depth 
– every other character exists as a hollow shell. Cilka is not a character but a vessel primed 
for prosthetic engagement. She is a device which Morris must use in order to make herself 
feel something for the victims of the Holocaust – to bring the too distant past back to life. 
There is no humanity in Morris’s representation of the Holocaust sufferer, in short. There is 
only an emphasis on physicalised suffering. To reiterate the theme of this chapter, therefore: 
in modern Holocaust fiction, ultimately, there is only the body.  
    The Tattooist of Auschwitz, this section contends, emblematises the current state of 
Holocaust literature. Whereas first-generation writers possessed the capacity to regard the 
victims of the Holocaust impiously, we – through the passage of time – have lost any sense 
of them as approachably real people. As such, despite the assertions of Matthew Boswell, 
modern-day Holocaust fiction does not possess the capacity to represent the psychology and 
inner motivations of the Jewish sufferer. We may strive to do so, but our attempts will always 
be thwarted by two things: Firstly, our inability to see beyond the body – we cannot, like 
Semprun’s French women, engage with them fraternally. And secondly, our prurient desire 
to inhabit them experientially – to touch the essence of the Holocaust through them, as 
Morris attempted with Cilka’s character. The final section of this chapter addresses two texts 
which explore the current prominence of the body in Holocaust fiction: Hope: A Tragedy by 





Shalom Auslander, Jonathan Littell and the Body 
Present-day Holocaust knowledge production, as Alison Landsberg has intimated, takes 
place principally in the body. At the most foundational level, we may say that museum 
spaces have been calibrated to provoke a certain felt response in the viewer. After exiting 
the boxcar during one of her visits to the USHMM, Landsberg noticed smoke drifting into 
the room. Her immediate assumption was not the rational, grounded presumption that the 
building may have been on fire but rather, given her heightened sensitivity to vulnerability, 
that the museum patrons were being gassed:  
This experience shows rather dramatically how the museum’s transgression of the traditional 
exhibiting strategies – its blurring of boundaries between the spectator and the exhibit – might 
actually make vulnerable the bodies of its spectators… it speaks to the power of the museum 
to place its visitors’ bodies in a threatening context. (2004, p. 137)  
The interior of the USHMM, therefore, may be considered a liminal space between the 
external reality of the present day and the Holocaust past. Unmoored from her daily reality 
and placed in close proximity to the boxcar – which she has just passed through and therefore 
imaginatively experienced – Landsberg is primed for Holocaust disaster. She has actively, 
bodily engaged with the cattle car interior – it is a real, tactile space which creates a level of 
sensuous engagement with the Holocaust past. As this experience took place within the 
isolating interior of the USHMM – a space designed to shut out the outside world in order 
to prime the visitor for experiential engagement – Landsberg also experiences a new sense 
of bodily vulnerability. Removed from all stabilising influences of the outside world, 
anything seems possible. Moreover, the USHMM actively encourages its visitors to 
temporarily shed their own identities and to identify with the Holocaust sufferer. The 
USHMM card system has been designed, as Gary Weissman notes, in order to facilitate “an 
immediate personal leap of identity” (2004, p. 81), as the museum visitor is encouraged to 
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imaginatively engage with the fate of an historical victim of the Holocaust. Weissman is 
careful to place a great deal of emphasis on the strict gendering of these cards, as nothing 
must prevent the viewer from fully engaging with their victim-doppelgänger: “It seems that 
Americans can imaginatively put themselves in the place on non-Americans; non-Jews can 
put themselves in the place of Jews… But one should not, or simply cannot, ‘make the 
personal leap of identity’ across lines of sexual difference” (p. 82). By touring the museum 
space,  and actively engaging with the exhibits provided – from the tactile reality of the cattle 
car to the shoes which emit the “sour smell of passed time” (Rothberg, 2000, p. 265) – the 
visitor is adding layers of substance to their doppelgänger’s Holocaust ghost. By literally 
touching history and experiencing it bodily the USHMM visitor is physically engaging with 
the person on their card. These two elements are combining to facilitate an excess of 
identification. By physically interacting with the objects featured in the USHMM we are 
bringing ourselves closer, in theory, to their lived reality. Though we cannot experience their 
suffering directly, as Landsberg would have it, we are now “better positioned” (2004, p. 131) 
to understand it. 
    Two elements seem to underpin our current conception of the Holocaust, therefore: a 
pedagogical assumption that one should try to identify with figures from the past and the 
assumption that this process of identification will involve a sensuous or bodily element. This 
becomes particularly apparent, I contend, when one considers the body of Anne Frank.  
In their essay ‘Bodies in Space/Bodies in Motion/Bodies in Character: Adolescents Bear 
Witness to Anne Frank’, James Chisholm and Kathryn Whitmore describe an American 
middle school project in which the students of a particular drama class attempted to 
empathetically and experientially engage with the story of Anne Frank. The foundational 
assumption behind the theory was that “emotion happens in the body” and that learning is 
more effective when “bodies and emotions are engaged” (2016, p. 7). Taking the USHMM’s 
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model of bodily engagement a step further, this project aimed to foster engagement with 
Anne Frank through the use of the body as a an “anatomical mediator” (p. 6). In order to 
engage with Frank as a character, the children were made to physically act out certain diary 
entries. Following one such attempt by a group of four female students, the authors of the 
study note one student’s particular level of immersion: “At the conclusion of the scene she 
stepped back out of the boots, peeled off her “Anne” nametag and literally and figuratively 
returned to herself” (p. 14). Lacey, the student in question, has therefore used her body to 
both assume and inhabit the Anne Frank identity. By performing the act of writing in an 
attic, she has effectively tried to place herself in Anne’s figurative shoes, inhabiting the same 
experiential space. One may reasonably assert, therefore, that by physically engaging with 
this scene, Lacey prosthetically adopted the position of Anne Frank. She experienced a 
moment of sensuous engagement with Anne Frank’s life and, in so doing, had a “bodily, 
mimetic encounter” (Landsberg, 2004, p. 14) with a past that was not her own. As with the 
card system at the USHMM, however – and as with all other acts of prosthetic memory – 
the body into which Lacey has stepped is merely a hollow shell. As Landsberg has 
established, those subjects used for prosthetic memory generally tend to lack particularising 
qualities. An excess of personhood, in short, would block our attempts to engage with them. 
Anne Frank, therefore, stands as the perfect subject for this type of imaginative engagement.  
The human specificity of Anne Frank has been gradually transformed into a serviceably 
stable archetype, constructed using her father’s modifications and then crystallised by others. 
After Otto Frank removed all elements relating to her sexuality and her fraught relationship 
with her mother, the writing team of Hackett and Goodrich then crafted the enduring vision 
of the Anne Frank character. This, as Tim Cole notes, came to cement the mythic version of 
Anne Frank as portrayed in their Broadway show and the subsequent film: 
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 The ‘Anne Frank’ made in America in the 1950s is not allowed a hint of pessimism… but 
only speaks optimistically of an enduring belief in human goodness in spite of everything. The 
Broadway and Hollywood ‘Anne Frank’ is not even the Anne in the ‘secret annexe’, let alone 
the Anne in Bergen-Belsen. Rather, she is a creation who comes and offers reassurance that 
the central tenet of liberalism — that humans are essentially good – is still valid. (1999, p. 35) 
Anne Frank, according to this reading, is now a quantified entity. She does not possess 
human subtleties and uniquely identifying characteristics, but she has instead become a 
broad cultural icon – a secular saint, embodying generosity of spirit and unrelenting 
positivity. She is not a girl, as Cole suggests, but rather an icon affirming the values of 1950s 
liberalism. We have a fixed and inflexible understanding of her character. This Anne Frank 
character constructed by the Hacketts may be engaged with and inhabited, therefore, as it 
both lacks definition and has fixed values. They have created, in essence, the solid outline 
of Anne Frank. We understand what she represents, and yet we are not prohibited from 
crossing the identificatory line as nearly everything particular about her has been sloughed 
away – including practically every example of her Jewishness.  
    This Anne Frank character, however, relies on one thing in order to survive: stability. A 












Figure 28: A picture Anne Frank taken in the “June 1942” (van der Rol & Verhoeven, 1995, p. 
35).101 Copyright: Anne Frank Fonds - Basel via Getty Images. Source: The Anne Frank Fonds 
Getty Image archive: https://www.gettyimages.com.au/photos/anne-frank-













Figure 29: Street artist James Cochran’s portrait of Anne Frank, which was undertaken at the 
request of the Anne Frank Zentrum in Berlin. Copyright: Street Art Berlin 
(https://www.flickr.com/photos/berlin_streetart/albums/72157632147184138) 
 
101 Not only is the image used on the cover of Ruud van der Rol and Rian Verhoeven’s Anne Frank Beyond 
the Diary: A Photographic Remembrance (Puffin, 1995) but the official Anne Frank House website also uses 
it as their embodying image of Anne. In their article ‘Who was Anne Frank?’ 
(https://www.annefrank.org/en/anne-frank/who-was-anne-frank/) the text sits over an enlarged version 
this picture. Additionally, it is also used as the cover image for Anne Frank: The Collected Works 




Figure 30: The Anne Frank mural by 
Eduardo Kobra. It can be found on the 
door of the lasloods (welding hangar) at 
the former NDSM shipyard in Amsterdam. 










Figure 31: An 
unattributed 
piece of wall art 
found on the 
sound barriers 
of the A28 
motorway in the 
Netherlands. 











As Figures 28 through 31 illustrate, our conception of Anne Frank has calcified around one 
image. Whether in the form of licensed memorials or unattributed wall art, the same image 
of Anne Frank is perpetuated, having entered into our broader cultural consciousness. The 
previously mentioned middle schoolers in the Southern United States can step into the body 
of Anne Frank because they carry, at all times, a fixed image of Anne – a specifically pre-
hiding vision, in which she still stands as a smiling child. In reality, however, our desire to 
hold on to this image of Anne is tokenistic of our desire to stabilise her character. She must 
remain an accessible, static icon. She cannot be recontextualised as a real, flawed human 
sufferer.  
    As L. J. Nicoletti notes, this image of Anne Frank is not representative of reality. The 
Anne writing in the attic gradually began to deviate from this unchanging picture of a 
Holocaust icon: “Within three months of her sedentary life in hiding, Frank gained seventeen 
pounds and soon grew out of her clothes. Pencil marks on the Annex walls show she grew 
over five inches unseen” (2012, p. 106). This is to say nothing of her gradual degradation 
within the camps. Not only did she lose her hair during the arrival process but, as other 
survivors have noted, both she and Margot developed scabies while in the women’s barracks 
in Birkenau: “The Frank girls looked terrible, their hands and bodies covered with spots and 
sores from the scabies… They were in a very bad way; pitiful... There wasn’t any clothing” 
(Bigsby, 2006, p. 238). These changes in Anne’s body serve to effectively particularise her. 
Her suffering becomes both individual and completely inaccessible to the nonwitness. 
Changes in her body, in short, shut off our imaginative capacity to engage with her as they 
only serve to remind us of her changing, malleable, unpredictable human nature. The body, 
after all, is chaotic and completely immune to human reason. Pictures, on the other hand, 
provide the illusion of permanence and physical stability. They convince us that Anne is 
easily, readily definable, that we understand the fullest extent of her character and that she 
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is basically quantifiable. The reality of her changing body simply interrupts our attempt to 
engage with her as it introduces a new set of variables. It reminds us that nothing remains 
consistent. In order to emotionally engage with Anne, therefore, we require that our image 
of her body is stable and unchanging. It is precisely this which Shalom Auslander seeks to 
satirise in Hope: A Tragedy.  
    As Sanford Pinsker notes, in Auslander’s novel “no Holocaust piety goes unpunished” 
(2014, p. 343). This is evident from the very first moment of Anne Frank’s introduction: 
“Jesus fucking Christ, he said… Close, she muttered” (Auslander, 2012, p. 28). As his text 
demonstrates, Auslander is clearly familiar with the mythic vision of Anne Frank. He 
understands her status as a secular saint and he means to violently de-stabilise it. This is done 
principally not through her behaviour, which is abhorrent, but through the calculated 
distortion of her physical image.  
    Twice, throughout the course of the novel, Auslander references the iconic Anne Frank 
photograph. In the first instance, it is associated explicitly with the content of the diary. 
Anne, having pitched the idea of a follow-up to her diary, is violently rebuffed by her 
publisher: “He went to his desk, Mr Kugel, held up a copy of that goddamned diary, with 
that goddamned smiling child on the goddamned cover, and said. They don’t want you. They 
want her” (p. 71). The smiling child, as Anne’s publisher has intimated, is emblematic of 
her diary’s core message. She embodies hope for the future and the possibility of societal 
resurrection. As Auslander’s Anne puts it, people “want to know that we can rise like a 
phoenix from our own fiery human ashes” (p. 71). Anne’s smiling face, therefore, is 
inherently linked to the concept of foundational human decency. It imparts to the reader the 
truth of her statement that people are really good “in spite of everything” and that every 
period of calamity must end. The permanence of this message, and therefore the stability of 
Anne’s character, is explicitly tied to this image of a smiling child. To disrupt this image, by 
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altering our perception of Anne’s body, is to kill the mythical Anne Frank. This is precisely 
Auslander’s intent with this text.    
    Auslander’s vision of Anne Frank is patently, cartoonishly monstrous. She is a “hideous” 
vision, with “cloudy yellow” eyes, “wiry and unkempt hair” and “gnarled hands… capped 
with yellowed, talonlike fingernails” (p. 61). She does not walk, additionally, but is 
described as moving in a literally verminous, insectile way: “Kugel returned… in time to see 
her scurrying, insectlike, along the floor and around the corner” (p. 62). Auslander’s 
evocation of Anne, therefore, resembles a Disney-inspired crone with elements of Gregor 
Samsa added to the mixture in order to compound our visceral sense of disgust. She is not 
the smiling, approachable child of the standard image, but a figure designed to repel any 
attempt at emotional or affective engagement. One cannot inhabit this vision of Anne Frank, 
or approach her mimetically, as she is overly in-human. The children of Williams Middle 
School in the southern United States, for instance, cannot bodily mimic the scuttling step 
and ruined posture of this Anne Frank. By making her foundationally unapproachable, 
Auslander has – at least in practical terms – re-particularised her.  
    As an additional element, Auslander has also worked an aspect of satire into her physical 
deformity. This version of Anne’s body, he reveals, has warped to adapt to the shape of the 
attic:  
her body had adapted, or evolved, or devolved, into a shape most suitable for attic life: her 
knees seemed permanently bent at just the right angle to keep her head from hitting the rafters, 
and her spine and hips inclined forward at very nearly the same degree of slope as the roof. (p. 
64)       
As Anne intimated in the previous quotation, the world is unwilling to accept a vision of her 
which does not correspond with their fixed perception of the mythic, attic-bound sufferer. 
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As such, both literally and imaginatively, society has confined her to the attic space. 
Auslander’s deformity, here, is emblematic of our societal distortions regarding the real 
Anne Frank. We are at once incapable of imagining her in another space and fearful of 
imagining any changes to our fixed perception of her body. Auslander has amalgamated 
these issues by presenting the reader with a literally, physically warped vision of Anne. She 
is a character designed to confront our worst fears regarding Anne Frank and our worst sins 
regarding her legacy. Rather than maintaining her physical and spiritual integrity by passing 
her story on from generation to generation, post-memorial culture has warped her beyond 
recognition. Auslander is therefore creating a satirical mirror to highlight our damaging pre-
occupation with her body and our inability to allow her to evolve as a character. His Anne 
Frank is a nightmare vision designed to haunt the traditionally pious – those who cling to the 
vision of an Anne as a physically unchanging, faultless figure of moral inspiration.  
    Auslander has created a vision of Anne Frank which is the physical and conceptual 
opposite of the smiling martyred child of the standard image. At the end of the novel he then 
transforms Anne into the consummate survivor, countering our cultural perception of her as 
the ultimate embodying victim. As Roberta Rosenberg notes, Auslander links Anne Frank 
to Alan Dershowitz in her final scene in order to signal her departure from her former role 
as a “mythic sufferer: “Dershowitz… personifies politically incorrect chutzpah, cynicism, 
and courage rather than Anne Frank timidity, idealism, hope, and anxiety” (Rosenberg, 2015, 
p. 128;  131). Dershowitz, therefore, embodies a set of values which stand in direct 
opposition to those of the mythic Anne Frank. The smiling child of Frank’s dustjacket would 
have nothing in common with this latter-day embodiment of Jewish boldness. Having altered 
the limits of Anne’s body,  Auslander now also reframes Anne’s image. She is no longer the 
angelic, almost agnostic martyr created by the Hacketts, but an overtly Jewish survivor. As 
Rosenberg puts it, Dershowitz is at once “America’s most public Jewish defender” and a 
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“diaspora warrior” (p. 131) – his Judaism is integral to his identity. By contrast, as 
Christopher Bigsby has noted, many would contend that Anne’s Jewishness had been 
“evacuated from both diary and play” (2006, p. 250). The Hacketts, and then our broader 
culture at large, have de-Judaised Anne Frank. Through her association with Dershowitz, 
her Jewishness has not only been reaffirmed but given an added element of combativeness.  
Her final words in this text, indeed, are designed to starkly contrast with her image as a 
passive, hopeful idealist. As she is carried from the burning house by Dershowitz she takes 
a moment to degrade Solomon Kugel, the novel’s protagonist: “You would never have made 
it Mr. Kugel!, she called. You would never have lasted five minutes in Auschwitz. I’m a 
survivor, Mr. Kugel!” (Auslander, 2012, p. 333). Auslander’s Anne, then, is a taunting, 
mean-spirited, self-centred survivor. Auslander has given her back a sense of personhood 
and individuality, as she is not being spoken for but is rather stating her own agenda. She 
will always survive. She is not an angelic martyr but a deformed, spiteful crone. In short, she 
is a character designed to provoke unease in the reader. We are meant to squirm reflexively, 
as our learned Holocaust Piety grates against his vision of Anne Frank. And then, thanks to 
Auslander’s emphasis on Anne’s body, we are meant to analyse this inflexibility and to 
consider its source. Our image of Anne Frank cannot evolve as it is tied explicitly to her 
photograph. Here, Auslander is highlighting both the foolishness and superficiality of this 
pre-occupation with the unevolving picture of Anne Frank. By definition, as we choose to 
ignore the reality of the human body, and those changes Anne endured, it must lack 
definition and depth. We have learned to fixate on an idealised, universalised image which 
bears no reality to the historical Anne. Bodies change constantly. Anne’s was subject to 
numerous changes, all of which would have blocked our attempts to romanticise and 
canonise her – one cannot, after all, idealise a person who continues to live and evolve.  
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    Auslander’s image of Anne Frank reminds us, therefore, that the historical reality of Anne 
has been lost to time. Her real body changed and her perspectives likely shifted away from 
the faultless optimism which may, at times, be gleaned from her diary. In place of her 
humanity, therefore, we have only our own constructed image of her and the fixed image of 
her pre-war body. As Auslander’s novel explores, we are willing to admit changes to neither.  
    Conclusive evidence of this can be found in Kugel’s mother’s approach to Anne. Mother 
displays, at once, a refusal to accept an evolving vision of Anne Frank and a profound desire 
to inhabit her subject position. As Auslander notes, Kugel’s mother is unwilling to 
acknowledge the apparent physical changes in Anne’s body and is intent on crystallising the 
image of her as a young child: 
The ghastly stench in the attic contrasted violently with the pastoral, angelic bedroom set that 
Mother had created in the centre of the attic. Mother had dressed the bed as if Anne Frank 
were still a young girl, with a teddy bear propped up on the pillow and a pair of child-size one-
piece pyjamas… A childscape, thought Kugel, a won’t-let-it-go tableau. (p. 310)    
The vile stench – a powerful physical indicator of Anne’s altered body, as well as the 
changeability of the physical form itself – is designed to starkly contrast with this attempt to 
freeze Anne in virginal girlhood. The clothes, seemingly intended for a much younger child, 
are clearly indicative of Mother’s desire to freeze Anne in time. She will imagine her forever 
as an untainted vision of faultless purity. This is designed, clearly, as a satirical reference 
towards the broader American pre-occupation with Anne Frank, as Nathan Englander has 
also recently satirised in his short story ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Anne 
Frank’. There too Anne exists simply as a source of “inspiration” (Rosenberg, 2015, p. 125) 
lacking any form of discernible human depth. Mother, therefore, exists firstly to satirise this 
American – though one could argue that this impulse also exists globally – desire to stabilise 
the image of Anne Frank and to repel any attempts to actively change or evolve her character.  
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    It is precisely this level of fixity, the text comes to show, which allows the nonwitness to 
step into and inhabit the Anne Frank persona. Again, Auslander takes this concept to its 
logical extreme as Mother actively steals Anne’s narrative, assuming it as her own. As 
Chapter Two of this thesis outlines, Mother maintains her borrowed identity as a Holocaust 
survivor by incorporating standard images and stories into her performance. Given the lack 
of human particularity attached to the Anne Frank myth, it was somewhat inevitable that 
Mother would assume the backstory of Anne herself: “A child I was, nothing more, 
trembling in fear in a cold, bare annex, never knowing which hour death would come but 
knowing, yes, knowing it would” (Auslander, 2012, p. 241). As with the example of the 
‘Cattle Car Complex’, featured in Chapter Two of this thesis, Mother has undergone a literal 
fantasy of witnessing. She has transformed herself into a first-hand witness, assuming 
Anne’s position. Moreover, she is still also signalling her desire to crystallise the image of 
Anne Frank as the faultless, unevolved, victimised child. Note, she says, she was a child and 
“nothing more”. The emphasis is then placed on Anne’s pre-sexual, pre-Auschwitz 
innocence. In this example, therefore, Auslander has not only highlighted our general desire 
to cement our constructed vision of Anne Frank but our pronounced desire to step into her 
shoes. Such is the strength of this compulsion, he seems to imply, that one must put several 
barriers in place to block our attempts at identification. In order to block the audience’s 
learned compulsion to step into the shoes of Anne Frank he has had to contort her into 
something unambiguously monstrous. This would seem to align with the findings of Alison 
Landsberg, as in Engaging the Past she notes the lengths to which The Secret Annex Online 
– a virtual tour of the Franks’ attic – has gone to block the imaginative engagement of the 
viewer. As she puts it:  
these sites refuse their visitors a kind of seamless point of identification with individual 
historical figures or specific perspectives. Instead of fostering the illusion that the user is 
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“actually there,” these sites’ artificiality and stylisation call attention to their own 
constructedness. (2015, p. 148)      
Were these sites to present the user with an individual historical figure, she implies – a 
comparatively hollow shell that they may step into in order to better engage with the 
experience – the user would be compelled to inhabit their subject position. We simply cannot 
resist the possibility of inhabiting the body of the Holocaust sufferer. We seem to desire to 
wear their perspective prosthetically, briefly inhabiting the Holocaust space before returning 
to our own lives. We want a taste of suffering and roadblocks must be put in place in order 
to curb this impulse. Landsberg’s text is trying to find a series of tools and strategies which 
produce affect “but not in the service of facile identification” (p. 20). As Auslander’s text 
suggests, however – along with the work of Gary Weissman – this may be something of a 
lost cause. Not only does our compulsion to bodily identify with the suffering of Holocaust 
victims exist, but it stands as our primary mode of engagement with the Holocaust in the 
present. As we cannot connect with them fraternally, we have instead chosen to either 
imaginatively inhabit their bodies or fixate on the pure materiality of their suffering. Proof 
of this latter concept can be found in Jonathan Littell’s The Kindly Ones, which may be 
defined as a text which pivots around the image of the corpse. 
    In her essay ‘War of Images or Images of War? Visualizing History in Jonathan Littell’s 
The Kindly Ones’ Zoë Roth notes that the origins for Littell’s novel may be traced back to 
one particular image. In an interview with Le Monde, she states, Littell suggested that the 
novel’s origins could be traced back to the image of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya – a Soviet 
partisan, whose death is actively recreated in Littell’s text:  
She had been hung by the Nazis. The Soviets found her body later, half gnawed by wolves. 
Stalin subsequently made her into an icon. What is extraordinary about this image is that we 
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perceive how beautiful this woman was. That really got my mind working [Cela m’a beaucoup 
travaillé], and at the same time it was intolerable. (2017, p. 84)  
This intolerability, I contend, stemmed from the absence of Abjection. Elisabeth Gross 
outlines the essential components of Kristeva’s theory of abjection as follows:   
The ability to take up a symbolic position as a social and speaking subject entail the disavowal 
of its modes of corporeality, especially those representing what is considered unacceptable, 
unclean or anti-social. The subject must disavow part of itself in order to gain a stable self, 
and this form of refusal marks whatever identity it acquires as provisional, and open to break 
down and instability. (2012, p. 86)  
According to Kriestva’s theory of abjection, therefore, the stability of our identity is 
conditional upon our rejection of our body’s materiality. We are repulsed by our own human 
waste, all forms of bodily excreta and the human cadaver as these all act as reminders of our 
own physicality. The physical body, as has been implied throughout this section, is a wildly 
unpredictable entity, subject to constant change. In order to form a stable and abiding sense 
of self, we must try to ignore this materiality. The feeling of repulsion we feel when faced 
with the reality of human death should therefore be both natural and unavoidable. We are 
psychologically hardwired to feel a sense of repulsion when faced with the body as the 
corpse is the pure embodiment of an object – a categorical “not me”. Littell, however, is not 
repulsed by the body of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya. Indeed, he is unnaturally drawn to the 
image of this girl. He describes noting how “beautiful” she was and the intolerability of this 
feeling. As Roth notes, the “striking composition and latent eroticism” (2017, p. 85) of the 
image is certainly at odds with its grotesque subject matter. This echoes the image of the 
deceased mother at Bergen-Belson which Barbie Zelizer called “both too beautiful and 
perhaps too erotic to be shown” (2001, p. 258). In short, both of these images conflict with 
our natural impulse towards repulsion as they imbue the raw materiality of death with an 
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unsettling element of eroticism which troubles the mind. This finding is borne out by Aue’s 
reaction to this murdered partisan, who continues to haunt him throughout the text.  
    In the chapter simply titled ‘Air’, in which Aue has entered into a period of onanistic 
madness in his sister’s house, he begins to hallucinate the spectre of a phantom lover. This 
lover is never provided with a fixed description as it seems to have no concrete form. As 
such, Aue’s mind begins to wander during his sexual encounters with it – eventually landing 
on the image of the hanged girl: 
I saw the hanged women in Kharkov who as they suffocated emptied themselves over the 
passerby. I had seen that girl we had hanged one winter day in the park behind the statue of 
Shevchenko, a young and healthy girl bursting with life, had she too come when we hanged 
her and soiled her panties… had she ever come before, she was very young, had she 
experienced that before we hanged her, what right did we have to hang her… and I sobbed 
endlessly, ravaged by her memory. (Littell, 2010, pp. 911- 912)  
If the girls of Kharkov represent pure embodiments of the abject – things which are 
traditionally distancing as they hint at our own body’s “relentless materialism and 
uncontrollability” (Arya, 2014, p. 5) – then Kosmodemyanskaya represents a window 
through which he may finally understand the humanity of the sufferer. While Roth 
characterises her as an “aesthetic object” (2015, p. 85) which has meaning thrust upon it by 
others, Aue instead chooses to imaginatively engage with her. Robert Morris, as Barbie 
Zelizer notes, could not leave the deceased mother of Bergen-Belsen as a murdered object. 
102 Instead, he chose to transform her into a “beautiful woman innocently asleep under neon 
and strobe lights” (Zelizer, 2001, p. 258) – giving her back an element of innocent eroticism 
and, in doing so, salving his own conscience. Both Aue and Littell, then, perform exactly the 
 
102 The original image of the deceased mother is referenced in Chapter One. 
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same action with Kosmodemyanskaya. Their mutual fascination with her cannot allow them 
to leave her as an abject object. Instead, they begin to focus on her as a living being – a 
young woman, defined by her erotic potential. This reconstruction then re-humanises the 
hanged girl for Aue, as he begins to match her with other living women: 
the girl we had hanged wasn’t a pig or a steer that you kill without thinking about it because 
you want to eat the flesh, she was a young girl who had been a little girl who may have been 
happy and who was then just entering life… a girl like my sister, in a way. (Littell, 2010, p. 
912)  
In the space of this one sequence, therefore, Kosmodemyanskaya has been transformed from 
a troubling corpse into a fellow human being. Aue and Littell have resolved the essential 
crisis that they experienced in the face of a problematically erotic body by restoring her to 
life and recontextualising her sexuality. Instead of something to be cast away in disgust, as 
objects always are in Kristeva’s system, she has been reintroduced into the human world. 
She is just like any other little girl, or just like Aue’s own sister. As such, she may now be 
empathised with and engaged with imaginatively. In place of abjection, therefore, Aue and 
Littell have fallen into the trap of the Mutilated Woman. They have latched on to a character 
defined by their bodily suffering and then used them as a romantic window through which 
to view the suffering of the past. She therefore comes to represent a slightly eroticised 
version of both Weissman’s fantasy of witnessing and Landsberg’s prosthetic memory. For 
Littell, Kosmodemyanskaya’s vividly realised hanging allows him to experience a fantasy 
of witnessing, just as Lax’s son was able to emotionally connect with the horror of the 
Holocaust only through the felt pain of the parachuters. Aue, in effect, becomes the lens 
through which Littell views the atrocity and, arguably, interacts with it, instilling a distant 
historical event with a sense of tactility. Aue, after all, along with all of the other soldiers 
and officers present, kisses Kosmodemyanskaya prior to her hanging. This, I contend, allows 
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Littell to gain a sense of both physical and emotional proximity to the historical past. As Aue 
participated in the event, therefore, he cannot be said to have experienced a fantasy of 
witnessing. However, by creating a felt connection with the body of the Other – specifically, 
by focusing on her sexuality – he is able to engage with her as a fellow human. Throughout 
the text Aue has consistently demonstrated a preoccupation with female pleasure and, 
relatedly, a desire to inhabit his sister’s subject position. Examining his own penetrative 
encounters with men, he notes: “I reasoned, it brought me even closer to her; in that way, I 
would feel almost everything she felt, when she touched me, kissed me, licked me” (p. 203). 
Aue’s homosexual encounters are therefore staged as attempts to prosthetically inhabit his 
own sister’s erotic experiences – to temporarily gain a sense of her uniquely womanly 
perspective on pleasure. This indicates that Aue already has a pre-existing tendency to equate 
eroticism with a blurring of identities. By focusing on Kosmodemyanskaya’s thwarted erotic 
potential, he therefore comes to see the reality of his crimes as he finally conceives of her as 
a fellow human being – one who may be engaged with, inhabited and therefore partially 
understood, as she no longer represents a foreign entity.     
    It is telling, however, that Aue’s moment of empathetic and imaginative engagement 
happens with a non-Jewish character. As he remains an unrepentant “intellectual” (p. 241) 
anti-Semite, he never quite manages to humanise the Jewish body. They, the text affirms, 
are still abjected.  
    Proof of Aue’s stance regarding the abjected Jewish body is scattered throughout the 
novel. The basic premise is most explicitly articulated in the following section, however:  
 By killing the Jews… we wanted to kill ourselves, kill the vermin within us, kill that which 
in us resembles the idea we have of the Jew… For we’ve never understood that these qualities 
that we attribute to the Jews, calling them baseness, spinelessness, avarice, greed, thirst for 
dominion and facile malice are fundamentally German qualities. (pp. 874-875) 
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Though these words are not spoken by Aue, further context shows that they outline the 
National Socialist stance regarding the Jewish people. If within the context of the individual 
body/self the abject is “what I must get rid of in order to be an I at all” (Foster, 1996, p. 114), 
nationalist and racially driven groups will also define their own self-image by identifying, 
othering and expelling certain individuals. Wartime Germany, according to this reading, is 
redefining its own self-image by externalising a certain set of negative traits and assigning 
them to another racial group. As the Jewish population has now come to embody every 
internal trait that National Socialism wishes to expel, their murder will then stabilise 
Germany’s self-image. By having one of his characters explicitly state this, Littell is forcing 
the concept of abjection back into the reader’s consciousness. He wants his reader to consider 
the Final Solution from a purely Kristevan perspective. As such, the author’s frequent 
references to human filth – as Eric Sandberg has noted, “shit” comes to “permeate the novel” 
in “pronounced ways” (2014, p. 250) – become inextricably associated with both the corpse 
and murder as a means of affirming national identity.   
    During the massacre at Babi Yar, for instance, Aue notes: “The horrible smell of 
excrement was stronger than that of blood, a lot of people defecated as they died” (Littell, 
2010, p. 128). This is typical of Aue’s descriptions of mass killings, which always focus on 
the extreme materiality of murder. Through habituation, therefore, the reader comes to 
associate mass killing with defecation. This link is further hammered home during a later 
sequence in which we are faced with the reality of death in a mobile killing van. It is not, as 
Aue is told, a clean form of murder: “The bodies were covered with shit and vomit, the men 
were disgusted” (p. 174). This excessive emphasis on the pure physicality of death does not 
exist simply for the sake of gratuity, I contend. Rather, Littell is trying to indicate to the 
reader abjection’s role as a key to unpacking his text. One always needs to bear it in mind, 
as its central tenets underpin every aspect of Aue’s life. More than this, however, it is also 
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crucial to unpacking Aue’s basic psychology. He may not be familiar with the principle 
himself, but his behaviours are certainly defined by it and are only explicable though its 
application. 
As we have seen, the politics of the Nazi state seem to align with the general principal of 
Kristevan abjection. They are othering large portions of their nation in order to reify their 
own constructed sense of self. The Holocaust, then, was an event in which abjection 
frequently took place on both a private and public level. The murder of the Jewish people 
represents national abjection while the murderers were frequently repulsed on a personal 
level. This connection is affirmed in the chapter ‘Menuet (en Rondeux)’ in which Aue is 
gripped by sickness. His illness is recounted with a characteristic fondness for detail. He 
speaks of a “long diarrhoea that seemed to never end” before referencing his “toilet bowl 
full of waste” (p. 809). It is important to note at this point, however, that Aue is not repulsed 
by his own bodily matter. Though he does not revel in its presence, he does feel a curious 
sense of shamelessness. For instance, he is content to have Frau Zempke clean him, “as if he 
were a little child” (p. 811). This is inherently unnatural, as Colin McGinn has previously 
noted as we, as humans, should be most repulsed when waste is in close proximity to our 
body: “bodily waste is at its most appalling when in the very act of leaving the body’s interior 
– as with the dangling turd, the running nose, and spurting blood.… The closer to breathing 
life the material is the worse it seems” (2011, p. 103). Aue is presently unable to clean 
himself and so, practically speaking, he is figuratively steeping in his own filth – including, 
by association, his Holocaust sins. Despite this, however, he is content under the non-
judgemental gaze of a neutral party. When Helene – his current female companion, whose 
interest in him is always kind and indulgent – becomes his carer, however, Aue suddenly 
becomes aware of the abject nature of his own filth. After she cleans him, he states the 
following: “I wasn’t ashamed of it, but I was disgusted with myself and this disgust extended 
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to her, to her patience and her gentleness” (Littell, 2010, pp. 812-813). The source of this 
disgust clearly stems from his complex associations regarding human waste. This is not 
simply reflexive repulsion but a sudden awareness of guilt, as he is now under the watchful 
eye of a foundationally decent woman. She has not been corrupted by the taint of the 
Holocaust, and yet she is now in close proximity to his bodily filth – a substance which has 
become inextricably linked with his own guilt. This becomes overly apparent when he tries 
to force her, effectively, into inhabiting the grey zone. He begins to rail at her, implicating 
her in his own sins:  
You come to take care of me, you think I’m a nice man, with a law degree, a perfect gentleman, 
a good catch. We’re murdering people, you understand, that’s what we do, all of us, your 
husband was a murderer, I’m a murderer, and you, you’re a murderer’s accomplice, you wear 
and you eat the fruit of our labour. (p. 816) 
This reaction has clearly been prompted by Helene’s encounter with Aue’s human waste. 
Only now has his physical uncleanness, and his literal proximity to his own filth, come to 
bother him. This angst has then manifested as the furious spreading of blame. He is quick to 
remind Helene of her own inadvertent complicity. He may be a murderer, but she has 
benefited from the Nazis’ exterminationist actions. She is, after all, wearing clothes which 
once belonged to dead women and eating food seized from the homes and luggage of the 
Jewish population. This spreading of blame is emblematic of his desire to lessen his own 
sense of taintedness. His wishes to distance himself from his own physical and spiritual 
staining and so he is looking to bloody Helene’s hands by association. For a moment, 
therefore, Aue has genuinely entered into a state of bodily crisis. For perhaps the first time 
in his life Aue has experienced a moment of “corporeal turmoil” (Arya, 2014, p. 6), as his 
sense of disgust has shaken his foundational conception of himself. Aue is not, as he states 
in the opening of the text, a repentant man: “…I can assure you that they will at least be free 
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from any form of contrition. I do not regret anything: I did my work, that’s all” (Littell, 2010, 
p. 5). Though his narrative may not demonstrate contrition, it certainly does feature one 
sequence fuelled by self-disgust and a reflexive to desire to expiate – even to abject, by 
giving them to Helene – his own sins. This is not the product of self-reflection, but a moment 
of realisation stemming from physical repulsion.  
    As with Hope: A Tragedy, therefore, at the end of the day there is only the body. Littell’s 
text springs from his own preoccuptation with a beatific corpse and his problematic 
fascination with it. Aue’s narrative, similarly, is fuelled by a preoccupation with the body, 
excreta and the material substance of death. The body and its problematic physicality, 
therefore, practically underpins every aspect of this text.  
    Both texts featured in this section reduce the human complexity of the Holocaust dead to 
a simple preoccupation with the human body. We cannot form a felt, fraternal connection 
with Anne Frank as she existed in reality and so, in effect, we have become obsessed with 
maintaining her Holocaust ghost. Our broader cultural understanding of her was shaped in 
the 1950s and we are reluctant to allow this conception of Anne to evolve in any sense. Our 
vision of her has become fixed and static and, in order to give it an added sense of solidity, 
we have tied it to the image of a faultless smiling child. In place of a real body, therefore, 
we have a static picture, frozen in time. Anne’s form will forever remain fixed and 
unevolved. Our broader cultural desire, therefore, hinges on our assumption that she will 
always look the same – that she will exist forever, hopeful and unchanged. In place of her 
human reality, therefore, we have an empty body – a hollow vessel, which people may use 
to engage with the Holocaust past. At the end of the day, as Auslander effectively illustrated, 
our preoccupation with her is almost totally bodily.  
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    Littell’s preoccupation with Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya then adds further evidence of our 
societal preoccupation with the bodies of the wartime dead, as it actively explores his desire 
to see her as something other than an aesthetic object. His text, in short, pivots around his 
desire to restore a sense of humanity and particularity to one sufferer, while also exploring 
Aue’s feelings of guilt through the concept of abjection. Once again, therefore, the body is 
positioned at the very centre of a piece of modern Holocaust fiction.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with the foundational assertion that modern Holocaust fiction 
demonstrates a fundamental incapacity to engage with the Holocaust dead on a human and, 
as Semprun would have it, “fraternal” level. This is foundationally problematic as this 
profound emotional distance from the Holocaust has led instead to an intense desire to touch 
the essence of the Holocaust – to actively experience some form of bodily engagement with 
the victim’s plight. Holocaust sites, this study asserted, possess very little affective power 
and exist simply as sterile, manicured sites providing highly mediated snippets of 
information. In short, in order to engage with the Holocaust dead, something more radical is 
required of the modern writer/reader – a vivid, inhabitable moment of suffering. Unable to 
reconnect with their basic humanity, therefore, we have instead shifted emphasis onto their 
bodies. We now obsess over everything from the materiality of their deaths to their body as 
a means of affectively engaging with the Holocaust past. In place of fraternity, then, there is 
only the body.  
    The first section of this chapter utilised the writings of Ida Fink to explore the idea that 
Holocaust fiction has previously displayed the potential to approach the Holocaust dead 
impiously. Using Gillian Rose’s work as its theoretical baseline it argued that only those 
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with first-hand experience of certain elements of the Shoah – those who may be at least 
classed as a “kind of survivor” – may reflect the Holocaust dead with depth and humanity. 
For Fink, the murdered are not intangible abstractions but approachable humans with whom 
she feels a detectable kindship. For her, the Holocaust is not an entirely post-memorial 
construction. Instead, her lived experiences have invested her fiction with not only 
authenticity but human specificity. Moreover, as Fink has a felt, experiential connection with 
the Holocaust dead, she does not need to strain – as Martin Lax’s son did – to touch the 
reality of human suffering. It is because of this, therefore, that she was able to provide a 
“good enough” form of fictional testimony for the missing.  
    Heather Morris’s The Tattooist of Auschwitz, by contrast, epitomises the current issues 
facing Holocaust fiction. Morris’s evocation of Auschwitz stands as a tissue-thin 
construction of assembled post-memorial references and common images. Just as Lax’s son 
could find no felt connection to the Mauthausen site, so too was Morris’s vision of Auschwitz 
hopelessly abstract. This much was confirmed by the findings of Wanda Witek-Malicka who 
had painstakingly catalogued all of Morris’s false assertions and outright inventions. In 
short, Morris felt no form of connection to the bodily reality of Holocaust suffering and so 
she sought to re-vivify the horror of the Auschwitz camp by reimagining the plight of several 
female sufferers. In turn, the incessant brutality of Auschwitz was then reconceptualised as 
an explicitly sexual form of violence. Morris, in short, has reconfigured the historical reality 
of the Auschwitz camp in order to make it more comprehensible to both herself and her 
nonwitness readers. Returning to Lang’s standard of silence, therefore, Morris’s text may be 
considered actively harmful to our understanding of the Holocaust. It is not “probative”, or 
“incisive”, or “revealing” (2000, p. 18). Instead, as the Auschwitz Memorial Museum itself 
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has asserted, it is “almost without any value as a document”.103 This is problematic, as it 
claims to tell the true story of Lale Sokolov, while at the same time propagating a series of 
post-memorial distortions. 
    The final two texts discussed in this chapter, however – Hope: A Tragedy and The Kindly 
Ones – do add something to our broader understanding of the Holocaust. They are both, in 
their own ways, illustrative of our current pre-occupation with the body. Auslander’s text 
painstakingly explores the manner in which Anne Frank’s identity has been tied inextricably 
to the image of her as a smiling child. By creating a monstrous, insectile and patently cynical 
distortion of Frank, he has sought to trigger our own learned Holocaust pieties. We are 
incapable, just as Kugel’s mother is, of constructing an evolving vision of Anne. We wish 
to imagine her as a perpetual child, unaltered and accessible. To focus on the raw materiality 
of her body is to remind us, to again cite a quotation from Rina Arya, of the “relentless 
materialism and uncontrollability” (2014, p. 5) of the human form. Anne’s body did not 
remain static while in hiding. Our vision of her, however, demands stability. We need her to 
retain her dimensions, in short, in order to identify with her – to step into her persona and 
affectively engage with her past. Our modern-day preoccupation with the Holocaust, 
Auslander proves, is defined entirely by distance, a lack of knowledge and the absence of 
human understanding. All we have left is a preoccupation with the body – both ours and the 
victim’s. 
    Littell’s The Kindly Ones then built upon this argument by presenting the reader with a 
text which is entirely defined by the raw materiality of death. Not only did the germ of 
inspiration come from the body of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya – a corpse with which both 
Littell and Aue formed a problematic fixation – but Aue’s guilt was also tied explicitly to 
 




the dual images of defecation and death. It was, in short, a text entirely preoccupied with the 
raw materials of the Holocaust. Once again, therefore, in place of humanity we can find only 
the base components of the suffering body. In this way we may then say that both texts are, 
at the very least, probative in nature as they invite a level of self-analysis in the reader. By 
highlighting our preoccupation with the suffering body, and – in the case of Auslander’s text 
– by actively critiquing it, these texts may prove useful in correcting the foundational issues 
which underpin modern Holocaust fiction. Our frequent emphasis on the suffering body, as 
these texts illustrate, is emblematic of our current vision the Holocaust. We cannot 
understand their plight, or – in the case of the dead, recover them as people – and so we have 
become overly focused on either the material reality of death or moments of prosthetic 
engagement. This, however, is an approach which must be corrected as it represents a 
conceptual dead end. There is nothing to be learned from the suffering body beyond the 
simple existence of pain. We must find a way, I contend, to reconnect with the murdered as 
people, to particularise them as individuals by shifting away from these obsessive recreations 
of the atrocity.104 If we cannot do this, then fiction will remain trapped in a pattern of 













This thesis has articulated, from the outset, that our current conception of the Shoah is both 
overly narrow and inherently problematic. A foundational preoccupation with Auschwitz, 
and a cultural assumption that it represents the conceptual core of the atrocity, has resulted 
in a view of the Shoah which frequently leads to the dehumanisation of its victims. We 
cannot humanise them or individualise them by attaching particularising details, as they are 
commonly eclipsed by the sheer number of the dead. The mountains of evidence which now 
speak to their passing – the items displayed in the museum of Auschwitz-I and the United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum – only convey the scale of mass murder and the 
irrecoverability of the individual. This, the thesis asserts, defines our present post-memory 
of the Holocaust. Mere months prior to the completion of this study, on the 18th of June 2019, 
the real-world consequences of this Auschwitz-oriented conception of the event became 
apparent. Responding to Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s assertion that America’s border 
detention facilities resemble concentration camps, Rep. Liz Cheney of Wyoming replied: 
“Please @AOC do us all a favor and spend just a few minutes learning some actual history. 
6 million Jews were exterminated in the Holocaust. You demean their memory and disgrace 
yourself with comments like this [sic].”105 The crucial word in Rep. Cheney’s statement, and 
the one which automatically elucidates her thinking while also invalidating her argument, is 
“exterminated”.106 Rep. Cheney is disallowing Rep. Ocasio-Cortez’s analogy as the migrant 
 
105 Retrieved from Rep. Cheney’s Twitter account: 
https://twitter.com/Liz_Cheney/status/1140988893627478018 
106 In a video posted on her own Youtube page, Rep. Cheney reiterates her explicitly extermination-oriented 
conception of the Shoah. At 2:23 in her interview with Fox News, anchor-man Ed Henry highlights Rep. 
Ocasio-Cortez’s attempt to distinguish concentration camps and extermination camps. He undermines this 
distinction by using the word “somehow”: “she tried to clarify that she was saying that there’s a difference 
between concentration camps and extermination camps, somehow” (2:25). The anchor’s incredulous tone 
and downward look suggest that this clarification is being actively refuted. Rep. Cheney goes on to describe 
Rep. Ocasio-Cortez as “ignorant” (2:49), endorsing her own exterminationist view of the Shoah.  
The full video can be found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aFVlvodLbiw 
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detention centres are not extermination sites. As such, to borrow a term from the USHMM 
itself, Rep. Ocasio-Cortez is being accused of “sloppy analogising” (Friedberg, 2018, n.p.). 
In an abbreviated statement in 2019, the communications director of the institution – Andrew 
Hollinger – warns that the museum “unequivocally rejects efforts to create analogies 
between the Holocaust and other events, whether historical or contemporary” (2019, n.p.). 
Though the institution may speak of the human particularity of the Holocaust – from the 
“brutal murder of a baby boy” to the “rape of a beloved sister” (Friedberg, 2018, n.p.) – it 
publicly endorses a traditionally pious view of the Shoah.107 The Holocaust must not be 
approached or rationalised or made comprehensible through historical comparison, instead 
it must be regarded with unreflective reverence. Both Rep. Cheney and the USHMM are 
using Holocaust Piety as a rhetorical shield and a means to end the discussion. They wish 
for us to have no conception of the sufferers as people – to have no understanding of the 
moral reality of life within the camp system or the ghettos – but rather to be stunned into 
unreflective silence through the mere mention of the exterminated. Rep. Cheney’s statement 
is therefore not simply unreflective of the historical reality of the Holocaust – as Timothy 
Snyder has articulated the “huge majority of Jews murdered in the Holocaust never saw a 
concentration camp” (2019a, n.p.), having been murdered by killing squads in the occupied 
territories or disposed of in killing centres – but it represents a foundational misapprehension 
of Rep. Ocasio-Cortez’s position. As she stated in her now deleted video, she invoked the 
comparison to the concentration camps of the Holocaust as a means to explore the “Never 
Again” framing of the event. She intends, in other words, for Americans to ponder the 
political and cultural steps which have led to the creation of detention facilities on American 
soil – a form of moral decline which, as Christopher Browning has noted, does have certain 
 
107 The spokespeople currently speaking for the institution, it may be said, express this position of piety. It is 
overly simplistic, however, to state the museum itself is entirely pious in nature.   
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parallels with Germany’s changing attitudes in the 1930s – and their failure to learn from 
the Holocaust.108 As Snyder notes in a later piece, just like the concentration camps of the 
Holocaust, these detention centres demonstrate the moral impact of working in “legally gray 
places” as workers within these facilities gradually give way to “their worst impulses” 
(2019b, n.p.). As such, Rep. Ocasio-Cortez’s position is more in line with an impious view 
of the Holocaust which explicitly analyses and articulates the motivations of those within 
the moral grey zone. She aims to make a present-day event comprehensible through active 
comparisons to a historical tragedy. A tragedy which, implicitly, she understands to be more 
complex, human and particular than Rep. Cheney and the USHMM. In short, Rep. Ocasio-
Cortez has inadvertently proven that Holocaust Impiety is the only way forward. We can 
only understand the events of the present if we may come to terms with the moral complexity 
of the past. By contrast, Rep. Cheney has proven that the comparatively narrow conception 
of the Holocaust which is perpetuated in the vast majority of Holocaust fiction represents a 
conceptual dead end. When one understands the event only as a vague fusion of Auschwitz, 
the gas chamber and the quasi-sacred murdered then it cannot positively impact the present. 
It serves instead as a moral cudgel, to be used by those who wish to stun their opponents into 
silence.   
    Returning to Berel Lang, therefore, a valuable piece of modern Holocaust fiction – one 
which does not compound the problematically narrow conception of the event expressed by 
Rep. Cheney – must be “more probative, more incisive” or indeed “more revealing” (2000, 
p. 18) than silence. As Lang notes, the question must be asked if the loss of a given text 
might not, “in moral and/or cognitive terms, manifest itself as a gain” (p. 18). Four of the 
more contemporary texts analysed in this thesis – Pascal Croci’s Auschwitz, Tim Blake 
 




Nelson’s The Grey Zone, Steve Stern’s The North of God and Heather Morris’s The Tattooist 
of Auschwitz – represent works which, I contend, add nothing to our understanding of the 
Shoah. All four of these texts exemplify the flaws inherent in Auschwitz-oriented thinking. 
While Auschwitz dominates all four texts, Croci, Nelson, Stern and Morris all struggle to 
engage with the fundamental impossibility of representing the sufferer’s plight. The 
experiential reality of life and death within Auschwitz, as was outlined in Chapter Two, 
remains locked away within either the deep memory of the survivor or the experiences of 
the dead. Similarly, as Chapter Four demonstrated, the modern-day creator cannot approach 
the dead with fraternal familiarity, as they now represent distant, abstract, semi-sacred 
figures. As such, they are also unable to represent the Holocaust dead impiously – they 
cannot represent their inner fears or underlying motivations as they have no conception of 
their psychology or experiential reality. In place of an impious representation, therefore, all 
four creators instead rely on the same representational ploy: they ignore the humanity of the 
sufferer and instead focus on the material and the bodily. All four texts, as has been 
demonstrated, feature a totemic suffering body – specifically, the body of a woman and/or 
girl. Crucially, they are also built around the concept of bodily engagement or “prosthetic 
memory”. In short, they utilise the physical suffering of their featured characters in order to 
make the reader/viewer feel something of the atrocity – to have it momentarily come alive, 
as it did for Michael Lax in Mauthausen when he imagined the suffering of the “parachuters” 
(Weissman, 2004, p. 4). Just like Lax, the creator only comes close to “realising [their] desire 
to experience” (p. 4) the reality of the camps when they engage with the past on a bodily 
level. When Auschwitz dominates our conception of the Holocaust, therefore, our 
understanding of the Shoah becomes explicitly bodily. We resign ourselves to the 
impossibility of connecting with the psychology of the dead and instead focus on their 
suffering bodies. This, however – as Rep. Cheney’s statement illustrates – is not 
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instructive.109 We learn nothing from this kind of bodily engagement, experiencing only a 
moment of pious horror. Describing the viewer’s exposure to scenes of suffering in 
Schindler’s List, Alison Landsberg notes: “Our discomfort derives from the power of the 
image to move us and to make intelligible and visceral what we cannot comprehend in a 
purely bodily way” (2004, pp. 125-126). Specifically, Landsberg asserts that these sequences 
allow the viewer to experience a lack of physical “agency” (p. 125) – imagining that modern 
viewers will not have experienced violent racial oppression or military violence. However, 
according to Gillian Rose’s definition, this does not approach impiety. The viewer of 
Schindler’s List has learned nothing about the reality of racial fear or the psychological 
extremes experienced by those under pressure. Instead, they merely feel “vulnerable in 
bodily ways” (p. 125), which implies simply that they have experienced a moment of purely 
physical anxiety after having been presented with the image of another suffering body. We 
experience the blunt reality of another’s pain, and experience a moment of sympathetic 
unease, but the broader nature of the Holocaust remains ineffable. Proof of this can be found 
in Landsberg’s further description of the de-racialised bodies in Schindler’s List. Noting that 
a non-Jewish audience will likely struggle to engage with Night and Fog by Alain Resnais, 
as she believes media consumers to be incapable of “identification across ethnic lines” (p. 
124), she suggests that Schindler’s List presents more cross-culturally appealing characters:  
The film offers its viewers Jewish bodies with which they might have a mimetic relationship… 
Having identified with the Jews first as members of the middle class before the dehumanisation 
begins, the spectator finds the torture and cruelty of the Nazis all the more traumatic. (p. 124) 
The vision Schindler’s List presents, therefore, is of an almost entirely de-Judaised 
Holocaust. Immediately, therefore, the religious context of the Shoah itself has been side-
 
109 While I do not wish to claim that Rep. Cheney has engaged with the texts featured, I am asserting that 
she has an overly Auschwitz-oriented conception of the Holocaust. One which, I contend, leads inevitably to 
the dehumanisation of the sufferer/survivor.  
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lined in an effort to facilitate bodily engagement. Under these conditions the viewer learns 
nothing about the historical Holocaust, as the emphasis has been limited to bodily 
discomfort. They may, as Landsberg argued, engage on a physical level with the loss of 
agency, but this has been almost entirely de-contextualised. When the viewer is made to 
inhabit a body they do not understand, entirely lacking in motivations or – in most instances 
– a history within the narrative, they are only experiencing physical threat.  
    As Chapter Three outlined, Tim Blake Nelson’s The Grey Zone takes this notion to its 
logical extreme by having the viewer experience a moment of gassing. Once again, we are 
placed in an entirely de-contextualised body – the girl we inhabit has no spoken dialogue 
and does not feature in the film as a major character – and made to fully inhabit a moment 
of pain. Nothing is done to block our attempt at emotional engagement as we are positioned 
within an almost faceless child – prior to her gassing we are shown only her eyes, as Figure 
26 illustrates. As such, the viewer is once again learning nothing of the Holocaust. We are 
merely inhabiting a decontextualized, nameless, faceless child and experiencing a moment 
of primal insecurity – we, on a bodily level, do not wish to experience pain or to watch our 
mother die. The value of this experience, as such, is profoundly limited. The viewer’s 
perhaps non-Jewish body has engaged with a moment of physical, universal pain but nothing 
about the particular reality of the Holocaust has been learned or imparted. We have not made 
the cognitive leap towards understanding an ethnic perspective other than our own. Instead, 
we have merely imagined our own bodies, as nonwitnesses and potentially non-Jews, 
experiencing a moment of discomfort. This is not the kind of experience which might inform 
our view of the present or impact the world in a useful way as we have still learned nothing 
about the Shoah itself. Our vision of it, in fact, has become rather more partial, as the 




   Utilising Lang’s standard of silence, therefore, I contend that the world would lose nothing 
from the erasure of these texts. They are problematic as they have been positioned, culturally, 
as a means to provide the public with a “dose of Holocaust” (Cole, 1999, p. 154). When we 
encounter these moments of bodily connection in fiction, or indeed experience the cattle car 
in a USHMM, the nature of the atrocity has supposedly been imparted in the form of a 
microdose – a minor exposure to the nature of the Shoah. This is then enough “the thinking 
goes” to communicate the essence of the Holocaust and to inoculate us against the prospect 
of “totalitarianism, racism” and “state-sponsored murder” (p. 154) in the present. However, 
as recent events have proven, this is not the case. This pious vision of the atrocity, which 
does not reflect the psychology of the sufferer or particularise them racially, conveys the 
message that bodily suffering and mass extermination are the only parts of the Shoah which 
have meaning or value in the present. This is the kind of thinking, however, which fuelled 
the statements of Rep. Cheney. It effectively ends all discussion, as it suggests that the 
Holocaust is a broadly unapproachable abstraction which we cannot understand but only 
feel. This is societally damaging as it means that the thinking which fuelled the Shoah, the 
degrees of moral slippage which affected both the perpetrators and those within the grey 
zone, remains unfathomable. The only way forward, I contend, is to find a way to reconnect 
with the victims of the Shoah impiously, both in order to demystify the atrocity and, vitally, 
to humanise the victims who have been utterly dehumanised by modern media and, arguably, 
the USHMM. This, however, would require a shift away from Auschwitz and extermination 
as the conceptual cores of the Holocaust.110      
    Even those modern texts which this thesis views as being valuable, crucially, convey 
nothing about the reality of the Holocaust itself. As they are still governed by Auschwitz-
 
110 While I do not wish to ignore industrialised mass extermination as a vital part of the Holocaust, I do 
argue that an explicit focus on extermination – at the expense of the victims’ cultural and psychological 
particularities – is problematic.  
268 
 
oriented thinking, they cannot connect with the experiential reality of the past or the 
humanity of the dead. Instead, they have value as they critique our current vision of the 
Shoah. Shalom Auslander’s Hope: A Tragedy and The Kindly Ones by Jonathan Littell both 
illustrate and, to different degrees, probe the current preoccupation with the suffering body 
and the materialisation of Holocaust death. As Chapter Four detailed, these texts are both 
“incisive” and “probative” (Lang, 2000, p. 18) and so they may be deemed valuable. They 
may be said to positively impact our conception of the Shoah. However, they do so by 
illustrating its flaws. Auslander’s text, particularly, highlights the relative calcification of 
Holocaust knowledge and the degree to which our present vision of the Shoah now consists 
of two elements: limiting Holocaust iconography and inhabitable bodies.111 Specifically, 
Auslander critiques the modern compulsion to inhabit the suffering body. Both Solomon 
Kugel and his mother attempt to step into the shoes of Anne Frank. While his mother 
assumes Anne’s memories as her own, Solomon comes to fret about the prospect of a second 
Shoah and “who would agree to hide him and his family in their attic” (2012, p. 109). Bodily 
identification, Auslander’s text implies, represents our primary means of engaging with the 
Holocaust past. This is why his characters continuously try to rehome the Shoah in their own 
bodies – why mother takes on the persona of a survivor and Solomon, by extension, becomes 
her second-generation child. Auslander’s characters can only understand the Shoah when it 
has been repositioned in their bodies as nonwitnesses. Auslander’s monstrous version of 
Anne Frank therefore represents an extreme attempt to re-particularise the Holocaust – to 
house it specifically in one suffering body which cannot be inhabited. Such is our 
compulsion to prosthetically wear the experiences of others, Auslander’s text implies, that 
 
111 The imagery may be described as “limiting” as it promotes a specifically extermination-oriented, 
Auschwitz-specific vision of the atrocity.  
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the Kugels will step into anything humanoid, and so Anne must be warped beyond all 
recognition in order for her Holocaust past to remain exclusively her own.  
    Auslander’s text is therefore particularly incisive as it provides a salient warning about a 
trend which has come to define modern Holocaust fiction. Future generations, I contend, are 
being primed to engage with the Holocaust in an exclusively pious and bodily way. Both 
John Boyne’s text and Mark Herman’s film of The Boy in the Striped Pyjamas illustrate that 
Auslander’s warning has relevance. Assuming that the tragedy of the Holocaust would have 
less cultural significance when attached to the Jewish other – Shmuel is generally positioned 
as an alien figure on the other side of a fence – The Boy instead focuses on the death of a 
non-Jewish child. Bruno, given his lack of character definition, serves as the audience’s 
surrogate. Anne Rothe describes him as a “mini-Schindler” or “an infantilised version of the 
good German figure” (2011, p. 139). By this she means that he is not really a character but 
rather a simplistic embodiment of non-Jewish decency. In short, he is a character designed 
to be inhabited – to allow the audience to experience the horrors of the Shoah in a body 
almost indistinguishable from their own. When Bruno is gassed, therefore, the audience is 
not simply inhabiting the Jewish body, but rather the prospect of gassing has crossed racial 
lines. It is not simply an experience that non-Jews may wear – while still recognising its 
ethnic origins – but rather one which has been re-homed in the non-Jewish body. Gassing, 
in short, has been universalised. As such, The Boy is priming its audience for a life of bodily 
Holocaust engagement. The Jewish sufferer, they are being told, must remain an abstract 
figure on the other side of a fence. You cannot comprehend their suffering but, when the 
prospect of gassing is applied to the Christian middle-class body, you can bodily engage 
with a part of the Holocaust experience – arguably, its conceptual core. 
    As Auslander warns, therefore, the body has become the accepted means of engaging with 
the Holocaust. Under this Auschwitz-specific conception of the event, the dead remain 
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distant, psychologically incomprehensible figures. This represents not only a threat to our 
future – as Rep. Cheney’s statements affirm – but also a continuing trend in Holocaust 
fiction. On 3rd October 2019, Heather Morris will release a follow-up to The Tattooist which 
focuses explicitly on Cilka – the minor character whose sexual suffering conveyed the horror 
of the Holocaust in the original text. While it is too early to pass judgement on the content 
of the text, the risk remains that Morris may again connect to the Holocaust through the 
sexualised suffering of the Jewish other – re-conceiving Auschwitz pain as something more 
representable than abstract extermination or sustained brutality. This is again problematic as 
it both fails to convey the nature of the atrocity – by reframing the Holocaust as an almost 
exclusively sexual crime – and further dehumanises the victims. The focus once more is 
positioned not on their psychology, or the emotional reality of sex-for-survival dynamics, 
but on our present-day capacity to touch the Holocaust past. These lurid depictions of sexual 
suffering illustrate the lengths to which the contemporary author must go in order to feel 
something of the Holocaust – to experience at least a portion of the atrocity in their own 
body. In order to correct this compulsion, I contend – to prevent further limiting our 
understanding of the Shoah – we must find a way to reconnect with the dead as individuals. 
We must find texts which outline their motivations, their particular fears, the reality of their 
wartime communities, their particularising Judaism and – in certain instances – their moral 
downfall. We must once again widen our scope and reconnect with other writing about the 
Holocaust: accounts from other camps (preferably with less of an emphasis on 
extermination), accounts of people surviving in hiding and, vitally, writing from the ghetto.  
    As noted in the Introduction, Alan Mintz distinguishes between two forms of Holocaust 
writing: “exceptionalist” and “constructivist”. While exceptionalist texts focus on the horror 
of the atrocity, viewing the camps as a metonymy for the event, constructivist texts take a 
different approach, focusing instead on the ghetto. Constructivist texts are therefore defined 
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by two elements which this thesis deems vital to a fuller understanding of the Holocaust: the 
cultural particularisation of the victims and an exploration of their wartime psychology. 
Mintz argues, critically, that Auschwitz-oriented survivor memoirs, despite their undeniable 
value, have also partly contributed to the cultural de-particularisation of the victims of the 
Shoah. As he puts it: “The life of the prisoner is a life that has been reduced to a biological 
core that exists before culture or beneath culture” (p. 70). Unlike the ghetto, he suggests, the 
concentration camp represents a culturally vacant space, defined generally by hunger and 
survival. Though certain sources make mention of hidden religious practices – Fania Fénelon 
notes that in her block “overt religious practices” did take place, despite being “badly 
received” (1986, p. 170) by the other members of the orchestra, while Sybil Milton also 
describes the clandestine religious activities of Orthodox Jewish women in Auschwitz – the 
vast majority tend to emphasise the mechanics of survival and the brutal reality of 
Auschwitz.112 The specific culture of the victim, therefore, is eclipsed by the horrors of the 
atrocity. In order to come to a more complete understanding of the event, therefore – one 
which is not simply founded upon visions of extermination and inhabitable bodies in pain – 
we must supplement our Auschwitz-oriented reading with knowledge of Jewish pre-camp 
cultural life.  
    Unlike the camps, the ghettos existed as vibrant, complex communities with broadly 
unrestrained religious and cultural lives. David G. Roskies notes that life within the ghettos 
was “defiantly vibrant… Jews sang songs, delivered sermons and eulogies, declaimed 
poetry, mounted exhibitions, performed plays” (2012, pp. 45-45). By conveying these 
specific cultural details, and connecting the reader with the particular reality of the pre-camp 
 
112 Sybil Milton describes the Orthodox women from “Hungary and Subcarpathean Ruthenia” performing 
the following activities in secret: “When Sabbath candles were unavailable they blessed electric lightbulbs; 
their colleagues assigned to the Canada barracks… filched supplies for them to make Sabbath candles 
improvised from hollowed-out potato peels filled with margarine and rag wicks” (1993, pp. 229-230).  
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Jewish community, the ghetto diary is able to create a semi-fraternal connection to the 
Holocaust dead. As Mintz notes, the ghetto diary serves as a “window onto the experience 
of Jewry in real time rather than recollected time” (2001, p.65). This is not a post-Holocaust 
framing of the event, therefore – which will naturally have taken account of the prevailing 
view of the event at the time of writing – but rather real-time access to functioning Jewish 
communities. In lieu of having lived it, therefore, the ghetto diary provides the nonwitness 
with a means to reconnect with the Holocaust dead as culturally specific, complex people. 
In order to come to a fuller understanding of the event, therefore – and to provide the 
Auschwitz-oriented fiction of the present with much-needed context – we need to come to 
an intellectual and cultural understanding of precisely who the Holocaust’s victims were.  
    Roskies, for instance, outlines the role which songs often played in the ghetto 
communities. “In the East”, as he puts it, “everyone sang” (2012, p. 48). The harsh reality of 
ghetto life was framed and decoded using the music of street singers who would adapt the 
“familiar melodies” of Yiddish musical theatre or the “standard folk repertory” in order to 
sing pieces which were “highly topical” and “rooted in the present (p. 48). This represents a 
specific cultural response to the atrocity, a uniquely Jewish means of engaging with the 
events of the Holocaust as they transpired. This kind of specific detailing, I argue, is required 
to undo the decades of universalisation which have gradually transformed the Jewish victim 
into the suffering body. While I do not wish to discount and invalidate the writings of Levi 
and Wiesel, therefore, I do argue that – in the present – additional context is required in order 
to avoid a singularly reductive, purely horror-oriented conception of the Holocaust. In a 
thesis founded on the notion of post-memorial distance, therefore, the ghetto diary may begin 
to narrow the emotional and cultural gap which exists between the authors and readers of 
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the present and many of the victims of the Shoah.113 As Fink’s short stories illustrated in 
Chapter Four, an experience of the ghetto – or simply wartime Jewish living – is seemingly 
required in order to regard the victims impiously. While the ghetto diary cannot entirely 
close this gap, it can potentially create a firmer understanding in our minds of the dead as 
people.  
     This, therefore, accounts for one aspect of the constructivists’ attempt to particularise the 
Holocaust. As Mintz asserts, the ghetto diary also provides a greater sense of psychological 
proximity to the sufferer. Fink’s ‘A Spring Morning’ may be considered impious as it 
manages to approach the emotional reality of living under Nazi threat and the prospect of 
imminent death. For Fink, the dead are not post-memorial abstractions but approachable 
people, whose psychology she understands as she has lived with the same threats and 
experienced the ghetto environment. While we cannot claim to have the same level of 
psychological insight – as we have not shared those experiences – we can reacquaint 
ourselves with the reality of Jewish wartime psychology by reading diaries written prior to 
internment or extermination. As Mintz puts it: “One of the key features of ghetto writing is 
its uncensored moral rhetoric in which names of collaborators are named and the behaviour 
of Jews toward Jews is unflinchingly described” (2001, pp. 66-67). Post-war survivor texts, 
he contends, often tend to “play down the feelings of accusation and betrayal which were 
strongly felt at the time” (p. 67) and so ghetto writing provides a kind of emotional honesty 
and immediacy to which we would otherwise have no access. As such, ghetto writing – 
 
113 I do not wish to claim that it can provide access to all victims of the Shoah. The Diary of Anne Frank, 
Alicia Appleman-Jurman’s Alicia: My Story and Ida Fink’s The Journey all provide rich psychological insights 
into the mental rigours of a period in hiding. This also provides a vital part of the story. By their very nature, 
however, these texts are limited in scope and driven by the need to self-isolate. As such, they cannot 
provide as many insights into Jewish communal responses to the atrocity. I therefore argue that the ghetto 
diary may be used to provide vital cultural context for those still living in a Jewish community – information 
which is not as forthcoming in other sources. Additionally, they also provide more scope for the exploration 
of the moral grey zone.   
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instead of portraying the dead as quasi-sacred abstractions – provides a unique insight into 
the morality of survival. It can therefore be used to supplement our Auschwitz-focused 
conception of the Holocaust, as it once again contextualises the dead as people. It provides 
us with some inkling of the moral and psychological reality of survival and so helps to 
provide background information for those otherwise decontextualized bodies featured in 
most camp-centric fiction.      
    “Confessional diaries” (Roskies, 2012, p. 69), for instance, represent a particularly 
revealing subgenre of ghetto writing. Written in 1943, these diaries all represent “a 
moment… of radical self-confrontation” (p. 69) in which the privileged few came to consider 
the moral cost of survival. Calel Perechodnik’s Am I A Murderer?: Testament Of A Jewish 
Ghetto Policeman provides an unflinching account of man’s potential for moral compromise 
– demonstrating both the lengths to which one will go in order to ensure their own survival 
and the depths of shame to which they will descend in the aftermath. His text focuses, at 
least initially, on his time as a Jewish policeman within the Otwock ghetto. Written with full 
consciousness that he would “sooner or later share the fate of all Jews in Poland” (1996, p. 
xxi), it provides a thoroughly detailed portrait of not only his own primal desire to survive 
but also the moral complexity of his work. Describing his position within the community he 
notes: “Behind me are many nights I spent with my Jewish brothers. I lived through them 
threefold: as a Jew, as a human being, and as an animal led by the instinct for self-
preservation” (p. 73). As a ghetto policeman, made to force his fellow Jews onto cattle cars 
and guard them in the hours prior to a mass killing, he is at once part of the community and 
removed from it. Though he still regards his fellow townspeople with a feeling of fraternal 
closeness – referring to them frequently by name and providing humanising glimpses of their 
lives – he also exists apart from them as a collaborator in their deaths, driven by his own 
self-confessed feelings of cowardice. By outlining the nature of this cowardice, and making 
275 
 
it comprehensible, Perechodnik’s text provides much needed psychological context. He has 
articulated and demystified the morality of the grey zone, making his own moral compromise 
painfully plausible for the reader. 
    This kind of unique psychological portrait, I argue, makes the Holocaust more 
fathomable.114 Instead of viewing it as a pious abstraction built around the image of suffering 
bodies, we can come to understand it from a human perspective. We can begin to approach 
it impiously as, like Rose suggests, we can once again experience a “crisis of identity” (1996, 
p. 46) within our own breast. It is only this kind of moral and intellectual understanding, I 
contend, which will keep the Holocaust present. With this kind of additional context, we can 
begin to experience our own moments of personal crisis by wondering at our own capacity 
for moral downfall and considering our own fascistic tendencies. This, however, requires an 
impious understanding of the Holocaust. When it is regarded piously, the Shoah remains 
locked in the past. The dead are viewed simply as bodies to be regarded with unreflective 
reverence. When we begin to recontextualise them as people, however – people whose 
behaviours and anxieties we can understand – the past once again has relevance to the 
present. If we do not adapt our thinking, specifically by expanding our reading to include a 
more psychologically and culturally particular view of the victims, the Holocaust will 
forever remain an imponderable abstraction. Our understanding of it will calcify and the 
victims of the Shoah will become empty vessels, to be used either as vehicles for Holocaust 
engagement or weapons by those who wish to keep it ineffable. Progress, both in terms of 
fiction and our societal regard for the Holocaust, can only be made when we once again 
come to see the murdered as dynamic, fathomable, culturally specific people. If modern 
fiction cannot re-humanise the victims of the Shoah, and abandon its explicit focus on the 
 
114 The psychology of the privileged is also explored in Arnošt Lustig’s novel The Unloved: The Diary of Perla 
S. Through Perla, the reader gradually comes to learn of the psychology of those within the Judenrat, who 
also eventually experience moments of self-confrontation.  
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horror of the atrocity, the Holocaust will lose its capacity to positively impact the present. 
“Never again” will lose all meaning and we will lose a vital reference point for analysing 
our own potential fascist impulses. Given the current shift in Western politics, as evidenced 
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